





edited by DIANE KIRKBY
Published by ANU E Press 
The Australian National University 
Canberra ACT 0200, Australia 
Email: anuepress@anu.edu.au 
This title is also available online at http://epress.anu.edu.au
National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry 
Title: Past law, present histories / edited by Diane Kirkby.
ISBN: 9781922144027 (pbk.)  9781922144034 (eBook)
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
Subjects: Law--History. 
 Law--Research. 





All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system 
or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, 
without the prior permission of the publisher.
Cover design and layout by ANU E Press
Printed by Griffin Press
This edition © 2012 ANU E Press
v
Contents
Introduction: Interdisciplinarity in the Study of Law’s History   .  .  .  . 1
Diane Kirkby
I. Law and Colonialism 
Redemption, Colonialism and International Criminal Law:  
 The Nineteenth Century Slave-Trading Trials of Samo  
 and Peters   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 7
Emily Haslam
Linguistics, Religion and Law in Colonial New South Wales:  
 Lancelot Threlkeld and Settler-Colonial Humanitarian  
 Debates  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 23
Anna Johnston
‘Destitute of the knowledge of God’: Māori Testimony  
 Before the New Zealand Courts in the Early Crown  
 Colony Period  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 39
Shaunnagh Dorsett
II. Law in Community 
Public Opinion, Private Remonstrance, and the Law:  
 Protecting Animals in Australia, 1803–1914  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 61
Stefan Petrow
Using th e Law: Working-Class Communities and Carnal  
 Knowledge Cases in Victoria, 1900–06  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 85
Jennifer Anderson
Reading Past Cases of Child Cruelty in the Present: The Use  
 of the Parental Right to Discipline in New Zealand Court  
 Trials, 1890–1902  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 107
Debra Powell
Women, Children and Violence in Aboriginal Law: Some  
 Perspectives From the Southeast Queensland Frontier   .  .  .  . 125
Libby Connors
III. Law as Theory and Practice  
How to Write Feminist Legal History: Some Notes on  
 Genealogical Method, Family Law, and the Politics  
 of the Present  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 139
Ann Genovese
Spain’s ‘pact of silence’ and the Removal of Franco’s  
 Statues   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 153
Aleksandra Hadzelek
‘The sailor is a human being’: Labour Market Regulation and  
 the Australian Navigation Act 1912  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 177
Diane Kirkby
Parental ‘Consent’ to Child Removal in Stolen Generations  
 Cases  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 193
Thalia Anthony and Honni van Rijswijk
Contributors  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 209
Bibliography  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 213
1
Introduction: Interdisciplinarity in the 
Study of Law’s History
Diane Kirkby
Understanding law, its development, implementation and subsequent trajectory, 
requires empirical research that is both interdisciplinary and critical. The 
complex interplay between the timing, socio-political context and purpose of 
lawmaking in any specific instance calls for historical analysis through which 
we can engage with both narrow and broader definitions of law. Through 
historical analysis we can account for the often unpredictable direction of 
specific laws, and explain particularities as these change over time with each set 
of new circumstances. Informed by a critical theoretical and interdisciplinary 
approach, we can more deeply investigate the conceptual underpinning of law’s 
meaning.
This collection is a contribution to scholarship historicising and critically 
examining different instances of lawmaking that also contributes to 
understanding the broader meaning of law. The essence of the collection is its 
interdisciplinarity. Contributors bring methods and questions from humanities, 
law and social science disciplines to highlight problems that are both national 
and international in their implication. From different disciplinary backgrounds 
and theoretical positions, they illustrate how diverse and complex the study of 
law’s history has become.
The book had its genesis in the Australian and New Zealand Law and History 
Conference sponsored by La Trobe University and the Australia and New 
Zealand Law and History Society (ANZLHS) in Melbourne in December 2010. 
The theme of the conference, Owning the Past: Whose Past? Whose Present?, 
was designed to stimulate discussion around conflicting interpretations of the 
past in the present, and to highlight the continuing dialogue that exists between 
past and present and the contradictions inherent in the historical process. The 
conference attracted well over 100 speakers, all of whom were invited to submit 
their paper for publication; through a process of selection and refereeing, the 
papers published here were chosen.
The organising principle of the book is the relationship and interaction between 
the disciplines of law and history. This is not legal history as traditionally 
understood and practiced, as a self-perpetuating discrete area with its own logic 
of development and chronology. That view has been under sustained attack 
from critical studies scholars for over three decades, and was the basis for calling 
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the first law and history conference in Australia back in 1982. Instead, this 
collection is one of interdisciplinary scholarship that draws on the strengths 
of different approaches to carve out new ways of knowing. Law is consistently 
subject to a historicised social and cultural context, which is specific to the 
time and place of its occurrence, and is similarly specific to time and place in 
its present significance and the meanings to be drawn from it. The contributors 
to this book explore the problematic of past law in history’s present across 
indigenous Australia and New Zealand, from post-Franco Spain to current 
international law and maritime regulation, from settler colonial humanitarian 
debates and efforts to end cruelty to children and animals, to postcolonial legal 
proceedings in the stolen generation cases.
The book is organised into three distinct parts around the concepts that 
frame the interdisciplinary study of law’s history: law and colonialism, law in 
community, law as theory and practice. Part I includes chapters dealing with 
the impact of a slavery trial on the development of international law and the 
challenges posed for the rule of law over questions of indigenous people giving 
testimony in colonial courts in both Australia and New Zealand. Emily Haslam 
reminds us that slave-trading was one of the first international crimes as she 
seeks to expand the field of international criminal law with a close study of 
nineteenth-century anti-slavery cases in Sierra Leone. Shaunnagh Dorsett takes 
us to colonial New Zealand for an examination of the particularities of that 
colony in relation to Māori giving unsworn testimony. Her argument endorses 
the need for detailed knowledge of local circumstances when assessing the 
larger imperial framework in which colonial laws were enacted. In her chapter, 
too, Anna Johnston concentrates on the imperial–colonial nexus as illustrated 
by the work of a single individual from early New South Wales whose actions 
and writings on Aboriginal people and the law courts exemplifies the formation 
of settler and indigenous identities, both enabling and simultaneously limiting 
Aboriginal legal subjectivity.
Part II concentrates on law’s role in its community context and includes the 
evolution of animal protection law, issues of accessing the remedies available 
in law by working-class communities, the vexed question of the parental right 
to discipline children and the colonial context for violence against women 
in Aboriginal communities, all of which are issues of continuing relevance 
today. Stefan Petrow and Debra Powell in their individual chapters draw out 
continuities between past and present practice in explicit considerations of 
cruelty laws in Australia and New Zealand. Jenny Anderson advances knowledge 
of working-class use of legality as a means of regulating sexual activity, with 
a concentration on sexual assault cases in the state of Victoria. Libby Connors 
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provides an invaluable corrective to Sydney-centric histories of post-contact 
Aboriginal law with new insights that are based on research relevant to the 
history of Queensland.
Part III explores law theoretically in Ann Genovese’s important chapter on ways 
of doing feminist history of law with a specific focus on family law. This is followed 
by Aleksandra Hadzelek’s examination of the theoretical problem of memory-
making through law in an exploration of the national dilemma of remembering 
the unpopular regime of General Franco and Spain’s civil war. Diane Kirkby, in 
the third chapter in this section,  examines the Australian Navigation Act 1912 
as labour law in practice, changing its meaning and application with political 
and economic circumstances. The section is completed with a fourth chapter 
in which Thalia Anthony and Honni van Rijswijk explore a specific example 
of law in practice for families as they address the issue of parental consent for 
Aboriginal families whose children were removed by state policies.
All these papers examine past law, and present histories, in ways that illuminate 
and provide a valuable resource for continuing discussions. They demonstrate 
how diverse — and important — interdisciplinarity is to understanding law’s 
meaning.
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Redemption, Colonialism and 
International Criminal Law:  
The Nineteenth Century Slave-
Trading Trials of Samo and Peters
Emily Haslam
You are the first convicted under this act, and England will anxiously 
look for such an example to be made, as will infuse terror and dismay 
into the minds of every remaining slave factor on these coasts.1
My Lord, and Gentlemen of the Jury, reflect for a moment on the miseries 
of slavery, what is it that the poor African does not endure? Think of the 
separation of husband and wife, father and mother, children, brothers, 
sisters, kindred, and friends; think of the cold, the heat, the labour and 
the lash, that unfeeling custom has doomed to the condition of the slave; 
and to whom shall he apply for redress? I glory in knowing that he can 
apply to British law …2
Introduction
In April 1812 in the Vice Admiralty Court of Sierra Leone, Chief Justice Robert 
Thorpe dramatically convicted and then pardoned Samuel Samo for slave-
trading. The courtroom was crowded and the atmosphere was highly charged. 
The attorney-general, James Biggs, opened the prosecution with the expansive 
claim that the case ‘embraces the essential concerns of one quarter of the globe 
we inhabit, and involves the security and morals, the happiness and liberty, 
of millions yet to live’.3 In announcing Samo’s pardon, Thorpe proclaimed, 
‘You have received the mercy of the royal pardon — May your future conduct 
deserve that of our Father who is in heaven’.4 After this homily, Samo is said to 
have withdrawn in a ‘death like silence’ whilst others wept in the courtroom.5
1 Robert Thorpe CJ in The Trials of the Slave Traders, Samuel Samo, Joseph Peters and William Tufft Before 
the Hon. Robert Thorpe, L.L.D. with Two Letters on the Slave Trade From a Gentleman Resident at Sierra 
Leone to an Advocate for the Abolition in London (The Trials of the Slave Traders) (London: Sherwood, Neeley, 
and Jones, 1813) 33, Anti-Slavery Recovered Histories at http://www.recoveredhistories.org/pamphlet1.
php?catid=50 last accessed 17 October 2011.
2 Mr Biggs, in The Trials of the Slave Traders, 27.
3 ibid., 13.
4 Thorpe, in The Trials of the Slave Traders, 39.
5 ibid.
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At the time, Samo’s case attracted widespread interest and generated political 
controversy and debate beyond the colony. And yet, this case and the subsequent 
trials of Charles Hickson, Joseph Peters, William Tufft and Thomas Wheeler, have 
been overlooked in accounts of the development of international criminal law. As 
the first tranche of proceedings brought under the British Slave Trade Felony Act 
1811, which made slave-trading a felony,6 they represent a handful of the criminal 
and civil law cases from the early nineteenth century dealing with the slave trade 
and abolition. These have been largely overlooked by international legal scholars. 
Whilst it is true that there is a significant body of literature related to the United 
States,7 the literature dealing with the English context has tended to focus on a few 
key cases,8 to emphasise the activities of a narrow group of abolitionists,9 and to 
overlook (international) criminal law.10 Present-day approaches overwhelmingly 
trace the origins of contemporary international criminal law to the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo Trials.11 The neglect of this earlier litigation is disappointing.12 
Slave-trading was one of the first international crimes.13 Legal and institutional 
responses to the slave trade gave rise to many similar controversies that face the 
international community today, including the limits of international intervention 
and the extent of criminal responsibility. This chapter begins the process of 
exploring what international criminal law looks like when slavery litigation is 
brought back into the picture by examining some of the early slave-trading trials 
before the Vice Admiralty Court of Sierra Leone. In particular the focus is on 
6 An Act for Rendering More Effectual an Act made in the Forty Seventh Year of His Majesty’s Reign, 
entitled An Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, 51 Geo III C 23, 14 May 1811 (Slave Trade Felony Act).
7 For example, Robert Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1975).
8 Most notably Somerset v Stewart (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499; Gregson v. Gilbert 99 Engl. Rep 629 and The 
Slave, Grace, (1827) 166 Eng. Rep. 179. See further, F.O. Shyllon, Black Slaves in Britain (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1974).
9 For example, William Wiecek, ‘Somerset: Lord Mansfield and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-
American World’, University of Chicago Law Review 42, (1974–75): 86; Steven Wise, Though the Heavens May 
Fall (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2005).
10 To the extent that literature deals with international law, it tends to focus on the struggles over search 
and seizure in relation to slave ships, see Leslie Bethell, ‘The Mixed Commissions for the Suppression of the 
Transatlantic Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century’, Journal of African History VII, 1 (1966): 79–93; Holger 
Lutz Kern, ‘Strategies of Legal Change: Great Britain, International Law, and the Abolition of the Transatlantic 
Slave Trade’, Journal of the History of International Law 6, (2004): 233–58; Howard Hazen Wilson, ‘Some 
Principal Aspects of British Efforts to Crush the African Slave Trade, 1807–1929’, The American Journal of 
International Law 44 (1950): 505–26.
11 See, for example, Antonio Cassese, ‘From Nuremberg to Rome: International Military Tribunals to 
the International Criminal Court’, in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, 
vol. I, eds, Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John R.W.D. Jones (Oxford University Press, 2002): 3–19; 
Madoka Fatumura, War Crimes Tribunals and Transitional Justice: The Tokyo Trial and the Nuremberg Legacy 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2008); Dominic McGoldrick, ‘Criminal Trials before International Tribunals: Legality 
and Legitimacy’, in The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues, eds, Dominic 
McGoldrick, Peter Rowe and Eric Donnelly (Oxford: Hart, 2004): 9–46.
12 And, perhaps inevitable given ‘the singular focus on Nazi war criminals’ as ‘the exemplification of evil’, 
Gerry Simpson, ‘Didactic and Dissident Histories in War Crimes Trials’, Albany Law Review 60 (1996–97): 811.
13 Piracy is widely considered to be the first international crime, Gerry Simpson, Law, War and Crime 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007) 161–62.
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two of the trials, that of Samo and, to a lesser extent as a point of comparison, 
that of Peters. This contribution focuses less upon the doctrinal significance 
that this body of litigation had in the development of international criminal 
law. Rather, its focus is on the didacticism that emanated from the courtroom in 
Samo’s case and its similarities to that occurring in contemporary international 
criminal trials. It argues that, in Samo’s case, a religiously accented adjudicative 
logic of redemption was deployed in the service of a broader colonial project. 
The chapter suggests that this redemptive framework continues to exert influence 
in contemporary international criminal law. Today, these narratives are for the 
most part secularised with transition to democracy and the rule of law replacing 
emancipation and reconciliation replacing redemption. By suggesting the 
deployment of this narrative for a colonial project, this chapter seeks to contribute 
to a richer history of the development of international criminal law and more 
specifically its redemptive trope.14
The chapter begins by setting out the legal, institutional and political context 
of these cases by exploring the Slave Trade Felony Act 1811 and the significance 
of Sierra Leone to abolitionists at institutional and symbolic levels. Whilst the 
cases examined here are essentially ‘British’ rather than ‘international’, they 
are relevant to international criminal law because of the leading role that 
Britain played in developing strategies and tools to abolish the slave trade at the 
international level,15 and because participants in the Vice-Admiralty hearings 
engaged with thorny international legal questions of jurisdiction and nationality. 
Whilst the aim of the chapter is to contribute to a more expansive account of 
the development of international criminal law, it does not intend by focusing 
on British cases, to gloss over other, particularly non-European, contributions 
to the development of international criminal law.16 The third section explores 
the cases before moving on to examine the contestation to which they gave rise. 
Such contestation demonstrates that abolitionists understood law’s potential to 
contribute to the construction of public memory and the importance of the trial 
as a show.17 This final section explores the logic of redemption that ran through 
14 For criticisms of this redemptive trope see, for example, Thomas Brudholm, Resentment’s Virtue: Jean 
Amery and the Refusal to Forgive (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008).
15 See, for example, Suzanne Miers, Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade (London: Longman 1975); Ethan 
Nadelmann, ‘Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society’, International 
Organisation 44, (1990): 479–526.
16 For the criticism that non-Eurocentric origins are all too often overlooked in international legal histories 
see, for example, Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2002); Balakrishnan 
Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003).
17 For an excellent account of the construction of memories of abolition (which however does not deal with 
law and litigation) see J.R. Oldfield, ‘Chords of Freedom’: Commemoration, Ritual and British Transatlantic 
Slavery (Manchester University Press, 2007). On remembering the slave trade and abolition see further, 
Catherine Hall, ‘Remembering 1807: Histories of the Slave Trade, Slavery and Abolition’, History Workshop 
Journal 64, (2007): 1–5; Elizabeth Kowaleski Wallace, The British Slave Trade and Public Memory (Chichester: 
Columbia University Press, 2006).
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Samo’s case and the political usage made of it. The chapter concludes by positing 
Samo’s case as evidence of how the redemptive trope of international criminal 
law has been implicated in a colonial project.
Background to the cases
Shortly after Britain abolished the slave trade in 1807,18 it became apparent that 
the penalties provided by the Abolition Act were insufficient.19 The potential 
profits that slave-trading could generate made the financial penalties far too 
derisory to deter the practice. On 14 May 1811, the Slave Trade Felony Act was 
passed, instigated within parliament by Henry Brougham, Member of Parliament 
for Camelford. By section 1, removal, or assisting in the removal, transportation 
and shipment of slaves by British subjects, or in British territory, became a 
felony; and the legislation also provided increased penalties of imprisonment 
and hard labour for between three and five years or transportation for 14 years, 
thereby degrading slave factors, in the words of Thorpe CJ, to ‘pickpockets and 
swindlers’.20
In terms of the numbers of prosecutions, the impact of the Act was negligible.21 
This may explain the lack of attention that has been paid to the cases by 
(international) legal scholars. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the Act’s 
significance should be underestimated in assessing how it helps further our 
understanding of the development of international criminal law. The limited 
numbers prosecuted (whilst revealing) should not be allowed to obscure the 
messages participants attempted to deliver through litigation and how these 
prosecutions were ‘read’ at the time, both inside and outside the courtroom.
18 An Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade 47 Geo. III c 3, 25 March 1807 (Abolition Act). On abolitionism 
more generally see further, Roger Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition 1760–1810 (London 
and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1975); Robin Blackburn, The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1748 (London 
and New York: Verso, 1996); Adam Hochschild, Bury the Chains: The British Struggle to Abolish Slavery 
(Basingstoke and Oxford: Macmillan, 2005).
19 See, for example, Mr Brougham, House of Commons Debate, 5 March 1811, vol. 19, cc 233–40. See 
further Monroe H. Freedman, ‘Henry Lord Brougham — Advocating at the Edge for Human Rights’, Hofstra 
Law Review 36 (2007): 311–22.
20 The Trials of the Slave Traders, 11.
21 Marika Sherwood, After Abolition: Britain and the Slave Trade since 1807 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 301. 
See further, Old Bailey Proceedings Online (http://www.oldbaileyonline.org) February 1817, Trial of John 
Bean Hannay (t18170219-123); Old Bailey Proceedings Online (http://www.oldbaileyonline.org), February 
1819, Trial of Philippe Caday, alias Phillibert Armand Clerensac, Joseph Ann Tresgrose (t18190217-36); Old 
Bailey Proceedings Online (http://www.oldbaileyonline.org), January 1820, Trial of Jaques Alexandre Carrol, 
Alexandre Villemont (t18200112-66). See further, Proceedings under the Slave Trade Felony Act in the Island 
of Ceylon, Admiralty Commission of Oyer and Terminer, May 17 1813 and Proceedings under the Slave Trade 
Felony Act in the Island of Java, 2 October 1813, reported in Ninth Report of the Directors of the African 
Institution, 12 April 1815 (London: Ellerton and Henderson, 1815) (Google books last accessed 10 November 
2011).
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Sierra Leone was an institutionally prominent site in slave trade abolition, the 
‘centre of the government’s efforts to suppress the wider trade’.22 As home, first to 
Vice Admiralty and then to mixed commission courts at Freetown, Sierra Leone 
was the location in which much early jurisprudence relating to abolition was 
decided. Beyond that, it played a central symbolic role for abolitionists. Well-
known British abolitionists had played a pivotal part in each of the attempts to 
establish Sierra Leone as a colony, including in 1787, 1790, and then, finally, in 
1808 when it became a Crown Colony. Its origins can be traced from Granville 
Sharp’s plan to establish a home for poor black Londoners to those abolitionists 
who invested in the Sierra Leone Company. Many of these became influential in 
the African Institution, which was established after abolition with the professed 
objective of promoting civilisation and happiness in Africa.23
Sierra Leone was beset with a series of problems, including the controversial 
practice of enlisting and apprenticing former slaves.24 Partly as a result of raising 
these concerns the previous governor, Thomas Thompson, was replaced in 
1810 by Edward Columbine. This was the volatile political context in which 
Thorpe was appointed Chief Justice of Sierra Leone in 1808, although he was 
not allowed to travel to Sierra Leone until 1811. Thorpe was no stranger to 
controversy, having previously been removed as a judge in Upper Canada.25 
Thorpe’s criticisms of the management of Sierra Leone drew him into a bitter 
conflict with the African Institution. He was relieved of his post in 1815, for 
reasons which included the complaints that he made against that institution, 
some of which featured in the pamphlet debate over Samo’s pardon.26
The trials of Samo, Peters, Tufft, Wheeler and 
Hickson
The trials of Samo, Peters, Tufft, Wheeler and Hickson took place between April 
and June 1812. A detailed account of the trials was written by a ‘gentleman 
resident at Sierra Leone to an advocate for the abolition in London’. These 
reports were made public, with the view of affording:
22 David Lambert, ‘Sierra Leone and Other Sites in the War of Representation over Slavery’, History 
Workshop Journal 64, (2007): 105.
23 ibid., 105.
24 Section 7 of the Abolition Act permitted ‘slaves taken as prizes or forfeitures’ to be ‘enlisted for the land 
or sea-service’ or ‘bound as apprentices, whether of full age or not, for a term of 14 years’. Section 17 provided 
for the renewal of such apprentices at the end of their term.
25 John McLaren, ‘“Men of Principle or Judicial Ratbags? The Trials and Tribulations of Maverick Colonial 
Judges in the 19th Century” or “A Funny Way to Run An Empire”’, Windsor Review of Legal & Social Issues 
27 (2009): 150.
26 ibid., 149–50.
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the British Legislature, the Government, and the people in general, 
an early and correct view of the operation of the recent slave felony 
act of parliament: an act which reflects the highest honour on those 
whose humanity was so determined and conspicuous in conducting to 
a happy issue the long and strenuously contested question of African 
emancipation.27
The pamphlet is not an official account. The identity of the author is not 
declared. Yet, in the debates that followed Samo’s pardon, the African 
Institution suggested that it was published either by Thorpe or by his friends.28 
In the absence of an official report, this document is the source from which the 
following account of the trials of Samo and Peters is drawn. The account was 
clearly influenced by the pamphlet writer’s broader objectives as noted above. 
Even so, the way in which he told the story of the trials, even if not a verbatim 
record, is revealing. Assuming the African Institution was correct that Thorpe 
approved of publication, the account can be seen as strong evidence of how the 
judge framed the role of law in abolition.
Samo was indicted for five counts of slave-trading between August 1811 and 
January 1812. Samo’s twofold plea in response to the substantive offences 
appeared to be that he was respectable, an assessment supported by a number 
of witnesses, and that he had been working towards abolition.29 Samo was found 
guilty. However, Samo had also raised a more fundamental procedural objection 
to the jurisdiction of the court, which he renewed at the sentencing stage. He 
maintained that the Slave Trade Felony Act 1811 only applied to British subjects. 
Further he argued that as he was Dutch and, moreover, residing outside British 
jurisdiction in the Rio Pongas (now Guinea), the Act did not apply to him. 
Thorpe rejected these legal objections with the observation that the chiefs of 
the Rio Pongas treated white men living there as British.30 Although dismissed 
at this stage, these jurisdictional objections return to centre stage in the debates 
that followed.
When it came to sentencing, as Thorpe observed, there was not any obvious 
mitigating evidence on Samo’s behalf. Nor was this a case where the jury had 
recommended his sentence to be reduced.31 Despite this, he deferred sentencing 
Samo ‘in the hope of finding such exertions made by your friends to extirpate 
this trade, as will in a great measure diminish, though they may not be able to 
27 The Trials of the Slave Traders, v.
28 Special Report of the Directors of the African Institution Made at the Annual General Meeting on the 12 
of April 1815 Respecting the Allegations Contained in A Pamphlet Entitled ‘A Letter to William Wilberforce’ 
(African Institution, Special Report), (London: Ellerton and Henderson, 1815), 93 (Google books last accessed 
11 November 2011).
29 The Trials of the Slave Traders, 21–22.
30 ibid., 31.
31 ibid., 33.
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eradicate it’.32 In this way the judge opened his determination of sentence to 
external influences, making a pardon conditional on the willingness of others to 
show penitence by renouncing the slave trade. He continued:
And in proportion to the contrition exhibited, and the zeal for its 
destruction manifested, the discretion which the law gives to the Court 
shall be extended to you; and if it appears evidently the intention of 
the other slave factors, in the vicinity of this colony, to lead a new life, 
and turn benevolent and industrious, I will use my influence with the 
amiable personage at the head of this Government to extend the royal 
mercy to you on this laudable salutary and necessary repentance.33
The Chief Justice’s call seems to have received favourable answers. As a result 
of the respect in which Samo was apparently held, the court received several 
petitions from such eminent persons as the king of Mandingo and the king at 
Isles de Loss. Petitioners promised to renounce the trade if Samo were granted 
a pardon.34 Thorpe claimed, ‘it is not the individual victim of the law that is 
the most valuable’ but ‘the annihilation of the diabolical traffic is the victim 
the law demands’,35 and this was an action of which the gentleman letter writer 
thoroughly approved.36
Other defendants fared better. Days after Samo’s trial ended, Charles Hickson 
was tried for the same offence and acquitted. A short while later, Thomas 
Wheeler, the acting agent at Bance Island, was also acquitted — the principal 
witness having returned home for fear of offending neighbouring kings.37 Some 
defendants, however, met with less lenient treatment. William Tufft, a black, 
English-educated, former servant, essentially pleaded that he was acting under 
the orders of others, which was not accepted on the evidence. He was sentenced 
to three years hard labour on public works at Sierra Leone, but his sentence was 
commuted on condition that he join the Marine Corps for life. Tufft’s associate, 
Joseph Peters, who was tried in June 1812, found the court in a particularly 
unforgiving mood. His conduct, Biggs said, was compounded by ungratefulness, 
because he was in receipt of British pay ‘for attendance on British troops’.38 Central 
to Peters’s case was a narrative of both resistance and complicity. Peters had 
rewarded Chief Dallamoodoo and King Murra Brimer with slaves because they 





36 ‘To have the “father of the trade”, converted into its avowed enemy, and all his African connexion 
solemnly pledged to assist him in the humane work of abolition, was a great point gained, and infinitely 
preferable to sacrificing an individual slave trader to the rigour of the law.’ ibid., 37.
37 ibid., 49.
38 ibid., 41.
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notable for the part played by Africans in testifying against him.39 Peters was 
sentenced to seven years transportation. He remained in prison until he was 
pardoned by the governor on the condition that he left Africa for ever.40
Samo’s case contested
Samo’s case became a point of bitter contestation amongst prominent abolitionists. 
This debate formed part of a broader pamphlet dispute in which Thorpe made a 
series of damaging accusations about the Sierra Leone Company and the African 
Institution in a public letter to William Wilberforce,41 some of which resonated 
with those made earlier by Governor Thompson.42 Whilst Samo’s case was 
not the primary focus of this contestation, concerns that Thorpe raised about 
the allegedly oppressive exercise of jurisdiction against slave-traders by the 
authorities in Sierra Leone brought his own treatment of Samo into the frame.
For, amongst the many criticisms he levelled, Thorpe railed against the 
treatment of individuals apprehended outside the jurisdiction of Sierra Leone 
and convicted of slave-trading, in a manner that he considered to be both illegal 
and heavy-handed. In one such extra-territorial expedition in June 1813, HMS 
Thais arrested Robert Bostwick and John M’Queen, destroyed their factory 
and released over 240 slaves to Sierra Leone and condemned them as slavers.43 
Bostwick and M’Queen were sentenced to 14 years transportation but were 
freed following a successful petition to the Prince Regent. Other extra-territorial 
expeditions organised by Lieut-Colonel C. W. Maxwell who had been appointed 
Governor in July1811, came under Thorpe’s fire. Thorpe criticised the resulting 
sentencing in his absence by his non-lawyer deputy, Robert Purdie, of Malcolm 
Brodie, George Cooke and James Dunbar to transportation for slave trading and 
of Charles Hickson to hard labour on public works. Thorpe’s concerns about 
jurisdiction were justified in so far as Brodie, Cooke and Dunbar were pardoned 
39 He appears to have been convicted almost solely on the testimony of Africans, including former slaves. 
The evidence of at least 14 Africans (Banta, Dallamoodoo, Tom Krooman, Duboo, Yangyaraa, Adam, Bondoo, 
Quiepa, Saree, Borega and Boree) including three women (Monday, Foosingbag, Katta) is reported, in addition 
to that of Kenneth Macaulay ‘Esq’. The court’s treatment of African testimony of complicity and resistance in 
this case is explored in a further article in draft with the author.
40 Report of the Committee of the African Institution, vol. 8 (London: Ellerton and Henderson, 1814), 15 
(Google books last accessed 11 November 2011).
41 Robert Thorpe, A Letter to William Wilberforce, ESQ. M.P. Vice President of the African Institution 
Containing Remarks on the Reports of the Sierra Leone Company, and African Institution with Hints Respecting 
the Means by Which An Universal Abolition of the Slave Trade Might Be Carried into Effect (Letter to 
William Wilberforce) (London: Law and Gilbert, 1815) Anti-Slavery Recovered Histories at http://www.
recoveredhistories.org/  last accessed 11 November 2011.
42 Including the enlistment and apprenticeship of freed slaves, a practice Thorpe compared to slave-trading, 
‘involuntary servitude for life, established by an Act of Parliament, purporting to abolish slavery’. ibid., 46.
43 ibid., 19.
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as a result of being tried in the wrong court.44 However, his criticism of his 
deputy, Purdie, forced him to justify his own conduct in Samo’s case because 
Samo had also been apprehended outside the jurisdiction of Sierra Leone.45 
Thorpe explained:
to my great surprise and annoyance, Samuel Samo, and Charles Hickson 
were brought before me, as British subjects trading in slaves; they were 
seized by Governor Maxwell’s orders at the Isles de Loss, for selling 
slaves in the Rio Pongas, neither of which places were ever considered 
as belonging to Great Britain, nor did British jurisdiction ever extend 
over them in any shape … I found, however, so many insurmountable 
difficulties (for I was bound to protect the legal rights of the prisoner), 
that I informed the Governor, that I could not pronounce the sentence 
directed by the Act on Samo; and to prevent my reasons from being 
publickly known (lest they might affect the Abolition cause,) I advised 
the Governor to send to the Rio Pongus [sic], induce the Chiefs to ask for 
Samo’s pardon, and influence them to promise, that if their petition was 
granted, they would allow no more Slave trading in their dominions.46
In this way Thorpe challenged the idea that it was his actions in Samo’s case that 
constituted a precedent for Purdie in the cases of Brodie, Cooke and Dunbar. 
He claimed, ‘I rebuked the outrage, and refused to adjudge any punishment, 
having declared to the Governor, I was not authorised to do so’.47
In revealing that he suggested the pardon because his court did not have 
jurisdiction in the case, Thorpe displayed both a concern for adherence to the 
law coupled with an understanding of the potential for its strategic deployment. 
Thus, he appears to have understood the value of clothing his potentially 
unpalatable verdict in the international legal idea of jurisdiction, even when 
earlier in the trial he had rebuffed Samo’s challenge to the court’s jurisdictional 
competence. This understanding of the importance of law was also reflected 
in broader debate, showing how protagonists understood the contribution 
44 According to the opinion of the Crown Office lawyers. They could only have been tried in the colonial 
court of Sierra Leone had a special commission been issued to permit such a trial. To the African Institution’s 
charge that Thorpe was primarily responsible for obtaining such a commission, Thorpe responded that he 
had been unaware of the impending extra-territorial actions planned by the governor. African Institution, 
Special Report, 96; Robert Thorpe, Postscript to the Reply ‘Point by Point’ Containing an Exposure of the 
Misrepresentation of the Treatment of the Captured Negroes at Sierra Leone and Other Matters Arising From 
the Ninth Report of the African Institution (London: R. & R. Gilbert, 1815) (Google books last accessed 10 
November 2011), 44 (discussing the actions against Samo and Hickson). In fact Cooke was awarded damages 
of £20,000 in an action against Maxwell before the King’s Bench in 1817, which the government assumed 
responsibility for paying. Brodie died although he also instituted proceedings and Bostock agreed an out of 
court settlement, see Christopher Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone (Oxford University Press, 1962) 123.
45 See further, African Institution, Special Report, 98.
46 Letter to William Wilberforce, 18–19.
47 Robert Thorpe, Postscript, 38.
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law could make to the public memory. For example, the African Institution 
claimed that it was vital that the ‘proper’ interpretation should be placed on the 
pardon, a position echoed by William Wilberforce. Wilberforce’s concern, as 
expressed in the House of Commons debate following his unsuccessful motion 
to institute an inquiry on Brodie, Cook and Dunbar, was that ‘considerable 
error had crept into the world’ because people believed that their pardon was 
granted on the merits rather than on a legal technicality.48 These struggles show 
how abolitionists appreciated the capacity of the law to contribute to collective 
memory and the importance of the didactic potential of the law. This can be 
seen from the lengths Thorpe went to inside the courtroom to create a show of 
pardoning Samo, notwithstanding his concerns about lack of jurisdiction and 
notwithstanding that his verdict apparently rested on the basis of a negotiated 
compromise. It is to this show that this contribution now turns.
The logic of redemption and international 
criminal law
Samo’s trial was a spectacle, in which a religiously inflected logic of redemption 
at the individual and collective levels was used to legitimise a colonial project,49 
central to which was the idea of Britain as an abolitionist state.50 This logic 
was manifested in an implicit and sometimes explicit discourse of sin and 
redemption at the individual and collective levels.51 Stories of individual 
redemption and its relationship to the collective were played out in the context 
of witnesses, the defendant and a broader community. These stories served a 
wider political project and were deployed to exculpate as much as to implicate. 
This logic continues to resonate in contemporary international criminal law, 
48 British Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons Debates, vol. 30, 14 April 1815. In the 
debate that followed regarding the establishment of a parliamentary inquiry, concern was expressed ‘when 
they recollected all that was necessary for furthering the great work of abolition, it could not be unimportant 
to have all the aspersions and calumnies which had been cast upon the Government removed; and to show 
that it had not taken any part against the abolitionists, but that the sentence had been remitted through a mere 
defect of form in the trial’, Mr Whitbread, Hansard, vol. 30, 14 April 1815.
49 Thorpe CJ made frequent references to the divine, for example, ‘crime against God or man’, The Trial 
of the Slave Traders, 34. These references to religion are matched outside the courtroom by the judge’s view 
of the law of nations. Thorpe claimed that the ‘law of nations is built on the unerring rules of justice, which 
unchangeably direct every law, human or Divine, for individual man, or collective empire; it is founded on the 
law of nature, directed by the law of God’ (Thorpe, A Letter to William Wilberforce, 61).
50 On the well documented ‘moral pressure’ that abolitionists lent to the imperial project see David Rieff, A 
Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis (London: Vintage, 2002), 59; Miers.
51 On the role of religion in abolitionism, see Christine Bolt and Seymour Drescher, Anti Slavery, Religion 
and Reform (Kent: William Dawson and Sons, 1980); Huw T. David, ‘Transnational Advocacy in the Eighteenth 
Century: Transatlantic Activism and the Anti-Slavery Movement’, Global Networks 7, 3 (2007): 367–82; David 
Turley, The Culture of English Antislavery, 1780–1860 (London and New York: Routledge, 1991).
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albeit in a secularised version. It is hoped that tracing this logic of redemption 
and its usage will contribute to a richer account of the history and politics of 
international criminal law.
Biggs — and the pamphlet writer — saw the trial as a fundamental step to 
emancipation. However, in Samo’s case, this transition did not necessarily 
require the conviction and punishment of the accused. If conviction and 
punishment were not central to transition, pardon and redemption were. The 
courtroom provided a space in which the sin, pardon and redemption of the 
accused and others could be theatrically performed. Thus, whilst Samo was 
ostensibly central to proceedings, his case was used to create a show of publicly 
exonerating and blaming others.
Witnesses did not only testify for the purposes of giving evidence but, by 
participating in the trial, they were able to redeem themselves, even if their 
redemption was achieved after a personal struggle. Take Samo’s clerk, William 
Skelton, who on Biggs’s persuasion became convinced of the ‘exceeding 
wickedness and cruelty of the slave trade’ to testify against his former master. 
Biggs compared his conduct favourably with that of other named slave-traders 
who refused to ‘renounce the monstrous traffic’.52 Biggs lamented the death of 
one of the principal witnesses by noting his remorseful atonement:
Mr David James Lawrence fell a victim to disease and a broken heart, in 
consequence of the vile treatment and persecution of the slave traders, 
who hated him because he had renounced their fellowship and business, 
and complied with the laws of his country.53
In the pamphlet debate, Thorpe was particularly critical of the conviction 
of Brodie, who had testified in Samo’s case, promising to renounce the slave 
trade.54 Thorpe saw no evidence that Brodie had broken this promise.55 This 
redemptive framing found its apogee in the pardon that was granted to Samo. 
Thorpe proclaimed:
let that baneful commerce which has so long retarded the civilization, 
diminished the population, and dimmed the glory of Africa, be 
destroyed — let it be shattered to atoms in a storm of benevolent charity 
for mankind — it will be an immolation acceptable to the Deity — it will 
52 The Trials of the Slave Traders, 24.
53 ibid., 24–25.
54 Robert Thorpe, Postscript¸ 36–37.
55 Although the testimony, as reported was hardly expansive, ‘he does not know of Mr Samo supplying any 
slaves; the slave dealers trade as secretly as possible, to evade the acts’ (The Trials of the Slave Traders, 18).
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be a sacrifice of human viciousness on the altar of Divine compassion — 
it will be death until sin — and a new birth unto righteousness — it will 
plead your pardon in this life, and plead for mercy in life everlasting.56
This redemptive logic lent support to the idea of Britain as an abolitionist state 
and was deployed to buttress a colonial imperative. First, take the reporting of 
the case. In accordance with the logic of what Makau Mutua has described as 
a ‘savage-victim-savior’ metaphor in human rights law,57 the pamphlet writer’s 
aim was to inform of the ‘beneficial effects arising from their disinterested zeal 
in behalf of those thousands of enslaved Africans who could do nothing for 
themselves’.58 Further, driven as it may have been by his concerns about legal 
jurisdiction, the pardon gave Thorpe an opportunity to exercise leverage over 
powerful individuals outside the court’s jurisdiction. In this way redemption 
in the form of pardon could be mobilised to buttress other imperial ambitions. 
Thorpe saw Samo’s case as providing an opportunity to extend Britain’s 
territorial rights on the coast.59 Writing to Governor Maxwell about Attorney 
General Biggs, Thorpe wrote:
I am convinced you are too deeply indebted to him by his extricating 
you from a most severe difficulty; the friends of the Abolition are too 
deeply indebted to him for his exertions in the slave trade; and Great 
Britain is too deeply indebted to him for the extra territorial he has 
established on the coast for her.60
Third, the hearings made a show of absolving the British public and the British 
state from guilt. As is widely observed, international criminal hearings make 
partial histories, despite their avowed archival functions. Not only is the 
production of history constrained by the demands of the legal process61 but, 
56 ibid., 35.
57 ‘The human rights corpus is driven — normatively and descriptively — by … the savage-victim-
savior metaphor, in which human rights is a grand narrative of an epochal contest that pits savages against 
victims and saviors. In this script of human rights, democracy and western liberalism are internationalized 
to redeem savage non-Western cultures from themselves, and to alleviate the suffering of victims, who are 
generally non-western and non-European’ (Makau Mutua, ‘Terrorism and Human Rights: Power, Culture, and 
Subordination’, Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 8 (2002): 5).
58 The Trials of the Slave Traders, v.
59 On the deployment of humanitarian concerns in the interests of empire in a contemporary context see, 
for example, Amy Bartholemew, ed., Empire’s Law: The American Imperial Project and the ‘War to Remake the 
World’ (London: Pluto Press, 2006); Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of 
Cosmopolitanism (Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007).
60 As quoted in the African Institution, Special Report, 103.
61 Marie-Bénédicte Dembour and Emily Haslam, ‘Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at the ICTY’, 
European Journal of International Law 15, no. 1 (2004): 151–77.
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as Gerry Simpson argues, all too often those histories are consciously deployed 
as part of a broader legitimising,62 or state building function.63 Of the British 
public, Thorpe observed in Samo’s case:
Could the animated skeletons that are landed here, imploring death 
for relief, be visible in England, an universal exclamation would 
involuntarily burst from that inestimable people — ‘Without ocular 
demonstration, we could not have believed that human depravity could 
have extended to these enormities — extirpate these monsters!’64
As regards the British state, Biggs in opening Samo’s prosecution observed:
the humane and anxious desire of the Parliament of the British empire to 
abolish the barbarous traffic in slaves is universally known, the remotest 
tribe on the face of the earth are apprized long ere this of the benevolent 
desire of every good mind in England, that however savage might be 
the race of distant climes, their land should not contain a single slave.65
Biggs portrayed Britain’s support of the slave trade as provisional and reluctant:
through the unwise and tyrannical system of Dutch, Portuguese, Danish, 
Spanish and French colonization, England was obliged unwillingly to 
acquiesce in the temporary policy of an iniquitous slave trade, yet she 
never for a moment lost sight of the grand and ultimate determination 
of effecting its radical and signal prostration.66
The individualising of the slave-traders’ guilt also operated to disassociate them 
from their national state, notwithstanding the role that Britain had played in 
the slave trade more generally.67 Thus, Biggs maintained that Peters was daily 
violating the Slave Trade Felony Act and ‘acting with practical ingratitude 
62 For example, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials can be seen as ‘attempts to vindicate the superiority of 
Western civilisation and the conduct of the Allied war’; Gerry Simpson, ‘Didactic and Dissident Histories’, 
830.
63 ibid., 827. Notably, the Eichmann trial was at least partly about the legitimacy of the establishment of the 
state of Israel (ibid., 826). So too is it argued that a driving force behind the establishment of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was the need for the West to affirm its ‘own fundamental morality’ 
(Pierre Hazan, Justice in a Time of War: The True Story behind the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (Texas: A & M University Press, 2004), 19).
64 The Trials of the Slave Traders, 11.
65 ibid., 14.
66 ibid.
67 See, for example, David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution 1770–1823 (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 1975); Kenneth Morgan, Slavery and the British Empire From African 
to America (Oxford University Press, 2007); Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade: The History of the Atlantic Slave 
Trade 1440–1870 (London and Basingstoke: Picador, 1997); James Walvin, Black Ivory: A History of British 
Slavery (London: Harper Collins, 1992). On British involvement in the slave trade after abolition, see Sherwood. 
On the ‘fiction of detachability’ in international criminal law according to which ‘the state … is imagined as an 
entity distinct from its bad apples and rogue statesmen’ see Gerry Simpson, Law, War and Crime, 63.
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towards the country from which he derived his subsistence’.68 At the same 
time, redemption provided an opportunity for British slave-traders to reconcile 
with abolitionism; compare Biggs’s elaborate description of the ‘redemption’ of 
Skelton and Lawrence to the absence of the themes of pardon, sin and redemption 
in Peters’s case, notwithstanding the centrality to that case of the resistance of 
runaway slaves and the complicity of those recapturing them. Whilst in Samo’s 
case evidence is given as to how the court came by the evidence of former slave-
traders and how Biggs persuaded some of them to testify and thereby ‘atone’ 
their guilt,69 in the account of Peters’s case there is no information as to how the 
African witnesses came into contact with the court and the legal process.70 In 
Peter’s case it is the very absence of this trope that contributes to the erasure 
by the trial of Africans in redemption/emancipation, notwithstanding their 
extensive testimony in the courtroom. This is consistent with the logic of the 
‘savage-victim-savior’ metaphor mentioned above.
Contemporary war crimes trials exhibit many similarities to the adjudicative 
framework adopted in Samo’s case. There is a striking similarity between the 
optimism displayed by many contemporary international criminal lawyers in 
the transformative potential of the law and the claim that the slave-trading trials 
marked the first stage of emancipation.71 Typically, war crimes trials are show 
trials in so far as they direct their didactic gaze beyond the courtroom,72 and 
look to the future as much as to the past.73 Compared to other transitional justice 
mechanisms, such as truth commissions, contemporary international criminal 
hearings adopt a more retributive approach to the accused, allowing little space 
for amnesties.74 Despite this, international criminal hearings are permeated with 
ideas about individual and collective redemption. This can be seen in the claim, 
which is all too often made, that testifying is curative75 and avoids revenge.76 
68 The Trials of the Slave Traders, 41.
69 ibid., 23.
70 This is a narrative framework that left little room for the participation — let alone agency — of Africans 
in processes of redemption, and for the replacement of stories of suffering with stories of resistance exemplified 
by the act of running away.
71 Biggs claimed, ‘This day will live in history, that will record this trial as the ground-work of that 
“universal emancipation” which it appears to be the will of the Almighty to spread, in process of time, 
throughout the world’ (Trial of the Slave Traders, 27).
72 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (London: Penguin Books, 1994); 
David Hirsh, Law Against Genocide: Cosmopolitan Trials (London: Glasshouse Press, 2003); Mark Osiel, Mass 
Atrocity, Collective Memory and the Law (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2000); Simpson, ‘Didactic and 
Dissident Histories’, 804.
73 See, for example, Dembour and Haslam; Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford University Press, 2000).
74 See, for example, Diane Orentlicher, ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations 
of a Prior Regime’, Yale Law Journal 100 (1991): 2537–615.
75 See further, for example, Osiel, 273.
76 This approach also operated to defer, that is to control vengeance in Samo’s case. Thorpe claimed: ‘“There 
is a God, all nature cries aloud,” that marks the movements of this world, and brings us to account; when you 
are summoned before that great tribunal for judgment, and those unfortunate Africans, whom you branded 
on the thigh with burning implements of torture, shall arise in evidence against you, what can you expect 
from the seat of Supreme Justice?’ (The Trials of the Slave Traders, 34).
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Whilst this framing dominates much of the literature, it is problematic. First, 
international criminal hearings have revealed a significant dislocation between 
the reality and promise of healing, for the courtroom is not a therapeutic 
forum — at least not for all. Stories of redemption have been shown all too 
often to instrumentalise survivors for the sake of the international criminal 
process.77 Although better practice and legal innovations can go some way 
towards mitigating some of the negative aspects of courtroom experiences,78 the 
redemptive framing of survivor testimony all too often instrumentalises victims 
in the service of a broader political project. This may include the construction 
of a political or international community79 and the expression of ‘political 
contrition’.80 Thus, redemption at the individual level is expected to contribute 
to redemption at a broader societal level. Notably, those who are ‘saved’81 by 
participating in international criminal hearings rarely have a role in determining 
the broader agenda to which their participation avowedly contributes. In Samo’s 
case this logic of redemption operated to buttress Britain’s extra-territorial rights 
on the coast82 and to minimise the role of Africans in their own emancipation. 
Bringing slavery and abolition back into the picture of international criminal 
law, shows how this redemptive trope was driven less by a curative imperative 
than by an imperial project.
Conclusion
As ‘the point in the constellation from which all legal discussion of war crimes 
trials proceeds or reverts’, histories of international criminal law typically 
point to the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials as foundational.83 And yet, particular 
narrative framings of international criminal law have a longer trajectory than the 
77 Dembour and Haslam.
78 For example, the establishment of victim participation at the International Criminal Court, widely seen 
as one response to the failure of the United Nations Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda to make adequate 
provision for the involvement of survivors in legal proceedings (Claude Jorda and Jérôme de Hemptinne, ‘The 
Status and Role of The Victim’, in Cassese, Gaeta and Jones, 1387–419).
79 On the appropriation of women’s stories of sexual violence for the sake of ‘post-conflict national identity’ 
see Katherine M. Franke, ‘Gendered Subjects of Transitional Justice’, Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 
15 (2006): 823. For Steinitz it is the international community which is the real subject of transition in the 
Milosevic trial (Maya Steinitz, ‘The Milošević Trial Live!’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 3 (2005): 
107).
80 In the case of the establishment of the United Nations Security Council’s International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda see Ralph Zacklin, ‘The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals’, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 2 (2004): 542.
81 This language is taken from Anne Orford who writes of the challenge of how to respond to the ‘victim 
who refused to be saved, the subject who will not speak her suffering in the time and place and languages 
offered to her by the mechanisms of transitional justice’. This indicates the ongoing rhetoric of saving in 
international criminal law (Anne Orford, ‘Commissioning the Truth’, Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 15 
(2006), 883).
82 Letter from Thorpe to Governor Maxwell quoted in African Institution, Special Report, 101–02.
83 McGoldrick, 9–46.
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mid-twentieth century. This chapter does not trace an unbroken historical path. 
It does, however, suggest striking similarities between the narratives running 
through some of the first trials under the British Slave Trade Felony Act and 
contemporary international criminal hearings. In Samo’s case, the deployment of 
redemption supported an imperial mission — inside and outside the courtroom. 
The implication of redemption in a colonial project challenges us to reflect upon 
the origins and use of narratives of redemption today. Admittedly, narratives of 
imperialism and colonialism in international criminal law play out differently in 
the contemporary context.84 However, Samo’s case shows how this redemptive 
trope was tied up with a imperial project to which a politicised discourse of sin 
and redemption lent weight.
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Linguistics, Religion and Law in 
Colonial New South Wales: Lancelot 
Threlkeld and Settler-Colonial 
Humanitarian Debates
Anna Johnston
Reverend Lancelot Threlkeld was a familiar face in the Sydney law courts 
during the late 1820s and 1830s. The missionary — the sole London Missionary 
Society (LMS) representative in the Australian colonies during this period — 
was regularly accompanied by an Aboriginal man, Biraban, who served as dual 
translator and advisor to Threlkeld. The presence of the two men dramatised 
questions about Aboriginal legal status and humanitarian interests in the colonial 
legal system, connecting local affairs with broader imperial concerns. Attending 
many of the key cases during the 1830s, Threlkeld was instrumental in raising 
uncomfortable questions about how legal processes dealt with Aboriginal 
people. His prolific and provocative writing on such issues circulated settler 
colonial controversies pertaining to the law around the British empire. Neither 
simply a cross-cultural hero nor a self-aggrandising bigot, Threlkeld exemplifies 
the complexity of settler identities and societies in formation.
In recent years, studies of settler societies have come to the fore in a variety 
of interdisciplinary contexts, as historians, sociologists, and literary/cultural 
theorists seek to account for Anglo-American hegemony from the nineteenth 
century onwards, and to question the self-congratulatory narratives that 
settler nations typically promulgate about their origins. Legal questions are 
particularly interesting ones to pose in this context, because they provide a 
fascinating framework through which to explore the circulation of ideas and 
discourse related to race, identity, and colonialism. Jennifer Hamilton argues 
that modern Anglo-American systems of law were significantly influenced 
by settler encounters with indigenous peoples. How law courts understood 
indigenous people — whether their ethnic identity was recognised by the court 
or not, and when and how that identity counted — was central not only to 
establishing relationships between settlers and indigenes, but also to the very 
formation of both those identities. In the western United States and Canada, 
Hamilton suggests, law was central to colonising projects and it had effects 
beyond legal institutions: these colonial legacies ‘are key discursive elements in 
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social and political life in settler states’.1 Problems of communication continue 
to trouble twenty-first-century Australian courts, particularly in relation to the 
provision of interpreting services and, because of the prevalence of ear disease 
and hearing loss in Aboriginal communities, assistance for defendants with 
profound speech and hearing disabilities. In these current debates, we can hear 
echoes of the colonial courts in trying to account for Indigenous difference and 
in assessing the role of non-Indigenous intermediaries in accessing justice.2
The mutually constitutive nature of these relationships — in which not only 
Indigenous identities but also settler identities were forged (in part) in terms 
of legal rights and responsibilities — is particularly instructive in historicising 
contemporary relationships between settler and Indigenous Australians, 
and between Aborigines and the law. Accounting for the complexity and 
contradiction within those relationships also attempts ‘to make the past less 
predictable’.3 Threlkeld’s role as translator in the nineteenth-century courts — 
and more broadly in the colonial community — effectively worked to provide 
Aboriginal defendants with a way to have their voices heard within a system 
that struggled to account for them as legal subjects. Yet, in his legal work, 
Threlkeld also crafted a position for himself that was dependent on his exclusive 
right to speak on behalf of Aborigines: his translation of Aboriginal evidence 
about crime was almost always contextualised by his adamant testimony that 
Indigenous people were incapable of swearing oaths, understanding a higher 
being (by which they could have sworn), or being converted to Christianity. 
His conflicted position both enabled and limited Indigenous legal subjectivity. 
Threlkeld’s well-meaning interventions provide a lens through which to 
examine how white colonists’ legal rights and responsibilities (and indeed, their 
roles within a courtroom) were formed often in conflict with, or contrast to, 
Indigenous entitlements, in ways that were crucial to settler identity formation.
Threlkeld’s Lake Macquarie Mission was one of the LMS’s unsuccessful colonial 
ventures: within two years of its commencement, the society refused to endorse 
Threlkeld’s bills and, in 1829, he was dismissed.4 Nevertheless, and with funding 
from the colonial government (until 1841), Threlkeld persisted and continued to 
pursue not only evangelising but also two interlinked projects about which he 
1 Jennifer A. Hamilton, Indigeneity in the Courtroom: Law, Culture, and the Production of Difference in North 
American Courts (New York and London: Routledge, 2009), 2.
2 See Damien Howard, Sue Quinn, Jenny Blokland and Martin Flynn, ‘Aboriginal Hearing Loss and the 
Criminal Justice System’, Aboriginal Law Bulletin 58 (1993), online; ‘Specific Hearing Health Issues Affecting 
Indigenous Australians’, in Hear Us: Inquiry into Hearing Health in Australia, Community Affairs References 
Committee, http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/clac_ctte/hearing_health/report/index.htm accessed 
18 October 2011.
3 Nicholas Thomas, ‘Against Heritage: An Afterword’, in Reading Robinson: Companion Essays to Friendly 
Mission, eds, Anna Johnston and Mitchell Rolls (Hobart: Quintus, 2008), 187.
4 This chapter draws on research material that is discussed in greater detail in my recent book The Paper 
War: Morality, Print Culture, and Power in Colonial New South Wales (Crawley: UWAP, 2011).
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was passionate: collecting Aboriginal language and translating for Aborigines 
called before the court. Threlkeld’s linguistic skills were a central part of his 
LMS inheritance: language collection, in order to translate scripture and preach 
in local languages, was fundamental to Protestant mission work. Experience 
in Polynesia, prior to his arrival in New South Wales in 1824, ensured that 
Threlkeld quickly began recording the Aboriginal language that surrounded 
him at Lake Macquarie.5 His first linguistic efforts were collated in 1825, 
and his major publications appeared intermittently between 1834 and 1850. 
Posthumously, his individual works were published as An Australian Language 
as Spoken by the Awabakal … (1892). This was not simply an intellectual project. 
Threlkeld saw his language facility as crucial in intervening between Aborigines 
and the colonial courts. In this work, as in other arenas, the missionary chose 
a controversial position that placed him directly at odds with many powerful 
settler colonial interests. He had written to the LMS in 1825 that, although his 
appointment was initially to minister to settlers and Aborigines, he could not 
represent both parties: ‘No man, who comes to this Colony and has ground 
and cattle and Corn, can dispassionately view the subject of the blacks, their 
interest says annihilate the race’.6 Threlkeld chose to represent Indigenous 
interests and his earliest letters to the LMS resound with news of unreported 
and unprosecuted violence against Aborigines.
Much recent colonial legal history focuses on the period from the 1820s up 
to the late 1830s and a series of important cases that show the legal system 
grappling with the question of Aboriginal legal rights and responsibilities.7 
Threlkeld attended, participated in, or was discussed during many of these 
cases. From his first appearance in 1827 for R v Tommy, Threlkeld appeared at 
11 subsequent trials in the next decade, including the multiple Brisbane Water 
trials in 1835 and the important inter se case R v Murrell (1836). In his annual 
Report of the Mission to the Aborigines at Lake Macquarie, New South Wales, 
Threlkeld regularly discussed matters pertaining to Aboriginal negotiations 
with the colonial courts, becoming increasingly frustrated with the anomalous 
position in which Indigenous people found themselves and, eventually, 
explicitly calling for imperial intervention for humanitarian ends. In written 
accounts of his court work, Threlkeld explicitly and politically advocated for 
Aboriginal civil rights. The contradictions between Threlkeld’s role within the 
5 For a comparison of Threlkeld’s service in Polynesia and Australia, see Anna Johnston, ‘A Blister on the 
Imperial Antipodes: Lancelot Edward Threlkeld in Polynesia and Australia’, in Colonial Lives across the British 
Empire, eds, David Lambert and Alan Lester (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 58–87.
6 L.E. Threlkeld to Rev. George Burder and W.A. Hankey, 10 August 1826, ‘Letter’, Council for World 
Mission (CWM), Australia Box 2, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS).
7 Amongst others, see Lisa Ford, Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in America and 
Australia, 1788–1836 (Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 2010); Bruce Kercher, 
Outsiders: Tales from the Supreme Court of NSW, 1824–1836 (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 
2006).
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court — as recorded in the court reports appearing in local newspapers — and 
his written representations about that role reveal the complex and contradictory 
position he occupied.
Language collection preoccupied Threlkeld from his earliest days in New South 
Wales.8 From his arrival in Newcastle, waiting for a road and a dwelling to 
be built at Lake Macquarie, Threlkeld erected a tent that Chief Justice Francis 
Forbes had donated, and conducted interviews with local Aborigines. Forbes’s 
gift reveals the interconnections between linguistics and law from the outset. 
The missionary sent Forbes a copy of his first printed language study, Specimens 
of a Dialect of the Aborigines of New South Wales: Being the First Attempt to Form 
their Speech into a Written Language (1827), and the judge was delighted that his 
‘very humble contribution … has derived a value from the work performed 
beneath its shelter which nothing else could have given it’.9 Like other legal 
men in the colony, Forbes was very interested in Threlkeld’s linguistic work 
and wanted to provide assistance to him. Arguably, this was in part due to 
the empire-wide interest in collecting indigenous languages — as the century 
proceeded, language study became something of a gentlemanly pursuit, akin 
to the burgeoning interest in amateur natural history — but also because there 
were obvious implications for the colonial legal system in establishing effective 
formal modes of communication between settlers and indigenes. Men such as 
Forbes did not operate in a vacuum — his previous experience in Bermuda and 
Newfoundland clearly informed his New South Wales tenure — and questions 
about indigenous subjects in colonial law were formulated in transnational and 
comparative contexts. The shared interest also reveals the imbrication of legal 
and religious identities in this period.
During his tenure as New South Wales attorney-general, Saxe Bannister 
regularly corresponded with and sought information from Threlkeld; the two 
men arrived in Sydney within months of each other in 1824. The connection 
was instrumental for Threlkeld: Bannister solicited his social calls, introduced 
him to the newly arrived governor Lieutenant-General Ralph Darling and 
Archdeacon Thomas Hobbes Scott, and regularly sought his opinion on current 
affairs. Bannister was fascinated by the missionary’s linguistic project, regularly 
enquiring about and commenting upon Threlkeld’s methods. Threlkeld wrote to 
him frankly, in 1825:
With respect to seeing my system, it can be seen and known in two 
minutes, namely, first obtain the language, then preach the Gospel, 
8 For an excellent overview of Threlkeld’s linguistic work, see David A. Roberts, ‘“language to save the 
innocent”: Reverend L. Threlkeld’s Linguistic Mission’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society 94, 
no. 2 (2008): 107–25.
9 Niel Gunson, ed., Australian Reminiscences and Papers of L.E. Threlkeld, Missionary to the Aborigines, 
1824–1859 (Canberra: AIAS, 1974), quoted at 229.
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then urge them from Gospel motives to be industrious at the same time 
becoming a servant to them to win them to that which is right. This is 
the sum and substance of our practice. We persuade Men.10
Bannister’s education lent him insight into linguistic study. On reading his 
personal manuscript copy of Threlkeld’s first linguistic work, An Orthography 
and Orthoepy of a Dialect of the Aborigines of New South Wales Part 1 (1825), 
Bannister warmly congratulated the author, asked for extra copies to send to 
friends in London and Oxford, and recommended that the LMS should send a 
copy to Lord Bathurst (then colonial secretary) in order to shore up the approval 
of the New South Wales land grant for the mission. Although supportive, he 
clearly questioned some of Threlkeld’s methodology and, in so doing, revealed 
his assessment of Aboriginal capabilities:
I have always thought that the greatest care should be taken not to apply 
the complications of grammar as established in books to the expressions 
of a simple people — and perhaps your present pursuit, if confined 
rightly to an examination of the mere actual modes of speech in use here 
by the uncorrupted, will exhibit a very curious and instructive stage of 
the human mind.11
Despite his reservations about the sophistication of Aboriginal languages, 
Bannister directly solicited Threlkeld’s assistance for the new court system 
established in 1824. Threlkeld declined Bannister’s request to train interpreters 
for the courts in 1826 as he felt his linguistic knowledge was not yet adequate.
The following year, Bannister was replaced as attorney-general by Alexander 
Macduff Baxter, and Threlkeld was directed to attend R v Tommy as an 
interpreter: he demurred ‘on account of my little knowledge of the language’ 
but was told that he would have Bungaree, probably one of the best-known 
Aboriginal figures in Sydney at the time, to assist and that he must ‘do [his] 
best’.12 Baxter’s enlistment of Bungaree was largely symbolic, and his placatory 
words either naive or cynical. Unless able to prove that they understood 
English and had a belief in a higher being in order to demonstrate the meaning 
of an oath, Aborigines were not able to be sworn as witnesses; neither, as 
Threlkeld and Biraban repeatedly found, could Aboriginal advisors be sworn 
as official translators. Without an acceptable translator who could swear an 
oath, Aboriginal voices were effectively silenced by the legal system. Men 
such as Bungaree and Biraban were crucial to the communicative acts taking 
place between the missionary and defendants — their role as cultural and legal 
10 L.E. Threlkeld to Rev. George Burder, 10 October 1825, CWM, Australia Box 2, SOAS.
11 L.E. Threlkeld to Rev. George Burder, 22 October 1825, CWM, Australia Box 2, SOAS, quoting Bannister.
12 L.E. Threlkeld, ‘Memoranda of Events at Lake Macquarie: Journal Extracts and Annual Reports to 1841’, 
in Gunson, 97.
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intermediaries is highly suggestive and would bear further analysis than is 
possible here. Sometimes Biraban needed a second intermediary to assist his 
advice to Threlkeld. In 1837, in R v Wombarty, Biraban found a Port Macquarie 
man who could communicate with the accused (who was from ‘the interior 
near Port Macquarie’) but because ‘the Black could not be sworn with myself 
as assistant interpreter’ Wombarty was discharged.13 These moments in court 
represent very complex cross-cultural negotiations. Even though the records are 
partial (and often problematic in their bias), the glimpses that we can reconstruct 
reveal just how nuanced and troubled was the contemporary debate.
Threlkeld’s first court appearance was unprepossessing: neither he nor Bungaree 
succeeded in communicating with the Aboriginal defendant Tommy, who 
made his defence in his own language with rare phrases of broken English. 
Neither Bungaree nor Threlkeld seem to have had a working knowledge of 
that language, which presumably pertained to the Bathurst region where the 
alleged crime occurred: despite his linguistic study, Threlkeld (like many 
others) was slow to realise that separate regional languages existed which could 
be mutually incomprehensible. Forbes, the presiding judge, is reported in 
the Sydney Monitor as summarising the case as ‘fully made out’; and the jury 
found Tommy guilty.14 He was sentenced to death and was hanged on the last 
day of 1827. Threlkeld declared that Tommy was ‘found guilty on the clearest 
evidence’,15 and attended the execution as part of the religious presence that 
commonly accompanied condemned men. Threlkeld’s attendance subsequently 
generated an unbecoming spat between Protestant and Catholic clergy in the 
colonial newspapers — Tommy’s Catholic baptism on the scaffold infuriated the 
Protestant attendants — but usually religious attendance imbued the public 
spectacle of English and colonial executions with moral authority and sober 
religious import, as Randall McGowen demonstrates.16 Threlkeld’s presence 
in court worked similarly to impart a sense of moral order to the unsettling 
presence of Aborigines, particularly given the fissures in law that their presence 
13 L.E. Threlkeld, ‘Report of the Mission to the Aborigines at Lake Macquarie, New South Wales’ (1837), 
in Gunson, 136.
14 ‘R v Tommy’, Supreme Court of New South Wales, 1827, Decisions of the Superior Courts of New 
South Wales, 1788–1899, the Division of Law, Macquarie University, http://www.law.mq.edu.au/scnsw/
Cases1827-28/html/r_v_tommy__1827.htm accessed 31 August, 2004.
15 L.E. Threlkeld, ‘Reminiscences of the Aborigines of New South Wales’ (1853–55), in Gunson, 97.
16 Randall McGowen, ‘The Changing Face of God’s Justice: The Debates over Divine and Human Punishment 
in Eighteenth-Century England’, Criminal Justice History 9 (1988): 63–98; see also V.A C. Gatrell, The Hanging 
Tree: Execution and the English People, 1770–1868 (Oxford University Press, 1994) and, on execution in 
colonial Australia, Michael Sturma, ‘Death and Ritual on the Gallows: Public Executions in the Australian 
Penal Colonies’, OMEGA 17, no. 1 (1986): 89–100; Libby Connors, ‘The Theatre of Justice: Race Relations and 
Capital Punishment at Moreton Bay, 1841–59’, in Brisbane: The Aboriginal Presence, 1824–1860, ed. Rod Fisher 
(Brisbane History Group Papers, 1992), 48–57; John McGuire, ‘Judicial Violence and the “Civilizing Process”: 
Race and the Transition from Public to Private Executions in Colonial Australia’, Australian Historical Studies 
29, no. 111 (1998): 187–209.
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revealed, and it certainly foregrounded the importance of Christianity to the 
workings of English law. Arguably, though, the missionary’s presence also 
focalised the incongruity of Aborigines as legal subjects.
When charged, Aborigines, like settlers, entered a process that inscribed them 
within legal discourse. The Information for each charge inaugurated a process 
of textual inscription and subject formation. The language of the Information is 
bureaucratic and formulaic: the particulars of each charge were entered by a law 
clerk on pre-printed forms. So, to take the instance of R v Jackey in 1834, the 
accused is described in a routine fashion: ‘Jackey an Aboriginal native of the said 
Colony not having the fear of God before his eyes but being moved and seduced 
by the instigation of the Devil …’ The language of the charge and its reading — 
a performative speech act — dramatises the interdependence of religious and 
legal discourses, and immediately reveals the peculiar position of non-Christians 
brought before the court. If white colonials could be temporarily seduced by the 
devil into criminal acts then, logically, Aborigines were especially vulnerable 
to moral turpitude given their ignorance of Christianity. From this moment 
onwards, Jackey’s non-Christian status proved a major hurdle to him accessing 
English justice. Threlkeld attended Jackey’s trial as interpreter. On the one hand 
we can imagine Threlkeld’s role as enabling Jackey to assert some limited legal 
rights, yet Threlkeld’s role as religious representative and gatekeeper complicates 
any such easy assessment. Despite his lengthy evangelical career in New South 
Wales, Threlkeld did not baptise any Aboriginal people, even Biraban whom 
Threlkeld knew was educating other Aborigines about Christianity. In 1837, 
Judge William Westbrooke Burton concluded that — after nearly 15 years 
involvement with Threlkeld and after nearly a decade assisting him in the 
courts — Biraban was ‘not yet aware of the nature of an oath’.17
Threlkeld’s role in all the cases in which he appeared as translator and 
ethnographic expert is thus ambiguous. Whether we understand his work as 
enabling Aboriginal testimony or speaking on behalf of Aborigines, as fighting 
for Aboriginal civil rights or as an ineffectual salve to the consciences of 
concerned citizens and legal personnel, Threlkeld’s presence in the court (like 
that of Bungaree or Biraban) dramatises the conflicted position of English law 
in a colonial setting. Edward Broadhurst, appearing for another Aboriginal 
defendant in R v. Billy (1840), decried the impossible position in which Christian 
linguistic and ideological framing placed Indigenous people. Reading out ‘that 
part of the indictment which stated that the prisoner had been excited and 
moved by the instigation of the devil’, Broadhurst expostulated that this was ‘a 
being whom the aborigines have no more knowledge of than they have of the 
17 ‘R v Wombarty’, Supreme Court of New South Wales, 1837, Decisions of the Superior Courts of New South 
Wales, 1788–1899, the Division of Law, Macquarie University, http://www.law.mq.edu.au/research/colonial_
case_law/nsw/cases/case_index/1837/r_v_wombarty/ accessed 31 August 2004.
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existence of the true God’.18 Ironically, Threlkeld was directly responsible for 
imparting that knowledge at precisely the same time that he regularly testified 
to Aboriginal ignorance of religion.
Threlkeld joined an international network of humanitarian figures who were 
concerned about indigenous welfare under settler colonialism, and troubled 
by the morality of colonisation more generally. Much recent scholarship has 
considered this ‘imperial network’ and provided imperial history with finely 
nuanced analysis of the multiple voices and issues at stake in the second British 
empire, connecting metropolitan debates with colonial concerns.19 Yet, much of 
this scholarship works from the Colonial Office down, or from Clapham outwards: 
understanding what humanitarianism looked and felt like in the colonies is rare, 
particularly from the antipodean perspective. Threlkeld’s work across a range 
of humanitarian/evangelical activities provides an excellent vantage point to 
consider such issues, not least because he was largely ineffective in bringing 
about change during his career. His voluminous writings, impassioned and 
informed, failed to make the impact they could have, in part because of his 
difficult personality and fractured relationship with the LMS, but also because 
the colonial setting meant that he recognised contentious issues well before 
they registered on metropolitan agendas. In terms of legal rights for Aborigines, 
Threlkeld was at the vanguard of humanitarian interest. It was just at the 
point that the Lake Macquarie Mission lost colonial government funding that 
Threlkeld’s representations could have had real effects.
Threlkeld’s work translating for Aboriginal defendants at the New South Wales 
Supreme Court resonated well beyond King Street, Sydney. The reports of the 
Lake Macquarie Mission were sent annually to the archdeacon, the colonial 
secretary, and the governor, and Threlkeld often sent copies to members of 
his wide international correspondence network. The missionary regularly 
infuriated local colonial officials with his contentious claims about Aboriginal 
disadvantage and settler violence: to be fair, his reports were sometimes ill-
advised and imprecise in detail, and thus had the potential to be as damaging 
to genuine efforts to curtail settler aggression as they were to the reputations of 
18 ‘R v Billy’, Supreme Court of New South Wales, 1840, Decisions of the Superior Courts of New South 
Wales, 1788–1899, the Division of Law, Macquarie University, http://www.law.mq.edu.au/research/colonial_
case_law/nsw/cases/case_index/1840/r_v_billy/ accessed 31 August 2004.
19 See Alan Lester, Imperial Networks: Creating Identities in Nineteenth-Century South Africa and Britain 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2001); Alan Lester, ‘Humanitarians and White Settlers in the Nineteenth 
Century’, in Missions and Empire, ed. Norman Etherington (Oxford University Press, 2005), 64–85; Catherine 
Hall, Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830–1867 (Cambridge: Polity, 2002); 
Anna Johnston, Missionary Writing and Empire, 1800–1860 (Cambridge University Press, 2003); Elizabeth 
Elbourne, Blood Ground: Colonialism, Missions, and the Context for Christianity in the Cape Colony and Britain, 
1799–1852 (Montreal: McGill Queen’s University Press, 2002).
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figures of colonial authority.20 Eventually, however, metropolitan sympathisers 
and organisations — who needed colonial evidence to support their humanitarian 
campaigns — eagerly sought such accounts.
On his return to London, Bannister was among the earliest metropolitan activists 
to call for law reform to enable Aboriginal testimony. Like Threlkeld, Bannister 
vociferously agitated for improving Aboriginal status through legal means. 
Bannister’s Humane Policy (1830), which focused mainly on conflict in the Cape 
Colony, was explicit about the state of law in New South Wales:
The English rules of evidence, the absence of interpreters, and the 
ill-conduct of the people (both settlers and convicts, with special 
exceptions,) render it exceedingly difficult to cause the law to be put 
in force against murderers and other heinous wrong-doers towards the 
natives; and when, by any concurrence of favourable circumstances, 
conviction has been obtained, the government has sympathised too 
much with the oppressing class, and too little with the oppressed, to 
permit justice to have its course.21
Threlkeld’s influence is clear in Bannister’s advocacy for active philanthropic 
exertions proportionate to the scale of colonial populations. Of the new Swan 
River colony, he exhorts: ‘It is, therefore, exceedingly to be hoped that at least an 
attempt will be made to save them, through the means by which at Sydney the 
London Missionary Society tried with considerable effort in 1826, in defiance of 
extraordinary obstacles’.22
Bannister’s service in New South Wales was relatively brief, and he was rarely 
lauded by his contemporaries for his legal work. He departed under contentious 
conditions, and spent most of his voyage home writing a lengthy defence of his 
colonial service, in part spurred by attacks in the colonial press just prior to his 
departure.23 Bannister was determined to establish the fact of his scrupulous 
treatment of Aborigines, both in terms of his legal concerns about their status 
and, somewhat paradoxically, his effort to suspend his humanitarian politics to 
allow for the appropriate conduct of his role. His key principle was ‘to carry the 
20 Roger Milliss expresses his frustration with Threlkeld’s typically elliptical and imprecise accounts of 
events surrounding the Myall Creek massacre: Roger Milliss, Waterloo Creek: The Australia Day Massacre of 
1838, George Gipps and the British Conquest of New South Wales (Melbourne: McPhee Gribble, 1992), 101–2.
21 Saxe Bannister, Humane Policy; Or Justice to the Aborigines of New Settlements Essential to a Due 
Expenditure of British Money, and to the Best Interests of Settlers, with Suggestions How to Civilise the Natives 
by an Improved Administration of Existing Means (1830) (London: Dawsons of Pall Mall, 1968), ccxl.
22 ibid., ccliv.
23 A document full of self-justification — reprinting much of his correspondence with Governor Darling 
(with whom he often quarrelled) and the colonial press — Bannister’s Statements and Documents Relating to 
Proceedings in New South Wales, in 1824, 1825, and 1826, Intended to Support an Appeal to the King by the 
Attorney General of the Colony (Cape Town: printed by W. Bridekirk, 1827) bears intriguing similarity to 
Threlkeld’s own justification to the LMS, A Statement Chiefly Relating to the Formation and Abandonment of 
a Mission to the Aborigines of New South Wales (Sydney: printed by R. Howe, Government Printer, 1828).
Past Law, Present Histories 
32
law into effect wherever, and in whatever way these people [Aborigines] came 
into contact with us’, and to encourage any effort to improve their condition. 
Concerned with the ethics of cross-cultural contact prior to his appointment (a 
‘“problem” as difficult as it is interesting’), Bannister insisted that the very fact 
that the Colonial Office was aware that he had ‘formed something like decided 
opinions on the subject’ ensured that he was ‘most cautious not to attempt 
setting up “theories” on it’.24
Yet Bannister did not have a good reputation for discretion, and his preferences 
were evident in his correspondence with Threlkeld, for example. The two 
men were drawn together by scepticism about Rev. Samuel Marsden — the 
controversial magistrate–chaplain of the Church of England — and other 
prominent religious figures in New South Wales whose involvement in 
settler capitalism and politics dimmed their advocacy for Aboriginal affairs. 
The internecine tensions between evangelical and established Protestantism 
sharpened their critique and strengthened their shared assumptions. Bannister 
and Threlkeld were highly critical of the phrenological studies of Aborigines 
conducted by visiting medical officers on the French exploration voyages 
of Captain Bougainville in mid 1825, and were well aware of the dangerous 
potential of pseudo-science to affirm settler prejudice. Bannister sarcastically 
notified Threlkeld that the ‘French medical gentleman has confirmed his opinion 
of the innate deficiency of these poor people by a careful examination of many 
heads’. Threlkeld suggested that, ‘Perhaps the Aborigines think that there is 
an innate deficiency in the bulk of white men’s sculls [sic] which prevents their 
attainment of the native language’. Dismissive of craniological studies, Threlkeld 
hotly asserted that his evangelical work:
lies wholly and solely with an organ that has escaped their notice namely 
the heart, but had they even searched and found an innate deficiency 
in that organ, I would then have smiled and retorted my trust is in him 
who has said ‘A new heart will I create within them’.25
This kind of deeply affective evangelical language and reasoning was familiar 
to both Bannister and Threlkeld; their writings resound with intense emotion, 
which may also account for their similar reputations for immoderate behaviour.
Bannister’s Humane Policy contains trenchant critiques of imperial expansion, 
which reveal both his passionate humanitarian beliefs, and his refreshing lack 
of political caution: ‘It is impossible to justify our present course of destroying 
every where those, whose only crime is, that they precede us in the possession 
of lands, which we desire to enjoy to their exclusion’.26 While recognising the 
24 Bannister, Statements and Documents Relating to Proceedings in New South Wales, 123.
25 L.E. Threlkeld to Rev. George Burder, 10 October 1825, CWM, Australia Box 2, SOAS.
26 Bannister, Humane Policy, vi.
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work of those (like Threlkeld) who attempted to leaven imperial expansion with 
‘humane policy’ towards indigenous communities, Bannister argued that such 
advocates were thwarted at every step because imperial policy and colonial 
governments had strongly supported opponents of humanitarianism. In New 
South Wales, he exhorted, ‘Common right, in matters of life and death, is 
constantly outraged, by our neglecting the plainest principles of equity’, laws 
that have ‘for many years been known to be of the first necessity’.27
Bannister was one of few witnesses to the British parliament’s 1837–38 Select 
Committee on Aborigines in the British Settlements who had held colonial office 
in New South Wales, and his testimony drew on his personal experience across 
New South Wales and the Cape Colony, and his persistent research about other 
settler colonies. Although the committee was dominated by the turbulent state 
of the Cape Colony, the Australian colonies make for a repeated — if muted — 
comparison throughout the monumental Report from the Select Committee on 
Aborigines (British settlements); Together with the Minutes of Evidence, Appendix 
and Index. Threlkeld’s Lake Macquarie Mission was mentioned by several 
witnesses, and in written submissions, although the influence of powerful 
enemies such as John Dunmore Lang substantially discredited the mission. 
Bannister referred to the translation work Threlkeld performed (although he did 
not name the missionary). He advocated an empire-wide ‘system of publicity’ 
to bring colonial news to the attention of the British public and to readers in 
the colonies. Frequent publication of the reports of ‘functionaries’ would be 
crucial, he suggested, as would ‘a very careful report of all trials of all sorts’.28 
Threlkeld’s annual reports must have been foremost in his mind. Legal reform 
was his main platform: the current state of affairs not only ‘constantly stopped 
justice’ in New South Wales but also effectively ‘stops the civilisation of these 
people at the threshold’. The failure of the justice system led to indigenous 
dissatisfaction and their ‘impunity encourages the colonists to hold the lives of 
the natives cheap’.29
Zoe Laidlaw compellingly describes the production of the final report of the 
select committee as a collaborative effort of Thomas Fowell Buxton’s family, 
especially Anna Gurney. Late intervention by Sir George Grey (coincidentally, 
a keen supporter of Threlkeld’s linguistic studies) resulted in considerable 
compromises and radical re-editing, such that the ‘cuts produced a broadly 
imperial report, rather than the explosively Cape-focused document the 
27 ibid., 7.
28 Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlement) With Minutes of Evidence Appendix 
and Index (1837), British Parliamentary Papers, VII, 175.
29 ibid., 176.
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Buxtons had planned’. Laidlaw also notes that Bannister — a close associate of 
the Buxtons — was considered too indiscrete to share in the knowledge of the 
collaborative authorship.30
Bannister’s response to the published select committee report lacked subtlety. 
Dedicated to Buxton as the chair of the committee, British Colonization and 
Coloured Tribes (1838) was intemperate in tone and frank in its disappointment. 
The report is internally inconsistent, Bannister insisted: ‘when good, [it] is almost 
a dead letter; and its bad passages, grossly inconsistent wit [sic] its evidence, are 
of a most dangerous tendency’. Bannister was highly critical of many who gave 
evidence at the select committee, including Major Dundas, acting Governor 
Wade, and the former Cape Colony governors Benjamin D’Urban and Sir Lowry 
Cole. Such are the men, Bannister fulminated, ‘with memories as infirm as their 
judgments, to whom the colonial-office is in the habit of confiding the interests 
of our remote possessions, and the fate of the coloured people’.31
The Select Committee on Aborigines in the British Settlements and its report 
galvanised many. In 1838, the inaugural annual meeting of the Aborigines 
Protection Society (APS) in London noted that they already had correspondents 
sympathetic to their cause in New South Wales but sought to establish a 
network of ‘well-informed gentlemen’ resident in all the colonies to which the 
APS directed its attention. They requested communications, ‘conveying the 
most specific and authentic intelligence of all circumstances connected with the 
Aborigines, as the most effectual means of guiding the Society to the adoption 
of wise and appropriate measures on their behalf’.32 Threlkeld was a regular 
writer to the APS, in part through his earlier association with Bannister, who 
was involved in the establishment of the APS with Thomas Hodgkin, and served 
as one of its founding honorary secretaries. Threlkeld’s involvement in the New 
South Wales Auxiliary Aborigines Protection Society (also established 1838) 
— where he served on the inaugural management committee — cemented the 
links between New South Wales and London, Threlkeld and Bannister. The APS 
noted their ‘most lively satisfaction’ at the New South Wales initiative: it was 
the first auxiliary society established.33 Threlkeld’s speech to the Auxiliary APS 
reflected on his 22 years’ colonial residence, and a lengthy abstract appeared 
in the second annual report of the APS (1839). He retold narratives of colonial 
violence against Aborigines that had shocked him on arrival, and strongly 
restated his key principle ‘that the Aborigines were entitled to protection and 
30 Zoe Laidlaw, ‘“Aunt Anna’s Report”: The Buxton Women and the Aborigines Select Committee, 1835–
37’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 32, no. 2 (2004): 18, 19; see also Laidlaw, Colonial 
Connections, 1815–45: Patronage, the Information Revolution and Colonial Government (Manchester and New 
York: Manchester University Press, 2005).
31 Saxe Bannister, British Colonization and Coloured Tribes (London: William Ball, 1838), 253, 244.
32 First Annual Meeting of the Aborigines Protection Society (London: Aborigines Protection Society, 1838), 
12–13.
33 Second Annual Report of the Aborigines Protection Society (London: Aborigines Protection Society, 1839), 25.
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compensation from those who had forcibly deprived them of their patrimony’.34 
The APS regularly published Threlkeld’s Annual Report of the Lake Macquarie 
Mission, and other correspondence, in their reports and extracts from their 
papers and proceedings. Reform of Aboriginal evidence laws was one of the 
first and most important goals for the APS: Threlkeld’s experience made him a 
significant informant for the London committee.
The late 1830s saw an acceleration of Threlkeld’s concern with court processes 
and Aboriginal rights. His 1837 annual report exploded with frustration. It was, 
Threlkeld wrote, ‘a mere Legal Fiction’ to claim that Aborigines were ‘subject to 
and under the protection of British Law’ when their evidence could not be heard 
in court. ‘[T]he strictness of the administration of the law becomes the height of 
injustice to all’, he posited, and cast this as a moral failing not just of the colony 
but of Britain. The value of Aboriginal land, he reminded his readers, ‘fills the 
coffers of our Exchequer with Gold, exalts Britain amongst the nations’. Britons 
accrued a debt by establishing colonies based on ‘the destruction of the native 
inhabitants thereof, and thus presents a powerful claim to the tender sympathies 
of our Christian Charities’. Surely, in ‘this age of Intellect’, he pleaded, the British 
constitution could be amended to take account of circumstances that it could 
never have foreseen: if not, the consequence would be that ‘year after year, the 
Aborigines [would] be frittered away from the land by private vengeance for 
injuries publicly sustained’. Generally, Threlkeld suggested, there was ‘a kindly 
feeling, a friendly disposition manifested towards the Blacks by the Colonists’, 
but the ‘private vengeance of injured Europeans’ would, he warned, with steady 
purpose ‘surely, secretly, and speedily annihilate the Aborigines from the face 
of this Land’.35 Threlkeld’s provocative warning about the effects of neglecting 
Aboriginal testimony joined other more sober efforts to engender change.36 
The APS extracted from the 1837 report Threlkeld’s explosive comments about 
the ‘Legal Fiction’ of colonial law, and his story about Wombarty’s trial, for 
reprinting in their Extracts from Papers and Proceedings (1839).
Other personal connections linked Threlkeld to metropolitan debates. Burton 
had requested a copy of Threlkeld’s personal records as part of the evidence 
he collected to take back to Britain on his two-year leave in 1839. Burton had 
been the presiding judge at five of the 1835–36 cases at which Threlkeld had 
appeared as translator (and also at the libel trial Threlkeld brought against John 
Dunmore Lang in 1836); in 1838, he sentenced the seven settlers convicted of 
the Myall Creek massacre. Threlkeld was keenly interested in the Myall Creek 
trials, as they brought to a head many of the rumours and evidence about settler 
34 ibid., 15.
35 Threlkeld, ‘Report 1837’, 136.
36 See Nancy Wright’s excellent analysis of the Aboriginal Evidence acts. Nancy E. Wright, ‘The Problem of 
Aboriginal Evidence in Early Colonial New South Wales’, in Law, History, Colonialism: The Reach of Empire, 
eds, Diane Kirkby and Catharine Coleborne (Manchester University Press, 2001), 140–55.
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aggression to which he had long been privy. During the long process of copying 
his records, Threlkeld wrote to Burton with further evidence about violence 
taking place on the Liverpool Plains and seeking his advocacy with Governor 
George Gipps:
such things ought to be made known to his Excellency that he may be 
enabled to judge betwixt man and man in the unequal warfare with 
the Blacks, and I could not rest satisfied to let the matter rest until my 
annual report to the Governor.37
Threlkeld’s careful copperplate transcription of his lengthy Memoranda Selected 
from ‘Twenty Four Years of Missionary Engagements in the South Sea Islands and 
Australia’ bears a respectful and personal autograph for Burton. Roger Milliss 
notes that Burton failed to produce the formal submission about the treatment 
of Aborigines — to be titled ‘Memoranda of Outrages against the Aborigines’ 
— that he had intended, but that his notes towards the project contain much 
material drawn directly from Threlkeld’s Memoranda and his 1837 and 1838 
reports.38 Burton carefully assessed Threlkeld’s testimony about mass slaughter 
of Aborigines and the culpability of police and military officials (Sergeant 
Temple and Major James Nunn, in two separate instances that Threlkeld 
described in his 1837 report). The missionary’s frank and fulsome explanations 
to Burton’s subsequent queries indicate a considerable level of trust in Burton 
(for many years, Threlkeld had been very circumspect about what evidence he 
made public). Comments in personal correspondence between the two men also 
suggest a personal connection.
Burton published The State of Religion and Education in New South Wales (1840) 
during his short absence from New South Wales, and his book bears some 
evidence of Threlkeld’s perspectives, amongst many others. His characterisation 
of Australia as ‘a great Moral Wilderness’39 recalls Threlkeld’s dire description 
of the poverty of the antipodean religious mission in 1827: ‘all dry, dry, very 
dry scattered bones, in the midst of a waste howling wilderness’.40 Burton 
condemns the absence of religion in outlying areas, and specifically situates this 
as a causal factor for the Myall Creek atrocities: these crimes, ‘of almost unheard 
37 L.E. Threlkeld to Judge Burton, 20 July 1838, Original Documents on Aborigines and Law, 1797–1840 
(Sydney: The Centre for Comparative Law, History and Governance of Macquarie University, and State 
Records NSW), http://www.law.mq.edu.au/scnsw/Correspondence/74.htm see also Gunson, 267–68.
38 Milliss, 612.
39 William Westbrooke Burton, The State of Religion and Education in New South Wales (London: J. Cross, 
1840), 310.
40 L.E. Threlkeld, A Statement Chiefly Relating to the Formation and Abandonment of a Mission to the 
Aborigines of New South Wales; Addressed to the Serious Consideration of the Directors of the London Missionary 
Society (Sydney: R. Howe, Government Printer, 1828), 29. See Meredith Lake, ‘Protestant Christianity and 
the Colonial Environment: Australia as a Wilderness in the 1830s and 1840s’, Journal of Australian Colonial 
History 11 (2009): 21–44, for an analysis of the trope of wilderness for Protestant clergy writing about 
Australia, although Threlkeld’s usage predates her examples.
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of depravity’, were the ‘consequences of Men living unawed by, because far 
out of the reach of the laws, and uninfluenced by Religion’.41 Interestingly, 
Burton also makes clear his contempt for John Dunmore Lang, Threlkeld’s long-
term adversary, and the ‘Internal Animosities’ in which Lang and his Colonist 
newspaper revelled.42
Those internal animosities motivated many of the mixed messages that emerged 
from colonial New South Wales. Ultimately they ensured that Threlkeld’s 
evidence was itself something of a dead letter at the time of the select committee. 
Lang had an ongoing feud with Threlkeld and a predilection for undermining 
religious competitors, so his written testimony to the committee repeated his 
libellous comments that Threlkeld had mismanaged the Lake Macquarie Mission 
from the outset and, consequently, little had been achieved in the decade since 
its formation. Marsden was so exasperated with Threlkeld’s independence and 
quarrelsome behaviour that his submission made no mention of missions in 
New South Wales at all. Instead, as is typical of Marsden’s abrupt dismissal of 
Australian Aborigines, his letter resonates with indignation on behalf of the 
Māori and exclusively details his humanitarian efforts in New Zealand. Only 
the LMS missionary John Williams (soon to depart for Erromanga where he 
would be killed by islanders) lauded Threlkeld’s active employment amongst 
Aborigines.
By 1840, Threlkeld’s annual reports were receiving the publicity that Bannister 
had advocated in the select committee. One phrase in particular resonated across 
many different media in colonial and metropolitan sites: ‘Christian laws will 
hang the aborigines for violence done to Christians, but Christian laws will not 
protect them from the aggressions of nominal Christians, because aborigines must 
give evidence only upon oath’.43 Yet 1841 saw the end of colonial government 
funding for the Lake Macquarie Mission.
Threlkeld’s involvement in legal settings implicates him in the messy, inchoate 
operations of colonial governmentality, even while his work was motivated by 
a desire to force the system to confront its own limitations, as in the case of 
Aboriginal testimony. Threlkeld’s legal representations were bound with the 
efforts of the nascent settler state to govern its most challenging subjects, even 
though attempts at control were frequently unstable and insecure. Connecting 
local Supreme Court trials with the broader work of British parliamentary 
committees emphasises the ways in which colonial knowledge moved across 
41 Burton, State of Religion, 279.
42 See ibid., Appendix, cxviii.
43 The phrase originated in Threlkeld’s 1840 Report: ‘Report of the Mission to the Aborigines at Lake 
Macquarie, New South Wales’ (1837), in Gunson, 166. It was reprinted, with various abridgements and 
commentary, by the Sydney Herald, Sydney Gazette, in the APS Extracts, and by the London Quakers’ Report 
from the Meeting for Sufferings.
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geographical boundaries while also providing the motor for governing both 
locally and trans-imperially. Threlkeld himself linked specific instances 
of colonial law to broader philosophical questions about the relationship 
between European and colonial peoples, between imperial policy and colonial 
governance. He brought to bear his ethnographic, evangelical knowledge upon 
issues germane to constitutions and sovereignty. Yet, the complexity of his 
own writing, and the awkward slippage between his good intentions and the 
consequences of his representations, provide evidence that continues to trouble 
simple narratives about Australia’s colonial past.
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‘Destitute of the knowledge of God’: 
Māori Testimony Before the New 
Zealand Courts in the Early Crown 
Colony Period
Shaunnagh Dorsett
In 1843 the imperial parliament passed the Colonial Evidence Act.1 Its purpose 
was to allow colonial legislatures to pass acts or ordinances to allow their 
indigenous inhabitants to give unsworn testimony before the courts. Unsworn 
testimony was testimony given by those who were not able to take the oath. At 
common law the rule was that evidence could only be given on oath, rendering 
those devoid of religious belief incompetent to testify. In British colonies, 
therefore, this rule resulted in most of the indigenous inhabitants being unable 
to give evidence before English courts. This was particularly problematic in 
the Australian colonies. The imperial Act of 1843 was the outcome of various 
ineffectual attempts to allow for such evidence by way of local act or ordinance, 
particularly in New South Wales and, more latterly, Western Australia. While 
some attention has been paid to the politics and processes of law reform 
concerning unsworn testimony in empire, and the ways in which such reforms 
formed part of broader disputes about the shape of colonial governments,2 these 
discussions have almost entirely revolved around the Australian colonies.3 New 
Zealand has received comparatively little attention. To the extent to which 
New Zealand has been considered, it has been in the context of the overall 
matrix of imperial reform and therefore much of the particular politics and 
processes of reform within New Zealand still await consideration.4 Although 
New Zealand promptly took advantage of the imperial legislation and passed a 
local Ordinance under its auspices, the history of the interaction between Māori 
and the courts, and their ability to testify before them, prior to the passing of 
that Ordinance diverges significantly from that of the Australian colonies. The 
particular history of New Zealand in respect of unsworn testimony illustrates 
1 Colonial Evidence Act 6 Vic. c. 22 (1843) (Imp).
2 See in particular Damen Ward, ‘Imperial Policy, Colonial Government and Indigenous Testimony in South 
Australia and New Zealand in the 1840s’, in Law and Politics in British Colonial Thought: Transpositions of 
Empire, eds, Shaunnagh Dorsett and Ian Hunter (New York: Palgrave Mcmillan, 2010); Russell Smandych, 
‘Contemplating The Testimony of “Others”: James Stephen, The Colonial Office, and The Fate of Australian 
Aboriginal Evidence Acts, circa 1839–1849’, Australian Journal of Legal History 8 (2004): 237.
3 See also Nancy Wright, ‘The Problem of Aboriginal Evidence in Colonial New South Wales’, in Law, 
History, Colonialism: The Reach of Empire, eds, Diane Kirkby and Catharine Coleborne (Manchester University 
Press, 2001), 140–55.
4 For New Zealand and imperial reform see Ward.
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the interplay of local micro-politics with imperial imperatives, as well as the 
ways in which the colonial office sought to accommodate the needs of specific 
colonies within the often constrictive bounds of imperial constitutional law.
Local dictates and imperial imperatives:  
The Land Claims Ordinances
Unlike other indigenous groups around the empire, prior to the passing of the 
imperial Act, Māori already had some limited ability to give unsworn testimony. 
In the 1840 New Zealand Land Claims Act (NSW) provision was made for 
unsworn testimony to be given by Māori.5 The New Zealand Land Claims bill 
was introduced into the New South Wales Legislative Council in May 1840.6 Its 
purpose was to institute a process for investigating lands acquired from Māori 
pre 1840 and the conditions under which those lands were acquired. The official 
position was that only titles derived from the Crown itself would be recognised, 
and a proclamation to this effect had been issued by Governor George Gipps, 
prior to the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi. A proclamation to similar effect 
was issued by (then) New Zealand Lieutenant Governor William Hobson in 
early 1840.7 Prior to this time, however, significant land had changed hands, 
purchased directly from Māori by pākehā (non- Māori, in this period generally 
white settlers). Land acquisitions from Māori, therefore, were to be investigated 
and those which were ‘founded on equitable principles, and not in extent or 
otherwise prejudicial to the present or prospective interests of Her Subjects in 
New Zealand’ were to be allowed and confirmed.8 Such a process had no parallel 
in other Australasian colonies, where the possibility of indigenous ownership 
of land was not even acknowledged. In New Zealand, however, the land claims 
investigations were critical to settlement of the new colony.
The bill was modelled on the Claims to Land Act 1835 (NSW), under which a 
Court of Claims was established to investigate claims to grants essentially where 
the Crown had made multiple promises to grants and the documentary records 
5 New Zealand Land Claims Act 4 Vic. No. 7 (1840) (New South Wales). New Zealand was a dependency 
of New South Wales for 18 months between late 1839 and 1841. During this period the New South Wales 
Governor, Sir George Gipps, and the Legislative Council passed laws for New Zealand. 
6 Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Council 1840 No. 1, copy in Gipps to Russell, Despatch No. 40/66, 
29 May 1840, The National Archives (TNA), CO 201/297, fol 190a/b. For a full account see The New Zealand 
Land Claims Act of 1840, Evidence of Dr Donald M. Loverage for the Crown, WAI 45 #I 6 (Muriwhenua 
Claim), 1993 [revised version 2002] (Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington).
7 On 30 January 1840 Hobson read two proclamations, the first declaring the boundaries of New South 
Wales to include New Zealand; the second stating the Crown’s intention to only recognise titles derived from 
the Crown itself: Issued 30 January 1840, Hobson to Gipps, TNA, CO 209/7, fol. 23–24.
8 Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Council 1840 No. 1, 29 May 1840, TNA, CO 201/297, fol. 190a/b.
‘Destitute of the knowledge of God’
41
were insufficient to establish the entitled grantee.9 Under both land claims acts, 
determinations were to be guided by ‘real justice and good conscience’. Of 
course, the stark difference between the New South Wales and New Zealand 
acts was the New South Wales Act did not mention, or allow for the possibility 
of, indigenous owners. Nevertheless, it provided a convenient template that, in 
form, complied with Normanby’s instructions to Gipps for the preparation of the 
Act.10 Section VII of the New Zealand Land Claims Act, generally dealing with 
the calling of witnesses, recording of evidence, and penalties for perjury, was 
derived from s 6 of the 1835 New South Wales Act. However, cl. VII included 
provisions for the evidence of ‘Aboriginal Natives’, a provision obviously 
absent in the original Act. The evidence of the Māori vendors was critical to 
the functioning of the Act. As in any investigation to title, it was necessary to 
receive the evidence of the seller as to the nature of the transaction.
At this time, unsworn testimony was still not permitted in any courts either in 
England or around empire.11 As noted above, unsworn testimony was testimony 
given by those who were not able to take the oath. At common law the rule was 
that evidence could only be given on oath, rendering those devoid of religious 
belief incompetent to testify. However, it had been accepted since the decision 
in Omichund v Barker that the oath could be taken by ‘infidels’ who believed 
in a god and that they would be punished if they swore falsely. Chief Justice 
Sir Edward Willes noted that while the common law is a Christian institution, 
the substance of an oath predates Christianity, and has ‘nothing to do with 
Christianity, only that by the Christian religion we are put still under greater 
obligations not to be guilty of perjury ...’.12 While the forms of oaths may vary, 
the substance is the same: God in all of them is called upon as a witness to 
truth.13 Thus, it followed that ‘a man is not to be questioned as to his particular 
opinions, (as, whether he believes the gospels,) but, whether he believes in the 
9 An Act for Appointing and Empowering Commissioners to Examine and Report upon Claims to Land under 
the Great Seal of the Colony of New South Wales, 5 Wm IV No. 21 (1835) (New South Wales), in turn based on 
an earlier Act of the same name: 4 Wm IV No. 9 (1833) (New South Wales).
10 Loverage, New Zealand Land Claims Act, 43.
11 A possible exception to this was the resolution of the Council of Assiniboa on 2 February 1837 allowing 
for the admittance of native testimony in all courts in the District of Assiniboa: ‘Several Objections Having 
Been Made By Many Of The Colonists To The Validity Of Indian Evidence; It Is Resolved 1st. That The 
Evidence Of An Indian Be Considered Valid, And Be Admitted As Such In All Courts Of The Settlement’. 
The resolution is reproduced in E.H. Oliver, The Canadian North-West: Its Early Development and Legislative 
Records (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1914), vol. 1, 278. The resolution was of doubtful legal validity 
as it was likely repugnant to the common law. The earliest legislative endeavour to provide for such evidence 
was the 1764 draft legislation prepared by the British Parliament to supplement the Royal Proclamation 
of 1763. It was intended to establish a system of superintendents within the territory reserved for Indian 
Nations. The legislation specifically provided for both the appointment of superintendents and interpreters, 
as well as the taking of evidence in both civil and criminal matters from Indians (presumably non-Christian 
Indians): E.B. O’Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, vol. VII 
(Albany, New York: Weed, Parsons & Co., 1856–61), 637. My thanks to Mark Walters for drawing this to my 
attention.
12 Omichund v Barker (1744) Willes 538, 547 (125 ER 1310, 1314).
13 ibid.
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existence of a God, and a future state’.14 The rule was developed in the context 
of India. Thus, it was designed to allow evidence from those who believed in a 
god, but were not Christians. ‘Infidel’ testimony was admitted in a number of 
trials at the Old Bailey, although never the testimony of atheists. For example, 
in 1765, John Morgan, prosecutor in an action for theft, and a ‘Mohametan’, 
was allowed to swear on the ‘Alcoran’ at the Old Bailey. According to Morgan, 
‘I touch the book, the Alcoran, with one hand, and put the other to my 
forehead; then I look upon it I am bound to speak the truth’.15 In R v Sayhead, 
the prosecutor, Bonhalel, both a foreigner and a Mohametan, was able to give 
evidence through an interpreter,16 while in R v Boxo Colloso, Boxo Tindle, Carder, 
a Mohametan originally from Bombay, swore on the ‘forms of that religion’, 
also giving evidence through an interpreter.17 However, problematically, most 
indigenous peoples, particularly in the Australian colonies, did not adhere 
to any recognisable religion. They were entirely ‘destitute of the knowledge 
of God’ and therefore unable to swear any oath, even under the common law 
‘infidel’ exception.
While the practical purpose of admitting unsworn testimony before the Land 
Claims Commission was clear, the legal validity of the measure was unclear. The 
New Zealand Land Claims Act was passed by the New South Wales Legislative 
Council at a time in which Gipps’s policy was to make general provision for 
the admitting of unsworn testimony by Aborigines. In October 1839 the New 
South Wales Legislative Council passed an Act to allow unsworn testimony.18 
According to the despatch which accompanied the Act to London, the ‘measure 
was introduced at the desire of the attorney-general in consequence of the 
difficulty of obtaining convictions which he experienced in several cases, 
wherein native blacks have been concerned, either as the accused or the injured 
party’.19 The Act provided that evidence would be given ‘so much weight as 
corroborating circumstances may entitle it to’. Further, it required evidence 
be corroborated by European witnesses. The Act, however, was disallowed.20 
Gipps, it seems, had overreached himself. According to the barristers, Campbell 
and Wilde, to whom it had been referred for a legal opinion:
14 Samuel March Phillips, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence (London: Butterworth and Son, 1814), 11. To 
the same effect see Sir Geoffrey Gilbert, The Law of Evidence, sixth edition, vol. 1 (London: James Sedgwick, 
1801), 129; Thomas Peake, A Compendium of the Law of Evidence, fourth edition (London: Reed and Hunter, 
1813), 154–57.
15 R v John Ryan, Jeremiah Ryan, Mary Ryan, 27 February 1765, Proceedings of the Old Bailey (http://www.
oldbaileyonline.org), ref. no. t17650227-5 (theft) (Morgan’s Case 1 Leach 53 (168 ER 129).
16 R v Sayhead, 12 April 1809, ibid., ref. no. t8090412-57 (theft).
17 R v Boxo Colloso, Boxo Tindle, 3 July 1822, ibid., ref. no. t8220703-20 (violent robbery).
18 An Act to Allow the Aboriginal Natives of New South Wales to be Received as Competent Witnesses in 
Criminal Cases 3 (Aboriginal Evidence Act) Vic. No. 16 (1839).
19 Gipps to Normanby, 14 October 1839, Historical Records of Australia: Series I, Governors’ Despatches 
to and from England (Sydney: Committee of the Commonwealth Parliament, 1914–25), series I, vol. 20, 368 
(HRA).
20 On this further, see Smandych.
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[t]o admit in a Criminal proceeding the evidence of a witness 
acknowledged to be ignorant of the existence of a God or a future state 
would be contrary to the principles of British Jurisprudence; and the 
Act is loosely worded with respect to the admission of which evidence 
and the weight to be given to it that we do not think it could be attended 
with any advantage.21
Between the time that the New South Wales Aboriginal Evidence Act was sent to 
London, and notification of its disallowance received in New South Wales, over 
a year had elapsed. During this time, the New South Wales Legislative Council 
had passed the New Zealand Land Claims Act. The unsworn evidence provision 
in this Act was broader than that in the soon to be disallowed Aboriginal 
Evidence Act. Section VII asserted that:
Provided always, that in all cases in which it may be necessary to take 
the evidence of any Aboriginal Native who shall not be competent to 
take an Oath, it shall be lawful for the said Commissioners to receive in 
evidence the statement of such Aboriginal Native, subject to such credit 
as it may be entitled to, from corroborating or other circumstances.
The New Zealand Land Claims Act was disallowed, although not for reasons 
relating to the unsworn testimony provision. Section VII was not mentioned, 
either in correspondence, or by James Stephen in his minute on the Act. Rather, 
attention was directed to the issue of the effect of the separation of New Zealand 
from New South Wales on the Ordinance. Russell was set on disallowance.22 
He advised Hobson that the separation of New Zealand rendered ‘obsolete 
and impracticable’ generally arrangements ‘which require the interposition of 
the governor of the old colony’.23 The characterisation of the Act as ‘obsolete 
and impracticable’ was that of James Stephen, who advised that laws passed 
by one colony could still operate in another — Quebec laws in the Canadas 
for example — unless they became obsolete and impracticable. Stephen may 
have left matters as they were but, given Russell’s determination to disallow the 
Act, he advised that disallowance could be achieved simply by despatch.24 As a 
result, at the first session of the New Zealand Legislative Council, the New South 
Wales Act was replaced by the local Land Claims Ordinance (NZ).25 Section 9, 
21 The attorney-general and solicitor-general to Russell, 27 July 1840, HRA, series I, vol. 20, 756.
22 Russell, Minute, appended to Gipps to Russell, 16 August 1840, TNA, CO209/6, fol. 420.
23 Russell to Hobson, 16 April 1841, Despatch No 41/27 of 16 April 1841, British Parliamentary Papers 
(BPP) 1841 XVII (311), 60 and Russell to Gipps, 16 April 1841, BPP 1841 (311), 60. Both Hobson and Gipps 
were instructed to postpone notification of the disallowance of the Act, pending passing a new Ordinance.
24 Stephen, Minute, appended to Gipps to Russell, 16 August 1840, TNA, CO209/6, fol. 420.
25 Land Claims Ordinance 4 Vic. No. 2 (1841).
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providing for unsworn evidence, was identical to s. 7 of the original Act. This 
Ordinance was allowed.26 Again, the unsworn testimony provision received no 
obvious attention, either locally or at the Colonial Office.
Perhaps, as Gibbs was so certain that the original unsworn evidence Ordinance 
would be approved, he did not allude to this unusual provision. Neither 
did Hobson, who presumably had neither any idea of its unusual nature 
nor that the Aboriginal Evidence Ordinance had been disallowed. In neither 
Gipps’s instructions to the commissioners on their appointment, nor Hobson’s 
(substantially similar) instructions on their reappointment under the new 
Ordinance, was the matter of Māori evidence mentioned.27 In both sets of 
instructions Edward Godfrey and Mathew Richmond were simply reminded 
that in summoning witnesses and recording evidence they were to be guided by 
the Act. Both sets of instructions, however, made it clear that a protector must 
be present at all proceedings, as must a competent interpreter. The protector 
could function as both.28
After the 1841 Land Claims Ordinance had been allowed, the law officers, Pollock 
and Pollett, recommended disallowance of the Western Australia Aboriginal 
Evidence Act (1841).29 This Act had been passed in part on the urging of Russell, 
following the disallowance of an earlier Ordinance.30 On 26 October 1842, some 
eight months after the New Zealand Land Claims Ordinance was allowed, they 
reported that the 1841 Western Australian Act suffered from the same defect as 
the earlier New South Wales Act. It was repugnant. They stated that: ‘the two 
Acts are in fact, as far as regards the nature of these objections, substantially 
the same’.31 This led Stephen to suggest the enactment of an imperial statute. It 
was obvious that the local legislatures did not have the constitutional power to 
override a principle that was, at least as far as the law officers were concerned, 
fundamental to the common law.32
26 Lord Stanley to Governor Hobson, Despatch No. 27/42, 18 March 1842, BPP XXVIII (569), 464.
27 Gipps to Commissioners, 2 October 1840, TNA, CO209/6, fol 407ff; Hobson to Godfrey and Richmond, 
Instructions for the Commissioners, Archives New Zealand (ANZ), OLC 5/4B, 4.
28 On the other hand, the final commissioner, Spain, appointed from London, received no specific 
instructions. William Swainson and Chief Justice William Martin (prior to their departure to New Zealand), 
suggested that it would be desirable to furnish Spain with a full set of instructions: Martin to Russell, 10 
March 1841, TNA, CO209/13, fol. 185. James Stephen responded to Russell that, as there was a ‘positive law 
prescribing his duties’, his instructions would simply be to execute the Act. No further instructions were 
required: Stephen, Minute, 12 March 1841, TNA, CO 209/13, fol. 367.
29 An Act to Allow the Aboriginal Natives of Western Australia to give Information and Evidence without the 
Sanction of an Oath 4 & 5 Vic. No. 22 (1841). See generally Ann Hunter, ‘The Origin and Debate Surrounding 
the Development of Aboriginal Evidence Acts in Western Australia in the Early 1840s’, University of Notre 
Dame Australia Law Review 9 (2007): 115.
30 An Act to allow the Aboriginal Natives of Western Australia to give Information and Evidence in Criminal 
Cases and to enable Magistrates to award Summary Punishment, for certain Offences (1840) 4 Vic. No. 8. The 
terms of this Act were quite different to its New South Wales counterpart. For the reasons for the disallowance 
of this earlier Ordinance see generally Hunter, ibid.
31 Pollock and Pollett (Law Officers) to Stanley, 26 October 1842, TNA, CO 201/337, fol. 295, in Smandych, 
270.
32 Stephen, Minute, 28 February 1842, TNA, CO18/31, fol 16 in Smandych, 271.
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So, why was no comment made on the unsworn testimony provisions of either 
the original New South Wales New Zealand Land Claims Act 1840 or the 1841 
New Zealand Land Claims Ordinance? The New Zealand provisions were, after 
all, broader than those of either the New South Wales or Western Australian acts, 
which had been disallowed. The acts were scrutinised by James Stephen and it 
is impossible that he simply failed to notice the unsworn testimony provision. 
In 1813 Stephen, still a young lawyer, was appointed by the Colonial Office to 
scrutinise colonial laws on a fee basis.33 He was paid three guineas per Act. In 
1825 he was appointed as legal advisor to the Colonial Office and counsel to 
the Board of Trade, where he continued to scrutinise and comment on colonial 
legislation and, in 1836, he became permanent under-secretary. In this role he 
continued his previous task of reporting on colonial acts and ordinances. After 
1813, on the advice of Stephen, it became required that all colonial laws were 
sent to London. It was in any case a requirement in most governors’ standing 
orders that they do so. Failure to do so could, and did, lead to them being 
declared invalid.34 Most acts and ordinances were reported on by the Colonial 
Office legal adviser (namely Stephen). Where the colonial law was potentially 
repugnant, however, the solicitor-general or attorney-general might, on advice 
from the Colonial Office, appoint Crown law officers to write an opinion.35 This 
latter process had, of course, occurred in the case of both the New South Wales 
and the Western Australian Aboriginal Evidence acts. Stephen, most likely at 
the direction of the secretary of state for the colonies, The Hon Edward Stanley, 
referred the Western Australian Act to the law officers, aware of the advice that 
would come back. There seems little doubt, however, that as a matter of policy 
Stephen, as well as both Russell and Stanley, was in favour of allowing unsworn 
testimony. Stephen’s recommendation to disallow the Western Australian Act 
was reluctant, and conveyed only because it seemed impossible not to make 
such a recommendation in light of the law officer’s opinion that the Act was 
repugnant.36
What then constituted repugnancy? And in what circumstances and on what 
grounds were colonial ordinances and acts disallowed? Most problematic was 
where an act or ordinance was supposedly repugnant to the common law. 
The unsworn testimony provisions were enacted at a time of transition in the 
conventional meaning of ‘repugnancy’ and the way in which it was interpreted. In 
1851, Rogers, Stephen’s successor, noted that the unsworn testimony ordinances 
of the early 1840s had been one of the most obvious examples of the problems 
33 Paul Knaplund, James Stephen and the British Colonial System 1813–1847 (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1953), 12.
34 ibid., 38–39.
35 D.B. Swinfen, Imperial Control of Colonial Legislation, 1813–1865: A Study of British Policy towards 
Colonial Legislative Powers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970).
36 Stephen, Minute, 28 February 1842.
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of determining the meaning of repugnancy to the common law.37 Smandych 
records that Stephen was privately of the opinion that neither the New South 
Wales Act nor the Western Australian Act were repugnant as they were not, 
in his opinion, contrary to the ‘principles of British Jurisprudence’. Indeed, 
admitting such evidence was neither opposed to divine law or to Englishmen’s 
Birthright.38 By contrast, the law officers took a narrower approach, whereby a 
statute was repugnant if it was in contravention of a rule of the common law, 
such as that of the requirement of taking the oath. For Stephen, no fundamental 
common law principle was at stake in the matter of unsworn evidence. To 
the contrary, to allow such evidence would have been in the best interests of 
justice.39 By the late 1840s, Stephen’s position was the accepted one and, by 
the time of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, the position had been reached that 
colonial legislatures could pass any law unless it directly contradicted with an 
imperial statute intended to apply to that colony.40 Of course, this explanation 
assumes that repugnancy was always and only a question of law. As significant 
as the legal position, however, was the politics of disallowance, of which the 
Aboriginal Evidence acts are a key example.41
As a matter of speculation, there are two possible, not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, explanations for the failure to disallow the unsworn testimony 
provisions in the Land Claims Act and Land Claims Ordinance. The first is that 
Stephen simply determined as a matter of pragmatism that the matter should 
go ahead, aware of the result of referring the Ordinance to the law officers. 
Despite their opinions of both the New South Wales and Western Australian 
acts, Stephen was not of the opinion that unsworn testimony provisions were 
actually repugnant. Was then the provision simply ignored? While this is a 
simple explanation, problematically the Land Claims Ordinance was in fact 
referred to the law officers, who simply noted that they ‘had no objection in 
point of law’.42
The second possible explanation lies in the nature of the Land Claims Commission 
itself.43 The Land Claims Commission was to be guided by ‘real justice and good 
conscience’. Consequently, the commissioners were to act ‘without regard to 
legal forms and solemnities’.44 The commission, therefore, was a species of 
37 Swinfen, 61.
38 Stephen, Minute, 28 February 1842. An example of a fundamental common law principle might be found 
in the Picton incident, in which Governor Thomas Picton of Trinidad was brought to trial in 1806, charged 
with inflicting torture in order to extort the confession of Louisa Calderon, a British subject.
39 Minute, Stephen, ibid.
40 Swinfen, 65.
41 On repugnancy in all its guises see Damen Ward, ‘Legislation, Repugnancy and the Disallowance of 
Colonial Laws: The Legal Structure of Empire and Lloyd’s Case (1844)’, Victoria University of Wellington Law 
Review 41 (2010): 381.
42 Pollock and Pollett (Law Officers) to G.W. Hope, 12 March 1842, TNA, CO 209/17, fol. 172.
43 My thanks to Damen Ward for suggesting this line of argument.
44 Land Claims Ordinance 1841, s. 6.
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statutory court of ‘equity and good conscience’. Thus, it was neither a court 
of common law nor equity,45 and decisions were to be made according to the 
more discretionary norms of ‘real justice and good conscience’, although such 
courts could apply common law or equitable principles, or a modified version of 
them. The first courts of ‘equity and good conscience’ were small debt courts,46 
later more generally courts of request.47 In England, such courts were designed 
to allow matters to be determined in a manner that was shorn of the need for 
technicalities, difficult pleading or even lawyers, and they were often run by 
laypersons. The Land Claims Ordinance further directed that the commissioners 
were to direct themselves by ‘the best evidence they can procure, whether 
the same be such evidence as the law would require in such cases or not’.48 
Otherwise, the commissioners had similar powers to call witnesses and require 
documents to be produced as the Supreme Court.49 Evidence, other than Māori 
evidence, was by oath. There is, however, no suggestion that the particular 
issue of Māori evidence in any way dictated the court’s form. As noted above, 
that form was conveniently based on the 1835 New South Wales Land Claims 
Act, the form of which in turn had been suggested by the judges of the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales, based on (unspecified) ‘American precedent’.50 It 
may be, therefore, that it was considered by the Colonial Office that, as the land 
commission was not a common law court, its provisions could not be repugnant 
to the common law. Further, although not specified by the Ordinance, no 
appeal would be possible to the Supreme Court. This would include appeals on 
matters of competency (of either pākehā or Māori witnesses).51 As a statutory 
jurisdiction, unique rules could be set as to who gave evidence, and under 
what circumstances. However, had this been the case, it is unclear whether the 
Ordinance would have been referred to the law officers for an opinion in the 
first place.
Importantly, the land claims process, one which was of profound significance 
to the colonisation of New Zealand (and one, given the agitations of the New 
Zealand Company, of profound political import — both in England and locally), 
45 Courts of equity and conscience were neither courts of common law or of equity: Becke v Wells 1 C & M 
76 (1832) (149 ER 321).
46 The first appears to have been An Acte for the Recovering of Small Debt, and for relieving of the poore 
Debtors in London 3 Jac I, c. 15 (1605).
47 On courts of request as courts of equity and conscience see Harry Arthurs,Without the Law: Administrative 
Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth-Century England (University of Toronto Press, 1985).
48 Land Claims Ordinance 1841, s. 6.
49 ibid., ss. 7, 10.
50 The Act was established on the advice of the Forbes Supreme Court. Sir Francis Forbes CJ, Sir James 
Dowling and William Westerbrook Burton JJ suggested that a court of equity and good conscience be 
established: Judges to Colonial Secretary, 18 May 1833, Chief Justice’s Letter Book, 1824–1835, State Records 
of New South Wales, 4/6651, 331.
51 The Ordinance is silent as to appeals. However, the general rule was that no appeal lay to a common law 
court by writ of error or writ of false judgment from a court of equity and good conscience: Scott v Bye 2 Bing 
344 (1824) (130 ER 338). Further, there is no record of any appeal ever having been made on any grounds.
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could not have proceeded without such a provision.52 In the end, imperial 
dictates and local need may simply have overridden strict legal requirements. 
The specific requirements of the colonisation of New Zealand could not perhaps 
be deferred to British imperial law. The answer may be all of the above, and may 
never be known.
Māori, the courts and the local ordering of law
While Māori were giving evidence before the specialist Land Claims Court, they 
were also giving evidence before the regular courts. In this case, however, it 
was not as a result of special statutory authority, but because the high level 
of Christianisation meant that, prior to the passing of the Unsworn Testimony 
Ordinance, many Māori were already able to give evidence before the regular 
courts, either swearing as Christians, or under the ‘pagan’ or ‘infidel’ rules. 
Just as the sale of land (and therefore the involvement of Māori in the process) 
was critical to the legal settlement of the colony, the participation of Māori 
in the regular courts was also crucial to that settlement, here through their 
participation in the establishment of the domestic legal order. Māori appeared in 
legal proceedings before all levels of court: magistrates courts; coroner’s court; 
County Court; and the Supreme Court itself. They also appeared in criminal 
proceedings and those concerning commerce. Their high level of integration into 
the local fabric of law distinguished New Zealand from the other Australasian 
colonies. While in New South Wales, for example, Indigenous Australians were 
subjected to law (as defendants or victims), Māori were active participants in 
the legal process, not only subject to, but witnesses in, and initiators of, legal 
proceedings.53 This level of engagement with law is undoubtedly one of the 
reasons why the passing of the Ordinance in 1844 was so uncontroversial. The 
high conversion rate of Māori to Christianity was a feature of the colony. Māori 
often described themselves in court as ‘missionaries’, or ‘Mihinare’, showing 
that they were Christian (and probably Anglican in particular). The editor of the 
New Zealand Gazette referred to those able to take the oath as missionaries: ‘if any 
of the witnesses for the prosecution are not “Missionaries”, the best way would 
52 In practice, the commissioners would not proceed without the evidence of the Māori vendors. James 
Busby, the former British resident to New Zealand, had two claims rejected because of his refusal to call the 
relevant vendors as witnesses, although he did call other witnesses, mainly pākehā, but also one Māori, who 
had been present at the signing of the deeds of purchase. The result of this rejection was that the governor 
refused to allow him to re-file or proceed with these claims.
53 For an example of an action initiated by Māori see the prosecution of Steele for assault by a Māori woman, 
Caroline: Caroline v Steele, 8 September 1843, Police Magistrates Court, Auckland, reported in Auckland 
Chronicle, 13 September 1843, 2; or a civil action in the Supreme Court in contract for the value of 193 pigs: 
Ropata Nuitone o Te Pakaru v Johnsone Wilkinson, 7 September 1846, Supreme Court, Auckland, Martin CJ, 
Auckland civil minute book, 1844–56, ANZ, Auckland, BBAE 5635/1a, 47 reported in New Zealand Spectator 
and Cook’s Strait Guardian, 26 September 1846, 4.
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be to instruct them now in the sanctity of an oath and the existence of a Deity’.54 
Māori converted to Christianity in large numbers from the 1820s and, by the 
Crown Colony period, Christianity had spread to almost every iwi (tribe). There 
are differing explanations for this extent of conversion, all of which may have 
played a part.55 Suggestions include a fatal impact to existing belief structures 
that was experienced from encountering European culture; that disadvantaged 
groups gained influence from the new religion; that missionaries were a source 
of mana (prestige); that Māori adapted by creating a Māori Christianity; and 
that they desired to learn the ‘magic of writing’.56 Religion was integrated into 
a worldview that was built around structured rules which fused physical and 
spiritual domains. As Raeburn Lange tells us, religious authority was integrated 
into the existing structure of local leadership as it was ‘consistent with Māori 
understandings of power’.57
As a result, many Māori could give sworn testimony before both the county 
court and the Supreme Court, although it appears they were as frequently sworn 
under the ‘pagan’ or ‘infidel’ rules. At the first session of the Supreme Court in 
Wellington, held by Henry Samuel Chapman, first puisne judge of the Supreme 
Court, the grand jury was asked to find a true bill against John McCarthy for 
stealing some clothes which were the property of ‘an aboriginal native’.58 The 
only witnesses to the alleged crime were Māori. Chapman informed the grand 
jury of the circumstances in which ‘pagan’ (or ‘infidel’) witnesses could give 
evidence. When the witnesses came to be sworn, they were asked whether they 
were Christians. Two confirmed that they were, and were sworn. The others 
are reported to have ‘answered with a shrug of the shoulders “au” [sic].’59 
However, Chapman declined to further question the beliefs of these potential 
witnesses, rather he asked the crown prosecutor if the trial could proceed 
without them, and it did. A true bill was presented and McCarthy was tried. 
He was convicted on the evidence of the two sworn Māori witnesses, Pukahu 
and Tokoiwa. In McCarthy, although in the end only taking sworn evidence, 
54 New Zealand Gazette and Wellington Spectator, 26 July 1843, 3.
55 Lachy Paterson, ‘Maori Conversion to the Rule of Law and Nineteenth-Century Imperial Loyalties’, 
Journal of Religious History 32 (2008): 216, 220.
56 For a summary of these, from which this is taken, see Paterson, ibid.; see also Raeburn Lange, ‘Indigenous 
Agents of Religious Change in New Zealand 1830–1860’, The Journal of Religious History 24 (2002): 279; Gary 
Glover ‘“Going Mihinare”, “Experimental Religion” and Maori Embracing of Christianity — A Reassessment’, 
Christian Brethren Research Fellowship Journal 121 (1990): 44.
57 Lange, ibid., 288.
58 New Zealand Gazette and Wellington Spectator, 1 May 1844, 3, reporting on the Supreme Court session 
of 12 April 1844. Chapman arrived in Wellington in February 1844. Prior to this time there had been no 
permanent Supreme Court in Wellington. Martin CJ, on circuit, held the first Wellington session of the 
Supreme Court on 4 October 1842.
59 R v McCarthy, Supreme Court, Wellington, Chapman J, 17 April 1844, reported in the New Zealand 
Gazette and Wellington Spectator, 1 May 1844, 3; [HS Chapman], Notebook entitled ‘Criminal trials No.1’, 
1844–45, MS-0411/009, Hocken Library, Dunedin, entry for 17 April 1844, 15–18. Rather than ‘au’ (meaning 
I), the witnesses presumably shrugged and said ‘aua’ — meaning I don’t know, or no.
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Chapman J nevertheless instructed the court generally on the rules of unsworn 
evidence so as to ‘satisfy your minds on a point on which I know considerable 
misconception prevails’. According to Chapman:
a pagan witness who believes in a supreme being, who will punish him 
for telling a lie, either in the next world or in this, is a good witness, 
provided he be sworn according to the ceremonial which he believes to 
be binding on his conscience.60
Further, according to Chapman, the fact that the imperial parliament had just 
passed a law to admit pagan witnesses without oath was ‘proof that they could 
not now be admitted’.61
Prior to the 1844 Ordinance there are only three instances, other than McCarthy, 
of Māori giving evidence before the Supreme Court, all tried before Martin 
CJ: R v Maketu; R v Leethart; and E Poti.62 Most of the interaction between 
Māori and the courts occurred at the lower level county courts, or even before 
magistrates. In Maketu, decided at the first sitting of the new Supreme Court, 
three Māori witnesses were called: Tohu, E Atohu and E Hoa. All three were 
examined by sworn interpreter, George Clarke Jr, who was later appointed sub-
protector for Wellington. According to the newspaper report, Tohu, (commonly 
called Charley Penny) was asked if he was a Christian, to which he replied no. 
He was further asked if there was a God, to which he replied that he believed 
there was a God, and ‘if he spoke falsely he would be punished’. He was sworn, 
‘but did not kiss the book’.63 The latter two witnesses were also examined, but 
no comment is made as to how they were sworn. Leethart was tried at the same 
session. Leethart, annoyed at alleged trespass, deliberately shot at Pooterai.64 
He was tried for ‘shooting to cause grievous bodily harm’, and convicted of 
60 McCarthy, ibid.
61 McCarthy, ibid. Chapman was generally in agreement with the need to reform these rules of evidence, and 
would have preferred non-Christian evidence to be by affirmation (ibid). He was not in favour of ‘pagan oaths’. 
Most particularly, he was not in favour of non-Christian forms of swearing. In extra-judicial commentary he 
had previously condemned such practices, specifically including the practice by which ‘Chinese’ swore on 
cracked saucers or, in the West Indies, witnesses ‘swore on the dirt of graves’: H.S. Chapman, ‘Legal Notes’, 
c. 1858, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington (ATL) MS Papers-8670-047. The paper is undated. It is part 
of a collection of materials, including correspondence, which has been collated and designated c. 1858 by the 
ATL. However, the internal evidence points to this document having been written around 1845. On this, and 
Chapman’s views on ‘barbarous customs’ generally see Shaunnagh Dorsett, ‘“Sworn on the Dirt of Graves”: 
Sovereignty, Jurisdiction and the Judicial Abrogation of Barbarous Customs in New Zealand in the 1840s’, The 
Journal of Legal History 30 (2009): 175.
62 R v Maketu, Supreme Court, Auckland, Martin CJ, 2 March 1842, reported in New Zealand Herald and 
Auckland Gazette, 5 March 1842, 2; R v Leethart, Supreme Court, Auckland, Martin CJ, 2 March 1842, reported 
in New Zealand Herald and Auckland Gazette, 5 March 1842; R v E Poti, Supreme Court Wellington, Martin CJ, 
7 Oct. 1842, reported in New Zealand Gazette and Wellington Spectator, 19 October, 1842, 3.
63 R v Maketu, Supreme Court, Auckland, Martin CJ, 2 March 1842, reported in New Zealand Herald and 
Auckland Gazette, 5 March 1842, 2.
64 William Swainson, New Zealand and its Colonisation (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1859), 58. Swainson 
was attorney-general at the time.
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common assault. Of the three witnesses one, Tooke, was Māori. He was similarly 
asked if he was a Christian, and replied that he believed if he spoke falsely he 
would be punished.65
In E Poti, it was reported that a Māori, having been placed in the witness box, 
had the usual oath administered to him. Mr Clarke (the same George Clarke 
Jnr who had interpreted in Leethart and Maketu) translated the oath for him. 
Then, ‘the Maori took the puka puka [book] and swore’. However, the report 
goes on to say that the swearing took place ‘in a manner indicative of an entire 
unacquaintance with the real nature of an oath’.66 In fact, the editor was entirely 
outraged by the trial, stating that:
Not only was the prisoner a Moari [sic], but also the aggrieved person, 
and consequently the whole case constituted one of those acts, which 
might fairly have been tried by native laws and customs. Neither the 
accuser nor the accused knew a word of our language. An interpreter 
was required to translate the indictment to the prisoner, and to interpret 
the awfully responsible oath which an accuser takes in all cases of a 
criminal nature.67
Despite the brevity of the above descriptions, they are the best that can be 
discerned from the historical record. No case, for example, was appealed from a 
lower court to the Supreme Court on the grounds of inadmissibility of evidence. 
There are other instances of Māori giving evidence, before the Magistrates, the 
Court of Quarter Sessions and the County Court.68 In these instances, the detail is 
missing. We might assume, therefore, that all Māori were sworn under the same 
common law rules as in the decisions of the Supreme Court. However, there is 
some evidence that this was not so. During the session at which McCarthy was 
tried, Chapman asked the Crown Prosecutor what the practice was concerning 
unsworn Māori testimony. The prosecutor replied that the practice in the County 
Court had been to allow evidence to be taken without oath and leave the weight 
to be given to it to the jury.69 Presumably he could only speak for practice in the 
65 R v Leethart, 2 March 1842, Supreme Court, Auckland, Martin CJ, reported in New Zealand Herald and 
Auckland Gazette, 5 March 1842, 2.
66 R v E Poti, Supreme Court Wellington, Martin CJ, 7 October 1842, reported in New Zealand Gazette and 
Wellington Spectator, 19 October 1842, 3.
67 Editorial, New Zealand Gazette and Wellington Spectator, 19 October 1842, 2. Interpreters had been 
provided at the trial. The role of interpreters has not yet been the subject of sustained inquiry. For example, 
what effect, if any, did the way in which interpreters asked questions as to religious belief impact on 
determinations as to the admissibility of testimony?
68 The County Court was created by 5 Vic. No. 2 (Ordinance passed 29 Dec 1841 and taking effect 1 
March 1842). The same Ordinance abolished the Courts of General and Quarter Sessions. The court had 
criminal jurisdiction in all crimes except perjury that were punishable by fine, or imprisonment or both or 
transportation for a period not exceeding seven years. It had civil jurisdiction in all matters up to £20. The 
Court was abolished by 7 Vic. No. 8 (passed 27 June 1844 and taking effect 30 September 1844).
69 New Zealand Gazette and Wellington Spectator, 1 May 1844, 3, reporting on the Supreme Court session 
of 12 April 1844.
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Southern District before Edmund Storr Halswell, Judge of the County Court. It 
appears from the report that Chapman’s refusal to allow unsworn evidence in 
McCarthy was not expected by those in court.
An editorial in the New Zealand Gazette and Wellington Spectator sheds doubt 
on whether such testimony was given, at least as regards Halswell’s practice. As 
noted above, the editor had called for an ordinance to admit unsworn testimony 
precisely because of an alleged refusal by Halswell to allow such testimony. While 
no record actually survives of Halswell refusing to allow unsworn testimony, in 
April 1844, Halswell did refuse to allow a juror to take part in proceedings who 
had refused to take the oath from ‘conscientious scruples’. Having admitted to 
the court he was not a Quaker, but ‘a member of the connexion of Wesleyan 
Methodists’, he was excused. Halswell is reported as saying that he would 
refer the matter to the Supreme Court.70 On the other hand, Halswell was not 
above unconventional procedure. On a number of occasions he invited others 
to sit on the bench with him. In Te Kopo and E Pokai, both charged with theft, 
Halswell allowed Turingha Kuri the ‘Chief of Kai warra warra’, to sit on the 
bench with him and to give his opinion on the matter,71 while in E Waho both 
Bishop Selwyn (the first Anglican Bishop of New Zealand) and Moturoa (a Chief 
from the Wellington area) were invited to sit with him.72 Similarly, by his own 
admission, in Pakewa ‘several leading chiefs sat on the bench with me’.73
There is, in fact, little evidence of Māori being admitted as witnesses before the 
County Court without taking the oath. It may be that this happened before the 
Magistrate’s Court, which was largely staffed by laypersons, but what records 
remain of County Court proceedings suggests that most Māori were sworn, either 
as Christians, or as believers in future punishment and reward. In Lockwood, for 
example, E. Hape told the court that:
I am a missionary; I was induced to become a missionary because I 
believed in God, and that Christ was God; I know it to be wicked to tell 
lies, and if I do not speak the whole truth I shall be punished when I die.74
70 R v Thompson, 16 April 1844, County Court, Nelson, Halswell J, reported in The Nelson Examiner and 
New Zealand Chronicle, 20 April 1844, 3. There is no record of any referral of the matter to the Supreme Court.
71 R v Te Kopo and E Pokai, County Court, Wellington, Halswell J, 28 June 1842, reported in New Zealand 
Gazette and Wellington Spectator, 2 July 1842, 3.
72 R v E Waho, 19 December 1843, County Court, Wellington, Halswell J, reported in New Zealand Gazette 
and Wellington Spectator, 30 December 1843, 2; Journals of William Cotton, ATL, vol. 6, qMS-0566, entry for 
19 December 1843, 39; Louis Ward, Early Wellington (Wellington: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1928), 125.
73 Halswell to Lord Lyttleton, 18 June 1846, in Copies or Extracts of Correspondence between the Colonial 
Office and Mr Halswell, relating to the Discharge of his Duties whilst Protector of Aborigines in New Zealand, 
ed. Barry Baldwin (House of Commons, London, 1846), 9. While Halswell does not mention the case, by 
description it must be R v Pakewa, Court of Quarter Sessions, Wellington, Halswell J (Chairman), 4 October 
1841, reported in New Zealand Gazette and Wellington Spectator, 6 October 1841, 3; 9 October 1841, 3.
74 R v Lockwood, County Court, Wellington, Halswell J, 24 May 1842, reported in New Zealand Gazette and 
Wellington Spectator, 28 May 1842, 3.
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Similarly, in E Waho, charged with stealing clothing, three witnesses, all Māori, 
appeared for the defence: Pomare, William E. Tako and Maria.75 Pomare, who 
was described as ‘Chief of the Chatham Islands’ was examined by the court as 
to his belief in future rewards and punishments, while Maria described herself 
as a ‘church of England missionary native’. William E. Tako (Wiremu Tako), the 
‘Chief of Kumu Toto’, was also presumably sworn.76
Not only was the appearance of Māori as witnesses in trials reasonably common 
in the period, their failure to appear was commented on adversely on several 
occasions. In R v Hastings, a key witness, a Māori woman named Hannah, failed 
to turn up when called as witness. Halswell noted that this was the third case 
in which a Māori witness had not turned up and that two other cases had failed 
for this problem. While the defendant, Te Ito, gave evidence, it was insufficient 
in Hannah’s absence to obtain a conviction. The impression is that Hastings 
was fortunate.77 Similar comments were made by Halswell at the trial of Daniel 
Munroe.78 Two Māori had informed the chief constable that they had received 
certain goods, found to be stolen, from Munroe in return for potatoes to eat. 
While two other witnesses were called, only the Māori witnesses could connect 
Munroe with the stolen goods. He was acquitted. Where possible, the courts 
would compel witnesses to appear.79 However, Munroe is an example of how, 
in a limited way, Māori evidence could on occasion make its way before the 
courts, even in the absence of the witnesses themselves. In that case, the two 
pākehā witnesses recounted the story that they had been told by the missing 
Māori witnesses as to how they had acquired the stolen goods. Inclusion of 
these accounts in the trial was possible because the rule against hearsay did not 
emerge until later in the century, in part as a reaction by the courts to statutory 
reforms to competency.
75 R v E Waho (Wahu, Awaho), County Court, Wellington, Halswell J, 19 December 1843, reported in 
New Zealand Gazette and Wellington Spectator, 30 December 1843, 2–3. E. Waho was committed in the Police 
Magistrates Court on 30 November 1843: New Zealand Gazette and Wellington Spectator, 6 December 1843, 
3. Despite the prosecution calling ten pākehā witnesses, the jury initially returned a verdict of ‘not guilty’. 
However, on being re-instructed by the judge the jury finally returned a guilty verdict.
76 A change in name can indicate that a particular Māori individual had been baptised or otherwise accepted 
Christianity, although it is by no means an entirely reliable indicator. There were many other reasons why 
Māori might adopt English names, and many Christian Māori who did not. Lyndsay Head notes that ‘after 
conversion Māori were normally called by their baptismal name, which was usually an English or biblical 
name, transliterated into Māori’. The example she gives is that of Wi (or William/Wiremu) Tako (Lyndsay 
Head, ‘Land, Authority and the Forgetting of Being in Early Colonial Maori History’ (PhD thesis, University 
of Canterbury, 2006), 29). It is likely that Tako was a Christian in this period, and he died a Catholic. For more 
on Tako, see his obituary, Evening Post, 10 November 1887, 2.
77 R v Hastings, County Court, Halswell J, Wellington, 20 December 1843, reported in New Zealand Gazette 
and Wellington Spectator, 6 January 1844, 3.
78 R v Daniel Munroe, County Court, Halswell J, Wellington, 20 September 1843, reported in New Zealand 
Gazette and Wellington Spectator, 27 September 1843, 3.
79 At the inquest into the death of Archibald Milne the coroner, John Fitzgerald, was forced to adjourn 
proceedings and obtain a warrant to force Awaho to appear as a witness. Milne, 27 December 1841, Coroner’s 
Court, Wellington, FitzGerald (Coroner) with Halswell and White JPs, reported in New Zealand Gazette and 
Wellington Spectator, 29 December 1841, 2.
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Local law reform: The Unsworn Testimony 
Ordinance 1843
By the time the Colonial Evidence Act was passed, therefore, Māori had been 
giving evidence, at least before both the Land Claims Court and the regular 
courts, for over three years. The desirability, however, of further extending the 
ability of Māori to give unsworn testimony from the limited arena of the Land 
Claims Court to the general courts of the colony had been noted in a number 
of quarters. In July 1843, for example, the editor of the New Zealand Gazette 
and Wellington Spectator, commenting generally on the — as he saw it — fairly 
unimpressive legislative agenda of the Legislative Council, questioned why no 
ordinance had been passed to allow unsworn evidence? After all, it would be 
more immediately practicable than ‘preparing enactments relating to “the rule 
in Shelley’s Case” or “contingent remainders”’. He noted the necessity for such 
an ordinance as:
[w]ithin the last six months, His Honor the Judge of the County Court 
of Wellington, did reject a Native witness because it appeared on 
examination that he did not acknowledge a Supreme being; but we 
understand that in other parts of this island the English rule of Law has 
been intrenched [sic] upon and such evidence admitted.80
The editor specifically noted that there was no excuse for such an omission, as 
such a provision was specifically provided for in the Land Claims Ordinance. 
Undoubtedly ignorant of the origins of that provision, and of the disallowance 
of the New South Wales Aboriginal Evidence Act, he sheeted home the failure 
to enact a local unsworn testimony ordinance to the change in attorney-general 
since the drafting of the Land Claims Ordinance.81 In 1844 the editor of the 
Wellington Spectator returned to the matter and noted for the benefit of his 
readers that the imperial parliament had now enacted a measure to allow for 
pagan evidence to be admitted without oath, and that it was to be hoped that 
the governor and council would soon pass such a measure, as they understood 
that otherwise a gross crime might be committed in the presence of pagan Māori 
only, as it once could have been in England before Quakers.82
Almost immediately after the passing of the Colonial Evidence Act, Governor 
FitzRoy moved to enact a local measure, bringing the Unsworn Testimony bill 
80 Editorial, New Zealand Gazette and Wellington Spectator, 26 July 1843, 3.
81 ibid. Francis Fisher, the first attorney-general, was appointed from Sydney as an interim measure, 
awaiting the arrival of William Swainson. Swainson was appointed attorney-general on 21 September 1841.
82 Editorial Note on the opening of a new session of the Supreme Court, New Zealand Gazette and Wellington 
Spectator, 1 May 1844, 3.
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before the Legislative Council.83 The imperial Act simply provided that the 
passing of any act or ordinance to make admissible in any Court of Justice 
the evidence of those who were ‘destitute of the knowledge of God and of 
any religious Belief’ would not be held null, void or invalid because thought 
repugnant.84 Based on these words, and ignoring the clear limitation to ‘tribes 
of barbarous and uncivilized People’, Brown thought they could extend the 
reach of the Ordinance to all who had not had the benefit of religious education, 
a suggestion with which Sir Robert FitzRoy, Governor of New Zealand, at least 
initially agreed.85 Brown, whose interpretations of the Act appear to have 
somewhat irritated William Swainson, the attorney-general (who noted that Mr 
Brown ‘appears to have great confidence in this own judgment’), understood the 
Act to mean that if three or four persons whose opinion could not be trusted 
agreed on a thing that would ‘establish a fact’, and this could be so equally 
whether they were barbarian or white man who had not had the benefit of a 
religious education. Dr Martin agreed. That, however, was clearly beyond the 
licence of the imperial Act. The result was, therefore, as Brown pointed out, that 
the aborigines had the advantage of a while man in this regard.86
Mr Brown was correct in this regard. The Colonial Evidence Act was passed at 
a time when a range of reforms were being considered to the law of evidence. 
Throughout the nineteenth century generally, statutory reforms were introduced 
to widen the category of those who were competent, but such reforms were 
accompanied by the concurrent development by the courts of exclusionary 
rules of evidence. Reform took place in two waves: the first, 1828–54, was 
directed towards those who were incompetent because of defect of religious 
principle.87 In 1828, statutory reform allowed Quakers and Morovians to affirm 
while, in 1833, similar reforms were introduced for Separatists.88 Brougham also 
gave his famous speech on law reform in 1828. Among other reforms, he urged 
that the rules be relaxed to allow anyone who believed in a supreme being and 
future reward and punishment to affirm.89 The second wave, in which reform 
was directed towards those with a lack of religious belief, was between 1854 
and 1869.90
While proposals for a general right to affirm were placed before the British 
parliament as early as 1838, the broader matter of atheistic evidence took longer 
83 Unsworn Testimony Ordinance, 7 Vic. No. 16 (1844).
84 Colonial Evidence Ordinance 6 Vic. c. 22 (1843) (Imp.), s. 1.
85 The Southern Cross, 13 July 1844, 3–4, reporting on the proceedings of the Legislative Council for 
Tuesday 9 July 1844.
86 ibid.
87 C.J.W. Allen, ‘Bentham and the Abolition of Incompetency from Defect of Religious Principle’, The 
Journal of Legal History 16 (1995): 172, 173.
88 9 George IV c.32; 3 & 4 William IV c. 82.
89 Henry Brougham, A Speech on the Present State of the Law of the Country; delivered in the House of 
Commons, on Thursday, 7 Feb., 1828, second edition (London: Henry Colburn, 1828), 4; Allen, 173.
90 Allen, 173.
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to be addressed, and those with no religious belief were not finally permitted 
to give evidence until 1869.91 Arguments against admitting evidence from 
unbelievers were diverse but, according to Allen, the most common opposition 
was based on a belief that to allow such evidence would be ‘to loosen the bonds 
of society’. Religion was ‘fundamental to morality’ and even a key component 
of being a good citizen.92 It was, in short, a component of the civilised society.
A second matter of contention before the Legislative Council was the matter of 
penalty for falsehood. Dr Martin was concerned that, as Māori would be subject 
to the same penalties as Europeans for swearing falsely, this might lead jurors 
to lend the same credit to their testimony as to evidence given on oath. Further, 
punishment ‘would not make [Māori] moral characters; that they could not be 
compared with the Quakers, who gave their evidence on affirmation, it was not 
right to inflict the same punishment on the savage as the civilized Quaker’.93 
To the contrary, Charles Clifford thought Dr Samuel Martin’s arguments to be 
reasons in favour of the bill: ‘civilized men had a fear of society before their 
eyes, which could punish them in many ways; the savage had no such fear’. 
The governor agreed. Children found telling a falsehood could be corrected 
without regard to their weak intellect, and ‘the uninformed savage was but a 
child of larger growth, but with more mature passions’. In any case, ‘no definite 
punishment was mentioned’; it was to be left to the judge to determine the 
enormity of the offence if it could be proven that evidence had been given 
falsely and wilfully.94 This was the more controversial matter. Allowing unsworn 
evidence by Māori excited no discernible opposition, but the matter of the 
ability of the ‘uncivilized Māori’ to recognise and attach importance to truth, 
and whether they should be punished in consequence, was doubted by several 
members of the council. Dr Martin insisted that the bill be altered and, while he 
might have argued out the matter, in the end the attorney-general’s bill carried 
the day. All were in favour.95 And with that New Zealand became the first colony 
to enact legislation to allow unsworn testimony before the courts.
91 Evidence Further Amendment Act 1869 (UK).
92 Allen, 179–81.
93 The Southern Cross, 13 July 1844, 3–4, reporting on the proceedings of the Legislative Council for 
Tuesday 9 July 1844.
94 ibid.
95 There was a third matter of contention, quickly dealt with. Was it possible to admit the evidence of 
natives of all countries, or just of those countries ‘adjoining’, as stated in the preamble? Based on the words of 
the preamble, this matter was settled in accordance with Swainson’s interpretation that the scope be confined 
to those from adjoining colonies: ibid.
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Conclusion
After the passing of the Ordinance, Māori continued to give evidence before 
all courts, but without the need to demonstrate a belief in future reward and 
punishment.96 Unlike in New South Wales, where, despite the passing of the 
Colonial Evidence Act, Indigenous Australians remained unable to give evidence 
until 1876, the passage of the Unsworn Testimony Ordinance in New Zealand was 
not only without controversy, but welcomed in many quarters. This was not 
just because Māori had already been giving evidence before the Land Claims 
Court, but because of their place in settler society — many lived in towns, 
took part in commerce, were Christians and were literate. It would have been 
difficult to conduct day-to-day legal affairs in Auckland, Nelson or Wellington 
without involving Māori and impossible, in many cases, to secure conviction. 
In particular, of course, the very reason they could give evidence before the 
Land Claims Court was because without that evidence settlement simply could 
not have proceeded. The high level of interaction between Māori and pākehā 
in settlements like Wellington, so soon after Britain’s acquisition of the colony, 
set New Zealand apart from the Australian colonies. The particular history of 
unsworn testimony in New Zealand serves to remind us that, beneath the broad 
legal frameworks of empire, the local micro-politics and the particular situation 
of the indigenous inhabitants led to very different and diverse outcomes.
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Recent exposures of high rates of death aboard live animal export ships, and the 
‘abuse and torture’ of animals in some Indonesian slaughterhouses have brought 
cruelty to animals to public prominence in modern Australia.1 This mistreatment 
offends Australians’ sense of what it means to be civilised, which is reflected in 
the fact that every Australian state and territory has passed complex and detailed 
laws declaring that the ill-treatment of animals is illegal.2 These statutes affirm 
that ‘humans have evolved to the point that they no longer regard animals as 
pure objects or things, able to be treated in any way they choose’.3 As far as the 
statute law is concerned, society has expressed its ‘collective choice’ that anyone 
who subjects animals to pain, suffering or distress will be punished.4 While 
these statutes are a necessary protection for animals, they are not sufficient to 
guarantee that animals are protected. Peter Sankoff has questioned whether the 
animal welfare paradigm can work effectively for other than ‘extreme’ cases of 
cruelty, which represent a small fraction of all the harm humans cause animals.5 
Much depends on the enforcement of the laws and, if a case makes it to court, 
on whether the pain or suffering is deemed reasonable and necessary. The courts 
rarely lay down in detail ‘how the balancing test between necessity and animal 
harm should operate’ and offenders often escape with lenient sentences.6
1 Malcolm Caulfield, ‘Live Export of Animals’, in Animal Law in Australasia, eds, Peter Sankoff and Steven 
White (Sydney: Federation Press, 2009), 153–73; Animals Australia, ‘Cruel Cattle Exports to Indonesia 
Must Halt Immediately’, press release 30 May 2011, http://www.animalsaustralia.org/media/press_releases.
php?release=151 accessed 9 October 2011.
2 Deborah Cao, Animal Law in Australia and New Zealand (Sydney: Law Book Co., 2010).
3 Sankoff, ‘The Welfare Paradigm: Making the World a Better Place for Animals?’, in Sankoff and White, 14.
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Mike Radford has argued that in Britain an understanding of the evolution of 
the legal protection of animals is ‘essential for understanding the contemporary 
law’.7 This assessment also rings true for Australia, where the continuities 
are more striking than the discontinuities. Despite nearly 200 years of animal 
protection laws in Australia, enforcement remains ‘alarmingly inadequate’ and 
the number of cases reaching the courts is small.8 Only cases where the evidence 
is clear-cut are prosecuted and so most offenders plead guilty, leaving ‘little case 
law … to assist in future interpretation of the law’. Most of the small number of 
cases that are defended tend to involve factual and not legal issues. Commonly 
found terms in statutes such as ‘unnecessary’ or ‘unreasonable’ are applied 
on a case-by-case basis, depend on the interpretation of individual judges 
and magistrates, and give ‘little idea of what actually constitutes permissible 
conduct’. Annabel Markham notes that, despite the trend of recent legislation 
to impose heavier penalties, increased severity did not result ‘in any significant 
change in sentence levels’ and ‘moderate fines remain the norm’.9 Researchers 
studying the operation of current statutes question ‘whether the protections 
afforded by the legislation are more symbolic than real’.
The detection of animal cruelty is difficult and typically prosecutions depend, 
not on the police or other government agents, but on the work of the 84 Royal 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animal (RSPCA) inspectors Australia-
wide, who investigated 53,544 complaints of cruelty and neglect involving ‘farm 
animals, companion animals, pets and wildlife’ in 2009–10.10 The inspectors 
possess ‘wide-ranging powers’ and can enter and search premises, seize animals 
and relieve animal suffering.11 Despite such powers, the RSPCA prosecuted only 
247 cases, or about 0.46 per cent, of all the complaints its inspectors investigated 
and, of those cases, 185, or about 75 per cent, resulted in convictions, a high 
success rate due to ‘a very high proportion of guilty pleas’.12 Despite the high 
success rate, courts rarely impose custodial sentences even though only serious 
cases are prosecuted and usually in cases involving ‘extreme violence’, often 
verging on sadism.13 Most offenders are fined ‘modest’ sums and thus receive 
‘the least severe sentencing option’. More severe non-custodial sentences such as 
community service or work orders are infrequently imposed. Orders prohibiting 
an offender from keeping an animal for a specified period or permanently, which 
are suitably punitive for repeat offenders, appear not to be used extensively, 
7 Radford, 94.
8 Sankoff, 18–20.
9 Annabel Markham, ‘Animal Cruelty Sentencing in Australia and New Zealand’, in Sankoff and White, 290.
10 RSPCA web site at http://www.rspca.org.au/what-we-do/inspectorate.html and annual statistics at 
http://www.rspca.org.au/resources/ accessed 9 October 2011.
11 Cao, 172.
12 RSPCA, annual statistics; Cao, 174.
13 Markham, 294–96.
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but more research is needed to verify that observation.14 In short, inadequate 
sentencing practices undermine the power of statute law to protect animals 
and reinforce the traditional legal status of animals as ‘property and not living, 
sentient beings’.15 The history of animal protection law reveals this pattern.
Laws protecting animals were first passed in 1837 in Van Diemen’s Land, gradually 
spread to the other colonies in the 1840s, were extended in the 1860s, early 1900s 
and 1920s, and were revised in the 1950s and the 1980s in all states.16 While the 
level of research into historical cases of cruelty remains limited, it appears that 
relatively few cases of animal cruelty were prosecuted before the 1870s and, if 
they were, the courts held almost from their establishment that ‘the protection 
of the animal was always legally invisible next to the primary issue of animal 
possession’.17 No one took responsibility for prosecuting animal cruelty cases 
systematically until Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) 
were formed in Victoria, New South Wales and Tasmania in the 1870s. But as is 
the case with contemporary Australia, the percentage of complaints investigated 
by SPCA inspectors compared with the amount of cruelty practiced was small, 
the number of cases prosecuted in proportion to the cases investigated was also 
small, and the courts rarely imposed severe penalties on those offenders found 
guilty of cruelty. Circumscribed by limited resources, the SPCA also relied 
on educating public opinion to be kind to animals and remonstrating with 
individuals who mistreated animals to complement their prosecution of extreme 
cases of cruelty or recalcitrant owners. After 1900 the SPCA began to feel that 
the law was not effective in fundamentally changing human behaviour and 
turned more to education as their main weapon against cruelty. In this chapter, 
these generalisations will be supported by an examination of the operation of 
the law in Tasmania between 1803 and 1914, concentrating on the period from 
1878 when the SPCA began its work of stamping out cruelty in Tasmania.
British developments influenced the reactions of the Australian colonies to 
animal cruelty and an overview of those developments follows. The law loomed 
large in efforts to stop brutality in Britain from the passing of the groundbreaking 
Cruelty to Animals Act in 1822 and the passing of many more laws thereafter 
expanding the definition of cruelty and making punishment more severe.18 
Although there was ‘educational and symbolic value in getting kindness 
to animals incorporated into the law’, animals did not gain ‘more power’ or 
‘more freedom’, and much hinged on effective law enforcement to restrict 
14 Cao, 176.
15 K. Sharman, ‘Sentencing Under Our Anti-Cruelty Statutes: Why Our Leniency Will Come Back to Bite 
Us’, Current Issues in Criminal Justice 13 (2002): 334.
16 Philip Jamieson, ‘Animal Welfare: A Movement in Transition’, in Law and History: A Collection of Papers 
Presented at the 1989 Law and History Conference, ed., Suzanne Corcoran (University of Adelaide, 1989): 24.
17 B. Salter, ‘Possess or Protect? Exploring the Legal Status of Animals in Australia’s First Colonial Courts: 
Part 1, The Unnatural Theft and Murder’, Australian Animal Protection Law Journal 2 (2009): 40.
18 The various statutes passed in Britain are discussed in Radford, 33–89.
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human misuse of their dominion over animals.19 The SPCA was established in 
1824 (becoming the Royal SPCA in 1840) to ensure that the law was rigorously 
enforced, especially against the ‘visible ill-treatment’ of horses on urban streets; 
the SPCA wanted to stop cruelty from being encouraged by bad example.20 
Michael Roberts is right to point out that initially the RSPCA was ‘divided on 
the legitimacy and social effects of law enforcement as a policy’ and sought to 
gain ‘educational publicity via example-setting rather than tighter policing as 
an end in itself’.21 After overcoming initial jealousy and suspicion, the RSPCA 
secured the co-operation of magistrates and the police, to support the work 
of its own paid inspectors and, by the 1840s, ‘the principle of legislation to 
protect animals from cruelty had been firmly established’.22 The RSPCA was 
one of the few important pressure groups that ‘consistently collaborated with 
the authorities’ and this resulted in increased convictions for cruelty by 1901.23 
Most RSPCA prosecutions were of working men because their cruelty was 
the most visible and its officers were prevented from entering ‘private places’ 
because of ‘the sacredness of alleged rights of the citizen, the domicile and of 
private property’.24
In the second half of the nineteenth century, some animal protectionists 
again questioned whether using the law was the most effective way to change 
behaviour and warned against the dangers of infringing individual liberty 
by extreme legislation.25 By the 1860s, education to reinforce prosecution had 
become an increasingly important part of the RSPCA’s program.26 It aimed to 
familiarise people with the nature of animal mistreatment and to engender 
kindness towards animals, but also to persuade onlookers to intervene and stop 
cruelty. Special efforts were made by the many female members of the RSPCA to 
educate children in schools and through the Band of Mercy movement.27 From 
1865 churches helped to educate their parishioners with sermons on Animal 
Sundays.28 The RSPCA skilfully mobilised ‘the general public’s enthusiasm 
and even, on occasion, its sentimentality in defence of animals’.29 Despite the 
perseverance and courage of animal protection enthusiasts, the struggle to 
19 Brian Harrison, Peaceable Kingdom: Stability and Change in Modern Britain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1982), 121; John Passmore, ‘The Treatment of Animals’, Journal of the History of Ideas 36 (1975): 212.
20 Harriet Ritvo, The Animal Estate: The English and Other Creatures in the Victorian Age (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1987), 138, 146; Hilda Kean, Animal Rights: Political and Social Change in Britain 
Since 1800 (London: Reaktion, 1998), 37, 50, 80.
21 M.J.D. Roberts, Making English Morals: Voluntary Associations and Moral Reform in England, 1787–1886 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004), 135.
22 Radford, 61.
23 Harrison, 83, 93, 111, 146–50.
24 Radford, 84.
25 Kean, 35.
26 Ritvo, 147; Harrison, 129.
27 Kean, 46; Arthur W. Moss, Valiant Crusade: The History of the R.S.P.C.A. (London: Cassell, 1961), 196–98.
28 Moss, 205–06.
29 Harrison, 108, 114, 117.
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change cultural attitudes to animals never gained full acceptance and faced 
ridicule and resentment, evasion and resistance, especially amongst the poor 
whose recreations and livelihoods they attacked.30
The ‘civilizing mission’ of middle-class reformers in Britain was ‘exported to 
the colonies’ and found its ‘most telling expression’ in the formation of animal 
protection societies ‘devoted to notions of progress towards a higher state of 
civilization’.31 The key decade for the formation of animal protection societies 
in the Australian colonies was the 1870s, when four were formed.32 By the 1870s 
tolerance of cruelty and immoral behaviour generally had greatly lessened in 
the Australian colonies and the debate over vivisection in Britain renewed 
interest in animal protection. The next section explores the changing attitudes 
to cruelty in Tasmania from the 1820s to the 1870s.
Changing attitudes to cruelty in Tasmania
Settled as Australia’s second colony in 1803, Tasmania began life as the island 
penal colony of Van Diemen’s Land and gained a reputation for brutality in the 
treatment of convicts and the Indigenous population.33 British settlers to the 
island had been accustomed to be cruel to animals and ‘the dominion of man’ 
was reinforced by the freedom of all classes to hunt native animals for sport and 
food.34 In 1826 the Colonial Times railed against the ‘inhumanity’ with which 
horses, oxen and other animals were treated in Van Diemen’s Land.35 Each day 
settlers saw ‘the most brutal instances of ferocity’ practised on public streets 
by both free arrivals and convicts. The Colonial Times advocated the enactment 
of legislation for the prevention of cruelty to animals. In 1832 this call was 
supported by the editor of The Independent, who, in Launceston, daily observed 
‘lamentable scenes of cruelty too shocking to relate’.36
No legislation was passed and cruelty continued to attract newspaper attention. 
In 1834 a man was seen hitting his horse’s head repeatedly with the butt of his 
whip and, when passers-by remonstrated with him to stop, he replied that ‘the 
30 Ritvo, 166; Kathleen Kete, ‘Animals and Ideology: The Politics of Animal Protection in Europe’, in 
Representing Animals, ed., Nigel Rothfels (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 27.
31 Dorothee Brantz, ‘The Domestication of Empire: Human-Animal Relations at the Intersection of 
Civilization, Evolution, and Acclimatization’, in A Cultural History of Animals in an Age of Empire, ed., 
Kathleen Kete (Oxford: Berg, 2007), 75, 79.
32 Daily News, 22 June 1878, 3; T. Bonyhady, The Colonial Earth (Melbourne: Miegunyah Press, 2000), 154.
33 Lloyd Robson, A Short History of Tasmania, updated by Michael Roe, 2nd ed. (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1997).
34 David Young, Sporting Island: A History of Sport and Recreation in Tasmania (Hobart: Sport and 
Recreation, Tasmania, 2005), 1–4.
35 Colonial Times and Tasmanian Advertiser, 24 March 1826, 3; 17 November 1826, 3.
36 Independent (Launceston), 11 February 1832, 2.
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horse was his own, and he could do as he pleased with it’.37 Such conduct ‘can 
never be endured in a Christian country’, where no man had ‘a right to violate 
the laws of humanity by torturing any animal, because it is his property’, 
declared the Colonial Times. While Lieutenant-Governor George Arthur showed 
no interest in dealing with animal cruelty, his successor Sir John Franklin was 
more temperamentally attuned to suffering of all kinds, whether human or 
animal. Soon after his arrival in Van Diemen’s Land in 1837, Franklin travelled 
around the island and must have seen examples of mistreatment of animals.38 
He was also presumably aware of the enactment of new British legislation in 
1835 against ‘cruel and improper treatment’. Whatever his motives, Franklin 
passed the first legislation in Australian history to prevent cruelty to animals, 
The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, in 1837, extending to Van Diemen’s 
Land some of the provisions of the 1835 Act, known as Pease’s Act.39
Philip Jamieson calls the 1837 Act ‘a pale reflection’ of Pease’s British Act.40 Few 
prosecutions were brought under the 1837 legislation possibly because, as the 
Chief Police Magistrate Matthew Forster suggested when the bill was debated, 
of ‘the difficulty of determining what was cruelty’.41 Moreover, the police were 
too preoccupied with other offences to pay much attention to animal cruelty.42 
Cock-fighting and, to some extent, dog-fighting remained popular pastimes for 
the convict classes at least.43 In 1848 the Britannia and Trades Advocate thought 
that the prevention of cruelty legislation was not ‘generally known’ and 
noted ‘the brutal indifference’ with which men and some women treated their 
domestic animals.44 To show kindness and consideration to animals was held to 
be ‘a proof of weakness, and a fair subject of ridicule’. The newspaper declared 
that cruelty to animals was carried out to ‘a greater extent’ in Van Diemen’s 
Land than ‘we have witnessed in any other part of the civilized world’. It noted 
the absence of lectures, sermons or instructions to teach young boys and girls 
‘to feel kindly’ towards animals.45 The Britannia and Trades Advocate blamed 
women for allowing dogs to be deprived of water and food. It was ‘unwomanly’ 
to leave dogs ‘pining with thirst, tied to a stake, with scarcely room to turn’. It 
urged teachers to educate their students to be kind to animals and the police 
37 Colonial Times, 11 February 1834, 4.
38 Kathleen Fitzpatrick, Sir John Franklin in Tasmania 1837–1843 (Melbourne University Press, 1949), 
117–18.
39 Franklin to Glenelg, 4 December 1837, Colonial Office 280/81, 125, Despatch 128, Australian Joint 
Copying Project, National Library of Australia; Jamieson, 22.
40 Jamieson, 22.
41 Hobart Town Courier, 21 July 1837, 4; for examples of prosecutions see Cornwall Chronicle, 30 January 
1841, 2; Launceston Courier, 15 March 1841, 2 and Jamieson, 22.
42 Launceston Advertiser, 26 October 1844, 3; Stefan Petrow, ‘After Arthur: Policing in Van Diemen’s Land 
1837–1846’, in Policing the Lucky Country, eds, M. Enders and B. Dupont (Sydney: Federation Press, 2001), 
176–98.
43 Young, 17–18, 45.
44 Britannia and Trades Advocate, 24 August 1848, 4, emphasis in original.
45 Britannia and Trades Advocate, 15 November 1849, 4.
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to enforce the 1837 Act. Individual citizens could also prosecute for cruelty, 
but this was even less common than police prosecutions.46 As in contemporary 
Australia, much animal cruelty went uninvestigated and unpunished.
Further legislation had to wait until after self-government was introduced to 
Tasmania in 1856. Tasmania’s leading animal protectionist, the writer Louisa 
Anne Meredith, was ‘the prime mover in having Acts passed for the protection 
of wildlife’.47 For example, she persuaded her politician husband Charles to 
introduce legislation protecting black swans and this was passed in 1860.48 
Other legislation was passed in the 1860s and 1870s to protect native game and 
birds either during the breeding season or at all times. Section 83 of the Police 
Act 1865 imposed a £5 fine for anyone caught ‘fighting, baiting or worrying’ 
animals, but attracted no comment in the House of Assembly.49 This was a 
common provision in police legislation and did not represent any particular 
concerns in the community.50 It appears that this legislation was rarely enforced 
and dogfighting, dog worrying and cockfighting were ‘passively suffered’ by 
the police, especially on Sunday afternoons, until at least 1880.51 In June 1886 a 
correspondent called ‘Viator’ told Mercury readers that ‘insensibility to animal 
suffering in the Australian colonies’ was worse than in ‘more densely populated 
countries of the world’.52 In Tasmania, with its experience of ‘the awful cruelties 
of the convict era, it seems strange that cruelty to animals, tenfold more horrible 
and widespread, should be regarded with complacent apathy’.
Some Tasmanians found apathy increasingly intolerable and wanted to distance 
the colony from the cruelty and brutality of the penal past.53 Kay Daniels has 
characterised the three decades from 1860 to 1890 as a ‘period of transition in 
Tasmanian history from penal settlement to “civilized” society’, by which she 
means a ‘free community, increasingly dominated by the values of the middle 
class’.54 These values included sexual purity and restraint, honesty, decency and 
respect for property and person. During this period, the middle class demanded 
an end to violence, idleness and criminality, the hallmarks of convictism, and 
46 For a private prosecution that resulted in conviction see Hobarton Guardian, 7 December 1853, 3.
47 Vivienne Rae-Ellis, Louisa Anne Meredith: A Tigress in Exile (Hobart: St. David’s Park Publishing, 1990), 
184.
48 Louisa Anne Meredith, Tasmanian Friends and Foes, Feathered, Furred, and Finned: A Family Chronicle of 
Country Life, Natural History and Veritable Adventure (London: Marcus Ward, 1881), 158–59.
49 Mercury, 2 September 1865, 3.
50 Philip Jamieson, ‘Duty and the Beast: The Movement in Reform of Animal Welfare Law’, University of 
Queensland Law Journal 16 (1990–91): 241–42.
51 Mercury, 15 September 1880, 2.
52 Letter by ‘Viator’, Mercury, 23 June 1886, 3.
53 For a snapshot of the penal system see Robert Hughes, The Fatal Shore: A History of the Transportation of 
Convicts to Australia 1787–1868 (London: Pan Books, 1988), 368–424.
54 Kay Daniels, ‘Prostitution in Tasmania during the Transition from Penal Settlement to “Civilized” 
Society’, in So Much Hard Work: Women and Prostitution in Australian Society, ed., Kay Daniels (Sydney: 
Fontana, 1984), 23, 49.
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worked through many religious and benevolent institutions for the creation of 
a more respectable society.55 This transition was especially obvious in Hobart 
where, in the 1870s, middle-class Protestant moral reformers demanded that 
the municipal police force (established in 1858) impose order on the streets by 
suppressing prostitution, ruffianism and juvenile delinquency and enforcing 
the liquor licensing laws.56
As part of their mission to transform Hobart into a civilised society, middle-
class humanitarians also demanded in the 1870s that official action be taken to 
stop violence against animals. Criticism was directed at the municipal police 
for ignoring ‘scenes of brutality’ that regularly occurred on Hobart streets by 
licensed cabmen and owners of coaches who ill-treated their horses.57 Animal 
protectionists thought that the modernisation of the law was urgently needed 
to stamp out such behaviour. They had an ally in the House of Assembly in 
the Fingal farmer William St Paul Gellibrand. Gellibrand’s sister, Mary Selina 
Gellibrand, became a stalwart of the Tasmanian Society for the Protection of 
Cruelty to Animals (TSPCA) and no doubt urged her brother to introduce the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Bill in October 1877, which extended ‘the 
principles’ of the British Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1849 to Tasmania.58 
William Gellibrand noted that similar legislation in Victoria, New Zealand and 
Queensland had worked ‘remarkably well’.59 The bill was well received in the 
assembly and passed without amendment. In the Legislative Council only one 
member opposed the bill and it was passed with minor amendments.60
The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1877 repealed the 1837 Act. It sought to 
protect horses, cattle, donkeys, sheep, pigs, goats, cats, dogs and other domestic 
animals from being ‘cruelly and unnecessarily’ flogged, beaten, overdriven, 
overridden, overloaded, abused, tortured or otherwise ill-treated.61 Offenders 
who were found guilty of such offences could be fined up to £10 in a court of 
summary jurisdiction. But enforcement remained lax and complaints of cruelty 
regularly appeared in the press.62 It became clear that a SPCA was needed to give 
‘practical effect to the law’.63 The cause was spurred on in July 1878 by an act 
of ‘awful barbarity’ when boys in Upper Goulburn Street exposed ‘a helpless 
55 Peter Bolger, Hobart Town (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973), 135–193.
56 Stefan Petrow, ‘Arabs, Boys and Larrikins: Juvenile Delinquents and their Treatment in Hobart, 1860–
1896’, Australian Journal of Legal History 2 (1996): 37–59 and ‘Creating an Orderly Society: The Hobart 
Municipal Police 1880–1898’, Labour History no. 75 (1998): 175–94.
57 Letter by ‘Nec Timeo Nec Sperno’, Mercury, 18 February 1875, 2.
58 Weld to Carnarvon, 21 December 1877, Despatch 59, Colonial Office 280/384, 356, National Library of 
Australia, Australian Joint Copying Project.
59 Mercury, 31 October 1877, 3.
60 Mercury, 7 November 1877, 2; 9 November 1877, 3.
61 Mercury, 17 May 1878, 3.
62 Letter by ‘Englishman’, 24 May 1878, 3; Letter by ‘Justice’, Mercury, 3 June 1878, 3, 3.
63 Letter by ‘Justice’, Mercury, 3 June 1878, 3; Mercury, 15 July 1878, 2; Third Annual Report of the TSPCA 
(Hobart: TSPCA, 1881), 8.
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cat to the worrying of dogs’, and then slowly ‘roasted the mutilated, suffering 
creature to death’.64 Public pressure forced the police to prosecute one of the 
boys, Michael Maguire, for throwing the cat on the fire and he was fined £5. 
Cruelty would continue, asserted the Mercury, unless citizens joined together 
in ‘a corporate body for the inculcation of the principles of humanity and the 
strongest punishment of all forms of barbarity’. This case was the motivation 
for ‘a small band’ of animal lovers to form a local SPCA, which became the most 
prominent and influential pressure group in late-nineteenth-century Tasmania 
and led the ‘crusade against the vice and brutality of the oppression of animal 
life’.65
On 19 July 1878 a crowded public meeting, chaired by Governor Frederick Weld, 
formed the TSPCA.66 Royal endorsement by Queen Victoria had strengthened 
support for the British SPCA and Weld’s presence as the Queen’s representative 
gave the local cause ‘social standing and legitimacy’.67 The leading speakers 
highlighted man’s duty to ‘brute creation’. Sir James Wilson, member for 
Hobart in the Legislative Council, thought that they should put down cruelty 
with ‘the strong arm of the law as an example to all … evil doers’. The religious 
motivation behind the TSPCA’s formation was illustrated by Dean H.B. Bromby, 
who stressed that prevention of cruelty was ‘holy work’ and constituted ‘one 
of the foundations of Christianity’. Teaching the young to be kind to animals 
had social benefits: they would in later years ‘possess many of the elements of 
nobility and betray a more considerate tenderness, more moral courage and a 
more chivalrous bearing towards others’.68 The premier, W.R. Giblin, thought 
that the TSPCA was evidence of ‘the growth of a vigorous and healthy sentiment 
in the colony’.69 Cruelty stemmed from ‘the assertion of a sense of dominion 
over the brute creation’, but Giblin thought that few humans were ‘fit to be 
entrusted with the absolute dominion of any living thing’ and the TSPCA would 
check ‘the abuse of this possession of powers to ill-treat’.
The new society had two main aims. The prime objective was to excite and 
sustain ‘an intelligent public opinion regarding man’s duty to animals’.70 
The other major aim was ‘to prevent cruelty to animals by enforcing, where 
practicable, the existing laws’ and to seek new legislation when ‘expedient’. The 
TSPCA’s first annual report clearly stated that ‘prevention and not punishment 
64 Mercury, 15 July 1878, 2; 19 July 1878, 2.
65 C.E. Walch, The Story of the Life of Charles Edward Walch, with a Selection of His Writings (Hobart: J. 
Walch and Sons, 1908), lxxii; Mercury, 2 August 1887, 3.
66 Mercury, 20 July 1878, 2.
67 Radford, 47.
68 Bromby’s speech was printed in full from the reporter’s notes, see Mercury, 30 July 1878, 3 and drew 
criticism for being ‘a combination of fallacies’ (Letter by J.L. Livingston, see Mercury, 2 August 1878, 3).
69 Mercury, 20 July 1878, 2.
70 ibid.
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was the end to be attained’.71 If remonstrance by ‘word or by letter’ did not 
work and the law was persistently broken, then the perpetrator was prosecuted. 
But the TSPCA strongly believed that, ‘To educate to right thinking and right 
acting is a method more potent for good than to punish for wrong-doing’. After 
one year’s work and 30 prosecutions, of which 25 resulted in convictions, the 
TSPCA thought it had demonstrated the need for active supervision of animals 
and that its aims were not ‘Quixotic, wasting its resources and energies upon the 
impracticable’.72 The TSPCA described its work as ‘coercive persuasion’.73 No 
prosecution was undertaken without seeking the opinion of leading lawyer John 
Mitchell, who was the society’s honorary legal adviser.74 In subsequent annual 
reports, the TSPCA continued to remind fellow colonists of its guiding principles 
that ‘kindness of rebuke and remonstrance’ was appropriate for offenders who 
were ‘young and thoughtless, or poor and struggling’, but warned that ‘strict 
justice’ would be applied to ‘the wilfully cruel and cowardly’.75
Inspired by Meredith’s move to that city, a branch of the SPCA was founded 
in Launceston in August 1879.76 One of the founders, Anglican archdeacon 
Francis Hales, declared that they had not formed ‘a prosecuting society’ but ‘an 
educating society’.77 Their aim should be to teach labourers and children that 
they had a ‘duty’ to treat animals ‘kindly’ from ‘a sense of their responsibility to 
their Creator who formed them both’. Most cruelty arose from ‘thoughtlessness’ 
and, by helping people ‘to understand the sufferings they thus inflict’, the 
society ‘might rank next to Christianity as a means of developing the highest 
moral instincts’. Betraying a dislike for the increasingly inquisitorial actions of 
the Hobart-based society, the Launceston Examiner hoped that the Launceston 
branch would seek rather ‘to persuade than to coerce’ and warned that the 
community ‘will not tolerate a system of espionage that may become an engine of 
persecution’.78 The branch should ‘foster habits of gentleness and consideration 
among all social classes of the community and especially to encourage them 
amongst the young’.79 The branch must not infringe ‘individual liberty’ when 
doing its legitimate work.
The Launceston branch, having absorbed the message, stressed in its first 
annual report that it had avoided exercising ‘over much zeal at the outset’ lest it 
antagonise the community and not gain public support.80 Indeed, its proceedings 
71 Mercury, 19 July 1879, 2.
72 ibid.
73 Mercury, 8 August 1879, 2.
74 Mercury, 3 September 1878, 2.
75 Second Annual Report of the TSPCA (Hobart: TSPCA, 1880), 7.
76 Rae-Ellis, 216.
77 Launceston Examiner, 21 August 1879, 3.
78 Launceston Examiner, 11 September 1879, 2.
79 Launceston Examiner, 16 September 1879, 2.
80 Launceston Examiner, 22 September 1880, supplement, 1.
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were characterised by ‘such cautious discretion’ that many supporters thought 
it was ‘somewhat too conciliatory’. In most cases ‘careful enquiry’ was followed 
by ‘an earnest remonstrance’ to an offender and, as many cruelties arose from 
‘thoughtlessness, custom or gross ignorance’, this was sufficient to stop cruelty. 
But some members thought that punishment was necessary in ‘extreme or 
obstinate cases’.81 For example a ‘thoroughly brutal’ master who overloaded, 
flogged or starved his horse would not be ‘converted to humanity by soft 
words only’. The branch willingly sought to punish anyone who ‘persistently’ 
disregarded ‘the voice of mercy’.82 But the Launceston branch operated 
intermittently. In about 1885 it virtually disappeared from public view until it 
was reorganised in 1892, and then disappeared again around 1906 and was not 
reorganised until 1923.83 The lack of continuity weakened its effectiveness and 
the law was a dead letter when the society lapsed. The next section will examine 
how the SPCA went about its work in Tasmania, with special emphasis on the 
more active Hobart branch.
Public opinion, private remonstrance and 
prosecution 1878–1904
Immediately after its formation, the TSPCA set about making the Tasmanian 
public aware of the reason for its existence. The society realised that many 
people, and even the police, were unaware of the new Act and printed placards 
and posters outlining the society’s aims and sections of the Act, which were 
circulated in town and country.84 The press, especially the Mercury, was a useful 
ally in spreading the aims of the TSPCA and denouncing cruelty to animals.85 
The Mercury supported the TSPCA because it brought Tasmania ‘into the fold 
of European humanity’.86
A crucial step in building caring public attitudes towards animals was to exert 
influence in day and Sunday schools.87 The TSPCA believed that ‘among the 
young — the coming men and women of our community — rests the most hopeful 
part of the society’s operations’.88 The TSPCA sought to bring into action ‘the 
divinely implanted instincts of tenderness and love, and pity which are latent 
81 Letter by ‘M’, Launceston Examiner, 30 October 1880, 3.
82 Examiner, 9 October 1900, 7.
83 Launceston Examiner, 20 August 1892, 4; Minute book, SPCA, Launceston, 21 June 1923, NS870/1/1, 
Tasmanian Archives and Heritage Office (TAHO), Hobart.
84 Mercury, 24 July 1878, 3.
85 Mercury, 27 August 1878, 2.
86 Mercury, 21 October 1878, 2.
87 Mercury, 27 August 1878, 2.
88 Mercury, 19 July 1881, 3.
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in every child’.89 Following the Victorian system, the society invited the public 
schools in Hobart and some schools in the country to join its Scholar’s Branch 
and pay a fee of one penny per year per child.90 Essay competitions were held 
yearly on the subject of ‘man’s duty to animals’. Meredith hoped that writing 
essays on such topics would help develop in students ‘a keener perception of 
what is beautiful and lovable in animal nature’ and that the children would 
note ‘with gentler sympathy and sharper censure any act of cruelty they may 
encounter’.91 In addition to the Scholar’s Branch in the schools, the TSPCA 
encouraged the formation of Bands of Mercy, comprised of children living in a 
particular district.92 The wife of the governor, Lady Teresa Hamilton called the 
members of bands ‘soldiers, bound to stand shoulder to shoulder in the cause 
of mercy’.93
By August 1887, 24 schools and Bands of Mercy had affiliated with the TSPCA 
and over 2000 children had become members, pledging themselves to prevent 
‘suffering or oppression’.94 The Board of Education agreed to tell teachers 
about the aims of the TSPCA.95 Sunday Schools were asked to urge ‘kindness to 
animals upon the attention of their scholars’ and four had joined by July 1882.96 
Following the ‘exact discipline’ of the RSPCA, funds obtained from fines were 
not used for general running expenses or the inspector’s salary, but were used 
to pay for literature for the Scholar’s Branch.97 A legacy of £100 was devoted to 
pay for awards for essay prizewinners.98 Numbers for the Launceston branch 
are harder to divine but, by September 1880, over 700 children had enrolled in 
the Scholar’s Branch.99 Complementing the work of the Launceston SPCA was 
the branch of the English Dicky Bird Society, which urged children through 
the columns of the Tasmanian to protect native birds and had 1680 members 
throughout Tasmania by 1892.100
Another crucial way in which SPCA branches spread their message was through 
the work of the key officer, the inspector. In Hobart, the first inspector was 
George Stuart, the visiting officer of the Board of Education, who was employed 
89 Mercury, 2 December 1885, 3.
90 Mercury, 19 October 1878, 2; Mercury, 19 July 1879, 2.
91 Launceston Examiner, 9 June 1880, 2.
92 Mercury, 2 December 1885, 3.
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until July 1880 when retired police sergeant Patrick Duggan was appointed.101 
Duggan was ‘an esteemed ex-member of the force’ and his appointment was 
expected to improve co-operation with the police. Duggan remained the society’s 
inspector until his death in September 1895 when another ex-policeman, Robert 
Large, was appointed to the position. The inspectors visited various workplaces 
where livestock were used or housed, such as the wharves, stables, quarries, the 
railway station, cabstands, public pounds and sale yards. Duggan gave much 
attention to the municipal slaughter yards and ensured that sheep had not been 
deprived of food and water.102 The TSPCA also warned against ‘the scalding of 
pigs before quite lifeless’ and strove to exercise its powers ‘to secure the merciful 
slaying of stock’.103 The inspectors traversed Hobart and surrounding suburbs 
and districts warning citizens to treat their animals kindly. Duggan extended 
his supervision beyond the suburbs of Hobart to Glenorchy, Brighton and 
Bridgewater to the north, Bellerive and Sorell to the east, and Huonville to the 
south.104 To Duggan’s ‘unwearied industry, discretion and courtesy, the cause 
of humanity owes its strongest support’, asserted the TSPCA annual report of 
1884.105 Large was equally conscientious in his work and remained the inspector 
until his death in 1930.106
In Launceston, Meredith was disappointed at the lack of action by the municipal 
police and advocated appointing an inspector to enquire into and report on 
cases of cruelty.107 In November 1880 ex-soldier and policeman William Sessions 
was appointed and was sent to Hobart for a week to be tutored in his duties 
by Duggan.108 Sessions proved his worth after one year. In his supervision 
of the streets, wharves, railway stations and sale yards he detected cases of 
mistreatment and his work had ‘a preventive influence’.109 When Sessions 
retired due to ill health in August 1883, the TSPCA chose another ex-soldier 
and former Corporation of Glasgow employee Alexander Kirkland to be its 
inspector.110 From about 1893 a series of short-term and part-time appointments 
filled the position of inspector with the help of some members who acted as 
honorary inspectors.111 Declining support left the branch without an inspector 
from about 1900 to 1914, but its work was carried on by developing closer 
101 Mercury, 8 August 1878, 2; 15 August 1878, 2; 15 July 1880, 3; Second Annual Report of the TSPCA, 7; 
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relations with the police and state schools.112 The police prosecuted those who 
disregarded ‘the voice of mercy’, but they too put more effort into spreading ‘a 
more intelligent conception of man’s responsibilities’ to animals.
The inspectors registered the names of anyone found guilty of cruelty and kept 
a record of cautions and remonstrances.113 They initially tried ‘every power 
of private remonstrance before resorting to publicity and punishment’.114 
This was shown in the way in which inspectors dealt with the treatment of 
horses, to which most of their efforts were directed. At first, Stuart tried to 
persuade individual owners to rest injured or tired horses. He advised owners 
not to turn the hose on horses ‘heated and exhausted by fatiguing work’, which 
damaged their health.115 He advised cab owners that clipping horses in cold 
weather deprived them of ‘the protection of their winter coats’. Some owners 
reprimanded their workers for mistreating horses and thanked Stuart for his 
information.116 In June 1879 Gellibrand reported that the society investigated 
every allegation of ‘ill-usage’ and received ‘the willing co-operation of all those 
with whom it became their duty to remonstrate’.117 This proved that cruelty 
was due to ‘ignorance or thoughtlessness’ and not ‘wilful barbarity’ and that 
the work of the society was ‘understood’. Inspectors such as Duggan could only 
deal with ‘open, flagrant cases’, and ‘much cruelty, practised in private’, was 
‘beyond his power to prevent or to bring forward for punishment’.118
In Launceston, Sessions issued cautions to owners not to work horses with 
swollen or sore collars and invariably found ‘the amelioration had been 
promptly attended to’.119 In 1892 a senior member of the Launceston branch, 
Henry Button, claimed that the greater ‘tenderness’ with which horses were 
treated was due to ‘a great extent’ to the efforts and influence of the TSPCA.120 
In 1894 the Launceston branch offered prizes at the agricultural show for horses 
that were judged to have been kept in the best condition.121 Prizes were offered 
to cab, racing, delivery and wood carthorses.
In addition to its efforts to educate the public and remonstrate with offenders, 
the TSPCA did prosecute extreme cases of cruelty. Between 1878 and 1890 the 
average annual number of prosecutions was 67, while between 1891 and June 
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1904, when the society’s public presence lessened, the annual average was 22.122 
Most of those prosecutions involved cruelty to horses, which were numerous, for 
they were used in many different occupations and for transport for residents and 
tourists.123 As Hilda Kean has argued for Britain, their mistreatment was clearly 
visible on city streets and showed that the society’s intervention was based on 
real evils not emotional overreaction.124 In Launceston details of prosecutions 
are patchy, with 51 prosecutions being positively recorded between 1882 and 
1894.125 Presumably most prosecutions also involved horses, because Sessions 
found ‘many’ examples of horses in ‘a poor and emaciated condition, underfed, 
badly housed, and hardly fit for work’.126
Cab owners were a particular target of the TSPCA as many knowingly overused 
and neglected the horses in their care. In February 1879 the TSPCA tried to 
awaken them to their responsibilities by issuing copies of the Cruelty Act, 
the society’s handbills and the Victorian Society for the Protection of Cruelty 
to Animals (VSPCA) pamphlet ‘Claims of Animals’.127 Overloading of cabs 
continued, but the TSPCA felt powerless to stop it. The power to prevent 
overloading of public conveyances fell within the jurisdiction of the police by 
s. 153 of the Police Act 1865.128 In one case, two omnibus horses were worked 
so hard that at the end of the day they could barely ‘crawl along’.129 After the 
society asked the Hobart City Council to stop ‘this very cruel custom’, the 
newly-appointed Superintendent of Police Frederick Pedder ordered his men to 
prevent overloading of omnibuses and night cars.130
Harder to deal with was the persistent working of horses that were lame or 
‘weakened by age and insufficient food’.131 The society regularly noted examples 
of feeble and thin horses on cabstands caused by ‘scanty feeding and general 
inattention’.132 It was difficult to prove ‘actual cruelty’ under the Prevention 
of Cruelty Act because of ‘technical difficulties’ and it would take a long time 
to eradicate the mistreatment by ‘isolated punishments’. Mistreatment could 
be stopped in a day if the mayor used his powers under ss. 136 and 137 of 
the Police Act and ordered monthly inspections of horses on cabstands. The 
TSPCA received support from the recently formed Hobart Town Cabmen’s 
122 These averages are drawn from the incomplete statistics found in annual reports of the TSPCA.
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Protective Union, who wanted to raise their status ‘socially and morally’ and 
stop mistreatment of horses. This is an example of how the society’s publicity 
and teachings in how best to treat animals could gradually change working-
class attitudes, but it also showed that the success of its message depended on 
individuals wanting to change that behaviour. Six members of the cabmen’s 
union were appointed honorary members of the TSPCA. After the mayor W.H. 
Burgess visited the cab and car horses, he ordered that horses whose condition 
‘evidenced wilful neglect and under-feeding’ should be withdrawn from 
service.133
Burgess’s successor as mayor, James Harcourt, was also sympathetic to the 
society and in 1882 appointed Acting-Sergeant Franklin to accompany Duggan 
in regularly inspecting all horses used by licensed vehicles and relieve unfit 
horses from work.134 Cab drivers tried to evade this inspection in ingenious 
ways. They tried to conceal wounds by using acid and plugs of grease and 
hair.135 The acid was ‘the most cruel agent’ because it scorched the skin, caused 
great pain and left a suppurating sore even larger and more painful than the 
original injury. Horses with injured or broken knees, caused by poorly made 
roads, were still used by cab owners, who covered up the injuries using black 
ointment on kneecaps.136 Even when guilt was proved, magistrates inflicted 
‘trifling punishments’ because of the poverty of offenders.137 The society 
believed that it was an ‘error of justice’ to award small fines for ‘deliberate and 
repeated offences’, weakening ‘the vigour and discipline’ of the law and the 
effect of the society’s ‘teaching of humanity’. With time, the society found that 
cautioning offenders did not work effectively because ‘the wilfully cruel man’ 
took advantage of ‘mistaken leniency’ to continue to work unfit animals many 
times until he was prosecuted.138 Light fines were ‘a parody upon the laws’ 
designed to stop cruelty and presaged the leniency shown by courts in the 
twenty-first century.139
Members of the TSPCA responded to needy offenders by giving some poor 
families sustenance from their own pockets while they rested an injured or tired 
horse, buying a new collar, lending others money to buy ‘a fresh horse’, or 
buying a ‘wretched worn-out animal’ so it could be destroyed.140 Cab and cart 
horses felt the extremes of winter and members of the society distributed 72 
rugs to keep them warm while standing still. But the society found that such 
kindnesses ‘induced fresh infractions of the law’ and Duggan had to prosecute 
133 Town Clerk, to Secretary TSPCA, 27 July 1880, MCC 16/7/7, 608, TAHO; Mercury, 14 August 1880, 3.
134 Mercury, 25 October 1882, supplement, 1.
135 Mercury, 18 June 1883, 3.
136 Mercury, 24 February 1879, 2; 21 March 1879, 2; 4 April 1879, 2.
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again.141 Or, the kindness resulted in the increased trafficking of ‘poor worn-
out suffering horses, cruelty thereby assuming a given money value’. Weak 
enforcement of the law and actions of generosity combined ‘to crush down the 
fear of punishment, and … to strengthen the power of lawlessness’. The non-
enforcement of the Police Act against omnibuses, cabs and cars allowed horses 
with ‘tottering’ gaits and ‘emaciated frames’ to endanger the ‘public safety’ 
and defy ‘humanity’. In 1885 two horses fell exhausted on to the streets, ‘the 
last compulsory effort proving too much for aged frames weakened by semi-
starvation’.142
The City Council finally acted decisively in 1890 when Mayor John Watchorn 
ensured greater attention was paid to supervising cab horses and dealt with 
‘some abuses’ that had previously been ignored.143 This greatly improved the 
way that cab horses were treated, but ‘the poor omnibus horses’ were licensed 
and supervised at the police office and only the police magistrate had the power 
to stop the overloading of passengers. Mary Gellibrand called this ‘licensed 
cruelty’ because those in authority did not enforce ‘proper restrictions’.
The overworking of coach horses worsened to the extent that tourists from an 
unnamed ‘neighbouring colony’ described their condition in 1899 as ‘a disgrace 
to Tasmania and a blot on civilisation’.144 The TSPCA investigation revealed some 
improvements. Horses were no longer driven with sores or ‘cruelly flogged’ and 
were mostly ‘well fed and fairly tended’.145 But profit-hungry coach owners 
still used too few horses for too many passengers with heavy luggage and used 
weakened and small horses too often on long stages without adequate rest. In 
many cases of cruelty the offenders pleaded guilty and escaped with a small 
fine but, if evidence had been presented and witnesses examined, ‘a much 
heavier penalty’ might have been inflicted.146 This too parallels the tactics of 
modern-day offenders who seek to escape heavy punishment as discussed in the 
introduction.
Duggan was mostly judicious in the cases he brought to court and often gained 
a conviction, failing, thought the Mercury, only where an ‘unscrupulous line 
of defence’ was adopted.147 Police Magistrate Tarleton thought the Cruelty 
to Animals Prevention Act was ‘a very proper Act’, but ‘such a highly penal 
statute’ demanded that knowledge of guilt had to be clearly proved.148 Sometimes 
141 Seventh Annual Report of the TSPCA, 7.
142 ibid.
143 Letter by M.S. Gellibrand, Mercury, 14 March 1890, 3.
144 Mercury, 31 March 1899, 2.
145 Letter by M.S. Gellibrand, Mercury, 11 April 1899, 3.
146 Mercury, 1 October 1904, 6.
147 Mercury, 3 January 1882, 2.
148 Mercury, 29 March 1879, 2; 30 April 1879, 2.
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Tarleton censured Duggan’s ‘somewhat exaggerated tone and style’.149 In 
February 1880 Tarleton dismissed two cases against James Hogan for using unfit 
horses in his carting business and accused Duggan of persecuting him.150
The acting chairman of the TSPCA James Macfarlane defended Duggan’s 
‘cautious, considerate and yet energetic’ methods.151 He reiterated that they used 
the law only against ‘very flagrant cases’ after an information had been sworn 
first, but for every prosecution at the police office, at least 20 cases of cruelty 
escaped punishment because of the ‘difficulty of legal proof and non-willingness 
of witnesses’. As the ‘influence of kindness’ had ‘never been forgotten’, the 
committee felt ‘surprise and pain’ when reading Tarleton’s remarks and denied 
abusing their power. Macfarlane pointed out that Tarleton had seen Hogan’s 
horse 19 days after the cruelty had been first discovered and the wound had 
healed. As to the accusation of persecution, Macfarlane pointed out that Hogan 
and his employees had been previously convicted six times for cruelty before 
Tarleton himself, three times by the police and three times by the society.
The Mercury agreed that the evidence presented in the Hogan case did not justify 
Tarleton’s ‘hostility’ and ‘false aspersions’.152 After all, Hogan had consistently 
broken the law and tricked Tarleton into questioning the ‘steadfast impartiality’ 
of the TSPCA’s work. Hogan was typical of those owners who saw their horses 
‘simply as beasts of burden, or articles of merchandise’ and asserted ‘a right’ 
to treat horses as they liked.153 Despite opposition and misrepresentation, the 
TSPCA did its work with ‘discrimination, judgment and forbearance’. But the 
society’s morale was dented by the difficulties of finding enough legal evidence 
to support their ‘moral evidence’ of cruelty.154 Cases of brutal flogging, kicking 
and mouth wrenching were especially difficult because Duggan was defeated by 
the ‘technicality of evidence’ and failed to secure ‘the rights of justice’, not least 
when seeking to punish the owners as well as the drivers of horses. Tarleton 
demanded proof in criminal cases that the owner knew that his horse was in 
an unfit condition to be worked, and that evidence was difficult to obtain.155 
Typically in cruelty cases it was not, and is not today, always easy to determine 
whether suffering was ‘unreasonable or unnecessary’ and much depended on 
the circumstances of a particular case.156
149 Mercury, 15 September 1880, 3.
150 Mercury, 24 February 1882, 2; 6 March 1882, 2.
151 Letter by James Macfarlane, Mercury, 25 March 1882, 3.
152 Mercury, 28 February 1882, 2; 27 March 1882, 2.
153 Mercury, 14 November 1882, 2.
154 Seventh Annual Report of the TSPCA, 8.
155 Mercury, 1 April 1891, 2.
156 Sankoff, 14, 20.
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After Tarleton retired to official acclaim in 1894, his successor as police 
magistrate, Bernard Shaw, continued his policy.157 Shaw exercised his power 
feebly and Mary Gellibrand alleged that his ‘sympathy actively works for the 
offenders’.158 Statistics drawn from the annual reports of other colonial societies 
received by the TSPCA supported her case. In 1895–96 the average penalty 
imposed in Hobart was 6s 1/2d, whereas in Victoria it was £2 and in Otago 
£2 6d.159 One specific example occurred in September 1896 when the society 
prosecuted the notoriously brutal municipal dog-catcher Samuel Dunbabin for 
ill-treating a spaniel by tightening a wire noose around the dog’s neck so hard 
that ‘its eyes and tongue protruded’.160 Shaw agreed that the action caused the 
spaniel ‘unnecessary pain’, but it was not an ‘aggravated case’ and he fined 
Dunbabin a mere 5s and 12s costs. But the example of West Coast magistrates 
belied any idea that the law was weak. They ‘constantly imposed heavy fines 
for all cruel offences’ and greatly reduced ‘that brutality which disgraced earlier 
days’ and taught offenders ‘understanding and respect for the law’.161 Their 
‘courage and justice’ were ‘an object-lesson on the improvement which follows 
the firm administration’ of the law.162
The brief of the TSPCA included amending the law when required and this 
occurred in the carrying of poultry. In October 1878 the society learnt that the 
legs of poultry carried to market were tied so tightly that, when they tried to 
struggle free, their legs fractured.163 The committee persuaded the attorney-
general to introduce an amendment to the Police Act Amendment Act, based on 
Victorian legislation, to require the carrying of poultry in crates and baskets and 
making tying legs together an offence.164 The House of Assembly ridiculed the 
idea and the amendment was lost. The colonial treasurer W.R. Giblin described 
the suggestion as ‘over-legislation’, which would create ‘hardship’ for the poor 
who could not afford crates and baskets. In May 1879 Charles Meredith for the 
TSPCA guided through the assembly an amendment to the Cruelty to Animals 
Act to punish persons who caused an animal to suffer when conveying it in 
vehicles.165 According to British law, this included the carrying of poultry.166 By 
157 Mercury, 22 September 1894, supplement, 1; Letter by ‘Humanitas’, Mercury, 29 September 1894, 3.
158 Letter by M.S. Gellibrand, Mercury, 12 January 1897, 4.
159 Letter by M.S. Gellibrand, Mercury, 27 November 1896, 3.
160 Mercury, 10 September 1896, 2.
161 Letter by M.S. Gellibrand, Mercury, 2 September 1902, 2.
162 Minute book of the SPCA, Launceston, 14 October 1902, NS870/1/1, TAHO.
163 Mercury, 4 October 1878, 2.
164 Mercury, 16 October 1878, 3.
165 Mercury, 23 May 1879, 3.
166 Mercury, 19 July 1879, 2.
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1881, Duggan reported that the amendment had been ‘effectual’.167 He waged 
‘a constant warfare’ against the ‘improper’ carrying of poultry and also dealt 
quickly with overcrowding in boxes and baskets.168
Another amendment to the law was introduced independently of the TSPCA. In 
November 1887 Dr Arthur Young, Member for East Devon, urged the House of 
Assembly to stop the ‘cruel way’ in which sheep were imported from Melbourne 
to Tasmania.169 They were ‘driven long distances’ to Melbourne and then 
‘closely packed’ in a ship without food or water. When they arrived at Torquay 
in Young’s electorate, they were dipped and once again packed tightly in a train 
at Latrobe before being sent to different areas of Tasmania. With the support of 
the assembly, the minister for lands, Edward Braddon, quickly introduced the 
Cruelty to Animals Amendment bill to ensure that sheep were not mistreated 
on Tasmanian trains and it passed both houses without dissent.170 The TSPCA 
praised the measure and hoped that, ‘as occasion may show the necessity and 
virtue of interference, the Executive will promptly take its stand against every 
form of cruelty’.171
In November 1890 the society became agitated when it heard that 700 sheep 
had been stowed in the holds of the steamer Wendouree on top of a coal cargo 
and not been fed for seven days because it would ‘injure the coal’.172 The society 
failed to prosecute the captain and chief officer because the law officers of the 
Crown asserted that the offence had occurred on ‘the High Sea’ and the 1887 
legislation did not apply there. The TSPCA tried hard to enforce the law so 
that animals carried in ships were ‘properly treated’ but, by 1901, had ‘not 
succeeded to any great extent’.173 From 1891 lack of funds meant the work of the 
TSPCA devolved to the inspectors and Mary Gellibrand until her death in 1903, 
but the revival of its public activity in 1904 was accompanied by the enactment 
of more vigorous legislation.174
The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1904 
and its aftermath
Cruelty to animals legislation had been strengthened in Britain and other 
Australian jurisdictions by the early twentieth century and Tasmania lagged 
167 Mercury, 6 July 1881, 3.
168 Sixth Annual Report of the TSPCA, 6; Mercury, 7 December 1888, 3.
169 Mercury, 4 November 1887, 3.
170 Mercury, 8 December 1887, 4; 16 December 1887, 3.
171 Mercury, 7 December 1888, 3.
172 TSPCA committee meeting, 27 November 1890, NS647/1/1, TAHO.
173 Mercury, 16 October 1901, 2, the view of J.W. Evans.
174 Examiner, 14 December 1903, 6.
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behind.175 In October 1904 member of parliament for Cumberland, lawyer and 
farmer John Dennistoun Wood, arguing that every animal was ‘susceptible of 
enduring great pain’, consulted the TSPCA before introducing a new bill based 
on British legislation and similar to a recent Queensland statute. It extended 
the law’s protection from domestic animals to any animal or bird, whether 
free or in confinement.176 Wood’s bill followed British law in empowering 
justices to impose imprisonment of one month instead of a fine for a range of 
offences including ‘overworking’ and ‘causing unnecessary suffering’. Another 
amendment ‘authorised the destruction of any animal so diseased or injured 
that its existence would be a cause of misery to it’.177
Despite increasing the severity and scope of cruelty to animal provisions, the new 
Act did not greatly change the society’s focus, but did help with prosecutions 
for overloading and over-driving of horses.178 After Shaw’s retirement in March 
1904, the new police magistrate for Hobart, W.O. Wise, interpreting the law 
more sympathetically, showed a greater willingness to impose ‘deterrent fines’ 
for ‘wilful or thoughtless’ cruelty to animals.179 The clearest example occurred 
in February 1905 when Thomas Johnson, alias George Birchall, felled his horse 
with a stone, hit it repeatedly on the head and left it lying in a drain until the next 
day before killing the animal and removing it on the order of the Sandfly road 
trust.180 Wise called this ‘the grossest case of cruelty that had ever come before 
the court’. As Johnson had not paid two previous fines for other offences, Wise 
sentenced him to one month’s imprisonment. This was the first imprisonment 
for cruelty under the new Act and, much to the society’s satisfaction, Wise 
continued to impose severer sentences than his predecessors.181 Cases that were 
prosecuted by the society were still dismissed on occasion, mainly because 
perjury was a common practice, witnesses were reluctant to attend court and 
‘uncertainty’ remained over the definition of overdriving, overloading and 
starving.182 These difficulties, and the gradual transition from the horse to the 
motor car, resulted in a drop in the number of prosecutions: between July 1904 
and 1913 the annual average was 19.183 In Launceston, the failure of witnesses to 
give evidence in court was attributed by the society to a lack of ‘moral courage’ 
or a ‘fear of giving offence, either for business or other reasons’.184
175 Jamieson, ‘Animal Welfare’, 23–28.
176 Mercury, 1 October 1904, 6; 22 October 1904, 6.
177 Mercury, 17 October 1904, 7.
178 Minutes of TSPCA, 3 February 1905, NS 647/1/1, TAHO. Native fauna and birds were regarded as 
outside the purview of the society before 1914.
179 Mercury, 27 August 1904, 7.
180 Mercury, 15 February 1905, 4, 6.
181 Minutes of the TSPCA, 23 June 1905, NS 647/1/1, TAHO; Tasmanian News, 16 November 1905, 2.
182 Mercury, 14 March 1906, 5.
183 These figures are compiled from statistics given in annual reports.
184 Examiner, 22 February 1906, 7.
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From 1904, until it suspended public meetings with the onset of war in 1914, the 
TSPCA continued its work of inspection and prosecution where cautions were 
disregarded.185 But, active members remained in short supply (membership was 
a low 137 in 1913), and much of the burden fell on Large and the new secretary, 
educationalist Miss Fanny Garrett, who made animal protection work ‘the 
main object of her life’ until her death in 1926.186 Garrett was more circumspect 
than Mary Gellibrand and, with her quiet guidance, the society generally 
remained moderate in outlook, avoiding ‘the realm of public spectacle’.187 While 
the focus of animal protectionists was on domestic animals, visiting German 
anthropologist and anatomist, Hermann Klaatsch noted that native animals 
‘were being totally exterminated, with no understanding and with no pity, 
the hard-hearted and ignorant colonists shooting everything on sight’.188 The 
protection of native animals and birds was taken up by new organisations, such 
as the Field Naturalists Club, the Gould League of Bird Lovers and the Anti-
Plumage League, which complemented the work of the TSPCA branches.189
After nearly 30 years of operations, the TSPCA came to realise that laws, though 
still necessary to punish vicious offenders, ‘will not make men and women 
humane, any more than it will make them moral’.190 As the Mercury put it, 
dependence on ‘prohibitory legislation and the power of punishment’ would 
not result in ‘radical improvement’ in ‘the habit of mind’ that perpetrated 
‘barbarous conduct’. This view might have been related to the difficulties of 
securing new legislation to stop sports that resulted in the killing of animals 
such as pigeon-shooting matches and rabbit and hare coursing.191 The society 
thus renewed its efforts to form Bands of Mercy, mostly dormant since 1890. In 
1907 parents and teachers were urged to inculcate in children ‘the duty of being 
kind and considerate to all dumb creatures’, especially domestic animals.192 By 
1909, 18 Bands of Mercy had been affiliated with the TSPCA.193 Many of the 
essays written by children for the prizes offered by the society showed ‘great 
love for animals, close observation, and great kindliness of heart’.194 Another 
educational initiative was the Society’s appeal to the clergy to preach on ‘Man’s 
185 Mercury, 18 June 1919, 8.
186 Letter by H.T. Gould, Mercury, 27 March 1908, 2; Thirty-Second Annual Report of the TSPCA (Hobart: 
TSPCA, 1910), 7; Thirty-Sixth Annual Report of the TSPCA (Hobart: TSPCA, 1914), 16–18.
187 Kean, 145.
188 Robert Paddle, The Last Tasmanian Tiger: The History and Extinction of the Thylacine (Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 168.
189 Thirty-Fourth Annual Report of the TSPCA (Hobart: TSPCA, 1912), 11.
190 Mercury, 15 March 1906, 4.
191 For example, the TSPCA-sponsored Cruelty to Animals Bill, designed to stop such practices, did not 
pass the second reading, Mercury, 7 November 1906, 6.
192 Mercury, 13 July 1907, 7.
193 Mercury, 17 March 1909, 6.
194 Thirty-Fourth Annual Report of the TSPCA, 13.
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Duty to Animals’ as was done regularly in England.195 Animal Sunday sermons 
were first given on 12 July 1908 and became an annual event in some churches, 
but reached only small numbers of people.196
Conclusion
After over three decades of activity, the branches of the SPCA in Tasmania offered 
divergent accounts of their impact. By 1910 the secretary of the Launceston SPCA, 
Mrs J.M. Fysh, pointed out weaknesses that limited the branch’s effectiveness. 
Fysh noted that the branch was dominated by women and, apart from a male 
chairman, men did not participate in the cruelty prevention work.197 While 
the police usually investigated complaints of cruelty, ‘indifference and apathy’ 
were widespread in Launceston. Men preferred to spend their spare time in 
pleasurable activities and not ‘laying a hand on sundry slavers in horseflesh’.198 
Fysh later reflected that ‘individual selfishness, want of thought, want of 
proper knowledge how to treat animals, dislike to interfere with the much-
abused “liberty of the subject”’ and the failure of mothers to teach children ‘the 
principles of kindness’ all worked against the society’s efforts.199
The TSPCA struck a more positive note. By May 1912 it had noted significant 
changes in public attitudes, helped greatly by its enforcement of the law and 
educational initiatives. It found evidence of ‘greater sensitiveness of public 
conscience and opinion, with acceptance of the rights of animals, and of man’s 
duty towards them’.200 In Hobart, ‘cases of neglect and abuse, that formerly 
passed unheeded’, were immediately ‘noted and disapproved’ and the society or 
the police were informed. Drivers of horses ‘readily invited and acted on advice 
for sick animals’ and accepted offers of literature on the subject. Hobart had 
certainly not been purged of cruelty to animals, the killing of animals for sport 
remained ‘a relic of barbarism and savagery’, and the lone inspector could not 
respond to the constant appeals from rural areas, but we should acknowledge 
what had been achieved.201 The ‘moral influence’ of the TSPCA had helped 
to change long entrenched practices and contributed to the ‘uplifting and 
ennobling’ of city life.202
195 Minutes of the TSPCA, 13 July 1908, NS 647/1/1, TAHO; Mercury, 17 March 1909, 6.
196 Thirty-Second Annual Report of the TSPCA, 5.
197 Letter by J.M. Fysh, Examiner, 23 September 1910, 3.
198 Letter by G. Garet, Examiner, 28 September 1910, 3.
199 Examiner, 9 April 1919, 6.
200 Mercury, 24 May 1912, 6.
201 The quote comes from Bishop John Mercer, Mercury, 24 May 1912, 6. See also his lecture ‘Have animals 
souls?’, Mercury, 28 June 1912, 8; Thirty-Sixth Annual Report of the TSPCA, 4.
202 Thirty-Sixth Annual Report of the TSPCA, 11.
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Moreover, while the two SPCA branches in Tasmania took great efforts to ensure 
that the law was of more than symbolic protection to animals, both faced a 
number of obstacles that limited their effectiveness and mirrored the experience 
of their counterparts throughout Australia in the twenty-first century. First, 
they relied on their own inspectors to prosecute cases and could not rely on 
the police or private individuals to initiate prosecution, leaving much cruelty 
untouched by the law. Second, the failure of witnesses to attend court or the use 
of a guilty plea by offenders obviated the need for witnesses or the presentation 
of evidence and contributed to the imposition of lesser penalties. Third, the 
number of cases reaching court was small because magistrates insisted on high 
evidentiary standards and dismissed cases on technical grounds relating to the 
extent and nature of the cruelty. Finally, magistrates were generally reluctant 
to impose heavy fines, even on repeat offenders, especially if they were poor 
and relied on animals for their livelihood. In short, the continuities between 
past and present in the enforcement of anti-cruelty laws are remarkably strong. 
They demonstrate that the weak enforcement of the law and lenient decisions of 
today have a long lineage and the time has come to take a completely different 
approach to law enforcement against animal cruelty. Unless the police are 
empowered to treat any harm to animals as an illegal abuse of responsibility 
worthy of prosecution, and unless courts are directed to impose mandatory 
heavier sentences for such harm, including heavy fines, custodial sentences and 
prohibition on keeping animals for serious cases of abuse, then animals will 
continue to experience pain and suffering of the kind endured over 200 years 
of white settlement.
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Using th e Law: Working-Class 
Communities and Carnal Knowledge 
Cases in Victoria, 1900–06
Jennifer Anderson
The case, R v Gravino, which came before the Supreme Court of Victoria in 1905, 
illustrates well the complex debates which often preceded state involvement 
in sexual assault cases and are revealing about community decisions to engage 
with the legal system. On 7 March 1905, 14-year-old Elsie Griffiths disclosed 
to her mother that their neighbour, 17-year-old Charlie Gravino, had sexually 
assaulted her or, in her words, ‘had me down at his place doing rude things’. 
Elsie’s father was dead, and her mother, Catherine Griffiths, kept a laundry 
in the Melbourne suburb of Brunswick, behind which Elsie lived with her 
mother, her 11-year-old brother Albert and her adult sister, Kate. The previous 
evening, Elsie had been sent out to look for her brother, when she met Charlie 
at the end of the lane. The two went into Charlie’s house, calling out for Albert. 
There, apparently taking advantage of no one being home, Charlie pushed 
Elsie down onto the ground and attempted to rape her.1 On the evening of 7 
March, Catherine took Elsie to Charlie’s house, where they spoke to Charlie 
in front of his mother and stepfather. Catherine asked Charlie whether he had 
assaulted Elsie and he eventually admitted that ‘he might have done’. At that 
point, according to Catherine, Charlie’s mother ‘asked me to forgive the boy’ 
and she and Charlie shook hands. Catherine was prepared to forgive Charlie, 
she told the court, because ‘no harm ha[d] been done to her [Elsie]. I said this 
because she wasn’t monthly, she was too young’.2 This outcome, however, did 
not satisfy Elsie’s elder sister Kate, who evidently held a different opinion as to 
what constituted ‘harm’. The next day, Kate took matters into her own hands 
and demanded a written apology from Charlie, ‘for satisfaction for my sister’s 
character’. When no letter was forthcoming, Kate took Elsie to the police and 
then the hospital. After the medical examination, Charlie was charged with the 
attempted carnal knowledge of Elsie Griffiths.3
1 Statement of Elsie Griffiths, R v Charles Gravino, Melbourne Supreme Court, 23 May 1905, Public 
Record Office Victoria (PROV), VA 667 Office of the Crown Solicitor, VPRS 30/P/0000 Criminal Trial Briefs, 
Unit 1385, Item 163. Charles was charged with attempted carnal knowledge because there was no medical 
evidence of actual penetration. He was convicted of indecent assault, see commentary in ‘Criminal Court’, 
Age (Melbourne), 26 May 1905, 10.
2 By which she meant that Elsie had not yet started menstruating, statement of Catherine Griffiths, ibid.
3 Statement of Kate Griffiths, ibid.
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In some ways, Gravino was an atypical carnal knowledge case to come to 
the attention of the Melbourne police in 1905. Siblings rarely intervened to 
the extent that Kate Griffiths did and, without her involvement, the matter 
probably would have gone no further. Like the families in Gravino, many parties 
in such cases were working class and, while these discussions were critical to 
the participants, they have attracted little academic attention. Since the 1980s, 
there has been a significant amount of feminist historical and legal scholarship 
on sexual crimes, with two main areas of interest. One strand of inquiry has 
examined the development and enforcement of legislation prohibiting under-
age sexual activity. Scholars have argued that middle-class reformers, including 
feminists, child rescue workers and social purists, advocated more stringent 
definitions of permissible sexual conduct from the 1870s and 1880s, as part of a 
drive both to delineate childhood and to control adult male sexuality.4 The same 
literature has suggested that the regulatory attempt was thwarted, at least in 
part, by ambivalent attitudes towards female sexuality in law.5 A second, albeit 
overlapping, strand has focused on court proceedings, exploring the influence 
of contemporary attitudes to gender, morality, class and race on the outcomes 
of prosecutions and on legal rules and practice.6 Such scholarship has often 
been overtly present centred, tracking historical precedents for the continuing 
problems women face in prosecuting sexual offences, and lending support to 
campaigns to alter rules of evidence and court practice.7 It has also offered 
explanations for why so few matters progressed to trial and for low conviction 
rates.8
Yet, before the legal process was engaged, offending behaviour had first to come 
to the attention of the authorities. If we assume, then as now, that most young 
women, or their families, did not make their experiences of sexual offences 
against them public,9 studying the circumstances of those who did opens up 
4 In Australia see Jill Bavin-Mizzi, Ravished: Sexual Violence in Victorian Australia (Sydney: University 
of New South Wales Press, 1995), 14; Bavin-Mizzi, ‘Understandings of Justice: Australian Rape and Carnal 
Knowledge Cases, 1876–1924’, in Sex, Power and Justice: Historical Perspectives of Law in Australia, ed., 
Diane Kirkby (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1995), 19–20. In the United Kingdom see Lucy Bland, 
Banishing the Beast: English Feminism and Sexual Morality, 1885–1914 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995), xiii–
xvii, 97, 110–12, 122–23; Louise A. Jackson, Child Sexual Abuse in Victorian England (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2000), 1–6, 12–17. In the United States, see Mary E. Odem, Delinquent Daughters: Protecting and 
Policing Adolescent Female Sexuality in the United States, 1885–1920 (Chapel Hill and London: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1995), 1–7, 9–10.
5 Jackson, 3–4; Odem, 64, 71–72; Bavin-Mizzi, Ravished, 42, 83–84; Constance Backhouse, ‘Skewing the 
Credibility of Women: A Reappraisal of Corroboration in Australian Legal History’, Western Australian Law 
Review 29 (2000): 29, 79–107.
6 Odem, 64–81; Bavin-Mizzi, Ravished, 10–13, 42–67, 83–87. See also Judith Allen’s classic Sex and Secrets: 
Crimes Involving Australian Women Since 1880 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1990), 57–62, which 
outlined the difficulties facing both rape and carnal knowledge victims in prosecuting cases successfully.
7 Allen, 2, 14, 252, 255; Backhouse, 80–81.
8 Bavin-Mizzi, Ravished, 197–203.
9 The general belief is that sexual offending against women and children, in Australia and elsewhere, has 
always been significantly under-reported. See Allen, 9–10; Jackson, 25–26.
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alternative, and equally interesting, lines of inquiry. Which groups tended to 
appear before the courts and what triggered the decision to notify the police? 
What did parties feel they had to gain, or lose, by legal involvement? Did they 
have any preliminary understanding of the legal process, which might affect 
their decision to make a complaint or to stay silent? Given the strong working-
class presence in this jurisdiction, such questions also invite us to consider the 
extent to which such communities were agents in these proceedings, or whether 
they were more often the subjects of state intervention. To date there have been 
no Australian studies on this point, although scholars in the United Kingdom 
and United States have considered similar questions. Louise Jackson’s study of 
child sexual abuse in Victorian England argued that working-class populations 
had informal as well as formal methods of dealing with sexual offending, with 
cases more likely to be reported if they involved non-family members. Incest 
in particular was likely to be hidden.10 She suggested that the police were not 
the automatic resort for such communities as relationships with authority were 
often fractured, although she also contended that they still viewed the law as 
the ‘appropriate final resolution’.11 By contrast, Mary Odem’s work on statutory 
rape cases in the Californian courts in the 1910s indicated that working-class, 
and particularly immigrant parents, used age of consent legislation to try and 
control daughters whose sexual relationships flouted familial and community 
expectations.12
The varying conclusions in these works can be explained in part by the different 
subjects of the studies, as well as the differences of time and place. Jackson 
was examining non-consensual sexual activity, or the rape of (mostly) young 
children. Odem focused on older girls who were more likely to be engaging in 
consensual sexual relationships. ‘Carnal knowledge’ cases, of course, covered 
the spectrum, from the forcible abuse of small girls to adolescent relationships. 
Nevertheless, given the lack of Australian research on this point, it is worthwhile 
to start by examining the available cases more generally, to see whether patterns 
that have been identified in British and American sources also held here. My 
primary source was the records of carnal knowledge proceedings listed in 
the Melbourne Supreme Court between 1900 and 1906. The majority of the 
matters came from the city of Melbourne, but the jurisdiction of the court also 
encompassed country areas where the court did not travel on circuit, so allowing 
for exploration of a mix of urban and rural cases. Most of the transcripts for 
these cases have survived and offer a rich source for the views of the witnesses 
who appeared before the courts. My approach was strongly influenced by the 
work of historians like Mark Peel, who have argued that we should heed the 
‘real voices’ of working-class communities, the subjects of intervention, as 
10 Jackson, 31, 47–48.
11 ibid., 36–40.
12 Odem, 40–47.
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much as the regulators whose views have so often dominated.13 Documenting ‘in 
their own words’ why people chose to use the law, in this particularly emotive 
and difficult area, throws important illuminations on attitudes towards sexual 
offending, the law and the reach of the regulatory state in Australia in our 
period.
The first part of the chapter outlines the legislative background and the sources 
used in the study. The second and third parts explore who reported sexual 
offending to the police, beginning with the circumstances in which state agents 
were involved from the outset, before turning to the more common scenarios 
in which family members made the decision to engage with the legal system. 
The fourth considers the expectations that families seem to have brought to 
court and, by outlining the outcomes in these cases, suggests that expectation 
and reality were often sharply divergent. I conclude by summarising the 
circumstances in which working-class communities in Victoria at this time used 
the law to regulate sexual conduct and what was distinctive about their choices.
Jurisdiction and sources
The offence of carnal knowledge of a girl under the age of 16 was created in 
the colony of Victoria by the Crimes Act 1891, which raised the age of consent 
from 12 to 16. This Act replaced in part the Crimes Act 1890, itself simply a 
restatement of earlier legislation. The 1890 Act had contained two such offences. 
Carnal knowledge of a girl under 10 was a capital offence. Carnal knowledge 
of a girl between 10 and 12 was a misdemeanour, punishable by a term of 
imprisonment.14 The new Act left the capital offence alone, but established an 
overarching felony of ‘carnal knowledge of a girl between 10 and 16’, punishable 
by a maximum of 10-years imprisonment. If the defendant was the girl’s teacher, 
the maximum sentence was 15-years imprisonment.15 The Act also created 
associated charges of attempted carnal knowledge and assault with intent to 
carnally know, misdemeanours punishable by three years imprisonment (five if 
the defendant was the girl’s teacher).16 Consent was no defence to either charge 
unless the girl was the same age or older than the defendant, a requirement the 
Victorian Supreme Court interpreted very strictly.17 The 1891 Act was modelled 
closely on the 1885 English Criminal Law Amendment Act and, like that Act, 
was the result of extensive campaigning by women’s groups, social purists, 
13 Mark Peel, The Lowest Rung: Voices of Australian Poverty (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 11–15.
14 Crimes Act 1890 (Vic), ss. 45 and 47.
15 Crimes Act 1891 (Vic), s. 5(1).
16 ibid., s. 5(2).
17 ibid., s. 6. In R v Hibbert 1906 Victorian Law Reports at 198 Hodges J held that ‘the same age or younger’ 
should be interpreted as ‘born on the same day or younger’.
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clergy and charitable organisations, who had argued that the existing legal 
framework left young girls vulnerable to sexual exploitation.18 Nevertheless, 
there were also significant differences. Unlike the English Act, the Victorian 
version contained no defence of reasonable belief that the girl was over 16,19 
and allowed a more generous time frame for prosecution.20 The 1891 Act also 
created a new offence of incest, or carnal knowledge of a daughter, lineal female 
descendant or stepdaughter, an offence not limited by the girl’s age.21
Carnal knowledge charges were heard before judge and jury in the Supreme 
Court. The trial was preceded by a committal, or preliminary, proceeding in 
the local police court, presided over by a bench of magistrates. Between 1900 
and 1906, 70 carnal knowledge and related cases were listed for hearing in the 
Melbourne Supreme Court: of these, 69 actually proceeded to trial. These cases 
were a small number of the total listings — there were between seven and 14 
each year, out of a total of between 500–600 cases overall. In the absence of 
exact records we can only speculate as to how many matters did not make it past 
committal although, from newspaper reports and contemporary commentaries, 
it would seem that there was a fair rate of attrition at the police court stage.22 
Of those that did advance to the higher court, 30, or 43 per cent, ended in 
acquittal. In 26 cases (37 per cent) defendants were convicted of the principal 
charge in the Crown indictment and, in 4 matters (6 per cent), the defendant was 
convicted of a lesser charge. Seven defendants (10 per cent) pleaded guilty, and 
one pleaded guilty to a lesser charge. In two cases the prosecution ultimately 
entered a nolle prosequi, in one case before trial because the defendant had died 
and in the other after two trials where the jury disagreed. Rates of conviction, 
however, varied significantly from year to year, from a low of 25 per cent in 
1906, to a high of 71 per cent in 1903, with no definitive pattern except that the 
acquittal rate increased slightly in years with higher numbers of cases.
Where a carnal knowledge case was listed for hearing in the Melbourne Supreme 
Court, the Victorian Crown Prosecution Office prepared a brief of evidence 
18 Women’s Christian Temperance Union of Victoria, Fourth Annual Report during the Year 1891 (Melbourne: 
Peacock Bros. Printers, 1892), 4–5; ‘The Protection of Girls — Deputation of Clergymen to the Premier’, Age 
(Melbourne), 19 August 1891, 5; ‘Protection of Young Girls’, Age (Melbourne), 14 November 1891, 4.
19 Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885, 48 & 49 Vict c. 69, s. 5.
20 The Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 initially limited prosecution to within three months of the 
commission of the offence, see s, 5. The 1891 Victorian Act (s, 7) allowed 12 months.
21 Crimes Act 1891 (Vic) s. 8.
22 In the 1890s the Victorian Women’s Christian Temperance Union had launched a high-profile campaign to 
increase the numbers of defendants who were committed for trial, see Women’s Christian Temperance Union, 
Eighth Annual Report during the Year 1895 (Melbourne: Spectator Publishing Co, 1896), 12, 46–47. Feminist 
commentators continued to criticise the operation of the committal system into the twentieth century, see, 
for example, the remarks in the journal Woman’s Sphere (edited by the prominent feminist and suffrage 
campaigner Vida Goldstein), ‘General Comments’, vol. I, no. 9, May 1901, 73–74; ‘Letter to the Editor’, 
vol. I, no. 12, August 1901, 99; ‘Children’s Courts and Police Matrons’, vol. II, no. 18, 10 February 1902, 145; 
‘Comments’, vol. III, no. 34, 10 June 1903, 306.
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which contained typed transcripts of the evidence given by the witnesses at the 
committal hearing and the other documents on which the Crown relied to make 
out its case. These generally included the girl’s birth certificate, the complaint 
and warrant, statements from expert witnesses, subpoenas and bail documents, 
and occasionally other legal correspondence. The brief sometimes also included 
letters between a girl or her family members and the defendant, if this material 
was seen to assist the case. The transcripts were evidently mediated by the 
questions asked and, to some extent, they were overlaid with legal language.23 
When combined with these additional records, however, they allow us to piece 
together a reasonably accurate picture of the relationship between complainants 
and defendants, the social standing of the parties and how the matter came to 
the attention of the police.
In the overwhelming majority of carnal knowledge cases the parties knew each 
other, often well. I accessed the prosecution briefs for 68 of the 70 cases listed 
for trial between 1900 and 1906,24 and divided the relationships in these cases 
into five broad categories. The first was members of the same household, which 
included both family members and non-relatives, such as fellow employees (20 
cases, or 28 per cent). The second (also 20 cases) included non-resident family 
members, friends and neighbours. In nine cases (12.6 per cent) complainant 
and defendant identified themselves as boyfriend and girlfriend. The fourth 
category I called ‘acquaintances’, which I used to describe situations in which 
the parties knew each other slightly, even if they had only met on the day 
of the incident (12, or 17.6 per cent). In only six cases were the defendants 
total strangers (9 per cent). One matter fell outside these categories, where the 
defendant was the girl’s former teacher.
The ages of the girls involved varied from 16 months to 21 years, although there 
was a significantly larger number of older complainants, or girls who had passed 
through puberty. Specifically, there were six children under 10 at the time of the 
offence (8.4 per cent) and 10 (14 per cent) aged between 10 and 12. Thirteen girls 
were 13 years old (18 per cent), 17 girls were 14 (24 per cent), 21 were 15 (29.5 
per cent), 2 were 16 (3 per cent), one was 17 and one 21.25 Three of the four girls 
over 16 were complainants in incest charges and the 17-year-old the (reluctant) 
complainant in a charge of abduction with intent to carnally know, where the 
age of consent under the 1891 Act was 18.26 Most of the younger children were 
old enough to be deemed capable of giving sworn evidence, a factor important to 
magistrates when they decided to allow a case to proceed to trial.
23 The witnesses, for example, invariably refer to the defendant as ‘the accused’, ‘the defendant’ or 
‘prisoner’ and, in some cases, it is clear that a child’s evidence has been doctored to make it flow more logically. 
In other circumstances, however, the transcript is apparently very literal, including witnesses’ grammatical 
errors, contemporary turns of phrase and slang.
24 One brief was missing and one was unable to be ordered.
25 There were in total 72 complainants, as three cases involved two complainants each.
26 Crimes Act 1891 (Vic), s. 17 (1).
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Of the 68 cases, 44 (64.7 per cent) came from the city of Melbourne, with the 
remaining 24 from a variety of country areas. The numbers reflected the court’s 
jurisdiction as well as the greater population concentration in Melbourne. The 
Victorian Supreme Court travelled on circuit to larger country towns, so the 
rural cases which made their way to Melbourne were usually from areas closer 
to Melbourne than other regional centres. A number of matters, for example, 
came from the foothills of the Dandenongs and four cases were from the seaside 
town of Sorrento, 112 kilometres south of Melbourne. The overwhelming 
majority of complainants and defendants, from both urban and rural areas, 
were working class. I assessed the parties’ class on the basis of where they 
lived, how they described their living arrangements, their occupation if they 
had one, and their parents’ occupations. Of the 44 cases from Melbourne city, 
in all but five cases, the parties lived in extensively working-class areas, from 
the southern suburbs of South and Port Melbourne to Footscray in the west 
and North Melbourne, Carlton, Collingwood, and Fitzroy in the inner north 
and east. The only complainant who resided in a definitely middle-class area 
(Armadale in the southeast) was a domestic servant living in her employer’s 
house. Where complainants worked, they were employed mostly as domestic 
servants or in factories. Defendants recorded a variety of occupations, both 
skilled and unskilled. Most of the girls, though, did come from fairly solid 
middle or upper working-class backgrounds. Only eight of the 68 cases involved 
girls from very impoverished, or fringe-dwelling families, including one current 
and one former state ward.
Case studies (1): State agents and 
professionals
Proceedings in the carnal knowledge jurisdiction began with the signing of a 
formal complaint before a police officer or magistrate. Signing the complaint 
was usually the responsibility of a family member. Police prosecuted on their 
own initiative in only four of these cases. Where police were involved from the 
outset, there was invariably an additional public order issue, often of suspected 
juvenile prostitution. In R v Kelly,27 for example, Constable Edward Monkivitch 
was on duty outside the Exhibition Gardens in Carlton in May 1906, when he 
observed John Kelly behaving suspiciously towards 13-year-old Elsie Lawson. 
He followed the two and caught Kelly about to have intercourse with Elsie under 
a tree. At the police station, Elsie disclosed that Kelly had said he would give her 
sixpence if she went with him and that she had met him the Saturday before, 
27 Melbourne Supreme Court, 15 May 1906, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1421, Item 214.
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when he had given her a shilling.28 Police members who intervened in such 
situations seem to have been both particularly observant and committed to the 
cause. In R v Martin,29 Constable Henry Grisfield apprehended 11-year-old Sarah 
Lawton and 12-year-old Gertrude Bigwood in Bourke Street, Melbourne, as they 
were being led away by a man. He took the girls to the station and obtained 
statements that also implicated Edward Martin, a Collingwood bootmaker. 
Grisfield then undertook an extensive investigation into Martin’s behaviour, 
which ended in a successful prosecution for carnal knowledge of Sarah. 
Grisfield simultaneously charged both girls with neglect and asked that they 
be committed to the Industrial Schools. The jury in Martin’s trial commended 
Grisfield for ‘taking young girls off the streets’.30
Active police members were also sometimes instrumental in persuading family 
members to make a complaint against a defendant, particularly when they 
viewed conduct as infringing public order as well as private morality. Constable 
John Brophy had been keeping an eye on 15-year-old Alice Saunders, an orphan 
in service at Moonee Ponds, for some time, as he had ‘heard that it was common 
talk amongst the boys that this girl was “good enough”’.31 When he discovered 
that she had become intimate with 17-year-old Charles Wilson, he interviewed 
her and accused her of the affair, which she denied. Brophy then wrote to her 
older brother, Herbert Saunders, who was living on Phillip Island, outlining 
the situation and advising him to come to Melbourne at once. Herbert came to 
town and, between them, they managed to get Alice to make a statement against 
Charles. Brophy then took Herbert Saunders before the city magistrate to obtain 
a warrant for Charles’s arrest in October 1906.32 Police were also closely involved 
in the investigation of a sailor, William Doyle, for the carnal knowledge of 
13-year-old Daisy Hamilton in January 1902. Daisy, also an orphan, lived with 
her older brother and sister in the port suburb of Williamstown. When she 
did not return home on the night of 18 January, her brother Walter reported 
her missing. Senior Constable Norgate saw her the next morning and asked her 
where she had been. She told him she had slept in a paddock, but he threatened 
her with the reformatory if she did not tell the truth. The next day he went 
to the pier and, seeing Daisy with Doyle, launched an inquiry that ended in 
Doyle’s conviction for carnal knowledge.33
28 Statement of Elsie Lawson, ibid.
29 Melbourne Supreme Court, 15 February 1904, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1348, Item 68.
30 ‘Criminal Court’, Age (Melbourne), 29 February 1904, 9, and ‘Police Intelligence’, 3 March 1904, 9.
31 Statement of John O’Connell Brophy, R v Charles Wilson, Melbourne Supreme Court, 15 November 1906, 
PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1434, Item 442.
32 Statements of Herbert Saunders and John O’Connell Brophy, ibid. Charles was convicted of attempted 
carnal knowledge, although the court remarked that the evidence showed ‘evidence of revolting immorality 
amongst a number of boys and girls’, see ‘Criminal Court’, Age (Melbourne), 22 November 1906, 10.
33 Statements of Daisy Hamilton and Henry Norgate, R v William Doyle, Melbourne Supreme Court, 17 
February 1902, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1280, Item 122.
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Other state agents and professionals occasionally reported carnal knowledge 
cases to the police. When they acted, the girl had invariably been committed 
to their care and they were standing permanently or temporarily in place of 
her family. The Victorian Department of Neglected Children had the formal 
guardianship of all state wards until they turned 18, and sometimes beyond,34 
but a departmental officer instigated the complaints system in only two of these 
matters. William Buswell notified the police in March 1901 after 15-year-old 
Margaret Green became pregnant, apparently to her employer’s son, William 
Orr. Margaret had been a state ward since infancy and was licensed to Mrs 
Orr under an agreement with the department.35 In R v O’Gallaghan a nurse at 
the Industrial Schools depot alerted the authorities after nine-year-old Sylvia 
Derrick disclosed a sexual assault by her mother’s de facto husband, Eugene 
O’Gallaghan, from whom she had contracted syphilis. Sylvia had recently been 
removed from her mother’s care following allegations of neglect.36 In two other 
cases, refuge workers apparently persuaded girls to make formal statements 
about sexual misconduct. In 1902, Louisa and Lydia Ward, aged 21 and 17 
respectively, disclosed to Mrs Pittman, manager of the Girls’ Rescue Home in 
Armadale, that their father had sexually abused them for many years, resulting 
in Louisa’s pregnancy.37 In 1906, 16-year-old Bessie Martin made a statement 
to the Carlton Refuge Committee that a family friend, Francis Hendry, had 
assaulted her earlier that year. Bessie came to live in the refuge six months later 
and only then made a complaint.38
As the intervention of the refuge workers suggests, professionals, like the police, 
might also influence complainants or their family to report sexual offending, 
even if they did not personally notify the authorities. No doctor, for example, 
actually reported a suspected carnal knowledge offence, at least amongst these 
cases. In several incidents, however, their recommendations assisted family 
members to make an obviously difficult decision. In one particularly serious 
case, R v Thomas Brown,39 from August 1900, Alice Anderson knew that her 
16-month-old baby girl Etta had been sexually assaulted and suspected their 
neighbour, Thomas Brown, who had been in the shed with Etta just before she 
returned to the house bruised and bleeding. Despite Etta’s age, Alice revealed 
the assault to no one except her husband Albert for two weeks, explaining 
that she ‘did not want to make it public for the child’s sake’.40 Two weeks later, 
34 Neglected Children’s Act 1890 (Vic) s. 25.
35 Statements of William Buswell and Margaret Green, R v William Orr, Melbourne Supreme Court, 15 
April 1901, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1238, Item 18.
36 R v Eugene O’Gallaghan, Melbourne Supreme Court, 15 November 1901, PROV VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 
1268, Item 489.
37 R v John Ward, Melbourne Supreme Court, 15 April 1902, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1287, Item 223.
38 R v Francis Hendry, Melbourne Supreme Court, 12 December 1906, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1438, 
Item 495.
39 Melbourne Supreme Court, 15 August 1900, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1223, Item 335.
40 Statement of Alice Anderson, ibid.
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when Etta still had a discharge, which did not seem to be improving, Alice took 
her to Dr Strahan who found that the baby had definitely been assaulted and 
‘told the mother to inform the police’.41 Alice and Albert still prevaricated for a 
time, Albert telling the court that ‘I had no money and … I was afraid that the 
man might injure me’.42 Eventually, though, they did go to the police. Similarly, 
Victoria Ginn gave birth to a baby boy in July 1900, when she was 17. The child 
was her father’s, although Victoria told her family at the time that she had had 
a liaison with a married man. In late 1901 she took the baby to the Children’s 
Hospital where the doctor apparently diagnosed congenital syphilis and told 
Victoria that the child’s father should be publicly exposed and punished.43 
Victoria then made a complaint against her father.
Case studies (2): Family, friends and 
complainants
By far the more usual scenario, though, was that in which a member of the 
girl’s family notified the police. In 50 out of 68 cases (73.5 per cent) a relative, 
mostly a parent, reported the offence. This decision was rarely an easy one. It 
often occurred only after extensive efforts to negotiate a settlement, financial 
or otherwise, out of court. Patterns of negotiations reflected power relations 
within families and communities. If available, and not the defendant, fathers 
usually filed the complaint, and they were also expected to take a leading role 
in negotiations. In R v Leftley,44 a typical example, 15-year-old Blanche Howes 
had been in a sexual relationship with, and became pregnant to, 19-year-old 
Harry Leftley. After Blanche sought medical advice about the pregnancy, the 
doctor told her mother, Mary. Mary informed her husband, Frederick, who, 
unusually, sought legal advice. The solicitor presumably advised him to try and 
negotiate. On 7 July 1904, Mary Howes and Blanche spoke to Mrs Leftley. Mary 
advised that the pregnancy had already proved costly and asked ‘what they 
were going to do for me’. Mrs Leftley advised her that ‘she would leave it to 
her husband’.45 Shortly afterwards, Frederick Howes arranged a meeting with 
Harry and his father. Harry denied responsibility and Mr Leftley offered no 
financial recompense. In August 1904, Blanche herself confronted Harry and 
told him that if he did not do anything ‘father is going to take it to Court’. Harry 
retorted that his father would spend ‘every cent he had’ defending the case.46 
41 Statement of Edward Alfred Strahan, ibid.
42 Statement of Albert Anderson, ibid.
43 Statement of Victoria Ginn, R v William Ginn, Melbourne Supreme Court, 10 December 1901, PROV, 
VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1274, Item 596.
44 Melbourne Supreme Court, 22 May 1905, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1384, Item 135.
45 Statement of Mary Howes, ibid.
46 Statement of Blanche Howes, ibid.
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Despite this, the Howes family still apparently hoped for recompense even after 
the baby’s birth in December 1904, for Frederick did not make a complaint to 
the police until April 1905.47
When a girl’s father was dead, or he or a stepfather was the defendant, mothers 
usually stepped in, although a male family member or friend sometimes assisted 
them. In R v Saddington,48 15-year-old Florence Grumont and 18-year-old Hedley 
Saddington were fellow servants at a property near Mt Macedon. In January 
1906, Florence complained to her widowed mother, Mary Grumont, that Hedley 
had sexually assaulted her four times between November and December 1905. 
Mary consulted William Donald, senior gardener at the house, for his views 
on the situation. Donald told her that ‘if it was my child I would send for the 
police’, but Mary was reluctant to do this, declaring that she ‘[didn’t] want this 
thing made public’ for the sake of Florence’s reputation. Donald then arranged 
a meeting between himself, Hedley and Mary. Mary told Hedley she would not 
take the matter further if he ‘[w]ould keep his mouth closed in regard to the 
affair’. A few days later she reported the matter to the police because ‘Saddington 
had been up reading reports about me and my daughter — I thought he ought 
to have kept silence [sic]’.49 In a rather different scenario, in R v Upton50 14-year-
old Gertrude Furzer was living with her widowed mother in a hotel in South 
Melbourne when she became involved with Herbert Upton, a married man with 
whom her brother was boarding. Their increasingly futile attempts to conceal 
the relationship finally ended when Gertrude became pregnant and her mother 
notified the police. Before that, Richard Alexander, barman at the hotel, had 
attempted to intervene with Herbert, telling him that ‘he was a married man 
and should be ashamed of himself’.51 Richard and several other neighbours gave 
evidence at the trial against Herbert.
Alexander might have assisted Mrs Furzer in remonstrating with Herbert and 
supporting her at trial, but it never seems to have occurred to him to go to the 
authorities himself. Such was the general respect for parental authority that other 
family members and friends rarely reported a suspected carnal knowledge case 
to the police except, again, where they stood in a parental capacity to the girls 
or, occasionally, when a mother failed to make a complaint against an offending 
father. Gravino, with the older sister’s decisive intervention, was unusual. In 
R v Mitchell,52 Grace Frith, aged 12, was an orphan living with a foster family, 
who were effectively her employers, when she complained that the father of 
47 Statement of Frederick Howes, ibid.
48 Melbourne Supreme Court, 15 February 1906, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1414, Item 82.
49 Statements of Mary Grumont and William Donald, ibid. Hedley Saddington was acquitted, the Age 
noting that Florence was ‘a hysterical character’ whose ‘evidence could not be relied upon’, see ‘Criminal 
Court’, Age (Melbourne), 23 February 1906, 8.
50 Melbourne Supreme Court, 26 May 1905, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1386, Item 178.
51 Statement of Richard Alexander, ibid.
52 Melbourne Supreme Court, 25 May 1903, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1324, Item 217.
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the household had raped her. Her aunts reported the case to the police.53 In R v 
Bower,54 Myrtle Bower, also 12, was living with her father and younger siblings 
in Footscray when her father sexually assaulted her. Myrtle’s mother was dead, 
and she eventually told Alice Tischler, who had been employed for a time by her 
father to look after the children, that she had an unusual discharge. Having also 
seen Frank Bower behave suspiciously towards Myrtle one night when he came 
home drunk, Alice notified the police.55 Mothers who suspected their husbands 
of assaulting their daughters could find the decision to involve the authorities a 
very difficult one. Court transcripts indicated that they were often the victims 
of brutality themselves, as well as being financially dependent. In R v Plozza,56 
Giacomo Bombardieri, uncle of 12-year-old Catterina Plozza, stepped in after 
his sister, Catterina’s mother, refused to make a complaint against her husband, 
Giovanni Plozza. Catterina had told Giacomo that she had been assaulted, and 
Giacomo had himself tried to warn Giovanni off, without success.57
The same deference to parental prerogative also militated against girls making 
complaints personally. Once a girl involved her family members, her own 
decision-making power was severely restricted, as the family subsequently 
decided on the course of negotiations and if the offending would be reported 
to the police. This meant that some girls gave their evidence reluctantly and 
defiantly, emphasising the consensual nature of their relationships with the 
defendants. Kate Flynn, aged 17, had become involved with Edward Mackney, 
a married man and a family friend. On 12 October 1902 she ran away with him 
to Geelong, where they remained living together for a month until the police 
arrested her on a charge of vagrancy. Kate gave evidence of some pressure from 
Mackney to come away with him, but the escape itself was carefully planned 
— he paid for a new dress and gave her a wedding ring to wear — and she 
agreed to live with him in Geelong ‘as his wife’.58 On the few occasions when 
girls did notify the police themselves they either lacked this close network of 
relations and friends or had moved beyond the reach of parental control. In R v 
Waterhouse,59 13-year-old twins Hilda and Winifred Waterhouse complained to 
the police that their father, Henry, had raped them and made them perform oral 
sex on him, sometimes in front of each other, on multiple occasions over a three 
53 Statement of Grace Frith, ibid.
54 Melbourne Supreme Court, 15 June 1903, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1327, Item 287.
55 Statement of Alice Tischler, ibid.
56 Melbourne Supreme Court, 15 October 1901, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1261, Item 400.
57 Statement of Giacomo Bombardieri, ibid.
58 R v Mackney, Melbourne Supreme Court, 17 December 1902, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1309, Item 
563. As Kate was over 16, Mackney was charged with abduction of a girl under 18 from her parent with intent 
to carnally know. At the first trial he was convicted, but appealed. The issue at appeal was the relevance of 
Kate’s consent, as the trial judge had directed that this was irrelevant. The appeal court held by majority that 
her ‘willing participation’ could be a defence to this charge, although not the ordinary carnal knowledge 
charge, and Mackney was subsequently acquitted by direction at a retrial. For the appeal decision, see R v 
Mackney 19 Victorian Law Reports 1903, 22–28.
59 Melbourne Supreme Court, 15 July 1905, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1393, Item 275.
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or four month period. The girls’ mother had left the household for England 
in April 1904, and they lived with their father and older sister above their 
father’s shop in Lonsdale Street, Melbourne. The girls reported the offending 
to police after they had been in service for several months, presumably gaining 
confidence from distance.60
Given this complex of family and community relationships that complainants 
and their families had to negotiate in the course of taking a matter to court, it 
was hardly surprising that reporting was frequently delayed and much debated. 
Although individual families’ circumstances varied, there were common threads 
linking their final decisions to notify the police. Families tended to advise the 
authorities only after the offending became, to some extent, common knowledge 
and when alternative means of redress were either unavailable or had failed. A 
girl’s pregnancy or suspected pregnancy was the frequent trigger for action. 
Not only did it alert family members to her sexual activity, but it meant that the 
wider community would inevitably become aware of it also. Further, for most of 
these households, it created immediate economic pressure about how to manage 
the coming baby. Such problems could be alleviated through marriage (if the 
girl was old enough) or financial assistance from the defendant and negotiations 
invariably focused on these points. In R v Horton,61 Elizabeth West discovered 
in December 1901 that she was pregnant to her boyfriend, William Horton. 
William was reluctant to marry her as he was already supporting his mother 
and sister. In early January 1902 he gave her money to buy ‘medicine’ in the 
hope of inducing an abortion, which failed. She then told her parents, who met 
with William on three occasions, pressuring him to marry her. On 28 January 
Elizabeth’s father Ansell also paid a surprise visit to William at his workplace. On 
1 February William eventually offered to pay Elizabeth’s confinement expenses 
and a small ongoing allowance, but still refused marriage. Ansell said he ‘would 
not hear of such a thing as that’ and, on 4 February, he obtained a warrant for 
William’s arrest.62
In some cases, of course, neither marriage nor financial assistance was an 
option. Where the father of a family was the offender, the economic crisis was 
of the opposite dimension, for if he was removed, his family could rapidly find 
themselves destitute. In September 1900, Emily Paul notified the police that 
her de facto husband, Thomas Paul, had sexually assaulted her 13-year-old 
daughter, Edith Richards. On 20 September Thomas Paul was committed for 
trial and remanded into custody. On 24 September Edith and her three younger 
half-siblings were committed to the Department for Neglected Children, Emily 
60 Statements of Hilda Waterhouse, Winifred Waterhouse, and Sergeant Patrick McManamny, ibid. The 
jury disagreed in two trials and ultimately the prosecution decided not to proceed. The twins’ older sister, 
Millicent, gave evidence against the girls.
61 Melbourne Supreme Court, 18 March 1902, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1284, Item 168.
62 Statements of Elizabeth Ann West and Ansell Joseph West, ibid.
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declaring that ‘she was entirely without means, and could not obtain any 
work’.63 In such scenarios, mothers seem often to have reported husbands only 
when their relationship had already deteriorated, and an assault on a daughter 
was the final straw.64 In R v Merry,65 for example, Cecilia and Thomas Merry 
had apparently had a volatile relationship for some years, Cecilia complaining 
that Thomas did not earn enough to keep her, forcing her to take in sewing, and 
Thomas that her daughters — his stepdaughters — were disrespectful.66 When 
Cecilia walked in on Thomas on top of her 15-year-old daughter, Beatrice Frazer, 
on Christmas morning 1903, she threw him out and took Beatrice to the police.67 
Similarly, in R v Dunkley,68 14-year-old Elsie Jude was raped by her stepfather, 
Charles Dunkley, but was frightened to tell her mother because ‘he [stepfather] 
was in the habit of hitting her [mother] and I thought he might murder her if I 
told her’.69 When a neighbour advised Annie Dunkley of Elsie’s allegations, she 
took Elsie to the police, later telling her husband that, ‘I could forgive anything 
you’ve done to me but not to my daughter’.70
Expectations and outcomes
Women like Cecilia Merry and Annie Dunkley reported assaults on their 
daughters in outrage and anger, presumably hoping that their husbands would 
be exposed and punished for their misdeeds. Desire for punishment was 
certainly one reason to bring offending to the attention of the authorities, but 
it was often only part, and sometimes a relatively minor part, of the overall 
decision. Economic considerations loomed large in pre-court negotiations, but 
most families do not seem to have expected that bringing the defendant to trial 
would itself lead to damages or any financial reward. Indeed, if the man or boy 
was convicted or imprisoned, they would not be able to claim any ongoing 
assistance from him at all for the life of the gaol term. This might explain why 
the Howes family held out for so long in R v Leftley, waiting until well after the 
birth of the baby before reporting the case. Only when it became absolutely 
certain that Harry Leftley was not going to provide for their daughter did they 
finally notify the local police. On the other hand, some families did subsequently 
bring maintenance proceedings against a defendant, in which a conviction for 
63 R v Paul, Melbourne Supreme Court, 15 October 1900, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1228, Item 414; 
‘Police Intelligence’, Age (Melbourne), 25 September 1900, 5.
64 Louise Jackson comes to the same conclusion in her discussion of nineteenth-century Yorkshire and 
Middlesex cases, see Jackson, 47–48.
65 Melbourne Supreme Court, 15 February 1904, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1346, Item 22.
66 Statements of Thomas Merry and Beatrice Frazer, ibid.
67 Statement of Beatrice Frazer, ibid.
68 Melbourne Supreme Court, 15 February 1903, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1312, Item 9.
69 Statement of Elsie Jude, ibid.
70 Statement of Nellie Jude, ibid.
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carnal knowledge could be useful, indeed essential, evidence. Daniel Peddie, 
father of 14-year-old Marian Peddie, does not seem to have tried to negotiate 
with 17-year-old William Sievers when he discovered that he had impregnated 
his daughter.71 Nevertheless, on 17 September the North Melbourne Police 
Court made a maintenance order against William, noting that he had recently 
been convicted of ‘intimacy’ with Marian.72
More often, the threat of punishment was held over defendants’ heads to try 
and force them to provide financial compensation or, in some cases, to stop 
the behaviour. Most of the witnesses in these cases were evidently aware that 
carnal knowledge of an underage girl was an offence punishable by a term of 
imprisonment. Mothers and fathers claimed repeatedly that they had warned 
young men that their daughters were under 16 and defendants sometimes 
made enquiries themselves. In R v Weatherdon,73 Arthur Weatherdon asked the 
complainant, Josephine Barrett, with whom he had been ‘walking out’, how 
old she was. Josephine, an orphan, told him she thought she was 16, although 
she added that she had once been told that she was a year younger. Arthur 
was evidently satisfied with the first reply and persuaded her to come and live 
with him in furnished rooms.74 In R v Watson,75 15-year-old Eileen Fogg, also 
an orphan, lived with her aunt and uncle, Elizabeth and Joseph Morris, in the 
seaside town of Sorrento. In December 1905 Elizabeth Morris suspected that 
her niece might be pregnant and took her to the doctor, who confirmed that 
she was between five and six months pregnant. Eileen then disclosed that she 
had had a sexual relationship with three men, including James Watson. The 
Morrises duly attended on James and his mother, Joseph Morris advising James 
that ‘it was not a simple case of maintenance [but] … a criminal case and it 
might be very serious for him’ if he did not co-operate.76 In a very different set 
of circumstances, when Giacomo Bombardieri told his brother-in-law Giovanni 
Plozza to stop assaulting his daughter, he also used the law as a backup, warning 
Plozza ‘if you don’t stop I will give you a summons’.77
Above and beyond any desire for punishment or economic reward, however, a 
major expectation, reiterated again and again, was that a hearing would restore 
the reputation of a girl and her family in the eyes of the public. Involvement in 
extramarital sexual activity, whether it was consensual or not, exposed a girl, and 
by extension her relations, to community condemnation. There were frequent 
references throughout these cases to the shame that families experienced when 
71 R v Sievers, Melbourne Supreme Court, 17 August 1900, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1224, Item 342.
72 ‘Police Intelligence’, Age (Melbourne), 18 September 1900, 6.
73 Melbourne Supreme Court, 22 February 1900, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1208, Item 96.
74 Statement of Elizabeth Barrett, ibid.
75 Melbourne Supreme Court, 23 February 1906, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1411, Item 22.
76 Statement of Joseph Morris, ibid.
77 Statement of Giacomo Bombardieri, R v Plozza.
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they became aware of their daughters’ situation. These feelings did not vary 
noticeably even with very young children. We will recall in R v Thomas Brown 
that Alice Anderson was reluctant to report a sexual assault on her very small 
girl ‘for the child’s sake’.78 Girls who had been the subject of unwanted sexual 
advances felt the same humiliation. In R v Francis Hendry,79 Bessie Martin had 
been raped by a family friend, a sailor who sometimes slept at their house. She 
told the Williamstown Police Court that, ‘I never made a complaint as I did not 
want to disgrace them all’.80 This sense of shame no doubt stopped many families 
from reporting incidents at all. For those who did, the trial was envisaged as a 
way to shift responsibility back onto the young man involved, by insisting that 
he was the dominant and/or coercive figure in the relationship. It also provided 
an opportunity for a family to assert (or re-assert) their own respectability. In 
both Leftley and R v Sievers the parents emphasised that the sexual relationship 
had occurred in otherwise ‘respectable’ contexts. In Leftley, Blanche Howes’s 
mother told the court that Harry Leftley had assaulted her daughter when she 
was ‘coming home from business’, and she was not otherwise allowed out at 
night.81
The twin aims of penalising the defendant, while exonerating the complainant 
and her family, were rarely achieved by the court process. Scholars like Jill 
Bavin-Mizzi and Constance Backhouse have emphasised the multiple legal and 
practical barriers young girls in carnal knowledge cases faced at all stages of the 
court process. These included the rules of evidence, which discriminated against 
uncorroborated evidence, the often offensively masculine atmosphere of the 
courtroom and the social attitudes, held by lawyers and magistrates alike, which 
assumed that sexually active young women, especially working-class girls, were 
morally untrustworthy.82 We have seen already that, overall, significantly less 
than half of the defendants in these cases were found guilty of the principal 
charge, although if guilty pleas and convictions for lesser charges are included, 
about 53 per cent of defendants were convicted of a charge. Breaking down 
the results in the Victorian cases between 1900 and 1906 supports the view 
that class, gender, and occasionally racial attitudes, significantly influenced 
outcomes at trial.
Carnal knowledge cases, as we have seen, usually involved working-class parties 
of the same social standing, hardly surprising when complainant and defendant 
were often either related or intimate acquaintances. In only eight cases out of the 
68 was there a significant variation from this pattern. Two cases involved girls 
who might be described as either middle or lower middle class and working-class 
78 Statement of Alice Anderson, R v Thomas Brown.
79 Melbourne Supreme Court, 12 December 1906, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1438, Item 495.
80 Statement of Elizabeth Martin, ibid.
81 Statement of Mary Howes, R v Leftley.
82 Backhouse, 86–88, 107; Bavin-Mizzi, Ravished, 10–13.
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defendants. Catherine Bazeley was a baker’s daughter from Leongatha whose 
father had employed the defendant as an apprentice. Lucy Hill was a farmer’s 
daughter from Sorrento and the defendant was a labourer on the property.83 
Generally, however, middle-class girls did not appear in this jurisdiction. In six 
other cases, the complainant was working class and the defendant middle or 
lower middle class. The typical social standing of the complainant created an 
immediate distance between the parties and magistrates or judges hearing the 
case, lawyers involved and possibly the jury members, for whom there was still 
a property qualification in this period.84
When the parties did not stand on an equal footing, the girl’s class position 
does seem to have influenced the outcome of the trial. In all but one case when 
working-class girls brought charges against middle-class defendants they were 
unsuccessful, regardless of the strength of the evidence. In R v Orr Margaret 
Green, a state ward, complained that she had been raped by her employer’s son, 
William Orr. William made admissions to the police, but he was not convicted.85 
In R v Whitley,86 13-year-old Sarah Turner alleged that Charles Whitley, a teacher 
at the local state school, had sexually assaulted her whilst she was employed 
cleaning his home. When Sarah’s mother took her to a local doctor he refused to 
examine her, not believing her complaint against a man in Charles’s position.87 
Although the prosecution produced a witness who had seen Charles entering 
the house at the relevant time, Sarah admitted under cross-examination that she 
had had a subsequent sexual relationship with another boy, which no doubt 
helped to further exonerate Charles.88 The one exception was Upton, discussed 
above, when there was an abundance of corroborating evidence linking 
working-class Gertrude Furzer with the middle-class (and married) Herbert 
Upton. Conversely, both the cases in which girls made complaints against a man 
of lesser social standing ended in convictions. In R v McPherson, for example, 
12-year-old Catherine Bazeley was sexually assaulted by, and became pregnant 
to, Neil McPherson, her father’s employee who had lived with them. Catherine 
said nothing about the incident until her mother noticed her pregnancy five 
months later, and both parents admitted that they had not observed anything 
at the time.89 These might have been damning factors in other cases, but Neil 
was convicted.
Whether parties came from urban or rural areas had a noticeable effect on the 
statistics. A significantly higher percentage of matters from rural areas ended in 
83 R v McPherson, 16 September 1901, Melbourne Supreme Court, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1264, Item 
433 and R v Swift, Melbourne Supreme Court, 15 October 1902, Unit 1305, Item 503.
84 Juries Act 1890 (Vic), s 5.
85 Statement of Margaret May Green, R v Orr.
86 Melbourne Supreme Court, 15 July 1901, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1251, Item 243.
87 Statement of Sarah Turner senior, ibid.
88 Statement of Sarah Turner junior, ibid.
89 Statement of Catherine Mary Bazeley, R v McPherson.
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acquittal than the average across all regions (16 out of 24, or 66.6 per cent). One 
rural defendant pleaded guilty to the principal charge and one pleaded guilty 
to a lesser charge, so only five were convicted after trial (21 per cent). It would 
require further study to see whether this was a general pattern or representative 
only of this relatively small number of subject cases. The types of negotiations 
were not especially distinctive in the rural transcripts, and we cannot know 
how many assaults were in fact reported, or how many did not progress past 
the committal stage. Nevertheless, there are some possible explanations for the 
differential outcomes in rural matters. Four of the six cases which involved 
working-class girls and defendants of higher social standing were from rural 
areas, all of them unsuccessful. Three of the rural cases from 1906 involved the 
same complainant, Eileen Fogg, who as we shall see below was discredited as a 
witness because of her relationship with multiple men. In her study of South 
Australian state wards, Margaret Barbalet has suggested that sexual assault may 
have been more prevalent in country areas, in part because girls were more 
isolated.90 The Victorian cases would not necessarily suggest that sexual assault 
was more common in the country, but isolation could certainly make a case more 
difficult to prove, through the absence of corroborating witnesses. Certainly, 
in at least five of the unsuccessful cases, there was clear evidence of sexual 
penetration but no evidence beyond the girl’s statement identifying the man 
responsible.91
Race or ethnicity was less often a consideration in these trials, as both 
complainants and defendants were mostly white and English speaking. In three 
of these cases, however, the defendant’s background was not British (or Irish) 
and this was clearly a factor at trial. Witness statements and investigatory reports 
indicated that the police and the courts approached these matters differently, 
and they all ended in conviction. In Plozza, the Plozza family were recent Italian 
migrants and both the investigating officer and jury evidently viewed the whole 
family as ‘less civilised’. When Giovanni Plozza was convicted of incest, the jury 
recommended mercy ‘on account of his being a foreigner and probably ignorant 
of the law’.92 The same assumptions seem to have been at work in R v Keefe.93 
Isaac Keefe, an Aboriginal boy from Coranderrk station near Healesville, was 
accused of assaulting seven-year-old Emma Patterson, a ‘half caste’.94 Unusually, 
Isaac’s first trial was suspended so that he could be legally represented, but 
90 Margaret Barbalet, Far From a Low Gutter Girl: The Forgotten World of State Wards, South Australia 
1887–1940 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1983), 90–91.
91 R v Carlsen, Melbourne Supreme Court, 15 February 1900, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1208, Item 93; 
R v Lamb, Melbourne Supreme Court, 15 February 1901, Unit 1241, Item 66; R v Cummings, Melbourne 
Supreme Court, 15 August 1902, Unit 1298, Item 393; R v Hyle, Melbourne Supreme Court, 15 April 1904, 
Unit 1352, Item 117; R v Manverton, Melbourne Supreme Court, 16 May 1904, Unit 1357, Item 230.
92 R v Plozza, notation on brief.
93 R v Keefe, Melbourne Supreme Court, 10 December 1902, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1309, Item 568.
94 Statement of Constable William Henry Hocking, ibid.
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his guilt was assumed from the outset and he duly confessed, so the trial was a 
formality only. In R v Abdullah95 members of a local working-class family pitted 
themselves against the defendant, Chaudri Abdullah, variously described as 
‘Indian’ or ‘Hindoo’. Fifteen-year-old Blanche Blight complained that Chaudri, 
her brother-in-law, had raped her. Blanche’s older sister Miriam had married 
Chaudri’s older brother Miyan Abdullah without the consent of their father, 
James, and the assault took place at Miyan’s shirt factory where Blanche worked. 
The relationship, and Miyan’s superior financial circumstances, evidently 
rankled James Blight immensely and he could barely contain his wrath at having 
to let Blanche work in an environment ‘full of Indians and Hindoos’.96 The jury 
perhaps sympathised for, despite much debate about a possible alibi, Chaudri 
was eventually convicted of carnally knowing Blanche.
Of course, whatever the class or ethnic background of complainant and 
defendant, a girl’s reputation still remained relevant. As in rape trials, sexual 
knowledge was a weapon and, while the prosecution might enquire about a 
defendant’s situation, they were far more interested in that of the girl and her 
immediate family. In such circumstances, Ruby Lever’s case against Samuel 
Pimlott was doomed from the outset. Fifteen-year-old Ruby was living with her 
widowed mother, Christina Lever, in a notorious slum area of Fitzroy when she 
complained that Samuel Pimlott, a friend (and, possibly, client) of her mother’s, 
had forced his way into her room and raped her. At trial Samuel gave evidence 
that ‘it was an immoral house and I thought Mrs Lever was a prostitute’, 
although he conceded that Ruby did not have an immoral reputation.97 Samuel 
was acquitted. Even without such associations, girls were habitually cross-
examined at length on their interactions with other boys; whether they worked 
in mixed workplaces or went out at night and any prior sexual history. Even 
young children were not immune from this line of questioning. Sarah Barber 
was nine years old when she was raped by her uncle, Charles Thompson. The 
Crown Solicitor’s Office demanded extra information from the police about 
Sarah’s school attendance, ‘truthfulness’ and whether she was allowed out 
on the streets.98 Consent was not a defence in carnal knowledge cases, unless 
the defendant was younger than the complainant, and relations with others 
were also legally irrelevant, but both were recognised means of obtaining jury 
and judicial sympathy for defendants. Eileen Fogg, from Sorrento, confessed 
95 R v Abdullah, Melbourne Supreme Court, 15 August 1900, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1223, Item 326.
96 Statement of James Blight, ibid.
97 R v Pimlott, Melbourne Supreme Court, 22 May 1900, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1216, Item 215.
98 Police Queries and Answers, R v Thompson, Melbourne Supreme Court, 18 October 1904, PROV, VPRS 
30/P/0000, Unit 1367, Item 393.
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to sexual relations with three boys. Her aunt Elizabeth Morris subsequently 
brought action against all three but, despite admissions confirming Eileen’s 
version of events, they were all acquitted.99
Conclusion: Using the law
Carnal knowledge cases that were heard in the Melbourne Supreme Court 
between 1900 and 1906 were familiar affairs. The vast majority of complainants 
knew the defendants, often intimately, and court proceedings took place 
amidst a complex network of family and community relationships. In many 
of these cases, law functioned as a secondary mechanism for regulating sexual 
relationships. Most families understood by 1900 that carnal knowledge was a 
crime and that they had the right to prosecute. The decision to engage with 
the judicial system, however, frequently came only after private negotiations 
had failed, or where settlements were impossible in the circumstances of a 
particular case. Negotiations reflected gender and power balances within 
families and communities. Fathers or male family members customarily initiated 
legal proceedings, with women taking charge only if men were unavailable. 
Respect for parental or familial authority was such that young women outside 
the protection of a family were significantly less likely to report, or have their 
case taken up by others, including state agents. Girls themselves rarely had 
the influence, or courage, to take such a step independently. Once other family 
members had become involved, decision-making power no longer rested with 
the young woman concerned, although she might continue to play a role in 
discussions. The decision to prosecute was much more likely if complainant 
and defendant stood on an equal social footing. When the defendant was of a 
higher social class, both reporting and conviction were significantly less likely. 
It was also, overwhelmingly, a white working-class jurisdiction. Middle-class 
girls appeared in only two cases and ethnic minorities also very rarely.
When working-class families and their friends did report carnal knowledge 
cases to the police, they apparently did so on the expectation that a trial would 
punish a defendant and restore respectability to the girl and her family. These 
expectations revealed the limits of their understanding of the legal system, 
for even when a hearing led to the defendant’s conviction, it did not usually 
salvage the reputation of either the young complainant or her associates. Girls’ 
moral characters were examined in far greater detail than those of defendants, 
invariably to their detriment. When exploring the regulation of sexual conduct, 
we are nevertheless reminded repeatedly that these people were not simply the 
99 R v Skelton, Melbourne Supreme Court, 23 February 1906, PROV, VPRS 30/P/0000, Unit 1412, Item 33; R 
v Watson, Melbourne Supreme Court, 23 February 1906, Unit 1411, Item 22; R v Hibbert, Melbourne Supreme 
Court, 23 February 1906, Unit 1412, Item 34.
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subjects of intervention. In the majority of cases, discretion to prosecute rested 
with family members rather than state agents. At most points in the process, 
working-class families, if not young girls themselves, retained a large degree 
of agency and their choices to use the law were based upon social and moral, 
rather than legal, imperatives. Transcripts of carnal knowledge cases allow us 
to listen to the voices of working-class communities at the turn of the twentieth 
century ‘in their own words’, with all their emotion, anxiety and distress. By 
listening to these voices, we can track attitudes to gender, class, sexuality and 
morality as they played out in everyday life and in the legal system. We can also 
chart the reach of the regulatory state, by unpicking the complex dynamics 
informing crucial decisions to make the private public, or by engaging with the 
legal system in the first place.
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Reading Past Cases of Child Cruelty 
in the Present: The Use of the 
Parental Right to Discipline in New 
Zealand Court Trials, 1890–1902
Debra Powell
In 2003 the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) annual report on child 
welfare focused its concerns on the physical maltreatment of children, and 
published a league table of fatal child abuse statistics that placed New Zealand 
among the worst performing Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) nations.1 Among its recommendations was the ending of 
legal sanctions (as enshrined in section 59 of the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961) 
that allowed for the hitting of children in the name of discipline.2 Since that 
time, the topic of child punishment has generated significant anxiety and debate 
amongst child welfare advocates, doctors, educators, journalists, politicians and 
the general public.3 Jane and James Ritchie, psychologists from the University of 
Waikato in New Zealand, were the first to suggest a link between the country’s 
high levels of societal and domestic violence and the physical disciplining of 
children.4 In 1979, acting on the findings of their groundbreaking study on 
the use of physical punishment in the home, the Ritchies made a submission to 
parliament advising ‘the elimination from statute of any provision that permits 
the right to employ physical force in the correction and training of the young’.5 
Not only was their submission disregarded, but the response they encountered 
surprised them in its aggression — they had, by their own account, uncovered 
a firmly embedded ‘cultural pattern’ which, when threatened, provoked a 
strength of feeling ‘so beyond reason and rationality as to indicate the social 
equivalent of a personal neurosis’.6
1 UNICEF, ‘A League Table of Child Maltreatment Deaths in Rich Nations’, Innocenti Report Card Issue No. 5 
(September 2003), Innocenti Research Centre, Florence, http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/repcard5e.
pdf accessed 14 May 2011. With Hungary, New Zealand’s abuse fatalities were singled out as being six times 
higher than the average rate for the leading countries. Only Mexico and the United States rated higher.
2 Statutes of New Zealand, 1961, No. 43, Crimes Act, Section 59; Innocenti Report Card Issue No. 5, 22–28. 
The report identifies the hitting of children by parents or carers as the most common form of violence in the 
industrial world.
3 For a comprehensive timeline of events relating to child discipline laws see Beth Wood, Ian Hassall and 
George Hook, Unreasonable Force: New Zealand’s Journey Towards Banning the Physical Punishment of Children 
(Wellington: Save the Children New Zealand, 2008), 33–50.
4 Jane and James Ritchie, Spare the Rod (Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), 105–22.
5 ibid., 132.
6 ibid., viii.
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In June 2007, however, the Ritchies’ vision came to fruition with the passing 
of the Crimes (Substituted Section 59) Amendment Act, which effectively 
removed the defence of ‘reasonable force’ for the purpose of correction, for 
parents charged with assaulting their children.7 During the course of the 2007 
campaign, those seeking the full repeal of Section 59 met with the same welter 
of intense emotion that the Ritchies had encountered almost 30 years earlier.8 
It had become clear that the issue of child discipline was one that still ‘cuts 
deep[ly] into the national psyche’.9
While proponents of repeal positioned it as a necessary step towards developing 
a domestic culture of non-violence towards children, opponents focused their 
concerns more narrowly on the criminalisation of the disciplinary smack.10 
The resulting debates, which were played out extensively in the public media, 
focused almost exclusively on the removal of the parental right to discipline 
their children as they choose.11 Among those who continue to believe in physical 
punishment as part of ‘good parental behaviour’, the resistance to change has 
been intense.12 The complex range of responses to repeal, however, belied the 
simplicity of its original aim: to remove the special legal defence available to 
parents who were prosecuted for significant assaults on their children, thereby 
affording children the same legal protection from physical assault as adults (or 
indeed, as animals).13 As the bill’s sponsor, Green Party MP, Sue Bradford stated 
during its first reading:
7 With the 2007 amendment to s. 59 of the Crimes Act, New Zealand became the 18th country to revoke legal 
provisions allowing for the physical punishment of children.
8 The first reading of the bill called for full repeal by removing s. 59 from the statute books. Compromise led 
to amendment in the form of a convoluted rewording that nevertheless removes the parental right to strike a 
child for the purpose of correction.
9 Sue Bradford, ‘Crimes (Abolition of Force as a Justification for Child Discipline) Amendment Bill’, First 
Reading, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), vol. 627, 22086, http://www.parliament.nz/en-NZ/PB/Debates/
Debates/b/1/6/47HansD_20050727_00001406-crimes-abolition-of-force-as-a-justification.htm accessed 27 
April 2011.
10 Hence the popular terminology promulgated by the media who referred (and continue to refer) to the 
discourse surrounding the bill and subsequent amendment as the ‘anti-smacking debate’.
11 British child welfare historian Harry Hendrick notes that the welfare of vulnerable children has more 
often been focused on adult, societal concerns, or, as Bronwyn Dalley says, on ‘what adults consider children 
require, rather than children’s needs’ (Harry Hendrick, Child Welfare: England 1872–1989 (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1994), 257; Bronwyn Dalley, ‘Deep and Dark Secrets: Government Responses to Child 
Abuse’, Past Judgement: Social Policy in New Zealand History, eds, Bronwyn Dalley and Margaret Tennant 
(Otago University Press, 2004), 178).
12 The bill for the repeal of s. 59 received more public submissions than any other piece of legislation in 
New Zealand’s history (Wood, Hassal and Hook, 8). Moreover, a well-funded but obfuscatory campaign by 
repeal opponents led to a national referendum in which 80 per cent of respondents (from a voter turnout of 
around 50 per cent) disagreed when asked whether ‘a smack as part of good parental correction should be a 
criminal offence’.
13 ‘Crimes (Abolition of Force as a Justification for Child Discipline) Amendment Bill’, First Reading. A 
related aim was to bring New Zealand law into line with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, which s. 59 effectively stood in breach of.
Reading Past Cases of Child Cruelty in the Present
109
I do not understand at all why it is illegal in New Zealand to beat my 
spouse, another adult, a policeman, or even an animal harshly with a 
horse crop or a piece of wood, but it can be legal to do the same thing 
to my child. It seems to me that section 59 of the Crimes Act is a relic of 
English nineteenth century law and thinking, which said that children 
were simply the property of their parents and were subject to their total 
control and to harsh physical discipline. At that time the same applied 
to wives, servants and horses. Strangely, it is only children to whom this 
quaint but dangerous law still applies.14
This chapter seeks to shed some light on the longer history of this ‘quaint but 
dangerous’ legislation by investigating its practice in the New Zealand courts 
at the turn of the twentieth century. Given the current strength of feeling, it 
is surprising that the laws relating to child discipline and child abuse have so 
far received little attention from New Zealand’s social and legal historians.15 
This chapter implicitly suggests that their investigation is crucial to our 
understanding of current debates, and the anxieties that surround them. In 
tracking the history and context of early child welfare legislation in the courts 
and in communities, this chapter reveals that late-nineteenth and early twentieth 
century contemporaries struggled similarly to negotiate the tensions between 
notions of parental control and parental abuse. It appears that attempts to 
balance the rights of parents to discipline and punish, and the need to legislate 
against parental violence and abuse have long been fraught with difficulties. To 
uncover the ways people imagined parental discipline and control, the chapter 
examines these issues using a microhistorical approach. This method, using the 
close reading of legal files from court trials and their media reportage, derives 
from social and cultural historical modes of analysis that are also relevant to 
legal–historical scholarship. I contend that the interpretation of historical court 
narratives might contribute fresh ways of seeing our present struggles over the 
place of physical punishment both within families and before the law.
The two case studies I have selected to illustrate this theme took place nine 
years apart. In 1893 Kate Donovan was charged under the Children’s Protection 
Act 1890 with ‘ill-treating’ her son by beating him with a stock whip.16 In 1902 
Harriet Drake was tried under the Criminal Code Act 1893 for the manslaughter 
of her daughter, who died following a ‘severe beating’.17 While vastly different 
in terms of charges and outcomes, and in the social classes of the accused, 
the case trials share similarities. Each involved extreme parental violence 
14  ibid.
15 An important exception is Sally Maclean’s research into the historical use of s. 59 in child cruelty cases 
tried in the Christchurch Courts (Sally Maclean, ‘Child Cruelty or Reasonable Punishment? A Case Study of 
the Operation of the Law and the Courts 1883–1903’, New Zealand Journal of History 40, no. 1 (2006): 7–24.
16 ‘Parental Castigation’, Wanganui Chronicle, 19 September 1893, 2.
17 The King v Drake, Gazette Law Reports, Court of Appeal, 22 (1902), 145–49.
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perpetrated by a mother on an eight-year-old child. Both the accused women 
argued that their actions were carried out as part of good parental discipline and 
turned to the legal defence of reasonable force for the purposes of correction. 
Both trials relied heavily on evidential testimony provided by friends, family 
and community. Above all, these case trials illuminate the contradictions and 
tensions surrounding the emerging ideas of child abuse and child protection 
that could be discerned at social, legal and governmental levels.
Beginning with the first case, this chapter goes on to consider the significance 
of early legislative responses and the emergence of agencies concerned with the 
issue of child welfare. The investigation of the second case trial is followed by 
an exploration of the peculiar tensions borne from the need to prosecute against 
such abuses in what, I argue, was an innately violent society.
Kate Donovan, a deserted wife and mother, was reported to be the first to be 
charged under New Zealand’s Children’s Protection Act 1890.18 Those attending 
the Auckland Police Court trial in 1893 heard from neighbour, Ellen Clark, how 
she had witnessed eight-year-old Daniel being whipped and beaten so severely 
by his mother, that the sight of the boy’s body ‘nearly made her faint’.19 Attracted 
by the child’s screams, Ellen had peered in through the windows of the house, 
attempted to force the locked door and threatened to ‘call a policeman’, while 
Daniel’s older sister ran pleading for someone to stop her mother from killing 
the boy.20
In court Kate Donovan stated that she did not consider the whipping too severe, 
insisting that the boy had grossly misbehaved himself by ‘interfering’ with the 
five-year-old daughter of a neighbouring family.21 Daniel himself was called 
to testify before the court, and responded to the first line of questioning by 
declaring that ‘he knew if he did not tell the truth he would go to burning 
fire’.22 He told the court that his mother had beaten him for ‘locking a little girl 
in her room’, and doing ‘naughty things to her’, though he maintained that it 
had been his sister Mary who had locked them in the room and that he had been 
accused unfairly.23
Counsel for the defence, in an impassioned call to reason, attempted to 
shift the focus to the witness Ellen Clark, who, it was noted, had only lived 
alongside the defendant for one week. Was she in the habit of peering into 
people’s windows? Had she never beaten her own little boy? The Bench, it was 
pointed out, frequently censured parents for not controlling their children, 
18 ‘Parental Castigation’, 2.
19 ‘A Terrible State of Things’, Observer (Auckland), 16 September 1893, 3.
20 ibid., and ‘People are not Satisfied’, Observer (Auckland), 21 October 1893, 2.
21 ‘Parental Castigation’, 2.
22 ibid.
23 ibid.
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yet, ‘unfortunately there were persons who would try to interfere with parents 
when they tried to control their children. The question was: what were parents 
to do?’.24
The magistrate himself physically examined Daniel and found that his body 
was ‘covered with wales’ and that the child ‘could hardly turn his head’.25 
Nonetheless, he admitted to finding himself in ‘a difficult position’ as Kate was 
a deserted wife with sole care of her children and reliant on outdoor relief in 
the form of Charitable Aid. Moreover, he personally took no issue with the use 
of a whip as punishment for the boy’s alleged misdeeds and ‘fully agree[d] that 
children must be controlled’.26 On the question of whether the punishment was 
‘reasonable’ under the circumstances, the magistrate, however, declared himself 
to be of the opinion that the ‘the boy had been punished too severely for his 
tender years’. Kate Donovan was found guilty of ill-treating her son. She was 
fined 40 shillings and returned home with Daniel in tow.27
Four weeks later, Daniel’s name again turned up in the official records, this time 
in a coronial report. The post-mortem carried out on Daniel’s body showed that 
his sudden death had been caused by a fracture of the skull.28 The inquest, 
which took place at the bar of the Rob Roy Hotel in Freemans Bay, heard a 
confusion of testimonies in which Daniel’s mother, neighbours, and other 
witnesses told conflicting stories. The boy had eaten poisoned oranges, or had 
fallen and hit his head on a fence; he spent the morning at school with his 
sister, or else he spent it lying on a stranger’s couch bleeding from a head-
wound.29 Letters to the editor of the Auckland Observer suggest that there was 
a degree of unease among those familiar with the case, and at least one writer 
was prepared to suggest a connection between the boy’s violent, sudden death 
and the ongoing violence in the Donovan household.30 Such concerns appear 
to have been put to one side at the coroner’s inquest. Instead, those attending 
heard from neighbours like Annie Melrose who came forward to offer positive 
accounts of Kate’s maternal character. Annie deposed that she had ‘always found 
[Mrs Donovan] kind and affectionate towards her children and only beat them 
when they were naughty’, and added in reference to the earlier indictment for 
child cruelty, that ‘[h]er whole affair was only a bit of spite’.31 Despite claiming 





28 Coroner’s Inquest Report: D. Jnr Donovan, J46Cor 1893/645 (Micro U 5400), Archives New Zealand, 
Wellington. The report also noted signs of neglect in the form of intestinal worms and bodily sores.
29 ibid.
30 ‘People are not Satisfied’, 2.
31 ibid.
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jury gave Kate Donovan the benefit of the doubt. They found that ‘no evidence 
was forthcoming to show how the fracture was caused’, and an open verdict was 
brought in on Daniel’s death.32
Daniel Donovan’s story, inconclusive and open-ended as it is, nevertheless 
illustrates something of the tensions between notions of ‘parental guidance’ 
and the reality of physical violence, and highlights the significant challenges 
encountered by a society grappling with rapidly changing attitudes around 
the care and welfare of children. These changing ideals were driven by a 
‘reconceptualisation’ of the notion of childhood, which took place throughout 
the western world from around the mid-to late-nineteenth century.33 While the 
rising awareness of children’s issues informed child welfare policy and practice 
in New Zealand, the path between shifting ideologies and legislative change was 
not always direct. In England, an obvious need for child protection legislation 
had been uncovered by reformers associated with child welfare organisations 
such as the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, and 
England’s Prevention of Cruelty to, and Protection of, Children Act, which was 
introduced there in 1889, came about as a result of the long and concerted 
efforts of those associated with the Society.34 In New Zealand, however, there 
had been no such agitation for reform. Isolated concerns about parental violence 
or mistreatment were muted and, before the turn of the century, passed largely 
without comment. New Zealand legislation, enacted in 1890, just one year 
after the introduction of the English act, was, in the words of New Zealand 
government minister the Hon. Dr Pollen, ‘simply a copy of [the] statute which 
had been passed by the Imperial Legislature in its last session’.35 The honourable 
minister argued against the ‘slavish’ adoption of such measures when ‘there was 
no necessity, to his mind, for encumbering our statute-book, which was already 
greatly over laden with laws that could have no immediate beneficial operation’. 
For Pollen and others, the object of the Act, which was ‘the prevention of cruelty 
to and better protection of children’, was an extraneous issue as ‘the conditions 
32 ibid.
33 The awareness of children’s issues took place across a range of Western countries. Paris held the first 
international conference on child welfare in 1882 and, in that same year, the state of Massachusetts pioneered 
a law to protect children from cruelty and neglect. A second conference, which was held in Florence in 
1896, was the catalyst for the formation of the International Congress for the Welfare and Protection of 
Children (Lionel Rose, The Erosion of Childhood: Child Oppression in Britain 1860–1918 (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1991), 235). On the shift in ontological thought around child life see for instance, Hendrick, 
21–37; George Behlmer, Child Abuse and Moral Reform in England 1870–1908 (Stanford University Press, 
1982), 44–77; Viviana Zelizer, Pricing the Priceless Child: The Changing Social Value of Children (New York: 
Basic Books, 1985), 11; and Dorothy Scott and Shurlee Swain, Confronting Cruelty: Historical Perspectives on 
Child Protection in Australia (Melbourne University Press, 2002), 9–10.
34 Behlmer gives a detailed account of the origins and passage of the English Children’s Protection Act, 
commonly known as the ‘Children’s Charter’, in Child Abuse and Moral Reform, pp.78–119.
35 Children’s Protection Bill, New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, vol. 97, 3 July 1890, 260–61.
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for which the act was intended to provide had practically no existence in this 
colony at all’.36 However, it was unanimously agreed that it was ‘better to 
prevent evil from asserting itself than to attempt to cure it after it had arisen’.37
Those looking to official figures might be forgiven for coming to such 
conclusions: even in the wake of a severe depression in the economy in the 
1880s and 1890s, few cases of child cruelty came to official notice. Under the 
terms of New Zealand’s Children’s Protection Act 1890, intentional ill-treatment 
or neglect of a child was punishable by a fine of up to one £100 or up to two 
years imprisonment, and a magistrate could order the removal of a child or 
children from the family home.38 While these provisions nominally included 
‘any offence involving bodily injury to the child’, enshrined within the Act 
was the common law defence of ‘reasonable punishment’.39 Section 14 held that: 
‘Nothing in this Act contained shall be construed to take away or affect the right 
of any parent, teacher, or other person having the lawful control or charge of a 
child to administer reasonable punishment to such child’.40
As this chapter shows, the practice of physically striking a child to cause shock 
and pain as punishment, and the belief in its necessity and efficacy, was firmly 
entrenched in Pākehā (non-Māori) society, and therefore the boundaries of what 
might be considered ‘reasonable punishment’ proved slippery to define.41 As a 
corollary the law was never heavily enforced. Indeed, in the eight years between 
1892 (when the annual police reports began recording returns) and 1901, only 35 
cases of child cruelty or neglect had been tried in New Zealand’s courts of law.42
Despite government assertions that New Zealand children were not yet in need 
of protection, societies and agencies concerned with the welfare of vulnerable 
children were formed in the larger urban centres, and were kept extremely busy 
36 ibid.
37 ibid.
38 Statutes of New Zealand, 1890, no. 21, Children’s Protection Act, ss. 3 and 7, 78, 80. Before the 1890 Act, 
child cruelty cases involving violence were charged under the Crimes Act 1867 as assault, assault causing 
grievous bodily harm or assault causing actual bodily harm.
39 Children’s Protection Act, Section 79(a), 80.
40 Children’s Protection Act, s. 14, 83. This same provision could also be called on for those charged with 
the assault of a child under the 1893 Criminal Code Act (s. 68). The defence of reasonable parental punishment 
was carried over into the 1908 Crimes Act (s. 85), and repeated with minor amendments in s. 59 of the 1961 
Crimes Act.
41 The research carried out by the Ritchies in the 1960s and 1970s showed smacking to be the prevalent 
disciplinary method, with just over half of parents surveyed reporting that they hit their child once a week 
or more (Ritchie, 27). Figures from a more recent study suggest this figure may have been conservative. 
A 2006 study by the Dunedin Health and Development Research Unit found that 71 per cent of a sample 
group of 26-year-olds experienced physical punishment on a regular basis throughout their childhoods. Jane 
Millichamp, Judy Martin and John Langley, ‘On the Receiving End: Young Adults Describe their Parents’ 
Use of Physical Punishment and other Disciplinary Measures during Childhood’, Journal of the New Zealand 
Medical Association 119, no. 1228 (27 January 2006), http://www.nzma.org.nz/journal/119-1228/1818/ 
accessed online 12 May 2011.
42 Maclean, 10–11. Maclean notes, as do historians transnationally, that trials were more likely to focus on 
neglect than abuse, as ‘cruelty was more difficult to define and reach a consensus on’. See also Hendrik, 30–31.
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in their work among families. Throughout the 1890s, Societies for the Protection 
of Women and Children (or the SPWC) were established in Auckland, Wellington 
and Dunedin, and the Children’s Aid Society was founded in Christchurch.43 The 
SPWC employed ‘lady visitors’ working in semi-professional positions to call 
into the homes of the poor to assess their needs. The group focused their efforts 
primarily on the work of ‘compelling husbands and fathers to recognise and 
discharge their duties’, which essentially meant following up cases of unpaid 
maintenance for deserted women and children.44 Nevertheless, some attempts 
were made to address the problems of child neglect and domestic violence when 
incidences were brought to their attention. The process by which concerned 
citizens could report such incidences was explained in Otago’s Daily Times:
Every case brought under the notice of the Society is investigated by 
the chairman, who is in attendance at a certain place one hour every 
day for that purpose. Having investigated a case he decides what steps 
should be taken with regard to it. As a rule, a letter from the secretary is 
sufficient to produce the desired effect; but when necessary the Society 
has recourse to the law.45
It was understood that communities regulated and kept watch over their own 
members and, while a number of cases were reported to local societies by the 
police, it was expected that incidences of abuse or neglect would be identified 
and reported by individuals living within neighbourhoods:
No active steps are taken by the committee to find out such cases as the 
Society deals with. The mere knowledge of the fact that a society exists 
for the protection of women and children causes people outside of it to 
bring cases under its notice.46
And, to some extent, this strategy was successful. In 1900 in the Coromandel 
district, northwest of Auckland, a local doctor reported such a case to the 
Auckland SPWC after local police declined to take action against Alfred Elmore 
for the excessive ‘punishment’ of seven-year-old Thomas Johnstone, who was 
in his charge.47 Although Elmore received a paltry £2 fine for his acts, the 
efforts of the SPWC in taking the case to court were rewarded by the public 
discussion that followed about the frequency and levels of violence used to 
punish children. Figure 1 shows a journalistic representation of the case, which 
was published for the readers of the Auckland Observer. The narrative describes 
the judicial leniency in this case as ‘an outrage in the name of justice’ and goes 
on to illustrate the unease that this case generated among local residents in the 
Coromandel community.
43 Maclean, 21.
44 ‘Society for the Protection of Women and Children’, Otago Daily Times, 11 February 1899, 8.
45 ‘Society for the Protection of Women and Children’, Otago Daily Times, 13 February 1899, 3.
46  ibid.
47 ‘A Fiendish Story: How Children are Treated at Coromandel’, New Zealand Freelance, 18 August 1900, 6.
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Figure 1: The Auckland Observer comments on the judicial leniency 
afforded to Alfred Elmore after excessively ‘disciplining’ seven-year-old 
relative Thomas Johnstone (‘A Gross Scandal — The Science of Torture’, 
Observer, 18 August 1900, 20).
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Such media commentary, however, was extremely uncommon and the scarcity 
of reportage or observation on the issue of child cruelty suggests that public 
discussions about the vulnerability of children were measured and infrequent. 
The physical welfare of children in their own homes was an issue that remained 
heavily veiled by powerful social conventions, which prevented interference 
into the private sphere of families and into the parent–child relationship in 
particular. Despite the confidence of the SPWC that incidences of cruelty 
would be ‘brought to their attention’, it is clear that cases like that of Thomas 
Johnstone were among only a small minority of instances of child neglect or 
abuse that were actually reported to social agencies or legal authorities. Witness 
testimonies taken from events that resulted in prosecutions commonly reveal 
evidence of prior or ongoing neglect or violence, and a marked reluctance by 
neighbours to involve those outside of the immediate community context. The 
Donovan trial provides evidence that those living within communities who did 
intervene when they believed the line between chastisement and cruelty was 
crossed, risked public censure. Moreover, neighbour Ellen Clark testified in 
court that she had witnessed Daniel being beaten more than once in the week 
that she had lived in Freemans Bay — it might be presumed, then, that others 
were aware of ongoing violence in the Donovan household, yet only one other 
person from the Freemans Bay community was prepared to serve as a witness 
against Daniel’s mother in a court of law.48 While a measure of self-policing 
certainly did take place in New Zealand communities, evidence from trial 
records detailing cases of fatal violence suggests that individuals struggled, and 
at times failed, to address long-standing and extreme cases of abuse occurring 
within their neighbourhoods.
Popular understandings of the root causes of child neglect and cruelty, and just 
where such problems might be found, further veiled abuse occurring within 
families. While such issues were widely believed to have been problems of 
the poor, those working in the area of child protection had come to recognise 
children’s vulnerability across class boundaries. George Behlmer notes that the 
London Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children argued strongly that 
child cruelty was ‘unrelated to economic status’.49 Representatives of Scotland’s 
equivalent society, the Royal Scottish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty 
to Children, agreed, declaring that they ‘wished the Society had the right to 
investigate the homes of the better classes as well as the homes of the poor, 
as they might often find cases which surprise them very much’.50 The New 
Zealand trial of Harriet Drake, who, in 1902, was indicted for the manslaughter 
48 Maclean’s study of child abuse trials processed in the South Island courts between 1883 and 1903, 
similarly found that ‘much child abuse went unreported or was not prosecuted’, Maclean, 11.
49 Behlmer, 94.
50 Lynn Abrams, The Orphan Country: Children of Scotland’s Broken Homes from 1845 to the Present Day 
(Edinburgh: John Donald, 1998), 210.
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of her eight-year-old daughter Dorothy, may have been seen as a case in point. 
The weight of the medical evidence in this case, coupled with the fact that 
the woman accused of manslaughter was the matriarch of a ‘well-known and 
highly-respected’ middle-class family, attracted considerable public interest in 
the trial.51 Unlike Daniel Donovan’s case, there was little ambiguity surrounding 
the death of Dorothy Drake. The description of the injuries on the child’s body 
left few in doubt that she had died of ‘shock’ after being ‘disciplined’ by her 
mother and two older sisters.52 Dorothy’s punishment, allegedly given after the 
child’s refusal to recite a verse of poetry, was administered with a supplejack 
and a triple-lashed riding whip and appeared to have taken place systematically 
over the course of an afternoon.53 A post-mortem report left no doubt as to the 
viciousness of the assault on the child, noting that the extent of the bruising 
meant that a piece of unbruised skin as wide as a shilling could not be found. 
A deep depression on the right side of the child’s head carried the marks of the 
metal handle of the whip and the inside of the scalp showed extensive bruising. 
Of note was the existence of old wounds and scars consistent with ongoing 
beatings.54
As a manslaughter case, Harriet was tried under the 1893 Criminal Code Act, 
and her defence relied almost exclusively on the parental right to reasonable 
force.55 Section 68 of the Act reads:
Section 68 (1) It is lawful for every parent or person in the place of a 
parent, or schoolmaster to use force by way of correction towards any 
child or pupil under his care; Provided that such force is reasonable 
under the circumstances; ... (3) The reasonableness of the force used, or 
of the grounds on which such force was believed to be necessary, shall 
be a question of fact and not of law.56
Dressed throughout the proceedings in deep mourning, Harriet argued that 
her actions were those of any responsible and loving mother — Dorothy had 
been a stubborn and disobedient child and in need of parental correction. The 
prosecution presented evidence, however, to show that Harriet was motivated 
by malice towards Dorothy that had existed since her birth. Witnesses were 
produced who were willing to attest to ongoing neglect and cruelty on the part 
51 ‘Evidence at the Inquest’, Evening Post (Wellington), 30 June 1902, 2.
52 Coroner’s Inquest Report: Dorothy Drake, J46Cor 1902/456-829 (Micro U 5426), Archives New Zealand, 
Wellington. Harriet Drake’s defence counsel’s suggestions that Dorothy’s death may have been due to 
concussion from an earlier fall, or even haemophilia, were unable to gain traction in the face of Harriet’s 
admission that she had given the child ‘a severe thrashing’. Evening Post (Wellington), 16 August 1902, 5.
53 ibid.
54 ibid.
55 Statutes of New Zealand 1893, Number 56, Criminal Code Act (s. 68).
56 Criminal Code Act 1893 (s. 68). This section was replicated with some slight rewording in s. 59 of the 
Crimes Act 1961, and remained in place for parents prosecuted for assault on their children until the 2007 
amendment.
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of Harriet towards her daughter.57 Notably, these witnesses were outsiders, who 
were no longer immediately associated with the local community of Otaki — 
an ex-domestic servant; a sister-in-law from Eltham who had fostered Dorothy 
for two and a half years; and an ex-labourer on the Drake family farm. From 
among those within the community, however, there was a markedly different 
response. A long line-up of defence witnesses from the Otaki district attested to 
the respectability of the Drake family and to Harriet’s affection for her children 
and devotion to her domestic duties.58 Harriet’s husband, Arthur, stood by his 
wife resolutely, insisting that: ‘a warmer-hearted or more self-sacrificing woman 
there could not be … she was entirely devoted to her household, and lived 
solely for the benefit of the children, who were very fond of her’.59
Harriet’s defence counsel, Mr Skerret, spoke at length on the temperament and 
upbringing of the accused woman, and stressed that while the consequences 
of her act were shocking, it could not be suggested that they were intended or 
contemplated.60 The act itself, he argued, was not one of deliberate or designed 
cruelty, but occurred in an outburst of passion. He appealed for mercy for ‘a 
woman who had brought up her children in a creditable manner, and discharged 
her duty as a loving mother, and whose remaining seven children should not 
be left without a mother’s loving attention and devotion’.61 Given the evidence 
of the physical injuries detailed in the coroner’s report and Harriet’s own 
admission that she had beaten her daughter severely, it is unsurprising that 
she was found guilty of the manslaughter of her child. Mr Skerret’s appeals in 
Harriet’s defence did not, however, fall on deaf ears. The jury delivered their 
verdict with a unanimous recommendation to mercy in order to indicate to 
the judge their preference for a light sentence. Nevertheless, the sentencing 
judge, Justice Edwards, was pragmatic. He informed the court that, ‘[t]hose who 
give way to their passions and allow themselves to use unrestrained violence 
towards young children must learn that the punishment which will follow will 
be a severe one’.62 Harriet Drake was sentenced to six years with hard labour in 
Wellington’s Terrace Gaol.
Undaunted, Harriet’s defence counsel called for the case to go before a Court 
of Appeal. Mr Skerret argued that the prosecution’s use of evidence relating 
to the mother’s prior attitude towards the child had been both irrelevant and 
prejudicial.63 He contended that ‘it had been established by the evidence already 
adduced by the Crown, that the occasion was a reasonable and proper occasion 
57 ‘Charge of Manslaughter’, Evening Post, 15 August 1902, 5.
58 ‘The Case for the Prosecution Closed’, Evening Post, 16 August 1902, 5.
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for parental correction; that the only questions for the consideration of the jury 
was whether the punishment was excessive, and whether, if excessive, it had 
caused death, or had caused actual bodily harm’.64 In deciding the question of 
what is meant by ‘force reasonable under the circumstances’ in such a case, Mr 
Skerret felt strongly that all argument must refer solely to the occasion of the 
correction.65 It was on this basis that the case was brought before the appeal 
judges. The parameters of what might constitute ‘reasonable’ force remained 
vague, however, and particularly so as they were to be considered in the context 
of the middle-class family home. When explaining his decision to allow the 
contested evidence, Justice Edwards demonstrated a keen awareness of this 
fact by repositioning his stance within the framework of a less emotive set of 
circumstances. He asked his fellow Court of Appeal judges to consider this:
If, for instance, a lad of seventeen, a scholar at a public school, should 
deliberately set himself to destroy the discipline of the school, and, after 
repeated mild punishments and kindly warnings, should be guilty of a 
further act of insubordination, it is plain that the schoolmaster would be 
justified in inflicting — nay, that in the interest of the offender himself 
he ought to inflict — a much more severe punishment in respect of 
such an act of insubordination than would be reasonable if such act 
stood alone. … Under such circumstances … it would be impossible to 
exclude evidence of the prior acts which rendered a severe punishment 
‘reasonable under the circumstances’. So, if a high spirited boy had 
fallen under the displeasure of his schoolmaster, and had been wilfully 
goaded into acts of insubordination … and the schoolmaster availed 
himself of such an act of insubordination as an excuse for administering 
a flogging to the boy, it would, I think, be impossible to reject evidence 
as to the prior matters, which would establish that the motive … was 
not the maintenance of discipline, but was the gratification of private 
malice. … The use of force by way of correction by a parent stands in 
exactly the same position.66
While the circumstances of the case in question presented an altogether more 
complex picture, the Court of Appeal judges unanimously agreed in principle 
with Justice Edward’s argument. They found that the testimony of Crown 
witnesses demonstrated that ‘what was done was not honestly done by way 
of correction at all, but was done vindictively, and that the pretence that it 
was done for the purpose of correction was merely colourable’.67 If, as Justice 
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occasion of a slight offence to cruelly beat [the child], then the force would 
not have been honestly used for the purpose of correction, and the defence 
must fail’. What the appeal judges had actually accomplished was a shift in 
focus which allowed them to avoid a debate about the ‘reasonableness’ of the 
parental force used to ‘discipline’ an eight-year-old child who had died as a 
result. In reopening the question of whether the force used had actually been 
carried out as part of parental correction, and by dismissing the appeal on that 
point, recourse to the second arm of the defence (whether the force used was 
reasonable) became unnecessary. Harriet’s conviction was left to stand.68
If the definitions of cruelty proved difficult to define in such case trials, this 
was grounded in their taking place within a culture of violence that existed 
despite the claims of parliamentarians. A deep contradiction lay behind the 
system whereby the courts themselves sentenced parents under the Child 
Protection Act and the Criminal Code Act for the use of excessive violence 
towards their children, while simultaneously rebuking others for failing to 
control their wayward offspring. Judges regularly commented on the need for 
physical punishment to be carried out by parents to stem the flow of delinquent 
children being brought before them. Indeed, those who were guilty of the ‘evils 
of laxity of home discipline’ were said to be culpable of ‘a crime against their 
children’.69 On sentencing 14-year-old Martin Murphy for the indecent assault 
of an eight-year-old girl, in 1900, Justice Denniston commented that ‘if all boys 
and girls of that age who committed indecency were brought up [before the 
court] they would have their docks full’.70 ‘It was a pity’, he said, ‘to see so 
young a lad convicted’. In the judge’s opinion, it should have been, ‘another 
case for domestic discipline ... a sound thrashing by the boy’s father would have 
been the commonsense solution of the case’.71
The law further encouraged and promoted physical punishment by sentencing 
children to be flogged or birched by the police. The Criminal Code Act 1893 gave 
no minimum age for physical punishment using the birch or whip, and flogging 
using a cat-o’-nine-tails could be carried out from around the age of 16.72 On 
sentencing 15-year-old James McLaren in 1888, a Dunedin judge mused: ‘It is 
difficult to know whether a boy of this age ought to be flogged with the “cat” 
... a good birching cannot hurt; it will inflict pain but it cannot be suggested 
68 ibid.
69 ‘Juvenile Depravity’, Hawkes Bay Herald, 27 February 1889, 2.
70 ‘Supreme Court’, Timaru Herald, 7 February 1900, 3.
71 ibid.
72 New Zealand Statutes 1893, no. 56, Criminal Code Act, s. 14, 325–26. Newspapers carry reports of 
judicially sanctioned corporal punishment being carried out on very young children. For example, in 1875, 
a Thames court sentenced eight-year-old John Quadri to be privately whipped and incarcerated for 24 hours 
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there is any cruelty about it’.73 This was certainly not the opinion expressed in 
a 1937 article in the British Medical Journal, where a medical doctor condemned 
the punishment — in which a boy was stripped, then tied hand and foot to 
a tripod and beaten with a heavy bundle of birch twigs soaked in brine — 
as inhuman and barbaric.74 By English law, police surgeons were required to 
be on hand to check the condition of the heart between each stroke of the 
birch, and to administer treatment afterwards, and it was noted that it would 
require ‘around three days’ for a child to be fit to attend school following such 
a punishment.75 Accounts of judicial birching in New Zealand suggest that the 
experience diverged in severity and application and was subject to significant 
regional variation.76 A correspondent in the Wanganui Chronicle described the 
‘instrument of punishment’ used in the judicial flogging of boys in Wellington 
as a rod of ‘blood-curdling’ appearence, which had been ‘purposely split for 
about half its length into a number of tails, and is there bound with cord to 
prevent it splitting further, the tails being bound also at the ends’.77 Obviously 
disturbed by the brutality of the practice, he went on to describe ‘the case of a 
boy who was beaten so severely [by the instrument] his screams could be heard 
from the closed cell by the watch-house (where the “birching” was inflicted) to 
the other side of Lambton Quay’.78
Predictably though, newspaper accounts of incidences of larrikinism and 
youth crime were regularly accompanied by correspondence from concerned 
citizens insisting on the ‘healthy and stimulating laying on of birch and leather’ 
to combat the ‘rising problem’ of moral laxity among the youth of the day.79 
The view appears to have been widely held that ‘[i]f parents so neglect their 
children as to allow them to become a menace to the well-being of society, then 
the State must in self-defence take charge of those children and endeavour to 
fill the place of parents’.80 Such correspondents may have gained a measure 
of satisfaction from an 1895 ruling, where fatherless Thomas Thompson was 
spared a conviction by the judge who declared that if someone from the boy’s 
neighbourhood would whip him with ‘ten good strokes of the birch’, the offence 
would be expiated. A newspaper article describes how a volunteer from the 
73 ‘Supreme Court’, Otago Daily Times, 12 April 1888, 2. McLaren was sentenced to six months imprisonment 
with hard labour, and privately whipped with 20 strokes of the birch rod.
74 ‘The Birching of Children’, British Medical Journal (20 March 1937): 618–19.
75 ibid.
76 See John A. Lee’s autobiographical account of his childhood experiences of judicial flogging in late-
nineteenth century Dunedin (John A. Lee, The Children of the Poor (Christchurch: Whitcoulls, 1973), 231–33).
77 ‘Juvenile Offenders’, Wanganui Chronicle, 1 May 1913, 5.
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80 ‘Juvenile Depravity’, 2.
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neighbourhood agreed, ‘amid roars of laughter from a crowded court’.81 Such 
evidence puts the hesitancy of juries and judges to condemn parental abuse, 
when presented in the guise of discipline, in a clearer light.
Historians of child protection legislation have shown how fledgling governmental 
concern for neglected and vulnerable children in the nineteenth century was 
effectively deflected by a social focus on the delinquent and criminal child.82 
A dualistic view of children as both victim and threat influenced legislation 
enacted throughout western countries and, in New Zealand as elsewhere, 
any government apprehension concerning the problem of parental neglect or 
cruelty centred not on the problematic family, but was projected outward, to 
the threat to societal stability that unsupervised and undisciplined children 
might engender.83 In New Zealand, the passage of the Children’s Protection Act 
1890 promised to prevent cruelty and ‘better protect’ children, however, the 
need to protect the rights of children to bodily safety was effectively trumped 
by the need to protect the rights of parents to physically punish. Trial records 
demonstrate that the violent actions of parents who appeared before the courts 
of law on charges of ‘cruelty’ were never trivial, and significant physical injuries 
to children were not uncommon in such cases. Nevertheless, as Sally Maclean 
has shown, there was a great deal of inconsistency in the verdicts pronounced 
on those tried for the maltreatment of children.84 The two hearings considered 
here, one tried under the Children’s Protection Act 1890 and the other under the 
Criminal Code Act 1893, resulted in convictions, though neither demonstrates 
an uncomplicated evaluation or understanding of the criminal actions under 
consideration. Rather, they provide evidence of complexity and uncertainty, 
as judges, juries and community members struggled to come to terms with the 
meanings of ‘violence’, ‘discipline’, ‘reasonableness’ and the boundaries of 
parental ‘force’.
The events discussed in this chapter took place during a period of social and 
political flux, when emerging ideologies surrounding child welfare and the rights 
of the child were coming into conflict with the inviolability of the family unit 
and ongoing concerns about child delinquency and criminality. The tensions 
that resulted from seemingly incompatible and contradictory beliefs around the 
issue of discipline were manifested not only at the social and intra-community 
levels, but also at the institutional level, within the provinces of government 
81 ‘Stratford and Ngaire’, Hawera and Normanby Star, 26 October 1895, 4.
82 See Hendrick, 7–12; Scott and Swain, 4; Bronwyn Dalley, Family Matters: Child Welfare in Twentieth 
Century New Zealand (Auckland University Press, 1998), 15–16.
83 I refer here particularly to the passage of the Neglected and Criminal Children Act 1867 which enabled 
provincial councils to establish industrial schools in which children, who were judged to be either delinquent 
or neglected, could be detained. Included in the Act is the ruling that a boy of any age attempting to abscond 
from an industrial school would receive a ‘private whipping’ in punishment. Statutes of New Zealand 1867, 
No. 14, Neglected and Criminal Children’s Act, s. 46, 172.
84 Maclean, 15.
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and law: government ministers introduced child protection legislation while 
confidently denying the need for it; the courts, forced to censure some parents 
for their excessive use of violence, continued to rebuke others for not punishing 
enough; members of the public were moved to indignation when cases of child 
cruelty did come to light, yet few were willing to speak up against violence 
occurring among the families living within their own communities.
The recent twenty-first century debates surrounding child discipline laws, 
questions of public intervention in cases of suspected abuse, and the policing 
of private life and families, demonstrate that such tensions remain far from 
resolved. The defence of reasonable force to correct children’s misbehaviour can 
no longer be used in court, although parents retain the legal right to use force 
in certain circumstances. In 2009, a government-ordered review found that the 
new law was working well and, the following year, the New Zealand police 
reported that the legislative change had had only a minimal impact on their 
activities.85 Nevertheless, the public discussions on child discipline continue.86 
It is my contention that a clear understanding of the historical antecedents of 
these issues can only assist in their resolution. It is therefore imperative that 
new directions continue to be taken in legal historical research by asking 
hard questions about the private worlds of home and family, and how private 
behaviours have been codified and moderated by the law.
85 Review of New Zealand Police and Child, Youth and Family Policies and Procedures relating to the Crimes 
(Substituted Section 59) Amendment Act, 1 December 2009, http://yesvote.org.nz/files/2009/12/s59-report-to-
prime-minister.pdf accessed 10 September 2011; and New Zealand Police, 6th review of Crimes (Substituted 
s59) Amendment Act 2007, 12 March 2010, http://www.police.govt.nz/news/release/22547.html accessed 10 
September 2011.
86 See, for instance, the release of a documentary in July 2011 that challenges the findings of the Government 
review of the new legislation, http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/80224/family-first-challenges-review-
of-child-discipline-laws accessed 10 September 2011.
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Women, Children and Violence in 
Aboriginal Law: Some Perspectives 
From the Southeast Queensland 
Frontier
Libby Connors
Aboriginal writers, Jackie Huggins, Michael Dodson, Rosemary van den 
Berg, Lester Irabinna Rigby argue that the extent of research conducted 
in Aboriginal lands and on Aboriginal people since British invasion in 
the late 1770s, is so immense it makes us one of the most researched 
groups of people on earth . . . Indeed, in some social science disciplines 
we are over-researched and this has generated mistrust, animosity and 
resistance from Aboriginal people.1
Unlike the other social sciences, and despite Henry Reynolds’s call for historians 
to write the story of the ‘other side of the frontier’ more than 30 years ago, 
Australian colonial historians have been slow to take up the challenge of 
Aboriginal-centred history. Bound by the limitations of overwhelmingly white 
and unsympathetic source materials, attempting to interpret Aboriginal frontier 
actors is fraught with methodological difficulty for the historian. Scholarship 
on missions and reserves from later periods which have been able to draw on 
Aboriginal writing and oral history have been tackled with greater confidence and 
are now being supplemented by evocative histories by Aboriginal scholars,2 but 
Aboriginal frontier histories remain underdeveloped. Postcolonial approaches, 
with their interest in indigenous subjectivity, should have stimulated greater 
interest in Aboriginal views of the colonial past but here, too, the influence on 
Australian historiography has been mixed. Bain Attwood’s book on the Batman 
treaty concluded that Aboriginal views of the 1830s were impossible to recover 
and so, only the Aboriginal protest movement of the 1970s was considered as 
1 Karen L. Martin, ‘Ways of Knowing, Ways of Being and Ways of Doing: A Theoretical Framework and 
Methods for Indigenous Re-search and Indigenist Research’, Journal of Australian Studies, no. 76 (2003): 203.
2 Rachel Perkins and Marcia Langton, First Australians (Melbourne University Press, 2010). The literature 
on missions is too immense to cover here but Robert Kenny, The Lamb Enters the Dreaming: Nathanael Pepper 
and the Ruptured World (Melbourne: Scribe, 2007) is groundbreaking. Some of the best examples of reserve 
histories from Queensland include David S. Trigger, Whitefella Comin’: Aboriginal Responses to Colonialism 
in Northern Australia (Cambridge University Press, 1992); Thom Blake, A Dumping Ground: A History of the 
Cherbourg Settlement (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 2001); Joanne Watson, Palm Island: Through 
a Long Lens (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2010).
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part of the study of that important experiment of land purchase.3 The best work 
in the field of Aboriginal-centred colonial history has come from Sydney where 
Inga Clendinnen, Keith Vincent Smith and Grace Karskens have been prepared 
to interrogate and sift the white sources to recover Aboriginal voices and actions 
in histories that are deservedly celebrated for their multi-layered and vivid 
retelling of colonial foundations.4
The task, however, is not easy and it presents formidable methodological 
problems, as Aboriginal and history critics have highlighted. This chapter 
uses some of the evidence from Moreton Bay to respond to some of the more 
complex and controversial aspects of traditional law that have surfaced in the 
Sydney histories, regarding the level of violence directed at wives and children. 
It briefly outlines some of the criticisms that have been made of Clendinnen’s 
Dancing with Strangers (2003), notes how Karsken’s The Colony (2010) overcomes 
some of the earlier work’s limitations but also where it concurs regarding some 
contentious aspects of Eora society; it then briefly outlines the evidence from 
Moreton Bay regarding just two aspects of traditional society — Aboriginal 
marriage and attitudes to children — before drawing some conclusions about 
contextualising traditional law in Australian historiography.
Despite its deserved celebration for recovering the importance of Bennelong’s 
role as a cross-cultural diplomat and negotiator in the founding of New South 
Wales, Dancing with Strangers was subject to staunch criticism from Aboriginal 
scholars, one of whom argues that it ‘render[s] invisible and dematerialise[s] 
contemporary flesh-and-blood Aborigines’.5 There was concern about 
Clendinnen’s portrayal of gender relations as being marked by excessive 
violence.6 It was argued that an effect of the work was to reproduce a view 
of Aboriginal women as the abject beasts of burden that was so favoured by 
nineteenth-century anthropology, a representation well and truly rejected by 
anthropologists by the 1980s.7 Another concern was that its timing affirmed a 
right-wing representation of Aboriginal community dysfunction that justified 
3 Bain Attwood (with Helen Doyle), Possession: Batman’s Treaty and the Matter of History (Melbourne: 
Miegunyah, 2009).
4 Inga Clendinnen, Dancing with Strangers (Melbourne: Text, 2003); Keith Vincent Smith, Bennelong: The 
Coming in of the Eora: Sydney Cove 1788–1792 (Sydney: Kangaroo Press, 2001); Vincent Smith, King Bungaree: 
A Sydney Aborigine Meets the Great South Pacific Explorers, 1799–1830 (Sydney: Kangaroo Press, 1992); Vincent 
Smith, Wallumedegal: An Aboriginal History of Ryde (Sydney: Ryde City Council, 2005); Grace Karskens, The 
Colony: A History of Early Sydney (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2010).
5 This is part of Philip Morrissey’s critique of Inga Clendinnen’s Dancing with Strangers. See Philip 
Morrissey, ‘Dancing with Shadows: Erasing Aboriginal Self and Sovereignty’, in Sovereign Subjects: Indigenous 
Sovereignty Matters, ed., Aileen Moreton-Robinson (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2007), 69.
6 Clendinnen, 146–51, 159–67.
7 See Les Hiatt’s summary of the anthropological debates on the status of women in L.R. Hiatt, Arguments 
about Aborigines: Australia and the Evolution of Social Anthropology (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 57–
63; Nancy M. Williams and Lesley Jolly, ‘From Time Immemorial? Gender Relations in Aboriginal Societies 
before “White Contact”’, in Gender Relations in Australia: Domination and Negotiation, eds, Kay Saunders and 
Ray Evans (London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992), 9–19.
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the Northern Territory Intervention, as introduced by the Liberal government 
of John Howard. Shoni Konishi contends that the problem lay in Clendinnen’s 
failure to consider how the assumptions and values of late-eighteenth-century 
ideas about civilisation infused the writings of the First Fleet officers; these 
works on which the author placed so much reliance were unreliable as they 
sought to represent Aboriginal gender relations as the polar opposite of that 
valued by refined and civilised late-eighteenth-century gentlemen.8
Karskens avoids such a reductionist view of traditional society by covering 
the broader span of Aboriginal individuals and communities over time, rather 
than telescoping on moments of internal discord. Karsken’s does not reject the 
white primary sources, with their collaborating data, but better contextualises 
them so that conflict and brutality, by both white and black individuals and 
communities, can be understood as cause and effect, heightened by new 
geographies. Nonetheless, the description of domestic discord and an incident 
of murderous payback carried out upon a six- or seven-year-old girl repeats 
evidence that is also presented by Clendinnen and disturbs the representation 
of the apparent integrity of Aboriginal law.9 It is this which needs to be 
critically examined by looking at the comparable evidence from other parts of 
the continent.
Part of my original interest in the topic of indigenous women in southeast 
Queensland was stimulated by the contrast with the circumstances of indigenous 
women in Sydney. The primary sources are derived from a period 30 to 50 years 
later and, unfortunately, they are not as extensive as those produced by the 
members of the First Fleet. There are, however, a number of sympathetic sources 
that offset the official and antagonistic settler documents. While none of these 
sources is flawless — the main counter-discourse came from missionaries who 
were bound by their own cultural assumptions of Christian moral superiority — 
they provide a contrast that allows a more balanced reconstruction of the events 
of the frontier period. Fortunately, the European sources are supplemented 
by the knowledge of Gaiarbau, a member of the Jinibara or Dalla10 who, as a 
man in his 80s, related a great deal of information about traditional life to L.P. 
Winterbotham between 1950 and 1957.11 The result is some intimate information 
that is, albeit, still very fractured by being embedded in the male perspective.
8 Shino Konishi, ‘“Wanton with Plenty”: Questioning Ethnohistorical Constructions of Sexual Savagery in 
Aboriginal Societies, 1788–1803’, Australian Historical Studies 39, no. 3 (September 2008): 356–72.
9 Karskens, 442, 460.
10 Gaiarbau gave the name of his people as ‘Jinibara’ but I have generally used the term ‘Dalla’ as it and 
‘Gubbi Gubbi’ are the names by which the traditional owners of the Blackall Ranges identify today. Where 
possible I have used the names for traditional owners as given by the Foundation for Aboriginal and Islander 
Research Action, but the missionaries’ nomenclature does not always match that in use today, and historic 
terms are retained to minimise confusion.
11 Gaiarbau’s story of the Jinibara tribe of southeast Queensland (and its neighbours). Collected by L.P. 
Winterbotham, MS 45 / MS 429, Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies (AIATSIS).
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The stereotype of Aboriginal brutality towards wives, as promulgated by 
sources based around Sydney, had become so entrenched in colonial discourse 
that the marooned convicts who gave us the first recorded evidence of gender 
relations in the north were taken aback by the level of sympathy and affection 
shown between husbands and wives. At the same time, they recorded women’s 
participation in communal meetings and group fights, which, along with 
other evidence, confirm women’s ready engagement in hand-to-hand combat. 
Clendinnen’s and Karsken’s use of the term ‘warrior culture’ seems the best way 
to categorise this aspect of hunter-gatherer society for a modern audience.
One of the earliest accounts from the Moreton Bay region comes from John 
Uniacke, a member of the crew that accompanied surveyor-general John Oxley 
in 1823. Left on board the main vessel moored near Bribie Island while Oxley 
went exploring up river, Uniacke was in a position to record discussions with 
rescued shipwreck survivors Thomas Pamphlet and John Finnegan, who had 
been living with traditional owners around the bay for several months. Their 
accounts challenged the prevailing view of female subjugation in Aboriginal 
society:
The women are far more fortunate than those in the neighbourhood of 
Sydney, where they are abused in the most cruel way by the men, and 
where the marriage ceremony consists of seizing the bride and beating 
her till she is senseless. Pamphlet assured me that, during his residence 
among these natives (nearly seven months) he never saw a woman 
struck or ill treated except by one of her own sex … The women that I 
saw were far superior in personal beauty to the men, or, indeed, to any 
natives of this country whom I have yet seen. Many of them are tall, 
straight, and well-formed.12
Oxley’s party had arrived in Pumicestone Passage, on the northwest side of 
Moreton Bay, just two days after a major meeting had taken place to settle 
intertribal matters, a circumstance that allowed Finnegan to give Uniacke a 
fresh and vivid account of proceedings. He related how, after two days’ travel 
he, and the tribe by which he had been adopted, arrived at the meeting place 
where the participants ‘were so numerous, that I could hardly count them … 
(for there were many tribes assembled to see the fight)’. The contests — for this 
was an opportunity to settle a number of outstanding grievances, not just a 
dispute between ‘two tribes’ as Finnegan had expected — took place about two 
and a half kilometres from the village and encampment; there ‘the multitude’ 
assembled around the perimeter of a specially constructed large sunken pit. The 
first fight Finnegan was permitted to witness was between two women:
12 Uniacke’s narrative of Oxley Expedition 1823 cited in J.D. Lang, Cooksland in North-Eastern Australia 
(London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1847), 410.
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I there saw a woman of my tribe, and one of another, fighting desperately 
with sticks. The battle did not, however, last long, as they appeared to 
be quite in earnest, and in five minutes, their heads, arms, etc, being 
dreadfully cut and swelled, our woman was declared the conqueror, the 
other not being able any longer to oppose her. The victory was announced 
by a loud shout from all parties, and the Amazonian combatants were 
immediately carried away by their respective friends.13
Pride in one’s kin group, physical prowess and personal bravery were prized as 
much by the women as by the men; there was no point in a woman initiating 
a legal challenge if she was not prepared to stand her ground forcibly. This 
‘Amazonian’ culture, shocking to European observers, was an intrinsic part of 
life and the system of law in southeast Queensland. Finnegan’s account made 
clear that the fights were supervised and governed by rules of fair play, with a 
halt called to proceedings when those rules were deemed to have been breached. 
Tom Petrie, who had travelled and periodically lived with local Aboriginal 
people since a small child, also told his daughter of how women not only fought 
to settle disputes, but would sometimes contribute to major battles between 
their menfolk from the outer fringes.14
Women with childcare responsibilities were not spared the tensions of these 
contests but had to be prepared to retreat with the children and give up their 
ground in the event of their men being routed. Finnegan gave a personal example 
of this as his lack of bushcraft left him at a decided disadvantage at this great 
fight. The Bribie Island ‘chief’ who had accepted him into his tribe insisted on 
introducing Finnegan to the other chiefs; he needed to gain a commitment from 
the other tribes not to molest Finnegan should the Bribie Islanders not prevail. 
Indeed, the fight did go against the Bribie Islanders and Finnegan was forced 
to withdraw with the women and children. He was unable to keep up with his 
companions, however, and his lack of bushcraft soon saw him surrounded by 
the Bribie Islanders’ opponents, who laughed at him as they overtook him.15
Some 18 years later, but still before the opening of the district to settlement, two 
of the German missionaries who had established a mission at Nundah in 1838, 
were invited by the local Aboriginal people to travel with them to a fight and 
festivities for several groups of traditional owners. They came from across the 
region to gather at Toorbal, on the northwest side of Moreton Bay. Like Finnegan 
13 ‘Account of a Fight Among the Natives of Moreton Bay Witnessed by John Finnegan’ cited by Lang, 
ibid., 411–15.
14 Constance Campbell Petrie, Tom Petrie’s Reminiscences of Early Queensland (Melbourne: Lloyd O’Neil, 
1975 [facs of 1904]) 46.
15 ‘Account of a Fight Witnessed by Thomas Pamphlet’ cited in Lang, 410–11, 413–14.
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before them, the missionaries were aghast at the ferocity of the women’s formal 
contests. Reverend Christopher Eipper wrote a description for their Presbyterian 
supporters in Sydney, which was printed in the Colonial Observer:
In the afternoon our attention was suddenly arrested by a great noise, 
caused by beating sticks together, and as we saw all the women run with 
their long and pointed sticks, which are used in digging dangum; we 
ran also to ascertain what this meant. But what a scene did we behold! 
The whole of the women were engaged in a regular battle; it was quite 
overwhelming to look at this fight of women, than which no contest of 
men could be fiercer; some actually had froth before their mouth. Each 
had her antagonist, who parried her blow by holding her stick between 
her fingers over her head; and then immediately returned the stroke, 
which was parried in the same way; when they got close together, they 
took hold of one another, each endeavouring to throw the other down.
‘Some had their fingers and elbows bleeding when we arrived’; Eipper continued 
and so the two young missionary men sought to disrupt the fight, much to the 
annoyance of the older women who ‘were very much displeased, and pointed 
their spears at ours; yea one threw it at Mr E’. Not only did the young Christians 
fail to understand the authority of the older women, they also failed completely 
to understand a warrior culture in which it was accepted that disputes were 
settled by resort to arms. The next morning they were shocked to see two 
women fighting ‘whose husbands were quietly looking on … we separated 
them, threatening that we should tell the Commandant of their quarrels’.16
A culture based on warrior values was also much more accepting of informal 
violence between men and women and between husbands and wives than 
contemporary standards allow. Unlike the castaways, the German missionaries 
did witness incidents of domestic violence but seemed as much struck by the 
women’s vocal objections to their treatment as by the assaults. This warrior 
culture was oral as well as physical and one reason for the ‘froth before their 
mouth’, as Eipper had phrased it, was that challenges and fights were preceded 
by the angry public issuing of a complaint and challenge followed by verbal 
jousting which sometimes averted a physical showdown while, at other times, it 
heralded the onset of a fight in earnest.17 On one occasion the missionary Niqué 
recorded how a woman, who was knocked down by a man after she provoked 
him, was not only not submissive, but continued to challenge him by singing 
16 Colonial Observer, 21 October 1841, 23.
17 ‘Such was the eagerness of all to listen to what was spoken on such occasions, that whenever any one was 
heard to speak in that way after the evening meal had been taken, we scarcely could get any information from 
our neighbours or guides of the cause of the quarrel’. Colonial Observer, 14 October 1841, 10.
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a war song at him for ‘about half an hour’.18 A vocal wife also reprimanded her 
husband at length when he struck her for eating his roast potato, a new delicacy 
courtesy of the missionary guests.19
A scolding is obviously not as effective an expression of power as physical force 
but it would be wrong to assume female subjection as a result. The missionaries 
were struck by the desire of the men to impress their women, and the obvious 
affection between married couples that was often displayed. On one of their 
excursions to Toorbal, young Ningy Ningy guides escorted the missionaries 
over to ‘Yarun’, the local name for Bribie Island. Circumstances forced them 
to stay overnight but, before returning to their own village, Eipper recorded 
that ‘as the [Ningy Ningy] were young men they were very particular to dress 
themselves carefully before they made their appearance again in the camp, 
significantly replying to our enquiry, why they did so, the ladies will see us’.20 
Anthropological work has established that the system of betrothals worked in 
the interests of the older men and women and increased competition among 
young men and unbetrothed females for the prize of a marriage partner.21
One of the most important contributions from the missionaries is the context 
for some of the violent exchanges that they witnessed, and how traditional 
society managed violence and set limits on its expression. The young German 
evangelists worked closely with Deciby, a Ningy Ningy man whom they referred 
to as the ‘King of Toorbal’ and who frequently stayed at the group of cottages 
the missionaries constructed for their regular indigenous visitors. The camp 
and gardens — known by a local name of Girkum — were on the other side of 
Kedron Brook, opposite the missionaries’ own thatched cottages and planted 
fields. Clearly a man of some stature, Deciby was an important diplomatic go-
between for the missionaries and many of the traditional owners to the north 
of Brisbane. Deciby’s standing was presumably also high among the women 
because, although he had a wife and a newborn son, he committed adultery 
with the wife of Wogan, a prominent local man who was well-known in Brisbane 
and at the mission.22 When informed of his wife’s actions, Wogan approached 
18 Journal of the Brethren Niqué & Rodé who were Itinerating Among the Natives at Umpie Boang from the 
12 of March to the 31st 1842, entry for 25 March, Lang Papers Mitchell Library (ML).
19 Colonial Observer, 28 October 1841, 27.
20 Colonial Observer, 21 October 1841, 23. Emphasis in original. This report also included discussion of a 
man’s great concern for his sick wife; other references to spousal affection or concern are evident in Colonial 
Observer, 11 November 1841, 42 and ‘Mission Diary’, entry for 15 January 1842, Lang Papers, ML.
21 Hiatt, 67–71 covers the debates concerning benefits to mothers-in-law of the bestowal system.
22 Wogan was well known in Brisbane and Ipswich and featured regularly in newspaper reports after 1842. 
He may have been an elder since the missionaries referred at times to the ‘Wogans’ meaning a number of other 
men who may have been his tribal or biological brothers. It is not clear from any of the accounts whether 
he was Yaggera, Turrbal or Ningy Ningy and his ready movement between Girkum, Toorbal and Brisbane 
indicate the high level of interaction between the Brisbane, Ipswich and Bayside peoples. For other references 
to Wogan see Colonial Observer, 14 October 1841, 10; 28 October 1841, 27; 18 November 1841, 51; Sydney 
Morning Herald, 7 April 1846, 3; Lang, 398–99.
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the camp late one summer night to confront Dambir Dambir, his wife, but he 
did not go alone. He brought with him his brother, Borungado. Wogan found 
his wife and brought her to his own hut where he was armed with his club and 
shield; Dambir Dambir was also prepared with her digging stick, which she used 
to shield herself from her husband’s blows. Wogan, however, soon knocked her 
to the ground at which point ‘all the women’ of the camp intervened, shielding 
Dambir Dambir from the blows of the waddies of Borungado and Wogan with 
their sticks. The missionaries believed that, if they left the scene, Wogan and 
Borungado intended to kill Dambir Dambir, although it is not clear how this 
could have been accomplished given the role of the other women of the camp.23
Was this normal women’s business to intervene to protect Dambir Dambir, or was 
Dambir Dambir fortunate to have her tribal sisters there that night? Gaiarbau 
gave another revealing account of how marital cruelty was managed. He assigned 
key roles not to the women of the tribe but to the victim’s mother and her 
brother. According to Dalla protocol, a secret message was sent to the headman 
of the wife’s tribe; the headman then organised for her brother to bring her back 
to her family. The brother had to carry a specially painted spear, which was 
adorned with the white cockatoo feather that had been presented to the girl’s 
mother upon her marriage. The headman of the husband’s tribe, upon seeing the 
brother, would allow him to approach his sister. If she took the spear she would 
be led away to her own people where it then became the responsibility of her 
brothers to maintain her. This system was essentially a form of divorce, for the 
wife was required to leave behind any children and neither husband nor wife 
were permitted to remarry during the other’s lifetime. Social harmony prevailed, 
however, for according to Gaiarbau, ‘All this was done by consent of the Bora 
and caused no fight’.24 So it would be unfair to characterise Dambir Dambir’s 
assault as typical since there were formal mechanisms to protect wives. Despite 
the pre-eminence of fighting skills in traditional culture, women’s security was 
safeguarded through their kin and through women’s culture.
The descriptions of women’s fighting and their lack of subservience to 
husbands mirror the Sydney material closely. What is new are the insights from 
Gaiarbau that, in the north at least, there were formal processes for limiting 
spousal violence. The lack of similar practice in Sydney could be a result of 
the smallpox epidemic’s impact on local traditions, a local variation peculiar to 
southeast Queensland, or a bias of the extant sources.
It raises similar uncertainties over the interpretation of the apparent payback 
killing of the six- or seven-year-old female child near Sydney Domain in 
23 Monday 7 – Tuesday 8 March 1842, Extracts from the Diary of the German Mission to the Aborigines at 
Moreton Bay from the 25th December 1841 to the 13 of May 1842, Lang Papers, ML.
24 Gaiarbau’s story of the Jinibara tribe of southeast Queensland (and its neighbours). Collected by L.P. 
Winterbotham. MS 45 / MS 429, AIATSIS, 29–30.
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circa 1795–96, which also indicates starkly different relationships to those in 
existence at Moreton Bay. In reports of their northern journeys, the German 
missionaries had commented on the evident affection for children that was 
displayed by the traditional owners. The tears shed by Aboriginal fathers, uncles 
and grandfathers on being reunited or parting from small children indicates 
demonstrative affection for children was a part of everyday manners in southeast 
Queensland.25 Furthermore, traditional law enforced respect for infant dead to 
the full extent. In 1829 the convict runaway, James Davis, witnessed the lawful 
killing of his companion John Downes who had emptied a dilly he had found in 
a tree of its bones. After long communal debate the coastal tribe insisted on full 
punishment for his sacrilege, for he had disturbed the bones of a dead child.26
Gaiarbau outlined the system of discipline for children as it operated in the 
1870s, and later, in his interview with Winterbotham. A mother and her 
brothers were responsible for the oversight of children; a common chastisement 
was to be hit on the legs with sticks which is consistent with Petrie’s story of 
the ‘beating’ of his youthful companion Wamgul by a ‘gin’.27 When a mother’s 
or uncle’s rebuke proved to be insufficient, the mother could appeal to the tribal 
council, which would enforce the ‘smoking’ of the child to drive out the evil 
spirit that was presumed to be responsible for the behaviour. It was a ritual 
that was also applied to adults and, according to Gaiarbau, thoroughly scared 
children, who lived in dread of it.28
There is no mention of payback applying to children and Gubbi Gubbi oral 
history affirms that it was unheard of.29 From February 1842, in the aftermath 
of the mass poisoning at Kilcoy Station, a pattern of Aboriginal payback can be 
identified across the region, culminating in a mass attack on Gregor’s Station 
near Caboolture in October 1846. This attack caused outrage in Brisbane, for it 
was the first time that a white woman, Mary Shannon — a female servant, who 
was killed alongside her pastoralist employer, Andrew Gregor — had been the 
victim of an Aboriginal attack in the north. Perhaps more remarkable, however, 
was that none of the four children, all under 11 years of age, who lived on the 
station were harmed.30 Under a system of payback it would seem logical that 
children might be seen as a target for law enforcement, given that Aboriginal 
25 See entry for 10 June 1842 in Karl W. Schmidt, Report of an Expedition to the Bunya Mountains in 
Search of a Suitable Site for a Mission Station (Translated by Dr L. Grope and edited and notated by P.D. 
Wilson, F.S. Colliver and F.P. Woolston), Acc. 3522/1 and 3522/2, Box 7072, John Oxley Library; also Journal 
of the Brethren Eipper and Hausmann During their Residence at Umpie Boang from 22nd November to 3rd 
December 1842, entry for 23 November 1842, Lang Papers, ML.
26 Lang, 420; Brisbane Courier, 27 October 1923, 19.
27 Petrie, 143–45.
28 Gaiarbau, 78.
29 Discussion with Gubbi Gubbi community historian and descendant of Dalaipi, Alex Bond, 26 February 2011.
30 For an account of the attack see Libby Connors, ‘A Wiradjuri Child at Moreton Bay’, Queensland History 
Journal 20, no. 13 (2010): 775–86. Ten-year-old Aboriginal boy, Ralph Barrow, and the three daughters of 
Thomas and Mary Shannon, five-year-old Margaret, four-year-old Mary Ann and two-year-old Eliza, were 
living on the station in 1846.
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children were reported to be among the dead at Kilcoy,31 but here they were 
consciously excluded from violence, despite a score or more of Aboriginal 
people raiding the station while the only remaining adult station worker fled 
for his life.
There was one attack on a white child by two Aboriginal men in Ipswich in 
April 1843 that needs to be considered in this context. The two-year-old child 
of a blacksmith went missing and her body was found, badly mutilated, six 
days later. From February to April 1843 there had been payback attacks on 
Kilcoy, Durundur and Eales stations but, other than the timing, these were 
markedly different adult-male-to-adult-male situations, comprising surprise 
spearings that were undertaken with local Aboriginal support. This attack on 
a child did not have local Aboriginal support: Aboriginal women, unaware of 
the intentions of Jacky Jacky, one of the perpetrators, had called out to him 
and his accomplice Peter when they abducted the child, been aggressively 
rebuffed and then reported them to the police. This suggests that there was no 
communal discussion of grievances, no agreed guilty party and no agreement 
about an appropriate punishment, all of which were standard features of local 
payback deliberations. The Sydney Morning Herald report gives only one hint 
— it described Jacky Jacky as ‘the complete terror of his tribe’.32 Jacky Jacky 
may have been a feared medicine man, a gundir in the language of the Dalla, and 
the murder of the child part of an act of sorcery, although this interpretation 
does not fit easily either. The gundir or ‘medicine man’ held great power and 
esteem. In southeast Queensland, the position was not confined to men for 
Gaiarbau knew of three women who had held this post.33 The awe and authority 
held by these ‘doctors’ was described by Petrie who gave the Turrbal name as 
‘Turrwan’.34 Because they had the power to use magic for good or ill, to bring 
rain and storms and to set a curse upon an enemy and to release them from it, 
gundir contributed an emotional and spiritual aspect to the intertribal politics 
of the region that often left them outsiders, people apart.35
It is possible to reconstruct historical events to provide Jacky Jacky with 
cause — there is documented evidence of his grievances with a convict who 
had taken an Aboriginal woman from Oxley Creek to the penal settlement in 
31 Only three individual victims of the poisoning were ever identified — the three sons of Pamby Pamby, 
who had adopted Davis into his tribe. Davis and Bracewell both reported to Commissioner Simpson that 
women and children were among the victims. Commissioner Simpson to Colonial Secretary, 30 May 1842, 
Return of Mr Petrie from Excursion to the North, letter no. 42/4284 in CSIL: Moreton Bay 1842, 4/2581.2, 30 
May 1842, Return of Mr Petrie from Excursion to the North, letter no. 42/4284 State Records of New South 
Wales (SRNSW).
32 Sydney Morning Herald, 19 April 1843, 3; entry for 25 January 1843, General Diary of the German Mission 
from 23 January to 18 July 1843, Lang Papers, ML.
33 Gaiarbau, 52.
34 Petrie, 29–30; see also Uniacke in Lang, 408.
35 Gaiarbau, 51–5; Petrie, 29–30.
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December 1841.36 The readiness with which Aboriginal information was given 
to the Ipswich police, however, and with which Jacky Jacky and Peter were 
surrendered, all suggest the killing was not sanctioned by the Yagerra.
As we struggle to reconstruct the processes of communal decision-making 
from brief and fragmented source material, the difficulty of interpreting 
situations such as the death of the blacksmith’s child at Ipswich or the young 
Aboriginal girl in the Domain will arise again. Without the brief references 
to Aboriginal opposition to Jacky Jacky’s attack in a Sydney Morning Herald 
report, the circumstantial evidence would have weighted an interpretation 
favouring payback. Construing the brutal death of a European child as an 
act of Aboriginal law in its historical context is not impossible: just as on the 
Cumberland Plain, night raids on camps of unsuspecting Aboriginal families by 
white settlers became more frequent in the decade following the opening of the 
northern region in May 1842, although the first openly admitted case in which 
an Aboriginal child and three women were killed was not until November 
1848.37 Where on such raids children were not killed outright but orphaned, 
we have accounts of Europeans returning home with Aboriginal children who 
became the first of many informal stolen generations, long before any official 
policy was in place in the twentieth century. Shirleene Robinson has sought to 
identify as many of these children in Queensland as possible and the unfree and 
unpaid conditions under which many of them survived.38
We could just as easily further historicise such retaliatory conduct by Jacky 
Jacky with reference to the excesses of the British criminal justice system 
between 1788 and 1840. The age of criminal responsibility was just seven years 
in the eighteenth century, and remained at eight years of age in British law until 
1963 when it was raised to ten.39 Children as young as seven were subject to the 
severity and callousness of a legal system that included execution, although 
most of these children escaped the gallows40 only to find themselves transported 
36 Andrew Evans: Charged with Disobedience of Orders and Neglect of Work, 21 December 1841, Book of 
Trials, Queensland State Archives.
37 Commissioner Rolleston on the Darling Downs reported the incident and his inability to find a single 
witness who would identify those responsible. Commissioner Rolleston to Colonial Secretary, 28 November 
1848, L/no. 48/14088 and enclosure in CSIL: 1848 CCL (2) 4/2812 SRNSW.
38 Shirleene Robinson, Something like Slavery: Queensland’s Aboriginal Child Workers, 1842–1945 
(Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2008).
39 ‘The Age of Criminal Responsibility in England and Wales’, House of Commons Library, Standard 
Note, SN/HA/3001, p. 2. Available at: http://www.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/snha-03001.pdf accessed 26 
February 2011.
40 Michael Stern and Richard Clark are attempting to catalogue all children and youths hanged in Great 
Britain from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries on their Capital Punishment UK website. See: http://
www.capitalpunishmentuk.org/child.html accessed 26 February 2011.
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to New South Wales.41 Contextualising British law’s cruel indifference to the 
plight of the child serves to undercut any accusation of reproducing anew a 
colonial discourse of the savagery of traditional society.
Such contextualisation is not necessary in the case of the attack on Moore’s 
child because the evidence, although light, points in the opposite direction 
towards an assault that was unsanctioned by Jacky Jacky’s Yaggera people. 
The evidence from the north suggests that Aboriginal law was far better at 
protecting its people from excessive cruelty than British law of the same era. 
As historians reconsider the colonial sources to tell Aboriginal-centred histories 
of the frontiers, broader patterns of traditional ways of managing one another, 
outsiders and intruders will be discerned. Perhaps then we will be able to explain 
the ‘stable core, a sense of rightness in one’s skin’42 that marks the persistence 
of Aboriginal identity and Aboriginal ways of viewing the world through such 
immense change. Close and critical reading of existing flawed primary sources 
can de-centre European interests and concerns and shift the critical gaze to the 
unnamed women who fill their background. The integrity of women’s lives in 
traditional society is a useful starting point for this venture into the realm of 
Aboriginal sovereignty.
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How to Write Feminist Legal History: 
Some Notes on Genealogical Method, 
Family Law, and the Politics  
of the Present
Ann Genovese
Genealogy does not oppose itself to history as the lofty and profound 
gaze of the philosopher might compare to the molelike perspective of 
the scholar; on the contrary, it rejects the metahistorical deployment 
of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies. It opposes itself to the 
search for ‘origins’.
Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ (1971)1
We are arguing for a political perspective in historical research and 
writing, a suggestion which must disturb every academic vigilant in 
pursuit of the ‘value-free’ … It is only by seeking and recognizing 
political relevance in history that we can bring it more directly into the 
battle of ideas ...
Sally Alexander and Anna Davin, ‘Feminist History’ (1976)2
What is the purpose of feminist legal histories, and how can we write them, 
especially in Australia in our own times? In this essay I explore, in the spirit of 
dialogue, how we might confront the tension between legal history’s intellectual 
traditions, and the political effects of law’s legacies in the present. This 
question of method is an important inference in this collection’s conversation 
about ‘who owns the legal past’. My premise is that for many legal history 
projects, especially in a settler-colonial state like Australia, writing about law 
historically requires a conscientious identification of law’s present paradoxes, 
discontinuities, and iterations. To this end, this chapter will be in three parts. 
First, a description of the historiographical problems I have encountered in my 
current project, which is an account of how feminism and law met in the 1970s. 
Second, a consideration of what genealogy as a particular theory and method 
for writing can offer feminist histories of the present in light of those problems; 
1 Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, in The Foucault Reader, ed., Paul Rabinow (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1984), 77.
2 Sally Alexander and Anna Davin, ‘Feminist History’, History Workshop 1 (Spring 1976): 6.
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and lastly, to turn to some of the questions of limits or anxieties that such an 
approach entails, when one of the political constituents of the present is spoken 
in the narratives and archives of law.
Problems: Writing Australian histories of 
‘feminism’ after 1970
My research project on feminism and family law after 1970 aims, in a macro 
sense, to understand current cultural and public discourse about feminism as a 
historical question. Feminism, in its 1970s formations, sought to question the 
gendered bases of how society operated, and to imagine a different, utopian 
future. Now, in the twenty-first century, feminism is resented or miscast, viewed 
as a battle for equality that has been won, or a revolution that promised much 
and delivered little. My political project is to understand how so many came to 
see feminism in this way, and with what consequences. Making theoretical and 
historical sense of how feminism is understood as simultaneously a malevolent 
success and a malignant failure drives much current feminist scholarship.3 As 
Angela McRobbie, to take just one example, writes in The Aftermath of Feminism, 
that feminism in its post-1968 expression was a manifold ‘self organised politics, 
taking place from the ground up, a kind of disputatious and contentious force, 
especially in matters of sexuality and family life’, bearing enormous potential 
for social change. Yet that potential, she argues I think correctly, is what has 
also, in our own times, caused ‘anxiety, concern and pre-emptive action, on the 
part of those bodies, institutions and organisations which do not wish to see 
established power and gender hierarchies undermined’.4
It is difficult, however, to write about feminism’s very recent past. In one sense, 
this is a difficulty for all historians of the late twentieth century — our ‘period’ 
is often unfathomable (even within historical scholarship itself) as ‘history’. As 
Tony Judt has argued, this miasma about the recent past is pervasive:
The 20th Century is hardly behind us, but already its quarrels and its 
dogmas, its ideals and its fears, are slipping into the obscurity of mis-
memory. Incessantly invoked as ‘lessons’, they are in reality ignored and 
untaught. This is hardly unsurprising. The recent past is the hardest to 
know and understand.5
3 This is a point made by many. For an important discussion, see: Marian Sawer, ‘Populism and Public 
Choice in Australia and Canada: Turning Equality-Seekers into “Special Interest”’, in Us and Them: Anti-
Elitism in Australia, eds, Barry Hindess and Marian Sawer (Perth: API Network, 2004), 33–56. Also see, Ann 
Genovese, ‘Worlds Turned Upside Down’, Feminist Review 95 (2010): 69–74; Margaret Henderson, Marking 
Feminist Times: Remembering the Longest Revolution in Australia (Bern: Peter Lang, 1996).
4 Angela McRobbie, The Aftermath of Feminism (London: Sage Publications, 2009), 2.
5 Tony Judt, Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 4.
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This is particularly the case when feminism (of the 1970s and 1980s) is 
evoked as a category of historical enquiry. Feminism in this sense is not 
directly interchangeable with feminist history writing. The latter has a been a 
key technique and practice of feminist politics since the 1970s6 and, as Sally 
Alexander and Anna Davin note in the epigraph to this chapter, it challenged 
the certainties of method and intent of historiography in order to expose the 
causes and shapes of women’s absence, resistance or oppression.7 The former, 
interrogating Australian feminism — itself a subject of feminist history — has 
of course played a part in that praxis. For example, Barbara Caine’s history of 
the Victorians,8 or Marilyn Lake’s work on the internationalism of the 1920s 
and 1930s and beyond,9 both demonstrate how earlier ‘waves’ of feminism have 
been written about to interpolate the political and historical form and content 
of the writer’s own times. But, maybe because of the rapidity of social change 
since the 1970s, or its sheer scale of impact (Agnes Heller calling 1970s feminism 
‘the greatest and most decisive social revolution of modernity’),10 or because 
those who were there are still very much present in the present, writing about 
feminism since the 1970s as a historical subject is often distinctively fraught. As 
Meaghan Morris has explained, the fact that feminism in this period occasioned 
social change ‘while at the same time contesting the very bases of modern 
thinking about what constitutes “change”’ induced ‘intense strain, almost a 
kind of overload, in historical articulation’.11 Margaret Henderson in Marking 
Feminist Times specifically explores that ‘intense strain’ through an Australian 
history of the cultural texts (film, histories, memoir, fiction) that were written 
by those present in the 1970s, to speak to their own unease about contemporary 
feminist politics. Henderson’s account argues that, because present ‘[f]eminist 
cultural memory is being made in a counter-revolutionary time’,12 there is 
tension between the historical remembrances (and mis-remembrances) produced 
by those who took part, and those who want to relate the archives produced by 
feminist groups in the 1970–90s to the manifestations of feminist disorder in the 
present.13
6 See Ann Curthoys, ‘Historiography and Women’s Liberation’, Arena 22 (1970): 35–40; Alexander and 
Davin.
7 See, in general, Ann Curthoys and John Docker, Is History Fiction? (Sydney: University of New South 
Wales Press, 2006), 154–79.
8 Barbara Caine, Victorian Feminists (Oxford University Press, 1992).
9 Of course Marilyn Lake also interpreted her own time, in the broader historical narrative. See Marilyn 
Lake, Getting Equal: The History of Australian Feminism (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1999); also see Margaret 
Henderson’s response to Lake in Henderson, 38.
10 Agnes Heller, ‘Existentialism, Alienation, Postmodernism: Cultural Movements as Vehicles of Change in 
Patterns of Everyday Life’, in Postmodern Conditions, eds, Andrew Milner, Philip Thomson and Chris Worth 
(New York: Berg Publishers, 1990), quoted in Henderson, 13.
11 Meghan Morris, Too Soon Too Late: History in Popular Culture (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1998), quoted in Henderson, 11.
12 Henderson, 14.
13 See ibid.; also see Ann Genovese, ‘Writing The Past as Politics’, Lilith: A Feminist History Journal 17 
(2008), lilith.org.au/the-journal/lilith-17-2008/Genovese accessed September 5, 2011.
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Despite these difficulties, there is important critical scholarship, such as that by 
Henderson, Natasha Campo, or Monica Dux and Zora Simic, that determinedly 
makes recent Australian feminism itself the object of historical inquiry.14 This 
work, however, speaks through the traditions of cultural and social history. To 
position recent feminism as a category for legal history is a less familiar practice, 
entailing not only similar difficulties but also additional ones. The similarity lies 
in the fact that feminisms’ recent engagements with and through law are usually 
written about in feminist legal scholarship as ‘lessons’ (in Judt’s sense). These 
‘lessons’ offer a means by which to compare feminist legal reform progress over 
the past 30 years, which tightens the bind and allure of teleological histories.15 
Notably, and as a general exception in Australia, Margaret Thornton has identified 
and written about feminism as constitutive of legal historical narratives (for 
example, Dissonance and Distrust) in a way that does not overcommit to the 
success/failure script.16 Perhaps because of this recognition, Thornton has also 
suggested how hard it is, in Australian feminist legal scholarship, to think about 
the recent and local as anything but normalised. In her 2004 essay ‘Neoliberal 
Melancholia’, she describes this phenomena as ‘myopia’: the inevitable loss of 
ability by individuals or communities to focus on what is nearest to them.17 I 
agree with her, but would also emphasise that this has consequences: it becomes 
incomprehensible to render strange or uncertain that which is accepted; and, 
at the same time, it becomes acceptable to ‘mis-memorialise’ legal feminism’s 
immediate past in the present. Although there is a wealth of feminist legal 
scholarship in Australia and internationally which is committed to viewing 
doctrinal or theoretical developments in law through a gendered history,18 there 
is, with few exceptions, a reluctance to understand the part played by legal 
feminism’s own institutional forms, and epistemic engagement with the object of 
its critique: the law. This is a point also made in the genealogical jurisprudence 
of legal scholar Maria Drakopoulou, who has argued, for example, that modern 
legal feminist thought is so ‘fuelled by a yearning for change’, by a desire to 
14 Henderson; Natasha Campo, From Superwomen to Domestic Goddesses: The Rise and Fall of Feminism 
(Bern: Peter Lang, 2009); Monica Dux and Zora Simic, The Great Feminist Denial (Melbourne University Press, 
2008).
15 See, for example, Australian Feminist Law Journal 20 (June 2004).
16 Margaret Thornton, Dissonance and Distrust: Women in the Legal Profession (Oxford University Press, 
1996). I have also written to these questions, see: Genovese, ‘Family Histories: John Hirst v Feminism, in 
the Family Court of Australia’, Australian Feminist Studies 21 (2006): 173–96; Genovese, ‘Madonna and/or 
Whore?: Feminism(s) and Public Sphere(s)’, in Romancing the Tomes: Popular Culture, Law and Feminism, 
ed., Margaret Thornton (London; Sydney: Cavendish Publishing, 2002), 146–64. Also see Dorothy E. Chunn, 
Susan B. Boyd and Hester Lessard, eds, Reaction and Resistance: Feminism, Law, and Social Change (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2007), which approaches these issues from a Canadian perspective.
17 Thornton, ‘Neoliberal Melancholia: The Case of Feminist Legal Scholarship’, The Australian Feminist 
Law Journal 20 (2004): 20.
18 See Diane Kirkby, Dealing With Difference: Essays in Gender, History and Culture (Melbourne University 
Press, 1997); Kirkby, ed., Sex, Power and Justice: Historical Perspectives on Law in Australia (Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press, 1995); Rosemary Hunter, ed., Rethinking Equality Projects in Law: Feminist Challenges 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008).
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expose, critique and reform the ‘phallocentric nature of the political, ontological 
and epistemological commitments’ of law,19 that feminism ‘necessarily registers 
a lack’ in itself.20 Drakopoulou seeks, as a response, to understand the practice 
of feminist jurisprudence itself as a ‘phenomena’, that shifts in its formations, 
and which must be held to account in how it ‘colours the seemingly neutral 
technology of reform’.21
There is therefore an additional difficulty of using feminism as a category 
for recent legal history that is not present for social or cultural histories. To 
argue for a history of law that is also unsettled, or at least unsettling, because 
of its interactions, dominations by, or contaminations with other cultural or 
political ideas, is always difficult. This is because of the tendency of law to be 
legocentric,22 to view the only sustainable historical narratives as those that 
mimic law itself: common law, stages of legislative reform, legal theory, which 
often do not speak to the contentious archive that feminism produces. Legal 
history, when reflecting on or summarising what has been achieved or what has 
not worked as it should in terms of reform, does not relish looking outside of 
itself to the communities and cultural contexts with which it interacts to look 
for explanations. It especially does not easily view that external history as of 
importance to itself23 (A point to which I will return.) Feminist legal scholarship, 
although a branch of critical legal praxis which could potentially engage in the 
cultural context or ‘outside’ of its own traditions, is reluctant to do so if the 
‘outside’ is the unruly yet dynamic cultural histories of Australian feminism, 
from where it emerged.24 As a result, feminist legal scholarship in Australia 
seems often unwilling to ask how, and when, ‘our positions work in the same 
register of the political rationality … which they purport to criticize’.25
19 Maria Drakopoulou, ‘Feminism, Governmentality and the Politics of Legal Reform’, Griffith Law Review 
14, no. 1 (2008), 330.
20 ibid., 331.
21 ibid., 334.
22 I have developed this point through conversations with Patrick Wolfe, who is in turn deploying the 
famous quote from Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is 
not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question’. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Ware, 
Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1998), 123.
23 See Robert W. Gordon, ‘Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in American Legal 
Historiography’, Law & Society Review 10, no. 1 (Fall 1975): 9–56.
24 Genovese, ‘A Radical Prequel: Historicising the Concept of Gendered Law in Australia’, in Sex 
Discrimination in Uncertain Times, ed., Margaret Thornton (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2010), 47–73.
25 Wendy Brown, ‘Genealogical Politics’, in The Later Foucault, ed., Jeremy Moss (London: Sage Publications, 
1998), 40.
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Problems: Writing Australian histories of 
(family) ‘law’ after 1970
In order to attempt to contextualise legal feminism through its episteme, I chose 
to explore the recent and disruptive history of Australian family law. This is 
not because I wish to offer an account of the reformist ‘phases’ of the Family 
Law Act (1975) Cth, to gauge if they provide signposts of legal responsiveness 
(or not) to a changing society. In my legal history, I have focused on family 
law and its archive because it has carried most transparently the story of the 
political responses to and incursions by feminism into law, since the late 1960s. 
Specifically, and in summary: The 1975 Act was intended by the state as a break 
with a non-cosmopolitan past, a progressive commitment to recognise people’s 
sexual and personal freedom through a ‘caring’ court. This new streamlined 
jurisdiction, a flagship of modern Australian values and governance in many 
ways, was accompanied by a raft of other measures that replaced older forms of 
moral or economic control over families with new ones. Under the new regime 
of the 1970s, which involved the intersection of family law with child support, 
state based protections against domestic violence, welfare and tax law, families 
could be socially identified, protected, and prosecuted. The move to modernise 
Australian family relationships, however well intentioned, led to diffuse 
forms of scrutiny and regulation of individual men, women and children. 
The personal battles between individuals in court — battles read specifically 
through shifting social and political ideas of gendered fairness, because of the 
critical praxis of feminist knowers, and actors — became translated into legal 
doctrine, and legislative presumptions. Rights, interests, needs, and freedoms 
that were grounded on sexed identities began to have a legal limit.26 My point is 
that feminisms and law in this period are not parallel but constitutive. Feminists 
in the 1970s and 1980s robustly debated the definition of the family in relation 
to the state and its premises, leading to the development of specifically feminist 
legal thinking and critique.27 These ideas inevitably made their way into family 
law reform processes. The performance and construction of legal feminisms can 
therefore be understood as a specific expression of what, in an American idiom, 
can be called Left Legalism. An outcome of lawyers’ engagement with critical 
politics from the late 1960s, Left Legalism was intent on enabling political 
questions of minority groups to become legal ones.28 This is I think a phenomena 
26 See Genovese, ‘Family Histories’; Genovese, ‘National Legislation and Transnational Feminism’, in 
Feminist Theory & Activism in Global Perspective: Feminist Review Conference Proceedings (2010), e99–e155.
27 For three examples: Martha Fineman, The Illusion of Equality: The Rhetoric and Reality of Divorce Reform 
(The University of Chicago Press, 1990); Regina Graycar and Jenny Morgan, The Hidden Gender of the Law 
(Sydney: Federation Press, 1990); Carol Smart, The Ties that Bind: Law, Marriage, and the Reproduction of 
Patriarchal Relations (London; Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984).
28 Wendy Brown and Janet Halley, ‘Introduction’, in Left Legalism/Left Critique, eds, Wendy Brown and 
Janet Halley (Durham; London: Duke University Press, 2002), 1–37. David Kennedy makes a similar point 
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that has also arisen in Australia, despite having a different experience, and 
meaning of ‘legalism’ itself. It is no accident, for example, that the direct 
confrontation of the state by Indigenous politics’ over the issue of land rights, 
since the 1970s, has become, increasingly, a series of questions for courts, or 
has, at least, been read through law. The same could be said of feminist projects.
Janet Halley and Wendy Brown, respectively legal and political theorists, in their 
edited collection Left Legalism/Left Critique explore this phenomenon in detail. 
They argue that critical legal praxis took seriously the legal realist point that law 
is politics by other means, but never anticipated the extent to which the reverse 
proposition would become increasingly dominant.29 Their analysis is useful as a 
way of interpreting law as a historical question, and practice, in later modernity. 
It infers that the rise of legalism as a form of politics has meant that the particular 
space which was carved out by lawyers in the 1980s, lawyers who were committed 
to gender or sexuality based challenges to liberal legalism’s traditions, has been 
undermined. This demands close archival attention in any feminist history of 
the recent past. The space for politics in law, imagined as a Trojan horse for 
feminists in the 1970s and 1980s, is now wide open: the ressentiment expressed 
by fathers’ rights groups, for example, appropriates the same strategic language 
as the feminist groups that they critique. This renders feminist arguments — 
those that contest law’s operation on gendered grounds — as potential poisons, 
and as vulnerable. If they want to have any voice at all, feminists must play in 
the demarcated spaces set up by family law, yet they are susceptible to being 
denigrated as a ‘femi-nazi plot’.30 The problem that emerges, and the one that 
drives my project, is that contemporary life ‘is so saturated by legalism’ that it is 
often difficult to imagine alternative ways of deliberating feminism’s response to 
law, or even imagining when the very rhetoric of ‘equality’ or ‘rights’ inferred 
a political response. Embeddedness of both feminist thinking within law, and 
thinking about feminism through law, make it difficult to address material or 
philosophical problems that are predicated in an ever shifting formulation of 
gender. As Brown and Halley put it:
As we incessantly refer our political life to the law, we not only sacrifice 
opportunities to take our inherited political condition into our own 
hands, we sacrifice as well the chance to address at a more fundamental 
or at least far reaching level various troubling conditions which appear 
to require address.31
about international law in the same volume: David Kennedy, ‘When Renewal Repeats: Thinking against the 
Box’, 373–419.
29 Brown and Halley, 19.
30 Genovese, ‘Family Histories’.
31 Brown and Halley, 20.
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For me, therefore, ‘family law’ is not only a constantly contested jurisprudential 
and policy space, but also a history of the present. In telling this narrative, I do 
not seek to ‘add in’ histories of feminism to what John Dewar has called family 
law’s ‘normal chaos’,32 nor to reposition ideas about what or how to constitute 
feminist legal theory through a gendered critique of family law’s operation.33 My 
point is slightly different, although informed by those other scholarly spaces. 
Family law offers to my project a complex archive of later modernity, through 
which to expose, and consider as contingent, the effects that liberal legalism has 
had on feminism as a political force which set out to contest it.
Genealogy, and how it matters for feminist 
histories of the present
But how can we actually write a politically and culturally located feminist legal 
history? It is one thing to offer a summary of my argument in this context, quite 
another to write this story in a historical form. I want to avoid teleology as a 
narrative frame, as it is the telling of feminism’s present as a story positioned 
on a ‘success’ or ‘failure’ or ‘lessons’ axis that is the problem. My search for 
an alternative approach has led me to a re-engagement with genealogy as a 
method for writing history of the present. As Foucauldian scholars Andrew 
Barry, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose have argued, genealogy can be viewed 
as a specific method for scholarly enquiry in later modernity; it helps us to 
destabilise the perceived inevitability of the present and to ‘bring into view the 
historically sedimented underpinnings of particular “problematizations” that 
have a salience for our contemporary experience’.34
The very idea of writing histories of the present is not only an exercise to 
diagnose our own times. Friedrich Nietzsche in On the Genealogy of Morality 
(1887) took the idea of writing of the subjective experience of knowledge as 
a way to destabilise the certainty of forward-looking Enlightenment projects. 
For example, he insisted that values experienced were not inevitable, that they 
served purposes that may not be immediately clear, and that they required 
‘deciphering’, or ‘artful questioning’ instead of chronicling, with the aim being 
32 John Dewar, ‘The Normal Chaos of Family Law’, Modern Law Review 61, no. 4 (July 1998): 467–85.
33 See, for example, Alison Diduck, Law’s Families (London: Lexis Nexis, 2003).
34 Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose, ‘Introduction’, in Foucault and Political Reason: 
Liberalism, Neoliberalism and Rationalities of Government, eds, Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas 
Rose (University of Chicago Press, 1995), 5.
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to reveal them as not common place, but historically contingent and variable. 
Nietzsche called this genealogy and described it as the way into ‘a secret garden, 
the existence of which no one suspected’.35
These were ideas that were of course attractive to historical (and political) 
theorists throughout the twentieth century, including, in different ways, 
Benedetto Croce, and Hannah Arendt.36 But, of course, it is the scholarship of 
the 1970s and 1980s itself, especially that of Michel Foucault alongside feminist 
historians like Joan Scott, who asked contemporaneous questions about the 
function of gender as a category of historical analysis and knowledge,37 which 
grounded genealogy as a historical practice in later modernity. These scholars 
sought to make sense of how Enlightenment traditions constructed political 
subjects yet, at the same time questioned the then dominant form of liberal 
critique: Marxism. What Foucault, for example, did in projects like Discipline 
and Punish (1977) was to take Nietzsche’s idea that knowledges are inherently 
capable of various perspectives, and Croce’s idea that the historian writes 
out of the interests of the present, and developed them into a ‘sociology of 
knowledge’.38 History, in these terms, became an analysis of power in the 
present: its deviations, ruptures, and insidiousness.
In his 1971 essay ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, for example, Foucault 
offers his account of the purpose and intent of genealogy as methodological 
politics and practice. He replaces the traditional search for total history — 
the ‘constants’ of ‘traditional history’39 with ‘effective’ history,40 ‘which 
seeks to dispel the chimeras of origin’.41 The point of this effective history is 
to ‘introduce discontinuity into our very being’42 to show the differences and 
disruptions of the uncertain past and, therefore, the uncertain present. Effective 
history is history of the present, it ‘shortens its vision to those things nearest 
to it … it reverses the surreptitious practice of historians, their pretensions to 
examine things furthest from themselves … It studies what is closest, but in 
an abrupt dispossession’.43 Foucault importantly, is not speaking in this essay 
as an abstract philosopher: genealogy is a ‘tactical weapon’ not a conceptual 
35 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality (1887), ed., Keith Ansell-Pearson, trans., Carol Diethe 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007), 5.
36 Benedetto Croce, ‘History and Chronicle’ (1917), as discussed in Curthoys and Docker, 91–93, and in 
Hayden White, ‘The Abiding Relevance of Croce’s Idea of History’, Journal of Modern History 37 (June 1963): 
109–24; Hannah Arendt, ‘The Modern Concept of History’, The Review of Politics 20, no. 4 (1958): 570–90.
37 Joan Scott, Gender and Politics of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Michel Foucault, 
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans., Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin Books, 1977).
38 Curthoys and Docker, 186.
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construction of fixed meaning, as Mariana Valverde has described.44 Nor in 
turning to genealogy as a method is he suggesting in any way the substitution 
of material or archival engagement for wilful theoretical disturbance. On the 
contrary: Foucault’s genealogies are always over archived: the archive rather 
than being a contained or linear investigation of key events, institutions or 
individuals, ‘demands endless erudition’,45 it becomes sprawling and ever 
expanding, in order to expose and understand the conditions of accident and 
how contingencies appear. The point is that the genealogist sets out to study 
‘numberless beginnings whose faint traces and hints and colour are readily seen 
by an historical eye’.46 What Foucault offers in ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, 
and in his histories, is both a method for and performance of how to write history 
of the present.
Genealogy can, however, be viewed as a dangerous practice.47 It can be treacherous 
for the writer, as there is no road map in, or out, of the sprawling archive, 
(Nietzsche’s ‘secret garden’) and the very artful questions asked at the start of an 
inquiry must, irresolutely, be shifted as a result. The danger is also that because 
by necessity genealogy speaks against the grain of the time in which it is written, 
the kind of knowledge that may be exposed is ‘[of a] kind that is not [necessarily] 
desired’.48 Further, as Wendy Brown argues in her essay on the political intent 
of Foucault’s genealogical method, ‘Politics without Banisters’ (2001), genealogy 
is a practice that is necessary for ‘stalled’ projects like feminism. Brown argues, 
I think rightly, that genealogies are often viewed as potential political dead 
ends, rather than as openings. This is because, unlike traditional political or 
narrative history, which desires to explain something in particular, and in which 
‘legitimate political positions’ flow directly from their endpoint of ‘objective’ 
or ‘systematic’ political critiques,49 genealogies proscribe nothing. They seek 
no totalising transformation besides disruption of what is thought of as so 
normalised as to be unworthy of comment (for example: ‘human rights means 
progress’). Yet, genealogy features instead ‘forthrightly contingent elements 
of desire, attachment, judgment and alliance as the compositional material of 
political attachments and positions’.50 Foucault called genealogy ‘ontology of the 
present’ and, as Brown suggests, this offers something to feminism. It is something 
quite different, she argues from ‘ontologically grounded politics’, it is instead a 
‘[c]ritical ontology of the present [which could] be precisely what productively 
disrupts or “cuts” the tight relation between constructions of identity and 
44 Mariana Valverde, ‘Specters of Foucault in Law and Society Scholarship’, American Review of Law and 
Society 6 (2010): 45.
45 Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, 77.
46 ibid., 81.
47 Or legacy; see ibid., 82.
48 Wendy Brown, Politics out of History (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), 97.
49 ibid., 118–20.
50 ibid., 119.
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normative political claims in the contemporary political rationality’.51 This is a 
point also made by Drakopolou, who exhorts specifically feminist legal politics 
to shift ‘away from the relentless effort to establish links between how things are 
and how they ought to be … and [to become] concerned instead with trying to 
identify why things are as they are and not as they were before’.52 It is for this 
reason that history of the present offers not just a way of engaging in scholarly 
disorientation, or even visiting secret gardens. It is an important practice for 
projects like feminism, which do seem stalled, or trapped because, as a practice, 
an act of writing, Brown reminds us:
[G]enealogy reorients the relationship of history to political possibility: 
although the political possibility is constrained by its histories, those 
histories are themselves tales of improbable, uneven, and unsystematic 
emergence, and thus contain openings for disturbance.53
Is genealogy intelligible to law and its history?
But, to write history in those terms, it is necessary to consider how the 
contemporary political rationality is already given narrative form. And, as 
noted, the role law itself plays in shaping our own times cannot be gainsaid. 
It constitutes the political relations for a project like feminism in our present, 
and surreptitiously demands stories of progress, (and therefore moralising about 
success/failure) when attempting to write of that relation. So, the real dilemma 
in attempting a history of the present predicated on asking about the contingent 
relations between feminism and family law, is not only feminism itself, as 
described in the first part of this chapter, but the law: both historicising it, and 
at the same time making it the constitutive subject of a broader political and 
historical narrative.
One aspect of this dilemma is the question of whether a genealogical approach, 
drawn as a method from Foucault, and when used to critique law’s doctrinal 
institutional (or in my case, cultural) presence, is recognisable within Foucault’s 
own work on law. This is a criticism raised by Ben Golder and Peter Fitzpatrick in 
their recent book Foucault’s Law (2009). Although there has been an important 
tradition developed in critical legal and sociological scholarship that uses the 
practices of genealogy,54 Golder and Fitzpatrick describe such scholarship 
(including the work of Valverde and Rose) as ‘appropriative’ and ‘occasioning 
51 ibid.
52 Drakopoulou, ‘Women’s Resolution of Lawes Reconsidered: Epistemic Shifts and the Emergence of the 
Feminist Legal Discourse’, Law and Critique 11, no. 1 (2000): 71.
53 Brown, Politics, 103.
54 See, for example: Valverde, The Age of Light, Soap, and Water: Moral Reform in English Canada, 1885–
1925 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1991); Jacques Donzelot, The Policing of Families, trans., Robert 
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a certain conceptual violence to Foucault’s broader arguments and critical 
focus’.55 This is because, in their own book, they seek to assert that within 
Foucault’s corpus of work is a discernable and conceptually whole philosophy 
of law. I think such assertion misjudges the purpose of Foucault’s own project, 
as described above, as it attempts to convert ‘the juridical’ from practices 
disturbed by genealogy as constitutive of problems inherent in liberalism, into 
theories of philosophical completeness that mimic the Enlightenment practices 
that Foucault sought to render uncertain.56 But, as I align myself with these 
‘appropriative’ scholars, who are interested in understanding genealogy as 
a historical practice that questions law’s intent and effects, as opposed to a 
jurisprudence, I want to consider two problems specific to the concerns and 
practices of legal history, and to ask whether genealogy can in fact be intelligible 
to law because of those traditions.
The first, as already mentioned, is the problem of legal history’s own method 
and intent. The dominant legal historiographical practice is what critical legal 
historian Robert Gordon described in 1975 as the common law tradition, in which 
legal history’s method and intent is to justify law’s teleology.57 This is regardless 
of whether history is invoked to write scholarly accounts of law’s development, 
or invoked judicially to make sense of what is empirically questionable in the 
experience of those who stand outside the law. This is important to question, 
in all nation states, where the archives that enable this ‘legal history’ are, in a 
spirit true to Ranke and to Hegel, those of the institutions of the state itself, 
especially the courts. Such archives, and the teleologies of national progress that 
they assume and produce, are of particular concern to legal historians in settler 
colonies like Australia and New Zealand. We only need to re-read, for example, 
the cumulative judgements in the Yorta Yorta decision, or even Mabo (which 
used history to expose terra nullius, yet to sidestep sovereignty), to see how that 
works in practice.58 What is absent from such traditional legal histories, histories 
that law both creates and can recognise, is their conscious challenge to law: they 
offer no room for alternative accounts of law, or a more open past. Genealogies 
of law, by contrast, openly challenge and contradict that tradition as they 
aim to distort the inevitability of the history of law itself. To make a case for 
genealogies as histories of the present where law’s own authority and function 
is not contained or certain in its legitimacy, opens the very real possibility that 
Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979); Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (London; New York: 
Routledge, 1989); Jeffrey Minson, Genealogies of Morals: Nietzsche, Foucault, Donzelot and the Eccentricity of 
Ethics (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1985).
55 Ben Golder and Peter Fitzpatrick, Foucault’s Law (New York: Routledge, 2009).
56 Valverde argues that Golder and Fitzpatrick are trying to ‘recuperate Foucault for the grand European 
philosophical tradition within which Heidegger looms large’: Valverde, ‘Specters’, 45.
57 Gordon, ‘Introduction’.
58 For commentary on Gordon’s thesis in the Australian context, as well as these cases, see Ann Curthoys, 
Ann Genovese and Alexander Reilly, Rights and Redemption (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 
2008), 140–43 and Chapters Two and Three, which discuss the Mabo and Yorta Yorta decisions respectively.
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one of the intended audiences for such histories — the community of law, as 
opposed to the community of which law is a part — can be dismissive of, or deaf 
to, the political intent and challenge.
The second, interrelated problem, is that of narrative. This concerns how 
genealogical interrogations that are intended to destabilise the present can 
ever account for law while, at the same time, trying to suggest law’s current 
function in our society has escaped its boundaries. That is, law becomes the 
site of critique of minority rights politics but, at the same stroke, is exposed as 
a means by which those groups must endeavour to contest their subjecthood. 
Historicising law as a response to present political conditions means unsettling 
law’s origins, yet also potentially acquiescing to law’s role in liberal societies. 
This is hard to write, as Gordon noted presciently in 1980s, as:
[making an historical case about] the fundamentally constitutive 
character of legal relations in social life is a lot easier to understand 
[and research] when made about slave or feudal societies than about 
liberal societies, as in liberal societies differences of legal status are 
not supposed to define social relationships, but merely to channel and 
facilitate them.59
Writing this story becomes increasingly difficult the closer we are to our own 
times, again, as already noted in relation to histories of feminism. Legal historians 
are always implicated in law: as both critics and participants, in ways we cannot 
always choose. The writing of law as a constitutive rather than isolated part 
of a general history of later modernity means the legal historian, if engaged 
in genealogy, can unsettle the very narratives they inhabit, potentially leaving 
their projects exposed as irrelevant to the triumphalism of law’s progress.
And yet, despite these limits, it is undeniable that we — the ‘we’ here being 
those of us who gather to write and research legal history, have as a discipline 
sought to meet the challenges we make. The opening up of legal history as 
a field of enquiry or critique that enables a different understanding of what 
law does in culture and society, to whom, and how, was, like feminism and 
legalism, also possible because of the philosophical and historical turns of 
modernity itself. Legal history as practice is therefore also produced by the 
conditions I seek to understand, and has as a result become difficult to describe 
and contain. It is no longer the handmaiden to precedent, the provenance of 
Frederick Maitland’s enclosed legal scholar.60 It has prised open the back of 
the common law’s ticking clock, most importantly — as already noted — in 
work concerned with understanding law’s implications in the settler-colonial 
59 Robert W. Gordon, ‘Critical Legal Histories’, Stanford Law Review 36, no. 1/2 (January 1984): 104.
60 Frederick William Maitland, Essays on the Teaching of English History (Cambridge University Press, 1901).
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project.61 Despite the suspicion of many jurists, the political nature of much 
historical writing about law’s violence over indigenous peoples, as well as their 
resort to its protections, has exposed a contingent nature of law, and produced 
significant political rethinking. Regardless of what other historical work we do, 
for many, if not most, legal historians in settler-colonial states in the present, 
myself included, there is a constant questioning of what laws must or can mean, 
that is never separated from the interrogation of dispossession. This does not 
eradicate the internal pull of law’s own promises, but the political question of 
injustice and Aboriginal people has made us work harder to cut another tight 
relation between constructions of legal history and law itself, as genealogy 
suggests we might.
To conclude: I think legal history as a practice must bring these insights to bear 
on all work that questions the nation state in various guises. The epistemological 
step in relation to settler–indigenous histories and the law demands nothing 
less: that is the paradigmatic example of how law operates, not its exception, 
and as such it suggests possibilities for perspectives that unsettle the effects 
legalism has had on minority politics. Although we need to be vigilant about 
our own traditions, I want to be optimistic that the political questions and 
practices, including those embodied by legal feminism, that seem normalised, 
underexposed or resisted can be understood as adventitious and also situated. 
How to write a legal history in which feminism operates as category and as 
a political question is, then, to descend into the sprawling archives of both 
the cultural politics of feminism, and its constitutive response in domestic law, 
and to make visible how it is implicated and embedded in complex national 
as well as disciplinary pasts. I have predicated my ‘legal history’ on political 
pamphlets as well as cabinet documents relating to the writing of legislation; 
I have conducted oral histories with feminist activists as well as judges; I have 
read the letters of an earlier generation of father advocates alongside the ‘canon’ 
of women’s liberation literature. The point is that the narratives that are opened 
by this uncertain archive may infer contingent possibilities for feminisms, as 
well as vary our understanding of law, in the unsettling contemporary moment. 
Genealogy’s value, as Foucault said, is as a ‘curative’ or ‘antidote’ to the poisons 
of its own time,62 and this is something that ought to resonate with legal 
historians today as we ‘discover that truth or being does not lie at the root of 
what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents’.63
61 For example: Shaunnagh Dorsett, ‘Mapping Territories’, in Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction, ed., Shaun 
McVeigh (Oxford: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), 137–58; Julie Evans, Edward Eyre, Race and Colonial 
Governance (Dunedin: Otago University Press, 2005); Paul McHugh, Aboriginal Societies and the Common 
Law: A History of Sovereignty, Status and Land (Oxford University Press, 2004); Lisa Ford, Settler Sovereignty: 
Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in America and Australia, 1788–1836 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 2010).
62 Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, 90.
63 ibid., 81.
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Spain’s ‘pact of silence’ and the 
Removal of Franco’s Statues 
Aleksandra Hadzelek
Introduction
The Spanish Law of Historical Memory, passed in 2007, is an important milestone 
in addressing several issues that have remained unresolved since the death of 
Franco, 32 years earlier. The law calls for, among other important provisions,1 
the removal of all Francoist symbols from public buildings and spaces. Franco 
was highly visible in the public sphere, using his own images to legitimise his 
rule, not unlike other dictators, contemporaneous or historical. But, what makes 
Franco’s case so interesting, is that he remained present in the public sphere for 
decades after his death, due to a ‘pact of silence’ that Spanish society agreed 
upon at the time of transition to democracy. In Giles Tremlett’s words:
for almost four decades [after his death] General Francisco Franco was 
someone Spaniards could not escape. He was there in school books, 
church prayers, statues, plaques, street names and thousands of other 
reminders of a violent insurrection that led to a vicious civil war. Now 
his face and name are being erased from public view.2
The reactions to the removal of statues, from the most publicised Madrid event 
in 2005 to a stream of other removals following the passing of the 2007 law, 
illustrate the divisions that are still present in Spanish society with regard to its 
recent past, and they encapsulate the main attitudes towards the re-evaluation 
of that past. At the core of these attitudes lies the period of transition from 
dictatorship to democracy, when any memories that might have provided an 
alternative to the official version of history, as supported by the old Francoist 
regime, were effectively silenced. Current attempts to revive those memories, 
considered by many people to be both necessary and urgent, are labelled 
dangerous and against the spirit of reconciliation by spokespeople of the 
1 It condemns Franco’s regime, recognises all victims of the war and violence on both sides of the conflict, 
annuls prior legislation, offers government assistance in identifying victims buried in clandestine mass graves, 
prohibits political events at Valle de los Caídos (Valley of the Fallen, burial place of Franco and a monument 
to nationalist soldiers who perished in the war), and grants Spanish citizenship to descendents of Republican 
exiles from the Civil War, as well as surviving members of the International Brigades.
2 Giles Tremlett, ‘Franco’s Face and Name Erased from Public View in Spain’, Guardian, 6 October 2009, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/06/franco-name-erased-spain accessed 2 September 2010.
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opposing camp. What some see as the necessary exposure of still open wounds 
to the light of day in order to heal, others see as the reopening of wounds that 
have already healed.
Franco’s iconography
Few images remain of Franco in his early years, before his spectacular military 
career lifted him from the unknown to a ruthless leader of the Moroccan 
campaign, to the leader of the insurgency that toppled the Spanish Republican 
government, to the victor of a three-year bloody civil war and the first military 
confrontation between fascism and the rest of the world.3 The images that 
appear after the end of the war hardly resemble the shy and plain looking boy 
from the early years of his training at the military academy.4 Franco the victor, 
the saviour of Spain from all things evil, made regular and heavily orchestrated 
public appearances all over the country,5 which were then broadcast as newsreels 
— carefully prepared sets of ‘news’ for the Spanish public, the only news that 
it was regarded as acceptable for Spaniards to see and hear, as they were now 
safely under the protection of the caudillo.6 The broadcasts were under tight 
government control and presented an image of the dictator at ease in a variety of 
situations: gentle family man with his wife and daughter; pious Catholic coming 
out of mass; thoughtful head of government in consultation with his advisers; 
and, ultimately, a firm military commander in full control of his troops and his 
country.
For Franco, his own images were part of an extensive propaganda machine, 
designed and implemented in an effort to legitimise his rule, as is often the case 
with dictatorships. Along with newsreels, public displays such as posters, busts 
and statues of Franco were being erected all over Spain from the very early 
3 The Spanish Civil War is also often referred to as the ‘Little World War’ as it was the first direct 
confrontation between fascism and communism, on the eve of World War II.
4 The website http://www.generalisimofranco.com has the most extensive gallery of photos of Franco 
available on the internet, and it includes some lesser known pictures of him from the early years, as well as the 
more iconic images of Franco as a saviour of the Spanish nation, which were widely circulated and publicised 
as part of the propaganda machine of the regime.
5 The public image of Franco while he was in power is in stark contrast with the image of General Salazar, 
the military dictator of neighbouring Portugal. While ideologically both Franco and Salazar represented right 
wing politics, fascism and defence of Catholicism against the communist threat, Salazar did not appear in 
public as much as Franco, and his appearances were not as carefully prepared by his advisers to project the 
image of imperial grandeur to which Franco aspired. The comparison between the two personalities is the 
topic of an excellent Portuguese documentary from 2004 (Franco and Salazar, produced by Jaquin Vieira and 
Fernanda Bizarro) but, surprisingly, it has not yet been examined in a dedicated academic study in Spanish 
or English.
6 Similarly to Hitler referring to himself as Fuhrer, and Mussolini as Il Duce, Franco decided to call himself 
‘Caudillo de España, por la gracia de Dios’: ‘the “great leader” of Spain, by the grace of God’. The term 
caudillo originated in 19th century South America, and has strong connotations of military authoritarian 
power, often of populist nature and based on personality cult.
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days of his rule. Jesús De Andrés7 dates the commissioning of the first one,8 
a bust to be placed in Salamanca’s main square, to November 19369 — only a 
few months after the beginning of the insurgency on 18 July, and in the midst 
of a brutal war with, at that point, no clear winner. The first equestrian statue 
was commissioned by the Servicio Nacional de Prensa y Propaganda (National 
Service for Press and Propaganda) in 1938. Diverting resources to iconography 
in such early stages of his rule is a powerful sign of Franco’s obsession with his 
own image and his aspirations to grandeur, but it also reflects the cult of the 
leader, essential to fascist ideology, and the role of iconography in a conflict 
that was fought on the propaganda front almost as much as on the battlefield.10 
What sets Spain aside from other fascist and authoritarian regimes of its time 
is the persistence of the iconography in the public sphere for decades after the 
dictator’s death, as well as its society’s inability or lack of willingness to, until 
recently, seriously address the human rights abuses of the Franco era.11
Francoism or fascism
Whether Franco’s regime was actually fascist is contentious and subject to an 
ongoing debate. Most academic literature from the 1970s and 1980s, especially 
by non-Spanish scholars, avoided the classification of Franco and his regime 
as fascist, preferring instead the more benevolent term of ‘Francoism’ that did 
not invite direct comparisons with other fascist regimes of the early twentieth 
century. Stanley G. Payne,12 Paul Preston13 and Christopher J. Ross14 all focus on 
the ideological aspect of the Franco regime and point out that it was not ‘purely 
fascist’ and that it distanced itself from fascism due to international pressure.15 
7 Jesús De Andrés, ‘Las estatuas de Franco y la memoria histórica del franquismo’, (Bilbao: Asociación de 
Historia Contemporánea, 2003), http://www.ahistcon.org/docs/Santiago/pdfs/s1g.pdf accessed 1 July 2011.
8 De Andrés, ibid., points out that, already in October 1936, a decision was made to erect a statue in El 
Ferrol, Franco’s birthplace, but it was not actually carried out until 1967.
9 The bust was installed on 1 October 1937, while the war was not officially over until 1 April 1939.
10 De Andrés. ‘Las estatuas’, offers an interesting analysis of the aesthetics of the various monuments in 
the context of the three widely accepted stages of the dictatorship, as well as the impact of international 
circumstances, such as the fall of Nazi Germany, on the symbolic meaning of different elements of sculptures, 
thereby demonstrating Franco’s understanding of the symbolism behind the public use of his images.
11 For an excellent introduction to a discussion on human rights abuses in the Franco era, in the context 
of the ‘pact of forgetting’ and the politics of memory, see Madeleine Davis, ‘Is Spain Recovering its Memory? 
Breaking the Pacto del Olvido’, Human Rights Quarterly 27, no. 3 (August 2005): 858–80, and Carlos Jerez-
Farrán and Samuel Amago, eds, Unearthing Franco’s Legacy. Mass Graves and the Recovery of Historical Memory 
in Spain (University of Notre Dame Press, 2010).
12 Stanley G. Payne, The Franco Regime, 1936–1975 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987).
13 Paul Preston, Franco: A Biography (London: HarperCollins, 1993).
14 Christopher. J. Ross, Spain 1812–2004, 2nd ed. (London: Arnold, 2004).
15 Referring to the ‘New State’, Ross says that ‘the name he [Franco] gave it emphasised its affinity with 
fascism, as did the special status enjoyed by the Falange. Short for ‘Falange Española de las Juntas de Ofensiva 
Nacional Sindicalista’ or FE JONS (Spanish Phalanx of the Assemblies of the National Syndicalist Offensive) 
from its founding in 1933 to 1937, and ‘Falange Española Tradicionalista de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional 
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On the other hand, many Spanish historians from the late 1970s and through 
the 1980s insist on the classification of Franco’s regime as fascist.16 António 
Costa Pinto observes that ‘the debate “fascism-authoritarianism” has, during 
the past decade, lost its ideological content in both Portugal and in Spain’.17 
Instead, the most recent literature seems more preoccupied with the issue of 
violence applied heavily by the Franco regime, particularly in the immediate 
post-war period. Peter Anderson, who calls Falange ‘the Spanish fascist party 
led by Franco’18 points out that:
only in recent years have historians uncovered conclusive evidence 
that reveals the massive scale of the Francoist repression. One of the 
conclusions these historians have drawn from their research is that 
Francoism formed an important component within the European 
totalitarian and fascist movements of the mid-twentieth century period.19
Javier Rodrigo supports the above argument that a comparative analysis of 
fascist movements in twentieth-century Europe indicates the fascist nature of 
Franco’s regime.20 It can be argued that the use of a ‘fascist’ categorisation of 
the Franco regime is in sync with leftist political ideas — Vyacheslav Molotov 
insisted on that categorisation throughout the post-war negotiations, and even 
convinced the Allies to adopt it in the text of the Potsdam Agreement.21 The 
association of Franco with fascism was present during his rule in the minds of 
his Republican opponents, and represented as such by the Republicans in exile. 
Those who had fought in the Spanish Civil War on the side of the Republic, had 
Sindicalista’ or FET JONS (Spanish Traditionalist Phalanx of the Assemblies of the National Syndicalist 
Offensive) from 1937 when Franco combined the original Falange with the Carlist party and assumed its 
leadership. It was the only legally permitted political party in Spain while Franco was in power.  Although to 
a large extent a reflection of Franco’s own ideas, its economic policy also had fascist overtones’ (ibid., 99–100). 
He agrees that Falange played an important part and fascist symbols such as the salute were adopted (ibid., 
100–02) but points out that ‘As soon as it became clear that the western democracies were going to prevail in 
the World War, Franco began to downplay the fascist side of his regime’ (ibid., 102).
16 For example: Juan Marsal, Pensar bajo el franquismo: Intelectuales y politica en la generacion de los 
años cincuenta (Barcelona: Ediciones Península, 1979); Raúl Morodo, Los orígenes ideológicos del franquismo: 
Acción Española (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1985) and Julio Rodríguez Puértolas, Literatura fascista española 
(Madrid: Akal, 1986).
17 António Costa Pinto, ‘Elites, Single Parties and Political Decision-making in Fascist-era Dictatorships’, 
Contemporary European History 11, no. 3 (2002): 437, note 29.
18 Peter Anderson, ‘Singling Out Victims: Denunciation and Collusion in the Post-Civil War Francoist 
Repression in Spain, 1939–1945’, European History Quarterly 39, no. 7 (2009): 16.
19 ibid., 22. Also see Ángela Cenarro, ‘Matar, vigilar y delatar: la quiebra de la sociedad civil durante 
la guerra y la posguerra en España (1936–1948)’, Historia Social no. 44 (2002): 65–86, for an interesting 
perspective on the participation of civil society in the violence and terror, through right-wing mobilisation 
and other tactics that were employed to engage the ‘good Spaniards’ in the oppression characteristic of the 
New State.
20 Javier Rodrigo, ‘La naturaleza del franquismo: un acercamiento desde la perspectiva comparada de 
los fascismos europeos’, in Universo de micromundos, eds, Carmelo Romero and Alberto Sabio (Zaragoza: 
Institución Fernando el Católico, 2009), 47–62.
21 See Enrique Moradiellos, ‘The Potsdam Conference and the Spanish Problem’, Contemporary European 
History 10, no. 1 (March 2001): 82–89.
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fought a war against fascism. Supporters of the Republican version of history 
are strongly opposed to the classification of Franco’s regime as Francoist instead 
of fascist. According to Vicenç Navarro:
its replacement by the term Francoist represents a successful conservative 
project of representing the regime only as caudillista while in reality it 
brings together all the characteristics of a fascist regime. And not only 
at the beginning but until the end.22
Navarro’s firm conviction that the regime maintained its fascist characteristics 
until the end is in contrast to many scholarly opinions that argue that Franco 
distanced himself from fascism as early as 1942.23 Peter Pierson analyses Franco’s 
policies and appointment of specific people to crucial posts as a way of gaining 
international acceptance, especially from the United States, and proposes 
that Franco manipulated the make-up of the government and the external 
appearances of his regime to appease the international community. ‘To appeal 
to the Catholic world, Franco stressed Spain’s Catholicism and downplayed the 
role of the Falange.’24 Stanley Payne in his 1987 work identifies the reforms of 
1967–68 as the final phase of the defascitization of the regime,25 and reiterates 
in 2011 (quoting David W. Pike26) that ‘in 1945 Franco was almost universally 
denounced as “the last surviving fascist dictator”, and would never entirely 
escape “the Axis stigma”. Nonetheless, most scholars conclude that the Spanish 
regime was not intrinsically fascist, though it included aspects of fascism’.27 
Aristotle A. Kallis analyses an additional category of para-fascism that could be 
applicable to ‘a larger category of regimes that adapted or aped “fascist” formal 
and organisational structures, but did not share the revolutionary ideological 
vision of genuine fascism’,28 including that of Franco’s Spain.
Similar disagreements surround the debate on whether Franco’s regime was 
totalitarian. Since Raymond Carr’s famous quote, ‘Francoism was not a totalitarian 
22 ‘su sustitución por el término franquista responde a un proyecto conservador exitoso de presentar aquel 
régimen sólo como caudillista, cuando en realidad reunió todas las características de un régimen fascista. Y no 
sólo al principio sino hasta el final.’ Vicenç Navarro, ‘¿Franquismo o fascismo?’, Público, 7 July 2011, http://
blogs.publico.es/dominiopublico/3625/%C2%BFfranquismo-o-fascismo/ accessed 15 November 2011.
23 ‘The defascistization of the Franco regime began as early as 1942 and proceeded in several stages’ (Payne, 
The Franco Regime, 629). ‘Franco distances himself from fascism in a variety of ways after 1942, and more 
rapidly after 1945. Thus, the raised-arm salute was dropped, as was the name “New State”. The Falange 
representation in government was cut, and its presence in public life generally reduced’ (Ross, 103). Peter 
Pierson in The History of Spain (Westport, CO and London: Greenwood Press, 1999, 109) also points out the 




26 David W. Pike, Franco and the Axis Stigma (New York: Macmillan, 2008).
27 Payne, Spain: A Unique History (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), 224.
28 Aristotle A. Kallis, ‘“Fascism”, “Para-Fascism” and “Fascistization”: On the Similarities of Three 
Conceptual Categories’, European History Quarterly 33, no. 2 (2003): 220.
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regime’29 and Payne’s firm conviction that ‘the Spanish regime was obviously 
authoritarian, not totalitarian’,30 a re-conceptualisation of totalitarianism has 
occurred in global historiography. Anderson, with reference to Abbott Gleason31 
and Sheila Fitzpatrick,32 points out that:
ironically this effort to understand Francoism as an important example 
of European totalitarianism came exactly at the time that historians 
of other mid-twentieth century terror regimes began to challenge 
some of the reductions of Cold War totalitarian theory. In this theory 
ideologically driven regimes control and direct their passive societies in 
both the public and private sphere through their use of a terror police 
force that is independent of the society it bends to its own will.33
Recently it has been proposed that specific categorisations of the Franco regime 
should be abandoned as they do not advance or benefit the analysis and debate 
of emerging critical issues related to the regime. Howard J. Wiarda and Margaret 
MacLeish Mott refuse the following denominations: ‘military dictatorship’, 
‘clerical’ or ‘theocratic dictatorship’ and ‘fascist’,34 and posit that one cannot 
describe the Franco and Salazar regimes ‘by employing bumper sticker labels’, 
but rather ‘by analysing them carefully’.35 They refer to Juan José Linz’s early 
work36 based on a:
distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, a distinction that 
was not always apparent to the victims of these regimes but which is helpful in 
understanding them. Linz argues that both the Spanish and Portuguese regimes 
should be understood as occupying an intermediary position, clearly not liberal, 
but not totalitarian either, and thus in between these two major types — an 
authoritarian regime that has its own distinctive politics and dynamics.37
Navarro, however, who points out Linz’s conservative terminology of fascist 
origins,38 is convinced that:
29 ‘In spite of the Fascist trimmings of the early years — the goosestep and the Fascist salute — Francoism 
was not a totalitarian regime. It was a conservative, Catholic, authoritarian system, its original corporatist 
features modified over time.’ Raymond Carr, Modern Spain 1875–1980 (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1980), 165.
30 Payne, The Franco Regime, 626.
31 Abbott Gleason, ‘Totalitarianism in 1984’, Russian Review 43, no. 2 (April 1984): 145–59.
32 Sheila Fitzpatrick, ‘New Perspectives on Stalinism’, Russian Review 45, no. 4 (October 1986): 357–73.
33 Anderson, 11.
34 Howard J. Wiarda and Margaret MacLeish Mott, Catholic Roots and Democratic Flowers: Political Systems 
in Spain and Portugal (Westport, CO and London: Praeger, 2001), 48.
35 ibid.
36 Juan José Linz, ‘An Authoritarian Regime: Spain’, in Mass Politics, eds, Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan 
(New York: The Free Press, 1970), 251–83.
37 Wiarda and MacLeish Mott, 48–49.
38 ‘... autores conservadores (procedentes de la misma nomenclatura fascista como Juan Linz)’, Navarro, 
Tergiversaciones, 3.
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if in Spain there had been a rupture with the dictatorship (as it 
happened in Eastern European countries) instead of a transition (which 
was executed under specific division of power, with a very right and a 
very weak left wing), today we would be speaking of fascism instead of 
Francoism.39
He also warns against considering Francoism a neutral term, given its political 
and ideological connotations: ‘the language that we use is not neutral, nor is the 
term Francoism that is used to define the dictatorship’.40
Madrid statue
The polarisation of academic standpoints on these terms and classifications of 
the regime are reflected in the public opinion as expressed in press and blogs. 
The events in Spain’s capital, Madrid, in 2005, and the accompanying press 
coverage, provide a good example of the attitudes towards the dictatorship and 
its memory that have prevailed in the Spanish society until the last decade. Until 
then, a seven-metre-tall bronze equestrian statue of Franco stood undisturbed 
in a square where it had been originally erected in 1959. On 17 March 2005 it 
was removed, initially without fanfare and with minimal media coverage.41 A 
small neo-fascist group protested against the removal of the statue while an even 
smaller group of supporters of the action cheered on. In an attempt to minimise 
any possible demonstrations or public debate, the event was not publicised in 
advance. In fact, the operation was kept secret even from the city authorities, 
which the mayor of Madrid complained about the next day. The removal 
occurred in the early hours of the morning, starting at 2 am, supposedly to 
avoid disturbing traffic. Interestingly, the statue was covered for transport, a 
clear sign that the authorities were nervous about the removal even at that time 
of the day. To pre-empt confrontation, there was a heavy police presence and 
spectators were told to disperse.42 Except for a few shouts and fascist salutes, 
39 ‘Pero creo que en España, si hubiera habido una ruptura con la dictadura (tal como ha ocurrido en los 
países del Este de Europa) en lugar de una transición (que se ha realizado en condiciones de gran poder de las 
derechas y una gran debilidad de las izquierdas), hoy se hablaría del fascismo en vez de franquismo.’ ibid., 15.
40 ‘El lenguaje que utilizamos no es neutro, y el término franquismo, que se usa para definir la dictadura, 
tampoco lo es.’ ibid.
41 The first removal of a Franco statue took place in 1981 in Puente Genil (Córdoba), according to Asociación 
para la Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica (ARHM, Association for the Recuperation of Historical Memory), 
while, in Santander, a monument was also removed in 1981, only to be put back in 1983. It was an exact 
replica of the Madrid statue and was still standing in front of the city’s Town Hall in 2005. The removal of the 
Madrid statue in 2005 is the most significant event of this kind since the death of Spain’s dictator, General 
Francisco Franco, 32 years earlier, save, perhaps, only the removal of a statue in 2002 in the city of El Ferrol, 
Franco’s birthplace, and thus very heavy in symbolism in its own way but not nearly as widely reported in 
the Spanish or international media.
42 Most sources do not provide any estimates as to the size of the crowd protesting during the actual 
removal, and concentrate on the demonstration on the following day.
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it was uneventful. Until the next day, that is, when people started gathering 
around the empty pedestal and adorned it with flowers and a Spanish flag, some 
praying on their knees. A demonstration in protest of the removal, organised by 
the Spanish fascist party Falange, was attended by approximately 700 people43 
who assembled in front of a large portrait of Franco that had been placed in 
front of the empty pedestal. One of the iconic images of Franco as a crusader was 
beamed onto the scaffolding that the authorities had placed there, projecting 
a virtual presence of Franco where the physical monument of him had stood 
before. This demonstration was reported in major international media outlets, 
complete with the image of the fascist salute, and was followed by a heated 
public debate in the Spanish media.
While international media focused on the resurgence of the Spanish far right, 
the public debate in Spain took a very different direction, mainly revolving 
around the issues of memory and commemoration. The opinions of two 
politicians who were frequently quoted in the Spanish media epitomised the 
divisions in Spanish society with regard to this particular event, as well as 
the discord regarding how Spain should deal with its difficult past in general. 
On the one hand, the leader of one of the ruling parties, Gaspar Llamazares of 
the Izquierda Unida (IU, United Left), declared that, despite the statue being 
removed in the early hours of the morning, it ‘could have been done in the light 
of the day’ as ‘there is no shame in removing what is shameful’.44 In contrast, 
the opposition, according to Javier Arenas of the Partido Popular (PP, Popular 
Party), considered the removal of the Franco statue an ‘unnecessary reopening 
of wounds’ stemming from the Spanish experience of dictatorship, and accused 
the ruling party of ‘hijacking the process of reconciliation’.45 On the same day, 
the Catalan edition of El País also published a short editorial by Isabel Olesti 
about a book called Mujer y exilio 1939 (Women and Exile 1939), as well as a talk 
delivered by its author, Antonina Rodrigo. Olesti finished her editorial with a 
quote from Rodrigo: ‘Franco’s death should have opened the doors of history. 
Instead a pact of silence was agreed upon and nothing happened. And we are 
left with what they taught us. And the wound remains open’.46
43 According to estimates in El País, Spain’s leading newspaper: ‘El PP critica la retirada y 700 fascistas 
protestan ante el pedestal’, 18 March 2005, http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/PP/critica/retirada/700/
fascistas/protestan/pedestal/elpepiesp/20050318elpepinac_10/Tes accessed 10 August 2005.
44 ‘Aunque comprende que se haya retirado de madrugada para no alterar el tráfico en una ciudad colapsada, 
entiende que sería “ilustrativo que se pueda hacer a la luz del día”, porque “no hay ninguna vergüenza en 
quitar lo que es una vergüenza: que se mantengan símbolos de una dictadura que se deberían haber retirado 
hace mucho tiempo.”’ ‘El PP critica la retirada de la estatua de Franco porque puede “abrir heridas” en la 
sociedad’, El País, 17 March 2005, http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/PP/critica/retirada/estatua/Franco/
puede/abrir/heridas/sociedad/elpepuesp/20050317elpepunac_6/Tes accessed 10 August 2005.
45 ‘Me parece muy mal que el PSOE esté intentando cargarse la reconciliación nacional. … es un error y 
abre heridas innecesarias en la sociedad española’. Javier Arenas, interview for the program Mirada Crítica on 
channel Telecinco on 17 March 2005, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1925031/
46 ‘Con la muerte de Franco se tenía que haber abierto las puertas de la historia. Pero se hizo un pacto de 
silencio: aquí no ha pasado nada. Y nos quedamos con lo que nos contaron. Y la herida sigue abierta.’ Rodrigo, 
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Pact of silence
The ‘pact of silence’ (pacto de silencio) that Rodrigo refers to was an actual 
political agreement between parties47 that delayed the removal of statues of 
Franco, such as that in Madrid, until almost 30 years after his death. It was 
agreed upon by post-Franco Spanish society in the name of the greater good 
— that of a peaceful transition to democracy and the regaining of political and 
economic stability in a country still bearing the scars of the war and facing 
great uncertainties as to the transition of power upon the dictator’s death. The 
fragility of the peace and the conflicting interests of the various groups that 
would make a grab for power were on everybody’s mind when Franco died in 
November 1975. He was almost 83 years old and his health had been declining 
in the last few years of his life, so the end of his rule had been anticipated. The 
totalitarian regime imposed on Spanish society after the end of the civil war 
in April 1939 had already softened significantly,48 and a successor to Franco 
had been nominated since 1969.49 However, executions of political opponents 
were still being carried out as late as September 1975, and emotions were still 
running high. Many feared that Spain could find itself at the brink of another 
conflict between the Francoists, who would resort to anything in order to cling 
to power, and the opposition, who would use the opportunity to seize power 
and exact revenge.
Nonetheless, a peaceful transition was achieved, in spite of the odds against it, 
by setting the immediate past aside and moving forward, but at the same time 
keeping the existing political structure and legal mechanisms. In the words of 
Salvador Cardús i Ros:
in Isabel Olesti, ‘Mujer y exilio’, El País, 17 March 2005, http://www.elpais.com/articulo/cataluna/Mujer/
exilio/elpepiespcat/20050317elpcat_3/Tes accessed 10 August 2005.
47 In a strong critique of the debates on historical memory, Payne argues that ‘“Pact of silence” is simply 
a propaganda slogan. No such thing ever existed. ...What was agreed upon was not “silence” but the 
understanding that historical conflicts would be consigned to the labours of the historians and journalists, 
and that politicians would not make use of them in their parties’ mutual competition, which would direct 
itself to present and future conflicts’. Payne, Spain, 251.
48 Wiarda and MacLeish Mott subscribe to the idea of ‘soft’ dictatorship in the later stages of Franco’s 
rule: ‘By the early 1970s such vast economic, social, cultural even political changes had occurred in Spain 
and Portugal that the two countries were hardly recognizable from what they had been earlier. What had 
once been “hard” dictatorships were now “soft” dictatorships led by enfeebled old men. These once fierce 
authoritarian regimes were now tired, out of date, old-fashioned, and hanging on mainly by inertia. It would 
not take much to topple them.’ Wiarda and MacLeish Mott, 59.
49 Franco reinstated the monarchy in 1947 and named himself regent for life. In 1969 he named as heir to 
the throne the previous king’s grandson, Juan Carlos de Borbón, who was enthroned two days after Franco’s 
death and who is still the King of Spain today. Effectively, the successor approved by and groomed by Franco 
remains as the head of the Spanish state over 35 years after the death of the dictator, although his role in 
initiating a democratisation process and his firm stand against the attempted coup in 1981 demonstrates 
an unquestionable departure from Franco’s ideology and politics. For an excellent analysis of the figure 
of the King and his role in the transition process see Paul Preston, Juan Carlos: A People’s King (London: 
HarperCollins, 2004).
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The transition is, basically, a process of historical and social amnesia, 
and the invention of a new political tradition (the contradiction is valid). 
… [It] is, in effect, the manufacturing of a great lie … that had the 
politically laudable intention of turning the page from an authoritarian 
to a democratic regime without bringing about a political breakdown 
and, in the process, achieving the unheard of situation in which the 
dictatorship’s juridico-political framework became the source of 
legitimacy for the new democratic model.50
The end of the dictatorship and the re-establishment of democracy should 
have made it possible, in theory, to contest the official version of the past, 
prosecute crimes, and seek reparations for victims. This, however, could have 
potentially led to purges, retribution, and even another armed conflict. The 
peace was too precious to Spaniards from both sides to jeopardise, even if it 
meant that anti-Francoists had to forgo a basic sense of justice. The political 
compromises achieved during the early transition period were reinforced by the 
amnesty law proclaimed in 1977, which was deemed necessary for the success 
of national reconciliation and the possibility of an open dialogue. The amnesty 
law guaranteed that there would be no legal avenues for the prosecution of 
crimes committed during the war and the dictatorial regime; however, it did not 
provide for any sort of public accounting of the abuses committed by those in 
power during that time. Moreover, the law recognised the continuing validity of 
the military tribunals from the Franco era and it was not until 1990 that the first 
capital punishment verdict against a political prisoner was annulled.51
The ‘pact of silence’ not only silenced any attempt to bring to light the violent 
excesses of the regime; it effectively prevented any legal action to punish those 
guilty of human rights abuses, as well as any rehabilitation or compensation of 
victims. Navarro, who moved back to Spain after three decades in exile, is vocal 
in denouncing the pact of silence and its role in the transición that, he said in an 
interview with Javier Valenzuela, ‘was a political pact to erase responsibilities, 
including the moral ones and the symbolic ones. Besides amnesty it was 
decided that there should be amnesia’.52 There was no attempt at a truth and 
reconciliation commission and, in fact, the term ‘reconciliation’ signified the 
50 Salvador Cardús i Ros, ‘Politics and the Invention of Memory: For a Sociology of the Transition to 
Democracy in Spain’, in Disremembering the Dictatorship: The Politics of Memory in the Spanish Transition to 
Democracy, ed., Joan Ramon Resina (Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi), 18–19.
51 While the 1963 verdict was legally annulled in 1990, and the execution of Julián Grimau deemed illegal, 
in 2002 PP blocked a parliamentary proposal of IU to formally rehabilitate him. In 2005 the IU lodged a similar 
proposal with the Assembly of the Autonomous Community of Madrid, and it was again successfully blocked 
by the PP.
52 ‘La transición’, dice, ‘fue un pacto político para borrar las responsabilidades, incluidas las morales, 
las simbólicas. Además de amnistía se decidió que hubiera amnesia.’ Javier Valenzuela, ‘El despertar tras la 
amnesia’, El País, 6 November 2002, http://www.elpais.com/articulo/semana/despertar/amnesia/elpepuculba
b/20021102elpbabese_9/Tes accessed 20 September 2010.
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pact of silence.53 In the name of the ‘spirit of reconciliation’, members of Spanish 
society were asked to leave the memories of their traumas outside of the public 
sphere or, as Helen Graham put it, ‘those who had been obliged to be silent 
for nearly 40 years were once again required to accept that there would be no 
public recognition of their past lives or memories’.54 Thus, the traumas of the 
war and the dictatorship were not dealt with collectively; the ‘smooth’ transition 
and the ‘spirit of reconciliation’ did not allow for any blame to be cast, and 
effectively removed the question of trauma from the public sphere. The political 
and social changes that Spain underwent from the mid 1970s to the mid 1990s 
excluded a collective memory of war and oppression and, as Susana Narotzky 
and Gavin Smith’s research concludes, ‘exposed in practice the split realities of 
public and private memories of the past’.55 In keeping with these split realities, 
Franco continued to dominate the public sphere with his presence in the form of 
monuments, street names and even on the coins that were not withdrawn until 
the 1990s56 while, for many Republican families, the memories of those killed or 
persecuted had to remain in the private sphere without public recognition or 
acknowledgement.
The ‘pact of silence’ is also often referred to as the ‘pact of forgetting’ as there was 
a tacit agreement to forget a war that Spaniards were no longer proud of. Preston 
points out that years of Franco’s indoctrination about a glorious ‘crusade of 
Spanish values against blood-crazed Communist barbarians’57 dissipated quickly 
after the transition and, by 1983, an opinion poll showed that 73 per cent of 
Spaniards regarded the Civil War as ‘a shameful period of Spanish history that 
is better to forget’.58 Referred to often as ‘amnesia’ (amnesia), ‘silence’ (silencio), 
‘forgetting’ (olvido), or ‘disremembering’ (desmemoria), this phenomenon is 
interpreted in various ways. Michael Richards argues that:
53 The Franco regime did not allow the public use of the term ‘reconciliation’, even by priests. Preston tells 
of a case where ‘the Primate of Spain, Cardinal Gomá, had a pastoral letter censored on August 9th, 1939, for 
using the word “reconciliation” instead of the officially sanctioned “recuperation”’. Preston, ‘Revenge and 
Reconciliation’, History Today 39, no. 3 (March 1989): 32.
54 Helen Graham, ‘Coming to Terms with the Past: Spain’s Memory Wars’, History Today 54, no. 5 (May 
2004): 30. And Paloma Aguilar points out that it also meant that the war veterans on the Republican side were 
never awarded the pension rights that had been enjoyed for years by the Nationalist veterans (Aguilar, ‘Agents 
of Memory: Spanish Civil War Veterans and Disabled Soldiers’ in War and Remembrance in the Twentieth 
Century, eds, Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 84–103).
55 Susan Narotzky and Gavin Smith, ‘“Being político” in Spain: An Ethnographic Account of Memories, 
Silences and Public Politics’, History and Memory 14, no. 1/2 (2002): 211.
56 Davis.
57 Preston, Revenge, 32.
58 ibid., 33.
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‘Amnesia’, individual and collective, came gradually to be seen as the 
best medicine for Spain. This prognosis was in line with the generalised 
and tacit agreement in the 1960s and 1970s that the Civil War had been a 
tragic act of madness for which all Spaniards were somehow to blame.59
In addition to Richards’s idea of ‘madness’ involving the whole of the society, 
Preston’s concept of ‘shame’ puts the blame on the Nationalists, and Aguilar60 
explores the ‘anaesthetic, narcotic’ aspects of forgetting when the trauma is in 
fact very well remembered.
The ‘pact of forgetting’ could have, in theory, led to the erasure of Francoist-
era monuments and symbols, and thus the removal of Franco’s statues would 
have appeared natural in this context of ‘forgetting’ shameful chapters of Spain’s 
history. Instead, the opposite happened. The transition from Franco’s regime to 
a parliamentary monarchy was conceived on the basis of continuity rather than 
rupture, thus effectively legitimising the dictatorship. Therefore, glorification 
of the Republican efforts in the war, exile, and resistance would have gone 
directly against the spirit of political stabilisation. The Second Republic, 
overthrown by Franco’s uprising, was perceived as being so radically to the left 
that, according to Aguilar and Carsten Humlebaek, ‘during the 1980s [it] was 
regarded favourably by only 5 per cent or less of the Spanish population and it 
consistently scored less than the Francoist regime’, the popularity of which fell 
from 21 per cent in 1984 to 8 per cent in 1990. At the same time, acceptance of 
the current political system in Spain rose from 58 to 76 per cent.61 While these 
figures do not directly link the current democracy to the previous regime, they 
certainly indicate a clear rupture from the legacy of the Second Republic.62 The 
reluctance to incorporate any political symbols from that era into the current 
democracy is such that post-Francoist Spain did not even consider restoring 
the Republican anthem and, to this day, the Spanish state continues to use the 
national anthem from the Franco years.
With the amnesty law in 1977, in the famous words of Marcelino Camacho, 
the spokesman for the Communists, the Spaniards ‘buried their dead and their 
resentments’.63 The main political players of the transition period accepted and 
put forward for social approval the idea of closing a certain chapter of Spanish 
59 Michael Richards, ‘From War Culture to Civil Society: Francoism, Social Change and Memories of the 
Spanish Civil War’, History and Memory 14, no. 1/2 (2002): 111.
60 Paloma Aguilar Fernández, Memoria y olvido de la Guerra Civil española (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 
1996).
61 Paloma Aguilar and Carsten Humlebaek, ‘Collective Memory and National Identity in the Spanish 
Democracy. The Legacies of Francoism and the Civil War’, History and Memory 14, no. 1/2 (2002): 145.
62 Aguilar and Humlebaek’s extensive research ‘into the symbolic practices and politics of commemoration 
of post-Franco Spain’ leads them to the conclusion that ‘there are many more continuities with the Francoist 
period than with the Second Republic or with any other previous period’. ibid., 152.
63 ‘Hemos enterrado nuestros muertos y nuestros rencores.’
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history without confrontation so that a political dialogue could begin. The 
overarching need for stability that dictated Spain’s political transition remained 
present in the society long after institutional changes assured the success of a 
peaceful political process. Aguilar and Humlebaek quote a Eurobarometer study 
that collected opinion polls between 1970 and 1992, which demonstrates that:
The importance that Spaniards accord, even today, to the values of 
‘peace’, ‘order’, and ‘moderation’ remains noticeably higher than in other 
European countries, a phenomenon undoubtedly linked to the memory 
of the fratricide and the desire to avoid its recurrence. In comparison, 
of all the countries of Europe, Spain gives highest priority to the value 
of ‘keeping order’, with a score of 11 points above the European mean.64
The inertia regarding the re-evaluation of the immediate past is in stark contrast 
with enormous changes in the Spanish social and cultural life, where the destape 
(lifting the lid) effect led to what is commonly referred to as a revolution, but 
it remained largely within the spheres of lifestyle and artistic expression. On 
the political level, care was taken not to alienate the major players in either the 
ruling party or the opposition thus, in theory, allowing all of the main sectors 
of society to participate in the political process. The hotly debated issues of 
regionalism and secularism became the most contentious topics in the political 
arena. Therefore the ‘smooth’ transition to democracy was deemed a big success, 
both domestically and internationally, and the ‘Spanish model of transition’ 
became a prototype for other fading dictatorships and dissolving totalitarian 
regimes. But, in view of the persistence of Spanish society in not addressing 
its difficult past and not breaking the ‘pact of silence’ or ‘pact of forgetting’, 
it is not surprising that the meaning of the term transición (transition) itself is 
widely debated.
Transición
The term transición is traditionally used to describe the three-year period 
between Franco’s death in November 1975 and the implementation of the new 
constitution in December 1978. As many scholars remark, however, the temporal 
end markers of the transition period are highly debatable. On one end, the 
beginning of the transición could be moved forward to the time when Franco’s 
regime evolved from the harshly totalitarian state of the 1940s and 1950s to a 
64 The respondents were asked ‘Which should be the first aim of your country?’ and were given four 
possible answers: ‘1. Keep order in the nation. 2. Give the people more voice in government decisions. 3. Fight 
price increases. 4. Protect freedom of expression.’ The European mean for ‘keeping order in the nation’ was 
37.8 per cent, with Spain scoring 48.5 per cent and Denmark (46.4 per cent) and Northern Ireland (45.6 per 
cent) just behind. The lowest score, 26 per cent, came from Belgium, which scored the highest in Europe (40.6 
per cent) for the option ‘fight price increases’. ibid., 150.
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milder version of an authoritarian regime in the 1960s, considering the seeds 
of change to have been planted while Franco was still in power. Wiarda and 
MacLeish Mott posit that ‘the post-Franco transition … had begun even while 
Franco was still alive’.65 Raúl Morodo puts forward a concept of pretransición (pre-
transition), to refer to some changes that Franco applied, forced by international 
pressures to make Spain appear more open.66 Ofelia Ferrán strongly opposes the 
idea of a pre-transition on the basis that it would credit Franco for preparing 
Spain for democracy67 and points out that executions of political prisoners took 
place up to the very end of Franco’s rule. According to Ramón Buckley, the year 
1968 initiated social and cultural changes that laid the ground for the political 
transition in the 1970s.68 Some consider the starting date for the transition to 
be 20 December 1973, when Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA, Basque Homeland 
and Freedom) assassinated Luis Carrero Blanco, groomed by Franco to be his 
successor.69 Javier Tusell70 reminds us that many comparative studies see the 
Spanish transition as part of a worldwide process named by Samuel Huntington 
the ‘third wave of democratization’.71
On the other end, the transition period is sometimes extended until past the 
coup d’état of February 1981, or even the electoral victory of the socialists in 
1982,72 seen as a more stabilising event than the 1978 Constitution. In 1992 Spain 
hosted the Olympic Games in Barcelona, the International Expo in Seville, and 
Madrid was the European Capital of Culture; this is sometimes considered the 
‘real end of transition’, the year in which Spain projected itself to the rest of the 
world as a modern country, and that in the 15 years since the re-establishment 
of democracy was able to overcome the shadowy past of a civil war and a fascist 
regime. Some scholars put the ending date of the transition even later: Teresa 
Vilarós considers it to be 1993 with the signing of Maastricht treaty, which 
for Spain meant real integration in the European community and the end of 
isolationism. Rosa Montero posits the 2000 electoral victory of the PP as the 
true ending of the transition: ‘I have a feeling that this is the true end of the 
65 Wiarda and MacLeish Mott, 69.
66 Specifically, Ley de Convenios Colectivos 1958, allowing some union representation for workers, and 
loosening up of censorship in Ley de Prensa e Imprenta 1966. Raúl Morodo, La transición política (Madrid: 
Tecnos, 1984).
67 Ofelia Ferrán, ‘Memory and Forgetting, Resistance and Noise in the Spanish Transition: Semprún and 
Vázquez Montalbán’, in Resina, 193.
68 Ramón Buckley, La doble transición: política y literatura en la Espana de los anos setenta (Madrid: Siglo 
Ventiuno, 1996).
69 An example is Teresa Vilarós, El mono del desencanto: una crítica cultural de la transición espanola (1973–
1993) (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno, 1998).
70 Javier Tusell, ‘La Transición política: un planteamiento metodológico’, in Historia de la transición 1975–
1986, eds, Javier Tusell and Álvaro Soto (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1996), 109–37.
71 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: 
Oklahoma University Press, 1991).
72 Gregorio Morán, El precio de la transición (Barcelona: Planeta, 1991). Morán considers various possibilities 
for its beginning, but puts its end firmly in 1982’s PSOE electoral win.
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Transition, the ultimate proof of our democratic maturity’.73 Joan Ramón Resina 
puts forward the economic argument, suggesting that market forces rather 
than any political events were responsible for the transition: ‘Spain’s insertion 
into the market economy goes a long way towards explaining the Transition’s 
temporal imprecision and the confusion of those who insist on anchoring it in 
politically significant events’.74
However, as Ferrán points out, ‘any historical dates one may try to set for the 
beginning and end of this variously defined epoch of recent Spanish history 
are therefore arbitrary and, more importantly, depend on what one is thinking 
of as having “transitioned”’,75 and warns that ‘any effort to delimit and define 
the transition period will be arbitrary, and subject to ideological constraints’.76 
Increasingly the process of transition is thought of as incomplete until the issue 
of silence and disremembering of the past is dealt with and can be discussed 
in the open. Dacia Viejo-Rose quotes the results of a 2000 study of Centro de 
Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS, Centre for Sociological Research), where half 
of the respondents answered ‘No’ to the question, ‘Have you forgotten the 
divisions and resentment that the Civil War created?’ and 66 per cent said ‘Yes’ 
to ‘Although the divisions and resentment of the past are forgotten, the deep 
mark left by the Franco period is still palpable’,77 and observes that these results 
occur ‘despite consensus on the significant changes that Spanish society had 
undergone in behavior, attitudes and “moral values”’.78 But, many scholars 
and social commentators deem these changes to be insufficient without the 
accompanying social and political action to bring about a change in attitudes 
and laws regarding historical memory. Ferrán argues that ‘an authoritarian, 
top-down approach to politics was one of the legacies of the Franco regime. In 
large measure, this top-down approach characterised much of the transition’.79 
In this, she evokes Carr and Eduardo Subirats who, she says, ‘goes so far as 
to state that, until such a critical recuperation and re-evaluation of the past is 
undertaken, no real transition will have taken place’,80 and for whom:
73 ‘Tengo la sensación de que éste es el verdadero fin de la Transición, la prueba definitva de nuestra 
madurez democrática’ (Rosa Montero, ‘Progresismo’, El País, 21 March 2000, http://www.elpais.com/articulo/
ultima/Progresismo/elpepiult/20000321elpepiult_2/Tes accessed 20 November 2011).




77 Dacia Viejo-Rose, Reconstructing Spain. Cultural Heritage and Memory after Civil War (Brighton, Portland 
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a true democracy will have been established only once such a 
confrontation with the past is undertaken, for only a recuperation of 
Spain’s historical memory will lead to the overcoming of the dangerous 
‘legacies’ of the Franco regime that the transition simply perpetuated.81
Breaking the ‘pact of silence’ is seen here as a necessary step for democracy to 
truly take root in Spain.
Breaking the ‘pact of silence’
This break takes place in the decade of the 2000s, based on background work 
produced since the mid 1990s, with Aguilar’s important study82 at the forefront 
of scholarly contributions. In Madeleine Davis’s words, this ‘unexpected 
emergence of the belated “memory politics”’83 in the last decade can be 
explained by a variety of converging factors, including the surprising win of 
the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE, Spanish Socialist Workers Party) in 
the 2004 elections84 and international pressure to deal with past human rights 
abuses.85 A general surge in interest in memory in the 1980s in other European 
countries such as France and Germany can also be credited. Davis discusses the 
catalysing effect of the 1996 indictment by Spanish courts of Chilean dictator 
Augusto Pinochet for crimes against humanity, Pinochet’s arrest in Great 
Britain in 1998 and Spain’s request for his extradition that received enormous 
media attention and inevitably led to parallels between Pinochet and Franco. 
And in the year 2000 Emilio Silva founded the Asociación de la Recuperación 
de la Memoria Histórica (ARMH, Association for the Reclamation of Historical 
Memory), the first of many Spanish grassroots organisations that will prove 
81 ibid., 197. Ferrán returns to the discussion of the place of historical memory in Spain’s transition process 
in Working through Memory: Writing and Remembrance in Contemporary Spanish Narrative (Lewisburg, PA: 
Bucknell University Press, 2007).
82 Aguilar, Memoria y olvido.
83 Davis, 862.
84 PP was predicted to win the 2004 election by a landslide, but its actions following the train bombings in 
Madrid only a few days prior to the elections changed the public opinion in favour of PSOE, led by Rodríguez 
Zapatero who promised to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq as part of his electoral campaign.
85 Human rights abuses committed during the war and under Franco’s rule started attracting international 
attention in the early 2000s, and the unwelcome publicity of reports from worldwide organisations such 
as Amnesty International in the mid 2000s might have aided Zapatero’s push for a historical memory law, 
approved by parliament in 2007. For a discussion of Amnesty International’s involvement in the debate and 
its impact on the political process see Tremlett, ‘The Grandsons of Their Grandfathers: An Afterword’, in 
Unearthing Franco’s Legacy. Mass Graves and the Recovery of Historical Memory in Spain, eds, Carlos Jerez-
Farrán and Samuel Amago (University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), 327–44. For a comprehensive analysis of 
associated legal challenges see Mónica Zapico Barbeito, ‘Investigating the Crimes of the Franco Regime: Legal 
Possibilities, Obligations of the Spanish State and Duties towards the Victims’, International Criminal Law 
Review 10 (2010): 243–74.
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instrumental in bringing historical memory to public attention and leading to 
a real eruption of what is today called a movement of recuperation of historical 
memory (movimiento de la recuperación de la historia memórica).
AMRH was initially one man’s quest to exhume the mass grave where he 
suspected his grandfather was buried. After successful identification through 
DNA testing, the association continued the effort of exhuming mass graves from 
the Civil War and Franco era and identifying bodies, giving the victims a proper 
burial and allowing the relatives a sense of closure. Based entirely on volunteers 
and without any financial support from government agencies, AMRH, which 
aims to identify the graves of all of the estimated 30,000 ‘disappeared’, has 
also become a forum for information and discussion through its website, aptly 
named memoriahistorica.org (http://www.memoriahistorica.org). Celebrating 
its 10th anniversary in October 2010, AMRH could count the exhumation 
and identification of 1500 bodies among its achievements, but its impact on 
society goes well beyond this. ARMH is now credited with initiating a powerful 
civil society response to the ‘pact of silence’ that eventually led to a more 
institutionalised movement for recovering historical memories of the Civil War 
and the dictatorship.86
The internet has acted from the beginning as the medium of choice for activist 
groups dedicated to recovering the memory of people and events silenced in 
the official versions of Spanish history. The popular ARMH website has regular 
updates on the recent developments in the politics of memory in Spain. Archives, 
testimonies and discussion lists can be found at websites such as Foro de la 
Memoria (Forum for Memory, (http://www.pce.es/foroporlamemoria), Archivo 
Guerra y Exilio (War and Exile Archive, http://www.galeon.com/agenoticias/
index.html) and La Guerra Civil Española (The Spanish Civil War, (http://www.
guerracivil.org). Equipo Nizkor (Team Nizkor, http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/
eng.html), in its 2004 report on Francoist crimes,87 proposed the term ‘Spanish 
model of impunity’, which is now accepted by the academic community.88 Some 
educational institutions have used their web servers to archive documents 
and host moderated discussion groups, thus forming the Biblioteca del Exilio 
(Library of Exile, (http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/portal/exilio/), as well 
86 According to Viejo-Rose, ‘efforts to create public platforms through which to unearth and share stories 
from these periods bore fruit in 2004, when a new socialist government began a process termed “the recovery 
of historic memory”’, 160. She specifically mentions ARHM by name, alongside Foro por la Memoria (Forum 
for Memory), as does Tremlett: ‘The work of ARHM, which had begun exhuming mass graves of Francoist 
Civil War victims in 2000, had much to do with the eruption of memoria histórica into the public sphere’ (‘The 
Grandsons’, 329–30).
87 Equipo Nizkor, ‘La cuestión de la impunidad en España y los crímenes franquistas’, 2004, http://www.
derechos.org/nizkor/espana/doc/impuesp.html accessed 01 July 2011.
88 Sergio Gálvez Biesca, ‘El proceso de la recuperación de la “memoria histórica” en España: Una 
aproximación a los movimientos socials por la memoria’, International Journal of Iberian Studies 19, no. 1 
(2006): 25–51.
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as a site named Memoria del exilio (Memory of Exile, http://clio.rediris.es/
index_exilio.htm) that provides educational materials for teaching and research 
in history. The rapid proliferation of internet sites, the impressive work of 
collecting documents and information, and of placing them on open access 
forums and databases, all demonstrate the scale of engagement of civil society 
and determination to make public what had remained in the private sphere for 
too long since the re-instatement of democracy in Spain.
Television played an equally important role in spreading the message to 
wider audiences. The 2000s saw a large number of documentaries about 
war, dictatorship and exile being produced by the state television company 
Radio Televisión Española, commercial television channels such as Canal+, 
publishing houses and research foundations. These documentaries combine 
previously unknown footage and photographs with interviews with survivors 
and witnesses. The stories they tell are powerful accounts of the suffering of 
individuals, families and communities, struggles to keep memories alive during 
the time of repression, frustration and further suffering when the ‘pact of 
silence’ does not allow these memories to become public in the long period of 
transition and, finally, the challenges and determination to not only preserve 
the memories of what happened many decades ago but to finally bring them 
forward to the public sphere and acknowledge their right to form part of the 
nation’s history. When aired on television, these documentaries attracted large 
audiences and were often rebroadcast due to popular demand. DVDs of these 
programs were often sold out and the demand has remained steady.
Magazines, weekly supplements to newspapers and other periodicals had an 
even bigger impact on society, as they reached out to an audience that included 
moderates, the disinterested, and even those who considered themselves pro-
Francoists; in brief, those who would not have otherwise found out about 
some painful episodes from recent history. In 2002, El Semanal, the weekly 
supplement of the leading Spanish newspaper El País, published an emotive 
account of a former prisoner of a concentration camp. A photo of the camp 
and the title of the article: ‘Yo viví el campo de concentración franquista’ (‘I 
lived through a Francoist concentration camp’) screamed from the displays at 
newsstands all over the country and caused a sensation. Most Spaniards had 
never heard of Franco’s concentration camps, and many would have considered 
the idea outrageous; however, they were confronted head-on with the harsh 
truth of the human right abuses of Franco’s regime, in a shock treatment that 
sent waves through the whole society. Many other magazines devoted entire 
issues to topics such as mass graves from the Civil War and concentration camps 
under Franco, most putting confronting images on the front page. And it was 
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not a fad; the trend continues89 as Spanish society goes through an accelerated 
process of re-evaluating its immediate past and learning the chapters of history 
that were previously suppressed.
The interest in testimonies and personal accounts of ‘silenced’ or ‘forgotten’ 
memories led to a surge in the publication of autobiographies, memoirs, and fact 
literature. Faction-style and fully fictionalised novelistic and cinematographic 
accounts of the war and the dictatorship have also been enormously popular, 
with Javier Cercas’s 2001 ‘faction’ style novel Soldados de Salamina (Soldiers of 
Salamis), an instant bestseller for 40 weeks and selling a million copies in six 
years, after an initial printing of only 5000 copies,90 being heralded by many as 
the real beginning of the ‘waking from amnesia’ (despertar tras la amnesia) that 
Spanish society has been undergoing for just over a decade now. Cercas’s novel is 
only one of innumerable fictionalised accounts of the war and the dictatorship,91 
many of them produced by Spanish writers who lived in exile while Franco was 
still in power. The 1990s saw a publishing boom of these literary works that has 
since continued. Already in 2002, in a very aptly titled editorial, ‘El Despertar 
tras la Amnesia’ (To wake-up from amnesia), Javier Valenzuela reflects on the 
popularity and success of publications such as Cercas’s book, especially among 
young Spaniards. The historian Santos Juliá contributes an explanation that it 
is always more interesting, fascinating, even, for a grandson to inquire about a 
grandfather, than for a son to look at a father.92 This is mirrored by an abundance 
of scholarly approaches in the fields of literary studies that, alongside historical 
and political approaches, contribute to the overall body of literature on the way 
in which Spanish society is coming to terms with its immediate past.
Similarly, the 2003 movie adaptation of Cercas’s novel by renowned director 
David Trueba,93 and other motion picture features such as Antón Reixa’s 2002 
El Lápiz del Carpintero (The Carpenter’s Pencil), Mexican filmmaker Guillermo 
de Toro’s 2006 El laberinto del fauno (Pan’s Labyrinth), as well as one the first 
89 In June 2011, issues of two of the most popular history magazines Clio and La Aventura de la Historia 
(The Adventure of History), both had large sections devoted to revisiting those chapters in Spain’s history. 
In Clio there is a 12-page spread on the Spanish Fascist Party by historian Xavier Casals (‘Las siete vidas de 
Falange o la odisea del fascismo español’, Clío: Revista de Historia 10, no. 116 (2011): 26–37), complete with 
a photograph of Juan Antonio Samaranch, future head of the International Olympic Committee, taking the 
oath. La Aventura de la Historia 13, no. 152 (2011) has a powerful photograph of deceased victims of the War 
on its cover, and four articles over 35 pages inside: Juan Carlos Losada, ‘El Golpe y La Guerra’, 62–71; Julio 
Martín Alarcón, ‘Testigos de la Tragedia’, 76–9; Enrique Moradiellos, ‘Bajo la Lupa de Europa’, 72–75; Ángel 
Viñas, ‘La Trama’, 56–61.
90 The book has been published worldwide in a myriad of languages and won the Independent Fiction 
Prize in 2004.
91 Cercas’ latest work, Anatomía de un instante (The Anatomy of a Moment), (Barcelona: Mondadori, 2009), 
examines the failed coup d’état of February 1981 and earned him the Spanish National Narrative Award 
(Premio Nacional de la Narrativa) in 2010.
92 ‘Este interés de la nueva generación se corresponde a la mirada del nieto sobre el abuelo, que siempre es 
más interesada, más fascinada, más curiosa que la mirada del hijo sobre el padre’. Juliá en Valenzuela.
93 Winner of 2004 Goya Awards.
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entries in this boom, Vicente Aranda’s 1996 Libertarias (Freedomfighters 
[sic]), are quickly becoming the most studied of contemporary Spanish films: 
popular fascination with this topic again being matched by academic interest. A 
television series Cuéntame cómo pasó (Tell Me How It Happened), set in the last 
years of Franco’s regime and in the transition period, has been broadcast since 
2001 and it is currently in its 13th season, with previous seasons averaging five 
million viewers and DVDs of past seasons, out of stock for years, just recently 
reissued.94
Del Toro’s film, El laberinto del fauno, won three Academy Awards in 2007 (for 
cinematography, art direction and make-up). It is one of many films and novels 
depicting the Spanish Civil War and the dictatorship era in Spain that found 
recognition outside of Spain. This, on one hand, confirms the artistic quality 
of these productions and, on the other, that an historical context can hold 
attraction for audiences unfamiliar with that context but able to relate to it — it 
highlights the universality of the fragile and contested boundary between truth 
and fiction, so often examined and questioned in the contemporary society.95 
The concept of truth is essential to the Spanish process of reclaiming memory: 
it originally operated on the assumption that there is one unequivocal truth 
about certain historical events that had been silenced or distorted, and therefore 
needs to be revealed or corrected. The prevailing terminology used by Spanish 
commentators in press articles and on dedicated websites was that of ‘falsifying 
the truth’ (falsificar la verdad) and ‘hiding the truth’ (ocultar la verdad) during 
the Franco era, ‘silence’ (silencio) and ‘oblivion’ (olvido) in the first 20 years of 
democracy, and the urgent need to ‘unveil the truth’ (desvelar la verdad) and 
‘reclaim memory’ (recuperar la memoria) as a ‘blood debt’ (deuda sangriente) of 
Spanish society to those who perished or suffered oppression. This emotionally 
charged vocabulary reflected the high level of frustration and disappointment 
that was felt by the victims and their families, due to the lack of a concerted 
political effort to publicly recognise the wrongdoings and rehabilitate the 
victims. It was accompanied by a flood of specialist history books and articles 
that adopted a more distanced academic language but departed from the same 
point of claiming the right for a public recognition of human suffering. By 
exhuming unmarked graves and collecting the personal testimonies of victims 
and witnesses, activists and historians alike attempted to make public what 
had until then remained in the private sphere. Rather than entering into the 
epistemological debate about truth in history, these works exploited the highly 
emotional nature of the term truth in a society that was only recently opening 
up to the idea of multiple versions of history coexisting in the public sphere.
94 It has already been subject to scholarly inquiries. An example is Rodolfo Serrano, La España de Cuéntame 
cómo pasó : el final de los años sesenta (Madrid: Aguilar, 2004).
95 In the interpretation of Maja Jaggi, writing for the Guardian (2011), Vargas Llosa called Soldiers of 
Salamis (the book) ‘magnificent’ and ‘proof that engaged literature is not dead’.
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The generation of Spaniards actively engaging in the process of recovery 
of historical memory is still heavily influenced by the concepts of one truth 
and one history, which prevailed in the Franco-era educational system. Older 
generations, those whose personal memories and testimonies are collected, are 
even more conditioned, having lived for decades under a regime that relied on 
a pervasive propaganda for its legitimacy. Franco’s propaganda machine had 
propagated only one official version of history, one in which Franco saved Spain 
from the clutches of the Reds, not unlike the crusaders fighting the infidels. As 
the saying goes, history is written by the victors and, in the case of Francoist 
Spain, this meant that the victors had not only the monopoly on interpretation 
of the actual conflict and the events leading to it, but also the right to rewrite 
other chapters of the past. Therefore, under Franco school curricula,96 media 
reports, published books, artistic performances, amongst other forms of public 
expression, emphasised the glory of Spain’s imperial achievements while 
suppressing knowledge of undesirable historical facts and processes, through 
strict censorship practices. Preston points out that:
the Franco regime used a distorted historical memory as a major weapon 
in its propaganda armoury. History under the Francoist dictatorship 
was a direct instrument of the State, written by policemen and 
soldiers, Falangists and priests, invigilated by the powerful censorship 
machinery.97
Besides exploiting the legacies of the Civil War and the Second Republic, Franco 
used Spain’s imperialistic and colonial past to reinforce notions of national unity 
and glory, especially by reinforcing the concept of a Christian crusade against 
infidels. Angel Luis Abós, in a study that examined over 200 history manuals 
used in Spanish schools between 1937 and 1975, considered this ‘manipulation 
of the past’ for propaganda purposes. As a result, entire generations of Spaniards 
grew up indoctrinated not only with a selective historical curriculum, but also 
had the concept of absolute historical truth embedded in them from very early 
age. Some beliefs that were fabricated and instilled in that era persist in Spanish 
society today, mainly due to the lack of an open public debate on Spain’s recent 
history, and the fact that, as Graham points out, the ‘coverage of the 1930s and 
1940s in school history syllabuses is still frequently patchy or non-existent’.98 
This had an enormous impact on the way in which Spain dealt with the issue of 
historical memory during the transition in the first place, and in the early stages 
96 See Juan Luis Abós, La historia que nos enseñaron 1937–1975 (Madrid: Foca Ediciones, 2003) and José 
Antonio Álvarez Osés, Ignacio Cal Freire, María Carmen González Muñoz and Juan Haro Sabater, La Guerra 
que aprendierion los espanoles: República y Guerra civil en los textos de Bachillerato (1938–1983) (Madrid: 
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 2000) for comprehensive analyses of Spanish educational curricula under 
Franco and into early transition, before changes were implemented.
97 Preston, Revenge, 31.
98 Graham, 31.
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of the process of recuperation of historical memory through the mechanisms 
discussed earlier, and when previously suppressed information was now being 
revealed as the supposed truth, while the version that had been propagated by 
the Franco regime got labelled false or a lie.
Politics of memory
While in the last decade there has been an explosion in popular interest in 
historical memory, the issue was not at the forefront of Spanish political battles 
between the Right and the Left as early as one might expect. When it was 
in power from 1982 until 1996, the PSOE did little to advance the cause of 
the Republicans and can be credited with only limited achievements as far as 
reparations to and the rehabilitation of the victims of the war and of the fascist 
regime.99 The process then suffered serious setbacks under the government 
of the right-wing Popular Party between 1996 and 2004,100 which in turn 
mobilised activists and academics to continue their research and to organise 
commemorative events at the local level. ARHM was founded in 2000, just as 
the PP was re-elected for another term. The return of PSOE to power after the 
11 March 2004 Madrid bombings was met with great expectations by the pro-
Republicans but, again, the issue of historical memory was upstaged by other 
urgent and hotly debated social and political issues such as the right of gays to 
marriage and adoption, and the rights of autonomous regions versus the unity 
of the Spanish state.
When in September 2004101 the socialist government announced the creation of a 
special commission to investigate the victims of the Civil War and Francoism,102 
it appeared that the memory of the Spanish Republic would finally become 
part of Spain’s historical memory through a proper institutional change as a 
law regarding rehabilitation of the victims and reparations was expected to 
be proposed sometime in late 2005, preferably before the 30th anniversary of 
Franco’s death, or even on the exact day (20 November). Yet on 12 September, 
the leader of the Commission, Deputy Prime Minister María Teresa Fernández de 
la Vega, announced not only that no legislation would be proposed in the near 
99 As mentioned earlier, from the mid 1980s, some laws were passed regarding reparations to victims, 
including recognition of time spent in prison as years of work for the purpose of retirement pensions (1984), 
and provisions for financial compensation for long-term political prisoners of Franco’s regime (1990–92).
100 Graham, 30, provides a clear example of PP’s political stand on these matters: while denying funding 
to the ARHM, the government provided financial assistance to the maintenance of the graves of Blue Division 
volunteers, Spanish fascists who fought alongside the Germans on the eastern front in World War II.
101 Approved on 10 September 2004 and created on 18 October 2004. PSOE rejected similar proposals in 
June and July 2004, agreeing with the position of the Popular Party, but the General Assembly of PSOE held 
in July 2004 forced the Executive to take action.
102 Comisión Interministerial para el Estudio de las víctimas de la Guerra Civil y del Franquismo.
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future, but also that the project now would include both sides of the conflict 
and not be used for reopening the wounds but rather to heal them.103 In a letter 
to the editor of El País, a supporter of the ARHM countered that argument 
by declaring that ‘nobody wants to reopen old wounds, we are only asking 
for truth and justice’.104 But the spirit of reconciliation — meaning the pact 
of silence — prevailed again. Two days after the 30th anniversary of Franco’s 
death, on 22 November 2005, the King celebrated the 30th anniversary of his 
coronation and, in his speech, he underlined the importance of reconciliation 
as the key for understanding what was achieved, and the best guarantee to 
continue ahead with unity, democracy and freedom.105
It is not, therefore, surprising that, when the Law of Historical Memory was 
finally passed in October 2007, it fell short of addressing many issues in a way 
that would be satisfactory to those engaged in the process of recuperation of 
memory, and that includes the issue of public displays of Franco’s imagery and 
symbolism.106 After heated political battle and rejection of various drafts,107 
‘in the end, the Law established that symbols honouring only one side of 
the war must be removed from all state buildings and recommends that the 
local governments do the same for all public buildings’.108 Viejo-Rose points 
out that ‘this was a modified version of the original proposal, demanding that 
these symbols be removed from all public spaces including church and private 
property’.109 The law was expected to deal with all remaining statues of Franco, 
still on public display at various locations around Spain. It certainly did, in great 
measure: after the 2005 removal of the Madrid statue, and the one in Zaragoza 
in 2006, the removals in other cities took place after the law went into effect, 
in Santander in 2008 and in Ceuta and Valencia in early 2010. In each instance, 
public demonstrations took place, and the press engaged in the familiar debates 
103 ‘El Ejecutivo ha decidido frenar o al menos ralentizar la ley que preparaba con la idea de buscar un 
proyecto “ambicioso” que “contiene a los dos bandos y no sirva para reabrir heridas, sino para cicatrizarlas”’ 
(Carlos E. Cué, ‘De la Vega frena la ley de memoria histórica para acoger a ambos bandos’, El País, 12 
September 2005, http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/Vega/frena/ley/memoria/historica/acoger/ambos/
bandos/elpepiesp/20050912elpepinac_9/Tes accessed 20 September 2010).
104 ‘… aquí nadie quiere reabrir viejas heridas, solo se pide justicia y verdad’ (Violeta López de Marcos, ‘La 
memoria histórica’, El País, 14 September 2005, http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/memoria/historica/
elpepiopi/20050914elpepiopi_4/Tes accessed 20 September 2010).
105 ‘El Rey subrayó que “el consenso, concordia y reconciliación están en la base misma de nuestra 
constitución, la clave para entender lo mucho que hemos logrado y la mejor garantía para seguir progresando 
con el esfuerzo de todos, unidos, en democracia y libertad”’ (Juan Manuel Pardellas, ‘El Rey vuelve a pedir 
consenso, concordia y reconciliación’, El País, 22 November 2005, http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/
Rey/vuelve/pedir/consenso/concordia/reconciliacion/elpepiesp/20051122elpepinac_24/Tes accessed 20 
September 2010).
106 José María Abad Liceras examines in detail the various legal challenges associated with the application 
of the Law to the removal of symbols and public monuments, in Ley de memoria histórica. La problemática 
jurídica de la retirada o mantenimiento de símbolos y monumentos públicos (Madrid: Dykinson, 2009).
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about ‘erasing memory’ and ‘reopening of old wounds’ while displaying — also 
very familiar by now — images of Franco’s horse suspended from the crane that 
was lifting it for transport into oblivion. The last equestrian statue of Franco 
on Spanish territory was lifted in August 2010 in Melilla, however, in the same 
city, another statue of Franco remains on public display despite the Law of 
Historical Memory. City authorities had originally committed to the statue’s 
removal early in 2010 but then decided to relegate the responsibilities to the 
Department of Defence, which in turn refused to accept it.110 In November 2010 
the city authorities declared officially that the statue would not be removed 
because is not against the law: it portrays Franco as commander of the Legion 
and not as dictator.111 It seems that Franco’s face is still not erased from public 
view as Spain moves to the next decade and the next government, with the 
Popular Party winning the election on 20 November 2011.
110 ‘Retiran de Melilla la Última estatua ecuestre de Franco expuesta en España’, El Mundo, 4 August 2010, 
http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/08/04/espana/1280942589.html accessed 25 October 2010.
111 ‘Melilla apunta que la estatua de Franco no incumple la Ley de Memoria Histórica’, La Gaceta, 29 
November 2010, http://www.intereconomia.com/noticias-gaceta/politica/melilla-apunta-que-estatua-franco-
no-incumple-ley-memoria-historica accessed 1 December 2010.
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‘The sailor is a human being’:  
Labour Market Regulation and the 
Australian Navigation Act 1912
Diane Kirkby
Labour lawyers wanting to broaden their field beyond the traditional narrowness 
of the employment relationship do so by employing a concept of regulation 
that has both economic and social objectives. They have called for law to be 
seen ‘in the wider framework of social relations’ with ‘a longer time frame 
for analysis’, and for an approach to the field which has an ‘eye to both the 
future and the past’.1 Their emphasis on the contextual factors impinging on 
and shaping labour law, its purpose and implementation, provides a compelling 
argument for historical research. As Michael Quinlan has pointed out, there is 
a complex interplay between context and purpose that is neither instrumental 
nor predetermined.2 Understanding the implementation of law thus requires 
historical, empirical research, to account for the particularities of its purpose 
and the unpredictable nature and direction of labour market regulation, which 
changes over time. 
This chapter takes up the challenge to undertake sociolegal research, which 
expands our understanding of labour regulation. It focuses on the maritime 
workplace and a process of lawmaking for that workplace which has not 
previously been studied as it traces the origins and history of the Australian 
Navigation Act. In so doing, it broadens the field of labour law by accepting 
the labour market regulation approach which contextualises the employment 
relationship. It continues an argument for looking outside labour law narrowly 
defined that was begun in previous work on licensing laws and regulation of the 
hotel workforce.3 By looking at laws and their changing formulation, historians 
can reveal not only law’s impact on the workplace in any particular instance, 
they can also offer perspective on the wider framework of the social history of 
labouring people.
1 Christopher Arup, Peter Gahan, John Howe, Richard Johnstone, Richard Mitchell, Anthony O’Donnell, 
eds, Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation: Essays on the Construction, Constitution and Regulation of 
Labour Market and Work Relationships (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2006), 11–12.
2 Michael Quinlan, ‘Contextual Factors Shaping the Purpose of Labour Law: A Comparative Historical 
Perspective’ in Arup et al, 21.
3 Diane Kirkby, Barmaids: A History of Women’s Work in Pubs (Cambridge University Press, 1997); Kirkby, 
‘“The Barmaid”, “The Landlady”, and “The Publican’s Wife”: History, Law and the Popular Culture of 
Women’s Work in Pubs’  in Romancing the Tomes, ed., Margaret Thornton (London: Cavendish, 2002), 167–83.
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The Australian federal government’s announcement in 2009 that it was 
undertaking a process of reviewing the century-old Navigation Act offers an 
instance of lawmaking where the larger regulatory approach is particularly 
pertinent. Importantly, this was only the second time that a Labor government 
had undertaken to amend this legislation. It followed the 2008 report ‘Rebuilding 
Australia’s Coastal Shipping Industry’ released by the House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and 
Local Government, which covered coastal shipping policy then regulated under 
Part VI of the Navigation Act 1912.4 The purpose of rewriting the legislation 
was to implement the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Maritime Labour 
Convention (MLC) 2006 (No. 186) regarding the working conditions of seafarers 
on ships.5 The government’s stated aim was to create ‘a contemporary framework’ 
for maritime safety and marine regulation by introducing ‘greater flexibility’ to 
allow the ILO amendments to be adopted and provide ‘confidence and certainty 
for industry’. It consequently set up a process of consultation and invited 
responses from stakeholders, business, regulatory authorities, and unions.
The Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) responded, accepting that the legislation 
needed to be modernised but not on the grounds of allowing more flexibility 
for business. ‘Regrettably, the term “flexibility for business” has come to mean 
a diminution of standards and a weakening of regulation, which is exactly the 
opposite of what is required in modernised maritime legislation’.6 The Australian 
Shipowners Association (ASA) welcomed the possibility of benefits that might 
flow to the industry. The shipowners looked forward to having key shipping 
policy reforms enacted, the promise of having a new maritime regulatory 
regime to replace the existing ‘cumbersome and complex legislation’, a single 
national maritime jurisdiction, reduced uncertainty, removal of complexity and 
duplication, and ‘a seamless transition from state to federal qualifications’.7 A 
key proposal of the review was to replace eight separate state and territory 
jurisdictions with one federal regime.
The government’s review (and subsequent introduction of the bill), however, 
provides a timely reminder of the importance of the Navigation Act to Australia’s 
shipping industry history, and an opportunity to explore an example of federal 
regulation that is arguably as important in its impact on the maritime workforce 
as arbitration. Histories of Australia’s industrial relations have not included 
4 Australian Government, Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local 
Government, Australian Maritime Safety Authority, Navigation Act Discussion Paper, 3 (Navigation Act 
Discussion Paper) http://www.infrastructure.gov.au accessed 1 November 2011.
5 ibid.
6 Maritime Union of Australia (MUA), Response to Issues Raised on Department of Infrastructure, 
Transport, Regional Development/AMSA Navigation Act 1912 Discussion Paper, August 2010, http://www.
infrastructure.gov.au/maritime/paper/files/MUA.pdf accessed 1 November 2011.
7 ‘Navigation Act under Review’, Ausmarine 32, no. 9 (July 2010): 15.
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discussions of the Navigation Act.8 Yet, its history is rightfully considered along 
with the better-known measures for regulation of the workplace given to the 
federal government. The constitution under section 51 authorised, and also 
confined, the federal parliament’s power to legislate on industrial matters to 
the power to make laws to settle industrial disputes, which, like bushfires and 
rabbits, could cross state borders. As is well known, the Commonwealth used 
this power to set up the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration in 1904, but the 
constitution also gave the Commonwealth parliament an instrument for more 
direct regulation of the workplace. 
Under the provisions of s. 51(1) read in conjunction with s. 98, which gave 
the Commonwealth parliament the power to regulate its overseas and interstate 
trade, terms and conditions for the employment of the workforce in the maritime 
industry were laid down and monitored by federal regulation under the 
Navigation Act. The special nature of work at sea prompted specific legislative 
regulations. Maritime workers employed in the coastal shipping trade crossed 
state borders regularly. They had been at the centre of the industrial disputes of 
the 1890s, which led to the arbitration power being included in the constitution 
at the time of federation.9 The mobility of this workforce, combined with the 
national economic (and defence) importance of merchant shipping to an island 
nation, produced a particular regulatory model as the two constitutional powers 
developed simultaneously as a conjunction of federal workplace regulation. 
Seafarers were regulated by both, and steered their course accordingly. The 
industrial importance of the Navigation Act cannot be underestimated, it is 
both historical and political.
Origins
The Australian statute’s origins lay in the seventeenth century English 
Navigation Acts that were passed to develop English shipping by restricting 
the carriage of foreign trade to ships built, owned and crewed by English 
subjects, and reserving English coastal traffic for English shipping. This was the 
principle of cabotage. These acts, which were the foundation of the merchant 
marine and tied commerce and national defence together, were central as Britain 
rose to worldwide supremacy as a maritime power.10 According to the current 
8 An example is Greg Patmore, Australian Labour History (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1991).
9 Stuart Macintyre and Richard Mitchell, eds, Foundations of Arbitration (Melbourne: Oxford University 
Press, 1989), 9–11.
10 Ernest Fayle, ‘The Navigation Acts’, Edinburgh Review 228, no. 465 (July 1918): 22–42.
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government’s discussion paper, ‘These Acts covered a range of welfare and 
safety measures appropriate to the times to address the generally poor working 
conditions of seafarers and the high loss rate of both ships and lives’.11
The Australian colonies were empowered under this English legislation to 
regulate their coastal trade, although this was subject to restrictions under 
the United Kingdom (UK) Merchant Shipping Act, which controlled ‘British 
possessions’. ‘A wide field of subjects was regarded as an Imperial preserve and 
merchant shipping for economic and political reasons associated with Britain’s 
worldwide supremacy was in that field’. Thus, merchant shipping ‘was the 
Imperial subject par excellence’.12
The UK Merchant Shipping Act 1869 and later, 1894, ‘charted the boundaries of 
the Colonial powers of legislation’: s. 736 allowed colonial parliaments to regulate 
‘the coasting trade’ (not specifically defined) on condition the legislation was 
reserved and confirmed by the United Kingdom, treated all British ships in like 
manner, and preserved the treaty rights of foreign states. Under the terms of 
the Act, colonial legislatures could pass legislation for vessels registered in the 
colony, ‘provided such legislation is not repugnant to the Merchant Shipping 
Act’.13 Coasting vessels were not those trading on lakes, rivers or within a port; 
but those which traded along the coast and sometimes, of necessity, voyaged 
beyond three miles from the coastline, so colonial statutes were still binding 
on the masters, crew and passengers of those vessels. The colonial acts passed 
by the various Australian legislatures were not overturned by the enactment of 
federal legislation but they were narrowed in their application to ships trading 
between ports within the particular state.14
Australia’s efforts to develop its own federal laws were slow and difficult. A 
Commonwealth bill to apply on the Australian coast in substitution for important 
sections of the UK Merchant Shipping Act 1894 was originally drafted just a year 
after federation, in 1902, under the direction of Charles Cameron Kingston and, 
subsequently on his retirement, by Sir Harry Wollaston. It was introduced into 
the Senate in 1904, the same year as the Arbitration Act was passed, but then 
it was withdrawn and referred to a royal commission chaired by William (Billy) 
Hughes. In 1906, when a new UK Merchant Shipping Act was passed, the bill 
and the royal commission report were both presented to parliament and the next 
year were considered by an imperial Merchant Shipping Legislation conference 
that was held in London by representatives of the Australian, United Kingdom 
and New Zealand governments, along with British shipowners. The conference 
recommended ‘that the coastal trade of the Commonwealth be reserved for ships 
11 Navigation Act Discussion Paper.
12 Basil A. Helmore, ‘Validity of State Navigation Acts’, Australian Law Journal 27, (21 May 1953): 16.
13 ibid., 16.
14 ibid., 17.
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… conforming to Australian conditions, and licensed to trade on the Australian 
coast’. The bill was then revised and reintroduced into the Senate in 1907, 1908, 
1910 and finally passed late in 1912.15
The Bill was then reserved for the Royal Assent as required and, for many 
months in Britain and Australia, shipowners campaigned against its becoming 
law. British owners maintained that ‘colonial’ legislation ought not to apply to 
British ships. Australian owners objected that the Navigation Act would lead to 
an ‘enormous increase’ of their costs, for accommodation for each seaman would 
have to be almost doubled and compensation of sick and injured seamen would 
be greatly increased.16 Consequently the Act was shelved until after the 1914 
federal election, and the outbreak of war postponed it further as the British 
government requested its implementation be delayed.17 Prime Minister Andrew 
Fisher announced it would be proclaimed in 1916, but it took until 1921 before 
the first sections, the Coasting Trade provisions, were proclaimed and it was not 
until 1923 that most of the other provisions were operative. At the time of the 
1924 royal commission, 46 of 425 sections (most of them dealing with pilots and 
pilotage) still remained inoperative.
The purpose for passing the Navigation Act, ‘which actuated the Parliament … 
and which lifted the subject to a plane of great importance above the ordinary 
considerations of party politics, was’, in the view of royal commissioners 
J.H. Prowse and A.C. Seabrook, ‘the desire to build an Australian Mercantile 
Marine’.18 To do this, the commissioners said, Australian shipowners needed 
to be protected ‘from subsidised foreign ships or poorly paid crews’, so it was 
necessary to ensure all ships had the same manning scale, paid their crews 
Australian wage rates and provided them with the same accommodation. 
In order to achieve this ‘the Australian coastal trade was to be reserved for 
Australian-owned ships, which were to be the source of a supply of skilled 
and trained Australian seamen in time of war’. Parliament regarded having an 
Australian Mercantile Marine as a matter of national security, of such national 
importance that higher freight rates was a price that had to be paid.19
This — applying the principle of cabotage — was in keeping with the spirit 
of the original British navigation acts, but it went further. According to Percy 
Clarey, former president of the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and, 
by 1952, a Labor member of parliament, ‘the Navigation Act was an earnest 
attempt on the part of the Australian parliament to give seamen reasonable 
15 Royal Commission on the Navigation Act, 1924 (Royal Commission 1924), Report (Melbourne: Government 
Printer, 1924), 2.
16 Brian Fitzpatrick and Rowan Cahill, The Seamen’s Union of Australia, 1872–1972: A History (Sydney: 
Seamen’s Union of Australia, 1981), 47.
17 Royal Commission 1924, 2.
18 ibid.
19 ibid.
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and decent conditions of employment, and make the maritime industry as safe 
as possible’. And, at the time it was passed, in 1912, he said, it was ‘the best 
navigation act in the world …’20
This Navigation Act, which specifically did not apply to the navy, applied 
only to ‘British’ ships, covered ships engaged in trade and commerce, taking 
on board and carrying passengers, or cargo, from and between ports in the 
Commonwealth and from there to foreign ports. The Act stipulated the number 
and nature of crews. All such ships had to have a duly certificated master and 
officers of differing grades (first mate, second mate, and engineers of various 
grades) who had to be British subjects and English-speaking. It included 
provisions relating to the qualifications of officers; the supply, engagement and 
discharge of crews; the payment of their wages, health and accident benefits, 
discipline and accommodation; as well as provisions as to safety, equipment, 
unseaworthy ships, and prevention of collisions.21
Division 4 on seamen applied to both British and foreign ships, covered methods 
of employment, apprenticeships, terms for becoming a rating (ABS or able 
bodied seaman after three years apprenticeship, and being 18 years old; an OS 
or ordinary seaman after one year at sea, minimum age 17 years old) all of which 
had to be verified with paperwork; a seaman could be ‘disrated’ by the master 
who had to record it in the logbook and provide the seaman with a copy; specified 
the number of crew to be employed; the procedures for establishing terms of 
agreement for employment and subsequent discharge from a ship; prohibited 
the payment of wages in advance; enabled the payment by ‘allotment’ of wages 
to family members; and procedures for deductions and payment on discharge. 
Division 12 of the Navigation Act 1912 was on Discipline. ‘Any master, seaman 
or apprentice who by wilful breach or neglect of duty or drunkenness’ caused 
or failed to prevent damage or loss to the ship or its cargo was guilty of an 
indictable offence. Smuggling was an offence for seamen, assault was an offence 
if committed by an officer.22
Revisions and amendments
Just three years after it came into effect, in 1924, the government set up a royal 
commission to investigate whether the Navigation Act had succeeded in its 
purpose of developing an Australian merchant marine. The commissioners could 
not agree, so their report contained three different positions and three different 
sets of recommendations. The first report was produced by the chairman (J.H. 
20 Australia, Parliament, Hansard, 1952, 3690.
21 Helmore, 17.
22 Australia, Statutes, Navigation Act, 1912, ss. 28–33; ss. 99–115.
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Prowse, MP) and another commissioner (A.C. Seabrook, MP); the second by 
Labor parliamentarians Frank Anstey MP, Senator C.S. McHugh, and G.E. Yates 
MP; and the third by two Senators W.L. Duncan and H.E. Elliott.
Prowse and Seabrook were unequivocal that the Navigation Act had failed 
to develop an Australian merchant marine; Anstey, McHugh and Yates were 
equally sure that the attack on the Navigation Act from the Tariff Board alleging 
that the Act had caused Australian trade to suffer, was ill-founded; Duncan and 
Elliott argued that repeal of the Act would doubtless ‘bring more foreign and 
non-British competition which would react very quickly against the wages and 
working conditions of our Australian seamen and against the best interests of 
Australia as a whole, unless some other form of protection be given’.23 Put simply 
Australia, as an island continent, was heavily dependent on shipping, and could 
not afford to increase its dependence on foreign shipping for the marketing 
overseas of its primary products. Australian seafarers were necessarily protected 
because the merchant marine was nationally important both for economic and 
defence purposes. It was a principle written into law from the beginning, 
and which was subsequently maintained in later emendations. The two Labor 
MPs (Anstey and Yates) in their minority report recommended that official 
administration of the Act should be changed and the director (who was thought 
to be too sympathetic to shipowners) made directly responsible to a minister.24
While they waited for the Navigation Act to become law, the Seamen’s Union of 
Australia (SUA) pushed their claims through the Arbitration Court where they 
won many of the same conditions as had been given to them in the Navigation 
Act.25 When the Navigation Act finally became operational in the 1920s the SUA 
‘was jealous to see that its protective provisions were enforced’: that Australian 
wages and conditions applied on ships trading on the Australian coast, that the 
provisions of the Act were sufficiently adhered to regarding unsafe practices, 
that damaged or overloaded ships, with improperly stowed cargo did not get 
clearances to sail from the Department of Navigation. When the SUA was de-
registered in 1925 and no longer had an award under the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Court, the only safeguard the union had for their conditions was 
the Navigation Act, but shipowners refused to comply with the SUA demand 
that award conditions be incorporated into ships’ articles of employment.26 In 
1925, this led to a three-month strike, which was part of a larger international 
industrial action. The 1930s were even tougher for seafarers, a huge strike in 
23 Royal Commission, 1924, 78.
24 ibid., 65; see also Fitzpatrick and Cahill, 58.
25 Fitzpatrick and Cahill, 48.
26 ibid., 57–58.
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1935 left the union devastated and led to a change in leadership.27 Amendments 
made to the Navigation Act in that year, however, were not substantive in their 
impact on the workforce.
During the Second World War, the defence role of the merchant marine became 
crucial as Australian shipping carried troops and materials overseas and around 
the coast. Merchant shipping was administered by the Department of Supply, by 
which means the government chartered ships and shipowners acted as managers 
on the government’s behalf. The SUA claimed its fight for seafarers’ rights was 
‘just as fierce as any fight in warfare’, but joined the war effort and cautioned 
members against sparking disputes over comparatively trivial issues which 
could strengthen shipowners and government opposition.28 With the coming 
of war to the Pacific, in 1942 the Curtin Labor government, under the National 
Security Regulations, set up the Maritime Industry Commission (MIC) whose 
task was ‘to secure the adequate and efficient manning of Australian merchant 
ships and the improvement and safeguarding’ of their crews.29 This was a 
tribunal authorised under special wartime conditions to deal with industrial 
matters that were traditionally covered within the jurisdiction of the arbitration 
system. It was chaired by former New South Wales industrial commissioner 
Justice de Baun, and consisted of representatives from each of the interested 
parties — three employer representatives for the shipowners, one nominee for 
the government, and four representatives from the several maritime unions, 
the Merchant Service Guild and the Australian Institute of Marine and Power 
Engineers which covered the officers; the Marine Cooks, Bakers and Butchers 
union which covered the catering crew and, for the deck crew, the Seamen’s 
Union.30
The MIC had the power to make an order become law notwithstanding existing 
Commonwealth or state laws or awards of industrial tribunals, but it could not 
reduce the conditions of seafarers nor take actions that would impact negatively 
on the efficient, adequate manning of a ship.31 The SUA welcomed the new 
commission. ‘It is obvious the MIC has unlimited power — always keeping 
in mind it can only “improve and safeguard”’, the Seamen’s Journal reported. 
‘Marine unions can now avail themselves of the Commission to secure for their 
seamen the best living and working conditions in the world’.32
With this in mind, the SUA, through the MIC, was able during the war to gain for 
its members shorter working hours (from the 56-hour week to the 44-hour week) 
27 ibid., 68–86; 99–113.
28 Editorial, Seamen’s Journal 1, no. 2 (August 1941): 1.
29 Fitzpatrick and Cahill, 136.
30 ibid., 137.
31 ibid., 136.
32 Seamen’s Journal 1, no. 5 (March 1942): 3.
‘The sailor is a human being’: Labour Market Regulation and the Australian Navigation Act 1912
185
they had been arguing for unsuccessfully in the Arbitration Court, increased 
wages to a level well above that of the regular navy, and improved accommodation 
— separate rooms for each watch, individual clothes lockers, change rooms, 
mess rooms with refrigerator — more improvements in one year than in the 
previous 25.33 Their efforts to have meals and catering equivalent to that of the 
officers were less successful. The war years were turbulent as the SUA exerted 
its industrial strength and the MIC spent much time deciding misconduct cases 
and imposing disciplinary measures on seafarers held responsible for holding up 
shipping.34 Nevertheless, these were years of comparative industrial peace and 
the SUA made gains without resorting to the procedures of arbitration. At the 
end of the war, under the Chifley Labor government, the MIC continued to deal 
with matters that would otherwise have gone to the Arbitration Court.35 The 
SUA was successful in winning improvements to their conditions by actively 
disrupting the Australian post-war shipping trade with stoppages that, by the 
early 1950s, members of the Menzies conservative government claimed were 
both too frequent and unjustified. They used the machinery of the Navigation 
Act to force the unions back into the Arbitration Court.
When the Menzies government came to power in 1949, the maritime and 
stevedoring industries, in what Menzies called ‘Australia’s vital shipping 
industry’, had the reputation for having the most troubled and difficult 
industrial relations records in Australia.36 In the overheated and what historian 
Tom Sheridan describes as the ‘miasma of Cold War propaganda’, the reality 
of workplace disputes was often lost in charge and countercharge of class 
warfare and secret agendas.37 At least one Arbitration Court judge saw seafarers 
as working in dreadful and degrading conditions that it was the court’s task 
to improve, while the Menzies government saw industrial laws and arbitration 
court processes as a means to combat communists and clamp down on industrial 
militancy. These were less direct, more covert laws than the failed initiatives 
— the Communist Party Dissolution Act 1950, which was challenged in the 
High Court by the SUA, the Waterside Workers Federation (WWF) and several 
other unions, and found to be unconstitutional, and the subsequent referendum 
of 1951 which was also defeated by a narrow vote.38 As the Cold War battle 
lines hardened, the government’s agenda for dealing with communists was 
implemented through other less direct, more specifically targeted, measures. 
33 Fitzpatrick and Cahill, 148–49.
34 ibid., 159
35 Seamen’s Journal 4, no. 11 (February 1948: 4.
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Penal sanctions were introduced into the Arbitration Act and amendments were 
made in 1952 to the Navigation Act, which others have claimed were ‘a direct 
threat to communist power’ in the leadership of the SUA.39
Understanding the Menzies government’s amendments to the Navigation 
Act begins with the long-standing militancy of the Seamen’s Union to win 
concessions from shipowners, now compounded in the post-war climate by a 
boom in shipping, an ageing fleet of ships, and the ideological battle lines of 
the Cold War. Led since 1941 by Eliot V. Elliott, described in the parliamentary 
debate as ‘a self-confessed well-known Communist’, the SUA was, like the 
WWF, held up as being Kremlin-dominated.40 There is evidence that the 
government also recognised that much of the cause for disputation rested with 
the shipowners, ‘the relative inefficiency of the private sector [which] rested 
on the twin historical handicaps of an ageing capital stock and a backward-
looking management mindset which misjudged market trends’.41 But, publicly 
and politically, this was never acknowledged.
In the 1950s Australian coastal shipping companies were, unlike overseas 
companies, protected from ‘unfair’ foreign competition by the relevant cabotage 
provisions of Australia’s Navigation Act. However land transport was now a direct 
and growing competition, they also faced potential competition from the federal 
government-owned shipping line, while the militancy of the SUA was exerting 
pressure on their labour costs.42 In this context, the Menzies government’s free 
enterprise ideology pointed to a policy to prevent the government fleet from 
undermining the profits of the private shipping companies but, the inability of 
those companies to meet demand meant that the government had to expand its 
own fleet. Nevertheless, private shipowners were sheltered from the full impact 
of both market forces and the more profitable national shipping line as ‘the 
government made every effort to prevent the publicly funded line from injuring 
private interests’.43 As Sheridan says, ‘unquestionably, coastal shipowners were 
fortunate that the Coalition government, and more particularly Prime Minister 
Menzies, remained in office’.44
With these economic considerations guiding policy, the government’s alterations 
to the Navigation Act were consistent with the economic advantage that could be 
39 Fitzpatrick and Cahill, 235.
40 Hansard, 1952, 3682; Sheridan, 89 et seq.
41 Tom Sheridan, ‘Coastal Shipping and the Menzies Government 1950–1966’, Australian Economic History 
Review 25 (March 1995): 3.
42 ibid., 3–4.
43 ibid., 4.
44 Sheridan, Australia’s Own Cold War, 17.
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gained by hobbling union militancy. The 1952 Bill proposed ‘some revolutionary 
amendments’ in the employment conditions of seafarers that Labor MPs claimed 
would ‘not be in the best interests of Australia’.45
The essence of the 1952 Bill revolved around three key issues. Firstly, it 
abolished the MIC. For a decade, the MIC, consisting of representatives from the 
shipowners, the government and the unions, had handled disputes that would 
otherwise have gone to the Arbitration Court. In bringing the maritime industry 
within the general framework of the arbitration and conciliation system, the 
government’s reform sought ‘to tidy up a system of boards and commissions 
… different rules and different interpretations of discipline applied to different 
industries’ thereby imposing the same discipline on the maritime industry 
as the court imposed on other industries. It was bringing a ‘new approach to 
discipline on the waterfront’.46
In Labor’s or, more specifically, its leader, H.V. Evatt’s, view, the MIC should 
have been strengthened instead of being disbanded.47 Similarly, the MP Clyde 
Cameron pointed to the advantages of informality, the in-camera hearings, 
the trust and confidentiality of discussion conducted with ‘common sense 
and amicable manner’ within a committee framework. Experience suggested 
that industrial relations were best conducted around a table rather than in the 
adversarial formal proceedings of a courtroom.48 Another MP reminded the 
parliament that ‘the sailor is a human being’ and should be treated as such.49 
To the government the MIC’s task was not to settle industrial disputes nor had it 
been successful in doing so.50 The fact that SUA Federal Secretary Elliott sat on 
the MIC meant critics and the government had easy ammunition to charge that 
‘communists sit on the MIC’ thereby discrediting the MIC itself.51 The Labor 
party pointed out that the government had introduced the measure without 
consultation with those in the industry: ‘no responsible member of the MIC, 
no representative of the employees’ organizations and … no representative of 
the employers knew that this measure was to be introduced …’ and the bill 
contained ‘nothing which in itself will provide a remedy for the evils which the 
Minister has mentioned’.52
Furthermore, in replacing the MIC, the Bill gave arbitration power to a single 
judge of the Conciliation and Arbitration Court and set up a separate committee 
to deal with issues of accommodation — both designed to reduce disputes 
45 Clarey, Hansard, 1952, 3690.
46 Freeth, Hansard, 3679.
47 Evatt, Hansard, 1952, 3666.
48 Cameron, Hansard, 1952, 3675.
49 Haylen, Hansard 1952, 4316.
50 Holt, Hansard, 1952, 3423.
51 Howse, Hansard, 1952, 3682.
52 Evatt, Hansard, 1952, 3667.
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generated by the maritime unions about their working conditions. The crew 
accommodation committee was to consist of trade union and shipowner 
representatives ‘assisted by the expert advice of governmental shipping and 
shipbuilding officers’ and was to ‘be empowered to make orders’ giving effect 
to its decisions.53 By this means, the Act replaced a commission with a court, 
removed union representation from deliberations, and replaced committee 
decision-making with judicial power. Cameron said, ‘If this bill is aimed at the 
Seamen’s Union of Australia, although the Minister did not say so, that union 
will be no more co-operative with an arbitration court judge than it has been 
with the MIC’. He asked, reasonably, ‘Why should it be?’ and why could not the 
same power that was being given to a single judge instead be given to the MIC?54 
Removing the MIC and its union representation removed the important role that 
the SUA had played in the decision-making process affecting the workplace.
Most notably, the legislation tightened the ‘disciplinary clauses to control 
seamen’, by ‘radically chang[ing] the definition of desertion’ and increasing 
the penalty attached to being a ‘deserter’.55 Desertion by a seafarer was now 
defined as being absent from his ship for more than 48 hours without leave 
or reasonable excuse, even if the ship was in port for weeks.56 This compared 
unfavourably with the previous definition, which made the intention of not 
returning to the ship the essence of the charge; that is, intention had to be 
proved for the charge of desertion to be maintained, which courts had difficulty 
doing. Now, absence in itself was held to be desertion, and the onus was placed 
on the seafarer to show he had a lawful or reasonable excuse for his absence.57 
The Bill also amended provisions relating to actions obstructing or interfering 
with officers ‘and harbouring or secreting deserting seamen or apprentices’.58 
The SUA pointed out that ‘the new law is aimed directly at every man who goes 
to sea regardless of rank or rating’.59 ‘Failure to obey’ orders to take a ship to 
sea, subjected both ‘officers and crew to a penalty of immediate dismissal, loss 
of repatriation to a home port, loss of accumulated leave, and a bad discharge 
which may mean exclusion from employment in the shipping industry’.60
Union officials could be held responsible for engaging seafarers as crew and 
punished with gaol for failure to obey, or for persuading seafarers to commit a 
breach of their agreement.61 Furthermore, the Act gave power and responsibility 
to approve or refuse employment on board ship to a single individual (‘a 
53 Holt, Hansard, 1952, 3425.
54 Cameron, Hansard, 1952, 3676.
55 Clarey, Hansard, 1952, 3690, 3707.
56 ‘ACTU Back Maritime Unions’ Protest on Act’, Seamen’s Journal 8, no.13 (November 1952): 4.
57 Hansard, 4314.
58 Holt, Hansard, 1952, 3425.
59 ‘Navigation Act Hits All Seamen’, Seamen’s Journal 8, no. 15 (December 1952): 4.
60 ‘A Challenge to All Seamen’, Seamen’s Journal 9, no. 1 (January 1953): 1.
61 ‘ACTU Back Maritime Unions’ Protest on Act’, 4.
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superintendent’) whose refusal may have no connection to any ship-related 
offence at all, something which had previously been decided by representatives 
of employers and employees meeting in conference in the MIC.62 The government 
claimed it was preserving much of what the commission had done, especially in 
the area of discipline, but the Labor party saw it as contradictory to preserve the 
principles and practices while not preserving the commission itself.63 Desertion 
meant a seaman was thus given a bad discharge from a ship and, under the new 
provisions, there was no provision for a seaman to appeal a bad discharge given 
by a master, yet three bad discharges excluded him from further employment. 
The Act took away the right to give a man a second chance, something the MIC 
had the power and discretion to do.64 ‘Let there be no doubt in anyone’s mind 
that to refuse to take a ship to sea after being ordered to by the Master … starts 
[a seafarer] on the way out of the industry’, the SUA alerted their members, ‘it 
is possible never to have received a bad discharge and yet to be excluded from 
the industry’. A ‘very good conduct does not cancel out a report which is bad 
within the meaning of the Act’.65
The amended Navigation Act passed through parliament quickly and came 
into force early in 1953. A new industrial award, the Seamen’s Award, followed 
in the Arbitration Court in 1955 which, when the SUA challenged it in the 
High Court in 1957, was upheld as valid.66 Further amendments — ‘far worse 
than the amendments which the ACTU strenuously opposed in 1952’ — were 
made to the Navigation Act and rushed through parliament in 1958.67 These 
amendments, again introduced into parliament without either the unions or the 
shipowners being given prior warning, imposed new and heavier penalties that 
deprived seamen of further rights. The government had held discussions on an 
earlier draft more than two years previously but when the bill was eventually 
introduced it included new provisions not contained in the 1955 draft, 
specifically ‘vital clauses abolishing the rights of seamen’.68 Despite a hastily 
organised deputation to the minister from all the seagoing unions (Merchant 
Service Guild, Marine Engineers, Radio Operators, Stewards, Cooks and SUA) 
which was neatly foiled by the minister being unavailable that particular day, 
combined with strong opposition from the Maritime Transport Council, and 
the Labor Party opposition on the floor of the House, the amended Act was 
hurriedly passed into law. The Maritime Transport Council considered the 
new clauses ‘most dangerous’ and that they would ‘worsen the conditions 
62 Hansard, 1952, 3665.
63 Holt, Hansard, 1952, 3423.
64 Cameron, Hansard, 1952, 3677.
65 ‘Let’s Be Clear About This Act’, Seamen’s Journal 9, no. 15 (December 1953): 3.
66 High Court of Australia, Queen v. Spicer and Others: Ex Parte Seamen’s Union of Australia, Commonwealth 
Law Reports, 96, 1957, 341–52.
67 Seamen’s Journal 13, no. 3 (April 1958): 6.
68 ‘Navigation Act’, Seamen’s Journal 13, no. 5 (June 1958): 3.
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of seamen’.69 Indeed, in the campaign for a new award that the SUA waged 
between 1958–60, the penal provisions of the Navigation Act were frequently 
used against individual seafarers.70 The SUA declared the Menzies government’s 
refusal to listen to seafarers on the realities of their workplace conditions, even 
when presented through a committee of shipowner and union representatives 
established by the government itself, reflected an ‘attitude of contempt towards 
the unions and all who work’.71 With these two pieces of industrial relations law 
— the Arbitration Act and the Navigation Act — acting in tandem, all seafarers 
had their job security, conditions, wages and their safety jeopardised without 
addressing the inefficiencies of the shipowners. As a consequence, arguably and 
perhaps not coincidentally, the amended Navigation Act was instrumental in 
setting back the working conditions of ordinary seafarers for another 15 years. 
The SUA’s agenda for stabilising and normalising their working conditions, 
which had been presented to shipowners as early as 1946, was not finally 
achieved until the mid 1960s.72
The Navigation Act 1912 has been amended many times since its inception 
but, from 1952, those changes were made consistently by Liberal Coalition 
governments, in conjunction with penal sanctions and more limitations being 
imposed on trade unions under the arbitration law. By 1979, when Prime 
Minister Malcolm Fraser was amending simultaneously both the Navigation Act 
and other industrial relations laws, seafarers were describing the Navigation 
Act as ‘one of the most vicious pieces of legislation to be drawn up against a 
group of Australian workers’.73 Calling it ‘unjust and one-sided’ with provisions 
that ought to have been rescinded years previously, union members found the 
most disturbing aspect of the penalties under the Act was the fact that seamen’s 
rights of defence were very limited, indeed, in most instances were non-existent. 
‘When a seaman is fined and logged his only defence is his right of reply to the 
Master’s log entry’, the SUA pointed out, and appeals to the Marine Council 
were a waste of time. ‘Very rarely does the Council alter or rescind any fine or 
log entry.’ Consequently seafarers felt themselves to be powerless to prevent 
injustices, ’We have not got the right to refuse to pay a fine if we think we were 
dealt with unjustly … [it just] can be deducted from your wages’.74
By the time of the Labor government’s review in 2010, the regulatory regime 
of industrial relations had been restructured, enterprise bargaining and the 
Fair Work Act replaced the older machinery of arbitration, and the maritime 
69 Seamen’s Journal 13, no. 3 (April 1958): 6; ‘Amended Navigation Act’, Seamen’s Journal 13, no. 5 (June 
1958): 5.
70 Fitzpatrick and Cahill, 276.
71 ‘Navigation Act: Government Ignores Committee of Advice’, Seamen’s Journal 13, no. 5 (June 1958): 7–8.
72 Fitzpatrick and Cahill, 238.
73 H. Leonard, ‘Navigation Act Vicious, Biased’, Seamen’s Journal 34, no. 8 (December 1979): 247.
74 ibid.
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workforce was no longer a merchant marine based on the navy’s models of 
hierarchy.75 The Coalition government’s review of the legislation reported in 
2000 that ‘there are several provisions in the legislation that address employment 
arrangements for seafarers that would more appropriately be addressed under 
modern company based employment arrangements governed by modern 
industrial relations legislation’.76 Moves had begun to move employment 
aspects out of the Navigation Act but, significantly, this report saw safety of 
shipping as unconnected to workplace relations: ‘In some cases, industrial and 
safety considerations have been intermingled. It is appropriate that these be 
separated to establish a clear focus on essential health and safety requirements 
in law, whilst enabling employers and employees greater freedom to negotiate 
on industrial matters’. Nevertheless the report also recognised that, ‘Work at 
sea, however, presents some unique circumstances and it is appropriate that 
shipping law continue to provide for conditions that reflect safe operations 
and reflect particular industry characteristics’.77 In other words, the maritime 
workplace continued to have its own very complex regulatory regime of which 
the Navigation Act is only one part. 
Conclusion 
The amendments and the debates over the Navigation Act are an insight in to 
what Sir Richard Kirby, former president of the Industrial Relations Commission, 
once called ‘the very human problems bound up in industrial relations’ that ‘a 
scientific approach based on law, economics or any field of learning would not on 
its own solve’.78 The history of the Navigation Act is a window on to this world. 
It follows a similar trajectory as the history of arbitration, as it moved from 
being ‘the best Act in the world’ protecting Australian industry, shipowners 
and maritime workers, to a mechanism for implementing punitive sanctions and 
reducing the bargaining power of the unions as companies trading on the coast 
faced increasing competition.
The review undertaken by the current Labor government, under Prime 
Minister Julia Gillard, was begun with the view that, a century later, Australia’s 
international trade continues to be dependent on shipping, that coastal 
shipping is thus vital to the national economy, and a key segment of the 
transport industry.79 The 2008 discussion paper made clear that the Navigation 
75 For an account of the restructuring of Australia’s seagoing workforce, see Diane Kirkby, Voices From the 
Ships: Australia’s Seafarers and Their Union (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2008), 350–66.
76 Review of the Navigation Act 1912, Final Report, 2000, i.
77 ibid.
78 Richard Kirby, A New Province for Law and Order (Robert Garran Memorial Lecture: Canberra, 1968), 13.
79 Navigation Act Discussion Paper.
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Act 1912 was now outdated, yet the government did not intend to rewrite 
its substantive provisions but rather, to modernise and clarify the current 
regulatory framework so changes would be ‘predominantly of a technical 
nature’.80 Prompted by the ILO and its MLC 2006 (no. 186) setting minimum 
requirements in the conditions of employment for seafarers to work on a ship, 
viz: ‘hours of work and rest, accommodation, recreational facilities, food and 
catering, occupational health and safety protection, medical care, welfare 
and social security protection’, the federal government set about establishing 
appropriate mechanisms for compliance, ‘through formalised inspection and 
certification compliance procedures, shipowners’ and shipmasters’ supervision 
of conditions on ships, flag state jurisdiction and control over local ships, and 
port state inspection of foreign ships’. Put simply, the Navigation Act was being 
rewritten because it was ‘the main legislative vehicle for implementing the MLC 
at the Commonwealth level’.81 
Nevertheless, as the first Navigation Act to be amended by a Labor government 
since 1942, it constitutes a significant moment of Australian industrial 
lawmaking. While it remains to be seen what this current legislative rewriting 
brings to the revitalisation of Australian coastal shipping, it is a significant step 
in regulating the ‘very human problems’ of safety and security of its maritime 





Parental ‘Consent’ to Child Removal 
in Stolen Generations Cases
Thalia Anthony and Honni van Rijswijk
Introduction: The problematic of consent in 
legal narratives
Consent, will and agency have problematic uses in the law.1 Subjected groups 
are implicitly inferiorised through these concepts, such that their complicity 
to acts of the subjector is taken for granted. This complicity, Sadiya Hartman 
asserts, shrouds the ‘condition of violent domination’ that actually operates 
between subjector and subjected.2 Writing about the legal context of racial 
subjugation during slavery and its aftermath in the United States of America, 
Hartman argues that consent became ‘intelligible only as submission’.3 In the 
Australian context, according to Ghassan Hage, non-‘whiteness’ has historically 
been a point of reference for structural inferiority.4 Yet, the law nonetheless 
assumes consent as capable of being equally afforded by ‘blacks’ and ‘whites’. 
The historical impossibility of consent in the context of forced subjection is 
usually not disentangled, explored, or even ‘seen’ by the courts.
In Stolen Generations cases, the subject of this chapter, assumptions that ‘whites’ 
could better care for children underlie the implication of complicity in the 
removal of children from Aboriginal5 guardians. These assumptions were taught 
to and at times appropriated by Aboriginal parents — who were then seen as 
succumbing to the system’s logic.6 As Hartman suggests, power can become 
defined by these manipulations to present a picture of reciprocation, rather than 
1 Sadiya V. Hartman, Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 40.
2 ibid., 85.
3 ibid.
4 ‘Whiteness’ is a cultural historical construct (Ghassan Hage, White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy 
in a Multicultural Society (Sydney: Pluto Press 1998), 58–59), which involves ‘both a European monopolisation 
of “civilised humanity” and a parallel monopolisation of Whiteness as its marker’ (Hage, Against Paranoid 
Nationalism: Searching for Hope in a Shrinking Society (Sydney: Pluto Press, 2003), 49–50).
5 The term ‘Aboriginal’ rather than ‘Indigenous’ is used throughout the article, excepting quotes from other 
sources. While Torres Strait Islanders also experienced child removal, the cases discussed in this article are 
based on mainland Aboriginal people. The term ‘Aboriginal’ is also used because it is consistent with the term 
referred to in the legislation and cases that constitute the basis of this article.
6 Hartman, 88.
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acts of domination.7 The agency of the dominated in providing consent ‘secures 
the fetters of subjection, while proclaiming the power and influence of those 
shackled and tethered’.8 It allowed the state to be presented as a benevolent 
institution rather than a terrorising one. There is, however, a further sinister 
side to the domination, which is always on guard when manipulations falter. 
When parents failed to comply with the removal of their children, they would 
attract reprisals from state agents — with consequences that included being 
reported to police, losing employment or experiencing physical violence.9 
Hartman challenges the possibility that ‘will’ means anything when operating 
in such a state of subjection, because it is ‘unrecognizable in a context in which 
agency and intentionality are inseparable from the threat of punishment’.10 As 
Hartman explains in relation to the ability of slaves and ex-slaves in the United 
States to meaningfully consent to sexual activity, ‘The issue of consent is framed 
by the law’s negation of the captive will and the violent domination of slave 
relations’.11
Our reading of recent Stolen Generations cases, described below, argues that 
courts prior to Lampard-Trevorrow12 treated consent as an individual act, freely 
and voluntarily given by a liberal subject. These readings are based on the texts 
of the judgments, rather than on analyses of the processes by which the texts 
were created — through the choice and shaping of facts, and the interpretation 
of evidence — which is the subject of research by Trish Luker.13 Consent was 
seen as a legitimate factor that duly activated the powers of the legislation to 
bring about legal removal, according to Justice Maurice O’Loughlin in Cubillo.14 
In the previous Stolen Generations case of Williams, formal consent had barred 
false imprisonment and trespass on the basis that a child cannot be imprisoned 
if her mother consented to the removal.15 This chapter goes further than simply 
suggesting that Aboriginal consent has been misread by the courts — which was 
clearly the situation until the case of Lampard-Trevorrow. It also proposes that 
consent was, and is still used in an underhanded way by the state to legitimise 
its actions and protect itself from liability. After all, most statutory creatures 
governing the Stolen Generations allowed for removal, irrespective of consent. 
7 ibid., 89.
8 ibid.
9 National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families, 
Bringing Them Home: Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Children from their Families (Sydney: Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 1997), 6, 8, 56.
10 Hartman, 85–86.
11 ibid., 105.
12 State of South Australia v Lampard-Trevorrow [2010] SASC 56.
13 Trish Luker, ‘Intention and Iterability in Cubillo v Commonwealth’, Journal of Australian Studies 84, no. 
1 (January 2005): 35–41.
14 Cubillo v Commonwealth of Australia (2000) 174 ALR 97, 262.
15 Williams v The Minister, Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 and Anor [1999] NSWSC 843. This finding 
was upheld on appeal: Williams v The Minister Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 and New South Wales [2000] 
NSWCA 255.
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The state, nonetheless, sought to procure consent in order to rationalise the 
policy, facilitate removals, and shift the responsibility for removal from the state 
to Aboriginal parents.
The use of consent in this way turned the state’s act of removal into a parental 
act, thereby transforming ‘relations of violence and domination into those of 
affinity’.16 It suggests that the powerless had agency and strength, and that 
there is an ‘ostensible equality between the dominant and the dominated’,17 
while at the same time concealing the actual powerlessness of the subjected. 
The fiction of consent suggests that Aboriginal people were placed in the same 
situations as, and had the same range of options available to, white people. 
Judicial narratives have mostly failed to illustrate the ‘limited possibilities, 
constraint, despair, and duress’18 that are masked by this narrative of consent. 
Further, the use of consent in organising child removal imputes that Aboriginal 
peoples are unwilling to care for their own children, and reaffirms the fiction 
that the caring and nurturing of children is the domain of ‘whites’, thereby 
undermining the role of the Aboriginal family. But, here, there is a further irony 
— that Aboriginal consent is predicated on the presumption of civility, and 
yet Aboriginal people are denied this virtue because of their role as neglectful 
parents.
Historical narratives in Stolen Generations cases
Historical narratives of the Stolen Generations in the 1997 report Bringing them 
Home revealed the hollow meaning of parental consent in child removal. Consent 
was often coerced and rarely informed. It was a veil for the forced removal of 
Aboriginal children. A Tasmanian Stolen Generations survivor described his 
mother’s capacity to consent in the following way: ‘[Mum] could not read or 
write, and obviously would not have understood the implications of what she 
was signing’.19 The report found that ‘mothers who had just given birth were 
coerced to relinquish their newborn babies … The Child Welfare Department 
did not check to ensure that Indigenous mothers understood they were being 
asked to agree to the permanent removal of their child’. The report identified 
that acquiring consent operated to circumvent official proof of neglect. Bringing 
them Home noted, ‘If parents could be “persuaded” to consent to the removal 
of their children the Board did not have to show that a child was neglected or 




19 National Inquiry, 86, quoting ‘Confidential evidence 384, Tasmania’.
20 National Inquiry, 40.
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and Welfare Boards overpowered their agency. Parents ‘were told they would 
have to leave the stations and would be denied rations’.21 Police officers told 
young mothers that ‘if they did not consent to the adoption of their babies the 
father of the child would be prosecuted for carnal knowledge’.22 Alongside this 
was an ideological campaign to make parents feel guilty that they could not 
offer their children the opportunities of the ‘outside world’.23 This is despite 
contemporary evidence and theory that children who were not removed 
performed much better in life than those who were removed.
The issue of parental consent for the removal of Aboriginal children has been 
central to cases involving compensation for injuries arising out of the removal 
of Aboriginal children. In Williams (1999),24 consent was key to whether Joy 
Williams’s removal at birth constituted false imprisonment; in Cubillo (2000),25 
consent was not determinative to claims in negligence due to the broad scope 
of the statute granting the Welfare Board powers to remove children, but was 
nonetheless argued in defence by the government and, in the 2007 trial case of 
Trevorrow,26 and the 2010 Appeal case of Lampard-Trevorrow,27 consent was 
discussed both in relation to negligence and false imprisonment. Consent has 
been a central issue in Stolen Generations cases for two main reasons: first, it 
formed part of the factual archive due to the widespread practice of officials 
seeking parental consent to expedite the process of removal; and second, the 
state has used parental consent to bar actions in trespass or false imprisonment. 
Therefore, the procurement of consent has had a doubly wicked effect, because 
it was used to justify expedient removals and was subsequently put as a legal 
justification to deny compensation on the basis that the mother had given away 
her child.
Before the most recent Stolen Generations case of Lampard-Trevorrow (the 
first in which compensation was awarded), cases dealt inadequately with the 
historical operation of consent. In Lampard-Trevorrow, parental non-consent 
was important to both the factual and legal findings. Factually, the court found 
no consent had been given. Legally, non-consent became central to the court’s 
interpretation of the state’s failure to properly execute its statutory authority and 
assume control of Bruce Trevorrow, at the age of 13 months, without parental 
consent. We will argue that, in Lampard-Trevorrow, the court demonstrated 




24 Williams v The Minister, Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 and Anor [1999] NSWSC 843. This finding 
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circumstances, with mixed results. On one side, there was a departure from the 
earlier case of Cubillo in which a formalist reading of consent was ultimately 
accepted, and this departure allowed for a finding of negligence on the part of 
the state. The Appeal Court in Lampard-Trevorrow, however, did not go so far 
as to provide a finding in false imprisonment, continuing the courts’ ahistorical 
reading of consent in the context of that legal issue. The court’s approach in 
Lampard-Trevorrow is not unproblematic, and a key question we ask relates to 
the case’s potential: does Lampard-Trevorrow provide a productive alternative 
and counter-narrative to past uses of consent in Stolen Generations litigation, 
or is it in fact traversing the same path as other litigation, where recognition 
depends on the existence of ‘lucky’ or atypical facts fitting within the dominant 
narrative, and which benefits a small number of survivors, while at the same 
time excluding many others?
Issue of consent in statutory interpretation: 
Taking the high ground in Cubillo
One of the first cases brought by a Stolen Generations survivor was Cubillo and 
Gunner v The Commonwealth in 2000.28 Here, the Federal Court, presided over 
by Justice O’Loughlin, ultimately failed to acknowledge that the production 
of parental consent to child removal, which involved practices of bluff or 
deception on the part of the state, had any legal effect, despite the acceptance of 
evidence that established these practices as a matter of fact. The first plaintiff in 
this case, Lorna Cubillo, was born in 1938 and, at the age of seven, was forcibly 
removed by the Aborigines Inland Mission and the Native Affairs Branch to 
Retta Dixon Home in Darwin, where she remained until she was 18 years old. 
The second plaintiff, Peter Gunner, was born in 1948 on a pastoral station and 
was removed when he was about seven years old to St Mary’s Church of England 
Hostel in Alice Springs. He remained there until he was 16 years of age. Before 
he was removed in 1956, the trial judge described him as having been ‘part of 
a happy, healthy Aboriginal community and environment at Utopia Station’.29 
The issue of consent to removal was at the heart of the Commonwealth’s legal 
argument against Lorna Napanangka Cubillo and Peter Gunner. Essentially, 
the Commonwealth sought to recharacterise the act of removal as consensual 
and thereby authorised by the parents. In Cubillo’s case, the court found 
that the issue determining legislative authority to remove her under s. 6 of 
the Aboriginals Ordinance was not one of consent. Rather, it was whether the 
director of Native Affairs held the opinion that it was ‘necessary or desirable’ to 
28 Cubillo v Commonwealth of Australia (2000) 174 ALR 97 (hereafter Cubillo).
29 ibid., 98.
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undertake her ‘care, custody or control’.30 Ultimately, the court acknowledged 
that the director properly used his authority under the legislation. In Gunner’s 
case, it was found that questions relating to consent, were not the ‘correct 
question[s] to ask’ in legally characterising the act of removal — rather, the key 
question was ‘the reason for his removal’ — so that ‘it would not matter by what 
persons or by what means that removal was effected, if his removal was effected 
within the terms of ss 6 or 16 of the Aboriginals Ordinance’.31 Nonetheless, 
parental consent was one factual matter that was taken into account in assessing 
whether the legislation had been properly applied. In referring to consent in 
his construction of compliance with s. 6, O’Loughlin J noted that ‘there was no 
way of knowing whether the thumb mark on the “Form of Consent” was [Mr 
Gunner’s mother’s]; even on the assumption that it was, there was no way of 
knowing whether [she] understood the contents of the document’.32 However, 
the court gave the government officers the benefit of doubt:
But it is not beyond the realms of imagination to find that it was possible 
for a dedicated, well-meaning patrol officer to explain to a tribal 
Aboriginal such as [Mr Gunner’s mother] the meaning and effect of the 
document. I have no mandate to assume that [Mr Gunner’s mother] did 
not apply her thumb or that she, having applied her thumb, did not 
understand the meaning and effect of the document.33
Therefore, the documentary record was found to prevail over the context in 
which Aboriginal parents were made to give their consent for their children to 
be taken.
On his way to finding that the issue of consent did not go ‘to the heart’ of the 
trial,34 O’Loughlin J rejected submissions made on behalf of the Commonwealth 
that some or all of the parents had initiated their children’s removal by asking 
the Native Affairs Branch or Aborigines Inland Mission to provide their children 
with a better education and better standard of living.35 The court found that 
evidence did not establish consent was generally obtained by the Native Affairs 
Branch in the removal of the children at Phillip Creek, of whom Cubillo was 
one.36 Although making no formal finding on the matter, he found that the 
evidence (including the behaviour of the mothers, the evidence of three Tennant 
Creek women and the limited time available to explain the process of removal) 
suggested that ‘some, if not all, of the children may well have been taken without 
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their mothers’ consent’.37 In fact, he was ‘unable to make a finding that any of 
the mothers gave their informed consents to the removal of their children’.38 
Therefore, the judge rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that consent had 
been generally given. Where there was documentary evidence of a thumbprint, 
however, he favoured the assumption that consent was informed, as in the case 
of Gunner’s mother Topsy. Although the court demonstrated an appreciation of 
historical context, it was not applied to interpreting legal sources.
It is significant that the court examined the operation of consent more generally 
than the circumstances surrounding the particular plaintiffs, and demonstrated 
that ‘consent’ was not an untroubled concept. O’Loughlin J questioned the 
nature and quality of consent, and the power relationship that produced 
consent, by referring to evidence that showed that the practices of the director 
in obtaining consent included processes of ‘educating and preparing mothers’ 
for separation.39 The implication here, of course, is that any final and formal 
consent can be seen as an end-effect of these processes of ‘education’. O’Loughlin 
J questioned whether sufficient consent can be deemed to have been given by 
parents, considering the stringent time constraints under which the information 
was purportedly provided.40
Ultimately, however, the courts found that the documents reflected Topsy’s 
informed consent. It took for granted that the relevant information was given in 
the correct language, and the effectiveness of a government education program 
in relation to removals. We will see later that, in Lampard-Trevorrow, the South 
Australian Court of Appeal, by contrast, expressed a distrust concerning the 
documentary record regarding consent, and used a practice of interpretation 
that considered general practices relating to consent (and its documentation) 
in evaluating the particular document at issue. In Cubillo, consent was made 
central to the narration of separation, as well as to the legal characterisation 
of this moment but, despite the fact that parental consent was discussed at 
length in the proceedings, it was rejected as a determining factor in law: it 
is a factor very much present in the text, but it ultimately appears in excess 
to the legal reasoning. It is thereby located strangely in the text, as a kind of 
haunting authority: the court found it impossible to narrate the separation of 
child from parent, or child from community, without considering the reactions 
of these parties; and the main way in which these reactions might matter in law 
is through the concept of consent. And yet, because these relationships are held 
to have no legal significance, the court told the story of this deeply problematic 
consent and then put that story aside.
37 ibid., 265.
38 ibid., 251, emphasis ours.
39 ibid., 179.
40 ibid., 265.
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History meeting law in Lampard-Trevorrow
In 2010 the South Australian Court of Appeal in Lampard-Trevorrow41 upheld 
a decision in 2007 to award Bruce Trevorrow over half a million dollars in 
compensation for the injuries he suffered following his removal from his family 
as a child. It was the first successful claim by a Stolen Generations litigant. 
The court’s reasoning revealed a different historical reading of the facts and 
the policy context of the Stolen Generations from earlier cases. The finding of 
non-consent of his parents was fundamental. It enabled the court to portray the 
removal as forced and provided a basis for a breach of law. Therefore, not only 
was there forcible removal, but it was legally wrong.
The decided facts in Lampard-Trevorrow are that Trevorrow was taken by the 
Aborigines Protection Board (APB), without the consent of his parents, at the 
age of 13 months, while he was in hospital. The trial judge found that neither 
Joseph Trevorrow nor Thora Karpany, the natural parents, knew about or 
consented to the placement of Bruce Trevorrow with the Davies family. The 
court found that it was the state’s failure to acknowledge the parents’ authority 
(and therefore the lack of consent to Trevorrow’s removal) that led, in part, 
to the state’s liability. Unlike Cubillo, the court of appeal did not find that the 
ultimate authority concerning Trevorrow’s removal lay elsewhere, such as with 
a statutory authority. The court found that s. 10 of the Aborigines Act 1934 (SA), 
which provided that the APB was ‘the legal guardian of every Aboriginal child’ 
was ambiguous. It found that the legislation did not abrogate fundamental 
rights in the absence of the manifestation of a clear intention to do so. Therefore, 
s. 10 did not give the APB the power to foster an Aboriginal child without the 
consent of the child’s parents.
Issue of consent in Lampard-Trevorrow
The state of South Australia submitted that the trial judge was wrong to find 
that neither parent consented to Bruce Trevorrow’s placement with Mrs Davies, 
and here it relied mainly on missing documentation concerning the removal. 
The court of appeal acknowledged that documents were missing, but found 
that consent had not been given — significantly, in doing so, it relied on 
evidence concerning general practices concerning consent, as well as evidence 
concerning Trevorrow’s particular case. While the court in Cubillo referred to 
similar general practices, its finding in relation to Gunner’s mother’s consent 
was based on the documentary evidence alone. The significance of the court’s 
interpretation in Lampard-Trevorrow is that it is an acknowledgment of the 
41 State of South Australia v Lampard-Trevorrow [2010] SASC 56 (hereafter Lampard-Trevorrow).
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importance of context in the historical operation and legal interpretation of 
consent. It is significant that the court of appeal was willing to look critically 
at documents presented as evidence, and did not interpret the absence of 
documents as necessarily favouring the state’s position. The court rejected 
the state’s submission concerning a particular missing file, that it may have 
contained the records of the almoner testifying to the consensual removal of 
the plaintiff, arguing that the time constraints and role of the almoner made it 
unlikely that the records would include a document concerning consent.42 On 
the question of privileging documentary evidence, the court held:
There is no reason why, in principle, the documentary records should be 
preferred to the oral evidence. Everything depends upon the facts of the 
case. In the present case it needs to be borne in mind that documentary 
records are not to be assumed to be reliable.43
Based on an analysis of correspondence concerning other cases, the court found 
that ‘the requirement to obtain parental consent was not always observed’.44 
The court based this conclusion on a number of documents. A letter dated 
12 August 1958, from the secretary of the APB to the officer in charge at the 
Oodnadatta Police Station, stated:
If the parents of these children have not already consented in writing 
for the United Aborigines Mission to care and control the children until 
a certain age, then I suggest that you endeavour to obtain the consent of 
the parents on the forms enclosed.
In confidence, you will certainly realise that in any case this consent 
form is not a legal document, and should it be that the parents remove 
the children from the care of the Mission or the Board, no legal action 
could be taken to regain control of the children.45
Another document, a letter of 16 October 1958, written by the secretary of 
the APB to the superintendent of Aborigines welfare in Victoria, stated: ‘Again 
in confidence, for some years without legal authority, the Board have taken 
charge of many aboriginal children’.46 In a letter dated 19 May 1960, to Pastor 
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For your information only I have to inform you that legally, I have no 
right to remove a child from its parents. However, in such cases I do so 
and where deemed necessary we refuse to allow the child to be returned 
to its’ [sic] parents without my consent.
If you so desire you can inform the mother of the child that it has been 
placed in your Children’s Home at my direction and cannot be released 
to the mother without my written consent. You should add that I will 
not likely consent to the children being released until such time as the 
mother is properly accommodated and able and willing to care for the 
child in a proper manner.47
Here the court concluded:
the Secretary of the APB is informing Pastor Eckermann, ‘off the 
record’ that on occasions he has removed and will remove a child from 
its parents, without parental consent, and will subsequently refuse to 
allow the child to be returned to the parents, unless satisfied that the 
proposed living arrangements are suitable.48
The last paragraph quoted above ‘contemplates a bluff being used to enable the 
APB to keep the child in question under its control’.49
It is in the context of this understanding that the court of appeal read a letter 
the APB sent to Thora Karpany in 1958, which was prepared in response to her 
inquiry about Bruce. The letter stated that Bruce was still undergoing medical 
treatment, and the court found this statement, and the implication that Bruce 
could therefore not be returned to her, ‘dissembling’.50 Even if Thora Karpany 
had consented to Bruce Trevorrow being fostered, such consent did not legally 
authorise Bruce’s permanent removal — and the secretary of the APB knew 
of Thora’s entitlement to have Bruce returned to her. Here we have the court 
explicitly acknowledging the problematic role of consent in the practice of 
removal — problems that were intimated in Cubillo, but which in Lampard-
Trevorrow are labelled as ‘a pretence of power’.51
Although the appeal court acknowledged the possibility that consent was 
obtained ‘by one of the now unavailable witnesses, and … placed in one of the 
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was supported by significant evidence.52 First, there was no documentation of 
consent in Bruce Trevorrow’s file. Second, there was no reliable reference to 
consent being given in other documents. Third, there was evidence that:
when necessary, in the perceived interests of a child, the [Board] would 
place a child in an institution or with a foster family without parental 
consent, using a pretence of power (which undoubtedly would have been 
effective) and, if appropriate, using an element of bluff or deception.53
This last point is significant since here, the South Australian Court of Appeal 
referred to the general context of practices and policies in which consent was made 
— taking a very different approach to interpretation from that used in Cubillo, 
where the Federal Court noted the evidence of general policies but, in making 
its findings, insisted on narrowing its focus to the particular circumstances of 
the applicants.54 In contrast, the court of appeal found that, ‘The reliance on 
medical advice in response to Thora Karpany’s letter to the [Board] of 25 July 
1958 is consistent with the use of a bluff to deflect her request’.55
Changing approach to false imprisonment: 
Turn from Williams
Consent was a central issue in the claim of false imprisonment in the first Stolen 
Generations case, Williams v Minister, Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983, brought 
before the New South Wales Supreme Court in 1999.56 False imprisonment 
is committed when someone ‘directly subjects another to total deprivation 
of freedom of movement without lawful justification [or consent]’.57 It is a 
powerful avenue for Stolen Generations litigants because it does not depend 
on the government acting negligently or breaching a statute. Rather, it arises 
because the plaintiff has his or her liberty restricted.
The facts of the Williams case were that Joy Williams was removed immediately 
after her mother had given birth and while being treated in hospital. Joy had 
stayed in children’s homes until she was 18 years old. She was removed under 
s. 7(2) of the Aborigines Protection Act 1909 (NSW), which gave the Aborigines 





56 Williams v The Minister, Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 and Anor [1999] NSWSC 843 (Williams).
57 Trevorrow, 982.
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consented. She claimed that the removal caused her physical and psychological 
harm and she brought a number of claims. However, it was false imprisonment 
in which the issue of consent was at the forefront.
The New South Wales Supreme Court emphasised the mother’s consent to 
removal at the time of the birth of her daughter, although this was contested by 
Joy, and ruled against false imprisonment on that basis.58 The court stated that 
there was no false imprisonment because the welfare board ‘had lawful control 
over the plaintiff’ due to the consent of the mother.59
In reviewing the case, the New South Wales Court of Appeal adverted to the 
problematic nature of consent, but chose to treat consent as proven by virtue of 
the documentary evidence of the application. The court held:
One part of the plaintiff’s case at trial depended on the proposition that 
she had been removed from her mother without her mother’s consent. It 
was this which underlay the claims of false imprisonment … This part 
of the case failed because … the plaintiff was lawfully admitted to the 
control of the Board on the application of her mother ...60
The nature of the evidence of consent, and how consent was acquired, has 
been questioned by academics and legal practitioners. Anna Cody, who was a 
solicitor on the case, commented that Joy Williams ‘was taken away from her 
mother when she was a few hours old. Any mother who’s had a baby would 
question exactly how much she could consent to giving a baby away when 
she’s just a few hours old’.61 Chris Cunneen and Julia Grix argue that the court’s 
comment that the mother may have forgotten whether she had consented reveal 
an ‘extraordinary lack of insight into the issues of consent and the power of the 
[Board] over Aboriginal persons’.62
Another issue that was raised by the New South Wales Supreme Court to 
inculcate the mother in the removal was that the mother did not attempt to 
58 The Supreme Court relied on s. 7(2) of the Aborigines Protection Act 1909 provided: ‘The board may on 
the application of the parent or guardian of any child admit such child to the control of the board’ Williams, 
[26].
59 Williams, [142]. The court stated, ‘My finding is that the AWB considered the mother’s application to 
give up control of the plaintiff to its control, and having done so, admitted the child to its control. I find that 
there was not any removal by the Board to the plaintiff, in the sense of taking the child against the will of the 
mother. The plaintiff was taken into the AWB’s control because the mother did not want the child, could not 
keep the child and asked the AWB to take control of her: see s 7(2)’: Williams, [26].
60 Williams v The Minister Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 and New South Wales [2000] NSWCA 255 at 
[58].
61 Quoted in Annie White, ‘Joy Williams loses her Stolen Generations Case’, The World Today: ABC Local 
Radio, 26 August 1999, http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/stories/s46829.htm accessed on 1 October 2011.
62 Chris Cuneen and Julia Grix, The Limitations of Litigation in the Stolen Generations Cases (Canberra: 
AIATSIS Research and Discussion Paper, no. 15, 2004): 24.
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release the child from foster care. This presumes that she was an informed liberal 
subject who had the capacity to pursue this avenue. It discounts the power of 
the state over Aboriginal people. The court stated:
I further find as a fact that the plaintiff’s mother at no time between 
1942 and 1960 made application to the [Board] or, otherwise sought 
to have the plaintiff released from the [Board’s] control, or sought her 
restoration to her care within the meaning of … the Act, nor was any 
discharge of the plaintiff sought at any time pursuant to … the Act.
… [This] is consistent with a view that she did not wish the child’s 
status or relationship viz the Board to change … nor did she wish to 
have the child returned to her care.63
False imprisonment in Lampard-Trevorrow
When false imprisonment was argued by Bruce Trevorrow, the Supreme Court 
of South Australia at trial accepted this on the basis that there was no parental 
or child consent. The court held:
By being placed with [his foster mother], the plaintiff’s will was 
completely overborne. Given the plaintiff’s age at the time of the 
removal, he did not consent; neither did his parents. The plaintiff was 
imprisoned, and the State, through its agents and emanations, caused 
the imprisonment.64
However, the South Australian Court of Appeal in Lampard-Trevorrow 
overturned this finding through a narrow reading of ‘imprisonment’, which 
is anomalous to the broad contextual approach it took to other aspects of its 
reasoning — including consent. It held that the care and protection given by 
the carer of a child is not a deprivation of the child’s liberty. The court of appeal 
reasoned that Bruce Trevorrow ‘was able to move about (once he reached a 
certain age) as he wished subject only to the normal limits placed on children’ 
and was ‘not imprisoned within a defined area’ by his foster parents beyond the 
normal control of parents.65 The bench stated:
It might be added that if this is a case of total restraint or total deprivation 
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fact, equally subject to the same restraint. … Bruce Trevorrow, when 
fostered by Mrs Davies, had the same freedom of movement, or absence 
of freedom as the case may be, as other children of a like age.66
The court did not appreciate that non-Aboriginal children of Bruce Trevorrow’s 
age would have had the freedom to be with their parents. It is only because of 
the policy of the Stolen Generations that Trevorrow was denied this freedom. 
The court drew unfitting analogies with restraint in childcare centres, stating, 
‘Most childcare centres have substantial fences and a gate that children cannot 
open’.67 In this acontextual reading, the court was not addressing the liberty 
denied to Bruce Trevorrow to be with his parents due to the policy of Aboriginal 
child removal. In other words, an Aboriginal child’s forcible restraint from his 
parents and against his parents’ wishes was regarded as the same as a non-
Aboriginal person who lived with his parents and was not subject to the Stolen 
Generations policy.
Conclusion
Consent generally implies an autonomous liberal agent who is invariably 
a white upper-class adult. The implications of this model do not auger well 
for Aboriginal subjects who do not have agency within a coercive policy of 
child removal. Nonetheless, the consent of the Aboriginal mother is referred to 
continuously by the state in attempting to defeat Stolen Generations cases. It 
was a powerful justification for the policy of removal, suggesting that not only 
did white officials and missionaries believe that removal was good for Aboriginal 
children, but so did their parents.
However, the historical record problematises the historical operation of 
Aboriginal consent in child removal. In Cubillo, the court alludes to these 
problems but it does not ultimately support the Aboriginal version of coerced 
consent or rely on it to affect the interpretation of the law underpinning 
removals. Justice Atkinson criticised the courts in Williams and Cubillo for not 
giving ‘adequate recognition to the social and historical context of removal’ in 
addressing the issue of consent.68
By contrast, the court in Lampard-Trevorrow explicitly acknowledged the 
problems with consent and this had legal effect. However, the court stopped 
short of recognising that non-consent to removal was a form of restraint on 
66 ibid., 285.
67 ibid., 298.
68 The Hon Justice Roslyn Atkinson, ‘Denial and Loss: Removal of Indigenous Australian Children from 
their Families and Culture’, QUT Law and Justice Journal 5, no. 1 (2005): np, http://www.law.qut.edu.au/ljj/
editions/v5n1/atkinson_full.jsp accessed on 1 October 2011.
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the child, that is, a restraint to be with his or her parents. Ann Curthoys, Ann 
Genovese and Alexander Reilly in their book Rights and Redemption: History, 
Law and Indigenous People discuss the increasing role of historians as experts in 
indigenous litigation involving historical wrongs. They point to the importance 
of the disciplines of law and history to talk to one another in these cases.69 
The expertise of historians was drawn on, across the Stolen Generations cases 
discussed. It is only in Lampard-Trevorrow, however, that a contextualised 
historical understanding has legal effect. There we begin to see a true marriage 
of law and history. It is yet to be seen whether, in future cases, there will be a 
more contextual understanding of consent.
Our analysis of the narratives in Stolen Generations cases reveals deep tensions 
in the ways consent arises: the ways in which consent does and does not 
matter; and the ways in which, as narratives and legal issues become focalised 
through consent, counter-narratives arise that challenge the interpretation of 
consent. Trevorrow and Lampard-Trevorrow go some way to show the operation 
of consent institutionally in the removal of children — particularly the South 
Australian Supreme and appeal courts’ selection/acceptance of evidence, which 
relies on an understanding of the institutional power that ‘produced’ consent 
and disguised both the state’s coercion and families’ resistance. The facts in 
Lampard-Trevorrow were held to indicate the absence of consent — in part 
this was due to the court’s practices of interpretation, which acknowledged a 
different kind of history and evidence from early cases, but this was also partly 
due to Bruce Trevorrow’s experience, which made him in many ways an ‘ideal 
plaintiff’.70 For mothers who gave their consent to the removal of their children, 
who were without choice or recourse in handing over consent, there continues 
to be no remedy.
The case leaves open a number of questions about how the legal narrative will 
continue to engage with historical accounts. Could future cases allow a claim in 
which formal consent is present, thus acknowledging the problematic operation 
of consent as a structural, historical practice? Or will Lampard-Trevorrow be 
confined to an exceptional status? How would Topsy’s thumbprint be interpreted 
post-Lampard-Trevorrow? We know that, at the moment, litigants in South 
Australia and elsewhere are lining up to draw on the precedent in Lampard-
Trevorrow. If the effect of Lampard-Trevorrow in future cases is to disavow the 
operation of meaningful consent in the context of Stolen Generations removals, 
this would go a long way in providing meaningful legal outcomes for Aboriginal 
plaintiffs. Under such an approach, the formal consent of Topsy’s thumbprint 
69 Ann Curthoys, Ann Genovese and Alexander Reilly, Rights and Redemption: History, Law and Indigenous 
People (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2008), 223–24.
70 Antonio Buti, ‘The Stolen Generations Litigation Revisited’, Melbourne University Law Review 32, no. 2 
(2008): 420.
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would be interpreted in the context of its historical production, and doubted 
as evidence of meaningful consent. A significant test will be how future courts 
confront documentary evidence of consent and how they handle competing 
historical evidence of the lack of choice facing an Aboriginal mother. Lampard-
Trevorrow provides precedent for a more contextualised understanding of the 
removal of children. The courts, however, cannot be complacent about the legal 
discipline’s role in addressing these matters, and will continue to need to rely 
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